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Abstract	
In	 this	 thesis	 it	 is	 asked	whether	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	Human	
Rights	 (ECHR)	 is	 a	 continuation	of	 the	Protestant	 theology.	 It	 is	 demonstrated	 that	
despite	 the	on-going	process	of	 secularisation,	Protestant	 religious	 frameworks	are	
still	embedded	within	Western	 legal	systems	 in	general	and	the	ECHR	 in	particular.	
Taking	 this	 into	 account,	 a	 new	 explanation	 regarding	 the	 interpretation	 and	
application	of	Article	9	is	put	forward.	It	is	explained	how	religious	freedom	came	to	
be	one	of	the	central	claims	within	Christian	Protestant	theology	in	association	with	
linked	 ideas	 such	 as	 secularism.	 When	 freedom	 of	 religion	 is	 situated	 within	
European	intellectual	history,	the	“two	kingdoms”	of	Luther,	the	private	realm	of	the	
conscience	 and	 the	 public	 realm	 of	 the	 (sinful)	 body,	 are	 clearly	 reflected	 in	 the	
wording	of	Article	9	ECHR.	Since	the	wording,	as	well	as	the	 judicial	 interpretations	
and	applications	of	Article	9	ECHR,	are	biased	 in	 favour	of	 the	Christian	Protestant	
view,	 this	 is	 automatically	 discriminatory	 against	 applicants	 who	 do	 not	 have	 a	
Protestant	 background,	 and	 even	 more	 biased	 against	 those	 of	 non-Abrahamic	
traditions.	It	is	demonstrated	that	applicants	from	a	non-Protestant	faith	or	tradition	
attempting	 to	 utilise	 Article	 9	 EHCR	 have	 to	 distort	 their	 claims	 to	 fit	 within	 the	
confines	of	Article	9.	This	bias	is	made	worse	by	the	interpretation	and	application	of	
Article	9	by	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECtHR).		
In	 the	 light	 of	 these	 conclusions,	 a	 fresh	 analysis	 is	 made	 of	 the	 ECtHR	
judgments	 on	Article	 9	 illustrating	 the	 continuation	of	 a	 post-Reformation	 struggle	
for	 iconoclasm,	 fought	 over	 through	 the	 secularised	 language	 of	modern	 law.	 This	
analysis	 includes:	 applications	 brought	 by	 those	 from	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions,	
other	 Christians	 and	 other	 Abrahamic	 religions;	 judgments	 concerning	 Muslims,	
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mainly	the	wearing	of	the	hijab	(headscarf);1	and	the	response	of	the	ECtHR	to	curbs	
on	 proselytisation	 and	 idolatry	 in	 some	 countries	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe.
																																								 																					
1	Such	as	Lautsi	 and	Others	 v.	 Italy,	Application	no.	 30814/06,	 judgment	of	 18	March	2011,	S.A.S.	 v	
France	Application	No.	43845/11	(ECtHR	Judgment	of	1	July	2014),	Lelya	Sahin	v	Turkey	Application	no.	
44774/98	Grand	Chamber	2005,	Dahlab	v.	Switzerland,	Application	no.	42393/98,	[2001]	ECHR	899.	
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Chapters	Outline	
Chapter	1	
In	 this	 chapter	 scholarly	 work	 concerning	 freedom	 of	 religion	 is	 examined	 to	
illustrate	that	Article	9	has	not	been	analysed	the	way	this	thesis	intends	to	do	and	to	
show	 possible	 relationships	 between	 previous	 studies	 and	 this	 thesis.	 Particular	
attention	is	given	to	literature	and	case	commentaries	where	a	Protestant	effect	on	
European	 legal	 systems	 is	 discussed	 and	 where	 scholars	 argue	 for	 harmonisation	
between	 human	 rights	 and	 religions.	 Scholarly	 work	 calling	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	
approach	 to	 culture	 and	 legal	 interpretation	 is	 also	 considered.	 Although	 many	
scholars	find	the	ECtHR	to	be	biased	against	applicants	wearing	religious	symbols	and	
the	 headscarf	 in	 particular,	 none	 have	 gone	 beyond	 this	 initial	 observation	 to	
question	whether	Article	 9	 itself	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 Protestant	 faith	 or	 could	 even	be	
seen	as	a	continuation	of	the	Protestant	theology.		
Chapter	2	
In	this	chapter	Balagangadhara’s	theory2	of	religion	and	how	religion	has	influenced	
the	 Western	 culture	 and	 the	 Western	 legal	 systems	 will	 be	 analysed.	 S.N.	
Balagangadhara	 is	 amongst	 the	 very	 few	 scholars	 to	 provide	 a	 novel	 approach	 to	
studying	religion	and	to	refute	the	claim	of	the	universality	of	religion.	He	thoroughly	
examines	 how	 despite	 secularism	 the	 West	 remains	 a	 religious	 culture	 that	 is	
predominantly	 influenced	 by	 the	 Protestant	 thought.	 An	 outline	 of	 the	 theoretical	
																																								 																					
2	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	 in	His	 Blindness….	Asia,	 the	West,	 and	 the	Dynamic	 of	 Religion	
(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005).	
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framework	and	hypothesis	will	be	presented.	This	will	act	as	a	guide	to	examine	the	
history	and	emergence	of	religious	freedom	in	Europe	in	the	following	chapter.			
Scholars	 such	 as	 Wilfred	 Cantwell	 Smith,	 Harold	 Berman	 and	 S.N.	
Balagangadhara	have	argued	that	the	framework	for	studying	“religion”	derives	from	
a	Christian	background,	even	in	the	realm	of	comparative	religion,	and	that	religion	
bears	the	hallmarks	of	a	theological	account.	Others,	such	as	Timothy	Fitzgerald	have	
argued	that	the	word	“religion”	should	not	be	used	at	all	within	the	social	sciences	
because	of	the	history	of	its	association	with	Christian	theology.3		
Balagangadhara,	claims	 that	 religion	should	be	 treated	as	a	phenomenon	 in	
the	world,	but	that	the	description	“religion”	should	be	restricted	to	the	Abrahamic	
traditions:	 Judaism,	 Christianity	 and	 Islam.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 assertion	 that	 all	
cultures	 in	 the	 world	 have	 religion,	 an	 idea	 which	 has	 also	 been	 adopted	 and	
elaborated	within	the	human	sciences,4	is	 itself	a	claim	of	Christian	theology,	albeit	
since	secularised.5		Balagangadhara’s	theory	offers	a	framework	to	study	Article	9	of	
the	 ECHR.	 	 Using	 this	 theory,	 the	 universality	 of	 religion	 is	 questioned	 and	 what	
constitutes	 religion	 is	 examined.	 It	 is	 also	 asked	what	makes	Christianity	 a	 religion	
and	 what	 qualifies	 for	 protection	 by	 the	 legal	 systems.	 It	 is	 demonstrated	 that	
attempting	to	define	religion	in	the	legal	system	is	futile.		
Chapter	3	
																																								 																					
3	Timothy	Fitzgerald,	The	Ideology	of	Religious	Studies	(Oxford	University	Press,	2000)	3-7.	
4		 See	also	 From	Tomoko	Masuzawa,	 ‘Secular	 Theories	on	Religion,	A	 Selection	of	Recent	Academic	
Perspectives’	 in	Mikael	Rothstein	and	Tim	Jensen	(eds),	Theology	to	World	Religions:	Ernst	Troeltsch	
and	the	Making	of	Religionsgeschichte	(University	of	Copenhagen	Tusculanum	Press	2000)	149-166.	
5	Peter	 Harrison,	 ‘Religion’	 and	 the	 religions	 in	 the	 English	 Enlightenment	 (Cambridge,	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	1990)	1.	
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In	 this	 chapter,	 freedom	of	 religion	 is	 located	within	 European	 intellectual	 history.	
How	 religious	 freedom	 came	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 central	 claims	 within	 Christian	
Protestant	theology,	in	association	with	linked	ideas	such	as	that	of	the	secular	State,	
is	discussed.	The	 two	kingdoms	of	 Luther,	 the	private	 realm	of	 the	conscience	and	
the	 public	 realm	 of	 the	 (sinful)	 body,	 which	 may	 be	 punished	 by	 the	 magistrate	
(State),	are	reflected	today	in	the	split	between	the	assertion	of	religious	freedom	in	
Article	 9(1)	 ECHR	 and	 the	 limitations	 expressed	 in	 Article	 9(2)	 ECHR.	 This	 is	 an	
appropriate	framework	with	which	to	make	sense	of	the	assumptions	within	Article	9	
ECHR	and	the	claims	made	upon	it.	It	is	also	argued	that	the	concept	of	secularism,	
or	neutrality,	 is	problematic	 in	today’s	world	and	 in	the	ECtHR	due	to	the	Christian	
theological	framework	from	which	it	emerged.	
Chapter	4	
In	 this	 chapter,	 how	 the	 “idea”	 of	 freedom	 of	 religion,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	
emerged	and	was	expressed	 in	 the	 law	and	how	 it	made	 its	way	 into	 international	
treaties	 and	 conventions	 will	 be	 considered.	 A	 chronological	 approach,	
encompassing	 key	 national	 and	 international	 instruments,	 is	 taken.	 It	 will	 be	
questioned	 whether	 religious	 freedom	 in	 the	 legal	 context	 differs	 much	 from	 the	
religious	freedom	expressed	by	Luther.	The	impact	of	Christianity	on	the	drafting	of	
the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	 (UDHR)	and	 the	ECHR	will	be	examined	
and	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 Protestant	 theology	 in	 international	 treaties	 and	
Conventions	will	also	be	demonstrated.	
Chapters	5		
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In	this	chapter,	specific	categories	of	Article	9	jurisprudence	is	examined	to	prove	the	
hypothesis	established	in	earlier	chapters.	Judgments	of	the	ECtHR	concerning	non-
Abrahamic	traditions	will	be	discussed	in	the	light	of	the	thesis	to	illustrate	the	kinds	
of	distortions	displayed	when	attempting	 to	 fit	within	 the	Protestant	 framework	of	
Article	9	ECHR.		It	will	be	demonstrated	that	the	current	framework	is	discriminatory	
and	 less	 intelligible	 to	 applicants	 of	 non-Abrahamic	 cultures.	 Case	 examples	 are	
provided	throughout	to	prove	the	hypothesis.	Furthermore,	the	extent	to	which	the	
ECtHR	has	marginalised	orthopraxy	over	orthodoxy	will	 be	examined	and	 linked	 to	
how	Protestants	 regard	 the	use	of	 symbols.	 	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 asked	whether	 the	
theological	roots	of	Article	9	are	causing	problems	and	distortions	when	Article	9	is	
relied	on	by	non-Protestant	 litigants.	 It	will	 be	 shown	 that	 the	 concepts	of	 “truth”	
and	 “falsity”,	which	play	a	 crucial	 role	 in	Abrahamic	beliefs	 and	are	 insignificant	 in	
other	cultures	and	 traditions,	are	 reflected	 in	 the	 language	of	ECtHR	case	 law.	 It	 is	
questioned	 how	 the	 ECtHR	 assesses	 what	 constitutes	 “religion”,	 and	 whether	 a	
manifestation	 of	 an	 act	 is	 actually	 a	 manifestation	 that	 qualifies	 as	 a	 “religious”	
manifestation	and	could	therefore	be	protected	under	Article	9.	It	is	also	asked	what	
position	the	ECtHR	takes	when	presented	with	acts	that	are	manifested	as	part	of	a	
tradition	 rather	 than	 a	 religion	 and	 whether	 these	 traditions	 have	 to	 present	
themselves	as	religions	in	order	to	qualify	for	Article	9	protection.	
Chapter	6		
In	 chapter	 six	 specific	 categories	 and	 judgements	 of	 Article	 9	 concerning	 other	
Abrahamic	and	other	Christian	(non-Protestant)	religions	is	examined	in	light	of	the	
thesis	show	the	Protestant	bias	in	the	case	law	and	the	kinds	of	distortions	displayed	
when	attempting	to	fit	within	the	Protestant	framework	of	Article	9	ECHR.	How	the	
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ECtHR	 has	 maintained	 its	 decisions	 especially	 with	 regards	 to	 proselytism	 and	
conversion	 and	 the	 Islamic	 veil	 will	 be	 examined.	 A	 fresh	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	 law	
including	 religious	 symbols	 is	offered	 to	demonstrate	 the	bias	 in	 the	 jurisprudence	
towards	the	Protestant	faith	and	the	continuation	of	the	post-Reformation	struggle	
for	 iconoclasm,	 fought	 over	 through	 the	 secularised	 language	 of	modern	 law.	 It	 is	
also	 argued	 that	 even	 amongst	 Abrahamic	 religions,	 there	 is	 a	 bias	 in	 the	 ECtHR	
towards	 the	 Protestant	 thought.	 It	 is	 demonstrated	 that	 this	 is	 caused	 by	 the	
language	of	the	ECHR	as	well	as	the	interpretation	and	application	of	the	case	law	by	
the	judges	of	the	ECtHR.	It	is	hypothesised	that	other	Abrahamic	and	other	Christian	
religions	 are	 seen	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 Protestantism,	 and	 that	 religious	 symbols	
(like	the	headscarf)	are	seen	by	the	ECtHR	as	a	symbol	of	iconoclasm.	Case	examples	
are	provided	throughout	to	prove	the	hypothesis.	It	will	therefore	be	demonstrated	
that	 the	 current	 framework	 is	 less	 intelligible	 to	 applicants	 who	 do	 not	 share	 a	
Protestant	background.	
When	deciding	Article	9	applications,	the	ECtHR	asks	questions	about	“faith”	
and	“worship”	that	are	only	intelligible	to	people	from	Abrahamic	religions	because	
they	 are	 fundamentally	 based	 on	 the	 Christian	 anthropological	 framework	 which	
assumes	that	humans	are	intentional	beings.	When	doing	so,	the	ECtHR	presupposes	
Protestantism	 to	be	 the	benchmark	 from	which	other	 “faiths”	 are	understood	and	
engages	in	Christian	ethics	and	discussions	of	what	ought	or	ought	not	be	done.6	For	
example	 the	 ECtHR	 generally	 formulates	 questions	 in	 terms	 of	 whether	 the	
applicants	are	required	or	obliged	to	say,	to	refrain	from	working	at	certain	days	of	
																																								 																					
6	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP45(1)		58-75	see	
also	Prakash	Shah,	‘Asking	about	reasonable	accommodation	in	England’	(2013)	IJDL	13(2-3)	83–112,	
89.	
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the	week	 based	 on	 religious	 grounds,	 or	 whether	 covering	 of	 certain	 parts	 of	 the	
body	is	also	a	religious	requirement.	Consequently	a	new	examination	of	judgments	
concerning	 Muslims,	 mainly	 concerning	 the	 wearing	 of	 the	 headscarf	 (hijab),	 is	
included.7	Judgments	 concerning	 proselytisation	 are	 also	 addressed.	 A	 theological	
pattern	 behind	 the	 ECtHR’s	 judgments	 is	 identified	 and	 an	 underlying	 Protestant	
approach	in	how	religious	symbols	are	treated	is	shown.	A	hidden	and	non-vocalised	
theological	pattern	behind	the	ECtHR’s	language	on	Article	9	ECHR	is	revealed.	
Chapter	7		
This	 chapter	 concludes	 this	 thesis	 by	 showing	 that	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 in	 its	 present	
format	 is	 biased	 towards	 the	 Protestant	 theology.	 It	 is	 demonstrated	 that	what	 is	
lacking	in	the	literature	and	jurisprudence	is	a	deeper	understanding	and	critique	of	
the	ways	 in	which	 the	ECtHR	engages	with	and	understands	different	 religions	and	
traditions,	 particularly	 those	 of	 non-Abrahamic	 background.	 The	 two	 kingdoms	 of	
Luther,	the	private	realm	of	the	conscience	and	the	public	realm	of	the	(sinful)	body,	
are	reflected	today	in	the	split	between	the	assertion	of	religious	freedom	in	Article	
9(1)	ECHR	and	the	limitations	expressed	in	Article	9(2)	ECHR	and	are	the	benchmark	
from	which	 the	 judicial	 interpretations	 and	 decisions	 by	 the	 ECtHR	 are	made.	 It	 is	
asked	whether	the	ECtHR	should	continue	in	this	way	or	drop	the	practice	of	treating	
all	 cultures	 as	 having	 a	 claim	 to	 religious	 freedom	 which	 may	 limit	 some	 from	
obtaining	the	protection	of	Article	9	in	the	future.	A	possible	alternative	for	looking	
at	and	interpreting	Article	9	is	offered.	
																																									 																					
7	Such	as	Lautsi	 and	Others	 v.	 Italy,	Application	no.	30814/06,	 judgment	of	18	March	2011,	S.A.S.	 v	
France	Application	No.	43845/11	(ECtHR	Judgment	of	1	July	2014),	Lelya	Sahin	v	Turkey	Application	no.	
44774/98	Grand	Chamber	2005,	Dahlab	v.	Switzerland,	Application	no.	42393/98,	[2001]	ECHR	899.	
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Introduction	
Religion	and	Western	Culture	
Religion,	specifically	Christianity,	has	played	a	fundamental	role	in	the	history	of	the	
West	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 Western	 culture.	 It	 has	 also	 played	 a	 role	 in	 the	
structuring	 of	Western	 experiences	 of	 the	world.8	Theories	 studying	 human	beings	
and	their	actions	in	the	West	are	said	to	have	developed	from	secularised	versions	of	
Christian	theology	and	are	consistent	with	Christian	theological	presumptions	about	
human	 relations	 and	 interactions	 with	 each	 other	 and	 with	 nature. 9 	S.N.	
Balagangadhara	argues	that	secularised	Christian	theology,	or	their	secular	variants,	
include:	
“[O]ur	theories	of	human	rights	as	natural	rights,	our	theories	about	the	State	
and	politics,	our	theories	about	the	growth	and	development	of	human	psychologies,	
our	theories	about	human	ethics	and	moralities,	our	constitutions	that	erect	the	wall	
of	separation	between	religion	and	politics.”10		
The	Western	culture	does	not	view	“other”	cultures	as	distinct	entities,	but	as	
variants	 of	 its	 own	 and	 presupposes	 the	 universality	 of	 religion	 and	 religious	
experiences	 in	 all	 cultures.11 	When	 the	 West	 encountered	 “other”	 cultures,	 “it																																									 																					
8	For	a	detailed	analysis	on	the	role	of	Christianity	in	the	formation	of	the	Western	legal	tradition	see	
Harold	 J.	 Berman,	 Law	 and	 Revolution:	 The	 Formation	Western	 legal	 Tradition,	 (Harvard	 University	
Press	 1983).	On	 the	 structuring	 of	Western	 experiences	 of	 the	world	 see	 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	The	
Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	of	Religion	(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	
New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005).	The	second	edition	(2005)	will	be	used	throughout	the	dissertation.	See	
also	Heinard	Steiger,	‘From	the	International	Law	of	Christianity	to	the	International	Law	of	the	World	
Citizen-	Reflections	on	the	Formation	of	the	Epochs	of	the	History	of	International	Law’	(2001)	3	J	Hist	
Int'l	L	180-193.	
9	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 ‘Generating	 a	 Scientific	 Hypothesis	 about	 Religion:	 A	 preliminary	 Attempt’	
available	at	https://www.academia.edu/6791902/A_Scientific_Hypothesis_about_Religion			
10	Ibid.		
11	Esther	Bloch,	Marianne	Keppens	and	Rajaram	Hegde	(Eds),	Rethinking	Religion	in	India:	The	Colonial	
Construction	of	Hinduism	(Routledge	2010)	4.	
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constructed	 a	 pattern	 and	 a	 structure	 that	 lent	 coherence	 to	 its	 cultural	
experience.” 12 	As	 Roger	 Cotterrell	 notes,	 “[i]n	 the	 past	 when	 immigration	 was	
somewhat	 more	 regulated	 European	 legal	 analysis	 assumed	 cultural	 homogeneity	
even	while	 social	 diversity	 is	 recognised	with	 regard	 to	 social	 class,	 social	mobility	
and	levels	of	wealth.	The	assumption	is	that	culture	in	the	sense	of	beliefs	and	values,	
custom	and	traditions,	is	relatively	uniform.”13	He	also	argues	that	this	is	not	the	case	
anymore	 and	 that	 nowadays	 different	 cultures	 cannot	 be	 ignored	 by	 the	 law.	
However,	 cultural	 diversity,	 although	 recognised	 by	 law,	 is	 recognised	 from	within	
the	framework	of	Christian	theology.		
Religion	and	Tradition	
Religion	 is	 not	 a	 concept	 common	 to	 all	 “traditions”	 and	 this	 produces	 distortions	
from	 those	 seeking	 the	 protection	 of	 Article	 9	 ECHR,	 and	 offers	 no	 protection	 to	
those	who	might	not	be	considered	“religious”.	Consequently,	when	non-Abrahamic	
traditions	encounter	the	Protestant	biased	ECHR	and	ECtHR,	problems	of	distortion,	
unintelligibility	and	discrimination	arise.	These	problems	develop	because	Protestant	
Christianity	 is	 still	 embedded	 in	 the	 background	 of	 the	 legal	 systems	 and	 the	
interpretation	and	language	which	the	ECtHR	uses	when	deciding	on	Article	9	cases,	
despite	 secularisation	 and	 the	 use	 of	 secularised	 language.	 The	 ECtHR	 therefore	
forces	 non-Abrahamic	 cultures	 to	 distort	 their	 traditions	 in	 order	 to	 fit	 into	 the	
Protestant	biased	ECtHR’s	framework,	so	as	to	qualify	for	protection	under	Article	9	
ECHR.																																										 																					
12	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Orientalism,	 Post-colonialism	 and	 the	 	 ‘Construction’	 of	 Religion’	 in	 Esther	
Bloch,	 Marianne	 Keppens	 and	 Rajaram	 Hegde	 (Eds),	 Rethinking	 Religion	 in	 India:	 the	 Colonial	
Construction	of	Hinduism	(Routledge	2010)	137.	
13	Roger	 Cotterrell,	 ‘Law	 and	 Culture:	 Inside	 and	 Beyond	 the	 Nation	 State’,	 Legal	 Studies	 Research	
Paper	No.	4/2009.	
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As	Carl	Schmitt	states,	
“[a]ll	 significant	 concepts	of	 the	modern	 theory	of	 the	 state	are	 secularised	
theological	concepts	not	only	because	of	their	historical	development	–	in	which	they	
were	transferred	from	theology	to	the	theory	of	the	state,	whereby,	for	example,	the	
omnipotent	 God	 became	 the	 omnipotent	 lawgiver	 –	 but	 also	 because	 of	 their	
systematic	 structure,	 the	 recognition	 of	 which	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 sociological	
consideration	of	these	concepts.”14	
The	 Protestant	 theological	 background	 to	 Article	 9	 effectively	 distorts	 and	
excludes	 the	 cultural	 and	 traditional	 practices	 of	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions.	 15	
Moreover,	 it	 is	 impossible	for	non-Abrahamic	traditions	and	cultures	in	general	and	
non-Protestants	 in	 particular	 to	 understand	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 secular	 State	 but	 being	
secular	“becomes	a	constitutional	understanding.”16	This	is	done	when	concepts	such	
as	 secularism	 and	 freedom	 of	 religion,	 which	 are	 within	 the	 Christian	 theology,	
become	“encoded	into	legal	instruments,	used	for	building	legal	theories.”17		
Cases	 before	 the	 ECtHR	 are	 considered	 either	with	 an	 embedded	 Christian	
theological	background	or	in	a	more	disguised	way	through	the	concept	of	“universal”	
ethics;	 the	 “moral	 ought	 to”	 and	 “ought	not	 to.”18	These	 are	 concepts	 that	 have	 a	
Christian	theological	backdrop,	and	which	have	been	 incorporated	 in	Western	 legal	
systems	and	human	 rights	 law	after	 going	 through	 the	process	of	 secularisation	as																																									 																					
14	Carl	Schmitt,	Political	Theology:	Four	Chapters	on	the	Concept	of	Sovereignty	(George	Schwab	(Trs),	
University	of	Chicago	Press,	2005)	36-51.	
15	Prakash	Shah,	‘Asking	about	reasonable	accommodation	in	England’	(2013)	IJDL	13(2-3)	83–112,	88.	
16	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	45(1)	JLP,	58-75,	62.	
17	Ibid.,	at	60.	
18 	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Colonial	 Experience:	 Normative	 Ethics	 I’	 March	 2,	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/02/colonial-experience-normative-ethics-101-s-n-balagangadhara/	
see	 also	 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Moral	 Domain	 not	 Defined	 by	 Norms’	 March	 23,	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/03/moral-domain-not-defined-by-norms-s-n-balagangadhara/			
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secular	and	universal	concepts	or	worldviews.	However,	these	concepts	make	more	
sense	 if	 the	 theological	 background	 is	 taken	 into	 consideration.19	Christian	 ethics,	
which	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 Western	 legal	 systems,	 and	 more	 visibly	 in	
human	 rights	 law,	 are	 claimed	 to	 hold	 universally	 irrespective	 of	 time,	 place	 or	
condition.	However	one	cannot	accept	this	type	of	ethics	without	accepting	Christian	
theology	as	true	and	Balagangadhara	has	further	noted	“the	so-called	secular	ethics	
today	continues	an	unbroken	line	with	these	religious	ethics.”20	
	One	of	the	main	hypotheses	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	ECtHR	uses	a	secularised	
theological	language	when	deciding	on	Article	9	ECHR	cases.	It	is	also	discussed	how	
judgments	of	the	ECtHR	regarding	freedom	of	religion	promote	in	a	“secular”	guise	
the	idea	that	non-Protestant	practices	and	beliefs	are	idolatrous	or	“false”	practices	
which	 after	 the	 process	 of	 secularisation,	whereby	 the	 Christian	 ideas	move	more	
into	 the	 background	 and	 become	 invisible,	 21 	have	 been	 labelled	 as	 “passive	
symbols”.22	As	a	 result,	non-Abrahamic	cultures	are	 forced	 to	distort	 themselves	 in	
order	to	fit	into	the	ECtHR’s	framework,	with	its	Protestant	theological	backdrop	and	
language,	 in	order	to	qualify	for	protection	under	Article	9	ECHR.	 In	other	words,	 it	
forces	 people	 from	 non-Abrahamic23	cultures	 to	 defend	 their	 traditions	 as	 being	 a	
religion	or	a	variant	of	religion.		
																																								 																					
19	Prakash	Shah,	‘Legal	Response	to	Religious	Diversity,	or	to	Cultural	Diversity?’	in	Silvio	Ferrari		(ed),	
Routledge	Handbook	of	Law	and	Religion	(Routledge,	2015)	119-132.	
20	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Colonial	 Consciousness	 and	 Victorian	 Morality’,	 Hipkapi,	 March	 23,	 2011	
available	 on	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/23/colonial-consciousness-and-victorian-morality/	
Last	accessed	November	2017].	
21	Ibid.		
22	In	Lautsi	and	Others	v.	Italy,	the	ECtHR	accepts	that	the	cross	is	a	passive	symbol.	
23	The	terms	“Abrahamic”	and	“Semitic”	religions	will	be	used	interchangeably	in	this	thesis.	
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As	Balagangadhara	shows	 in	his	book	The	Heathen	 in	His	Blindness…,	 it	 is	 in	
the	nature	of	 religion	 to	 distort	 traditions	 in	 a	 “secular”	way	 and	present	 them	as	
“false”	 religions.	 The	 belief-centred	 approach	 taken	 by	 the	 ECtHR	 explains	 how	
manifestations,	 such	 as	 wearing	 particular	 clothes,	 are	 seen	 as	 “symbols”	 in	 the	
Western	 legal	 systems	 generally	 and	 by	 the	 ECtHR	 particularly,	 as	 exemplifying	
beliefs,	 leaving	 it	 open	 to	 various	 interpretations	 as	 to	 what	 these	 “symbols”	
represent.	This	makes	it	difficult	for	people	outside	the	Protestant	understanding	of	
religion	 and	 religious	 practice	 to	make	 sense	 of	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 without	 having	 to	
distort	themselves	to	fit	into	the	current	system.	This	may	lead	to	a	situation	where	
minority	traditions	will	be	recognised	in	the	legal	systems	if	and	only	if	the	majority,	
which	 in	 the	 West	 happens	 to	 be	 Christianity,	 approves	 of	 such	 recognition.24	
Consequently,	Christianity	and	more	specifically	 the	Protestant	 ideology	will	be	the	
benchmark	through	which	these	traditions	are	interpreted	and	dictated	to	be	worthy	
of	recognition.		
If,	on	the	other	hand,	one	accepts	that	some	cultures	do	not	have	religion,	it	
follows	 that	 they	 also	 do	 not	 have	 a	 claim	 to	 religious	 freedom	under	 the	 current	
framework	of	Article	9	ECHR.	While	this	might	prevent	some	cultures	from	obtaining	
the	protection	of	Article	9	ECHR,	 it	 could	be	defended	on	 the	ground	 that	 treating	
them	as	having	religion	merely	distorts	their	character,	and	presents	a	false	picture	
of	reality.	Since	this	scenario	of	dropping	the	“universalistic”	reference	to	religion	is	
purely	hypothetical	in	the	contemporary	legal	context,	the	chapters	to	follow	in	this	
thesis	will	analyse	the	consequences	for	the	contemporary	 framework	of	European																																									 																					
24	The	ECtHR	relies	on	a	general	folk	understanding	of	religion,	which	the	majority	can	relate	to.	 	An	
example	of	this	is	clearly	illustrated	in	how	the	ECtHR	seeks	the	approval	of	the	majority	through	the	
approval	given	by	the	churches	e.g.	in	Lautsi	v	Italy.	
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human	rights	law	on	religious	freedom	in	Article	9.	It	is	argued	that	Article	9	ECHR	in	
its	current	format	is	not	going	to	work	in	practice	to	protect	“traditions”.	Article	9	is	
examined	in	the	light	of	the	specific	cultural	framework	that	gave	rise	to	 it	and	the	
religious	and	cultural	diversity	in	contemporary	Europe.	
Questions	Raised	
This	raises	a	number	of	questions:	what	are	the	consequences	of	the	universalisation	
and	 secularisation	 of	 religion	 for	 religious	 freedom	 as	 protected	 under	 Article	 9	
ECHR?	What	happens	when	a	culture	is	further	away	from	the	idea	of	religion	that	is	
presupposed	 in	 Article	 9	 ECHR,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 Protestantism?	 What	 happens	
when	 non-Christian	 cultures	 encounter	 the	 European	 human	 rights	 system?	 Is	 the	
current	 framework	 intelligible	 to	 applicants	 who	 do	 not	 share	 a	 Protestant	
background,	 or	 furthermore	 to	 applicants	 of	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions?	 How	 does	
Article	9	ECHR	cause	distortions	when	assessing	cases	presented	by	non-Abrahamic	
and	 specifically	 non-Protestant	 religions	 and	 different	 groups?	 How	 does	 it	
reconstruct	them	through	the	“agency	of	the	dominant	culture	to	remake	them	as	a	
variety	 of	 “religions”	 on	 the	model	 of	 Christianity?”25	Is	 the	Western	 universalistic	
attitude	driving	minorities	living	in	the	West	to	distort	their	culture	and	tradition,	out	
of	a	reaction	to	a	Western	drive	to	universalise	their	own	civilisation	and	“secularise”	
Christian	beliefs,26	as	well	as	what	contradicts	or	what	is	“foreign”	to	these	beliefs?	
The	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	 link	 between	 law,	 religion	 and	 tradition	 in	
																																								 																					
25	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP	45(1)	58-75,	61	
26Daniel	 Philpott,	 ‘Religious	 Freedoms	 and	 the	 Undoing	 of	 the	 Westphalia	 State	 Michigan’	 (2004)	
Journal	of	International	law	(25)	4,981-998,	987.		On	Islamic	countries	challenging	the	universality	of	
human	rights	see	Articles	(24)	(25)	of	the	Cairo	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	in	Islam	(CDHRI)	and	The	
Organisation	of	the	Islamic	Conference	established	on	September	25,	1969.	
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Europe	 with	 a	 close	 examination	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Protestant	 theology	 and	
ideology	 on	 Article	 9	 ECHR.	 It	 will	 be	 examined	 how	 the	 European	 human	 rights	
system	 generally	 and	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 specifically	 are	 understood	 and	 interpreted	
differently	against	various	cultural	backgrounds,	and	the	asymmetrical	relations	that	
the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 generates	 amongst	 non-Protestant	 and	 non-
Abrahamic	cultures.	 It	will	also	be	examined	how	this	distortion	 is	taking	place	and	
whether	it	 is	possible	to	identify	a	pattern	in	the	ECtHR’s	decisions	when	looking	at	
these	distortions.	One	way	of	showing	the	dysfunctions	 in	the	present	system	is	 to	
reveal	the	types	of	distortions	that	come	with	having	a	culture-specific	framework	of	
human	rights	such	as	that	which	protects	religious	freedom.	Distortions	can	occur	in	
all	claims	to	religious	freedom	before	the	ECtHR,	but	they	can	be	predicted	to	occur	
more	 strongly	 the	 further	 away	 a	 culture	 is	 from	 the	 idea	 of	 religion	 presupposed	
within	Article	9	ECHR,	which	is	based	on	Protestantism,	as	this	thesis	demonstrates.	
For	 this,	 a	 further	 hypothesis	 will	 be	 developed	 which	 states	 that	 the	 current	
framework	 is	 biased	 against	 applicants	who	do	not	 have	 a	 Protestant	 background;	
and	even	more	biased	against	applicants	of	non-Abrahamic	cultures.		
The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	
While	other	international	and	domestic	law	instruments	also	refer	to	the	protection	
of	 freedom	 of	 religion,	 European	 human	 rights	 law	 provides	 one	 of	 the	 most	
interesting	 contexts	 to	 study	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion	 given	 the	 variety	 of	
individuals,	 groups,	 and	 populations	 in	 a	 “superdiverse”	 Europe	 that	 make	 claims	
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upon	its	protection	as	they	engage	in	“public	reasoning”27	by	accessing	the	ECtHR.		
Protestant	 Christianity	 has	 not	 only	 influenced	 the	 way	 Europeans	 think	
about	law	and	religion,	but	has	also	shaped	the	development	of	the	law,	concepts	of	
human	 rights,	and	the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights,28	specifically	 Article	
9.29	The	 idea	of	 the	 “two	kingdoms”	of	 Luther	 the	private	 realm	of	 the	 conscience	
and	 the	 public	 realm	 of	 the	 (sinful)	 body,	 is	 clearly	 reflected	 today	 in	 the	 split	
between	 the	 assertion	 of	 religious	 freedom	 in	 Article	 9(1)	 of	 the	 ECHR	 and	 the	
limitations	thereto	as	expressed	in	Article	9(2)	and	presuppose	a	Protestant	theology.	
The	 jurisprudence	 clearly	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 forum	 internum	 is	 absolutely	
protected	and	that	“the	ECtHR	has	construed	freedom	of	religion	in	terms	of	a	binary	
opposition	between	belief	and	practice.”30	Recalling	the	two	kingdoms,	it	is	possible	
to	 identify	 similar,	 if	 not	 identical	 lines	 of	 thought.	 The	 private	 realm	 of	 the	
conscience,	which	the	State	could	not	and	should	not	interfere	with,	is	held	silently,	
and	the	public	realm	of	the	(sinful)	body	or	the	manifestations	may	be	punished	by	
the	 magistrate	 (State).	 Moreover,	 this	 separation	 in	 itself	 ascertains	 that	 there	
actually	 two	 parts	 to	 religion	 or	 belief:	 one	 is	 the	 thought,	 the	 ideas,	 and	 the	
doctrines	which	 constitute	 the	 first	 part	 to	 have	 a	 “true”	 religion;	 the	other	 is	 the	
manifestation	 which	 is	 very	 much	 linked	 to	 the	 doctrinal	 or	 theoretical	 part.	 In	
traditions	where	doctrinal	justification	for	manifestation	is	not	prevalent,	it	is	difficult	
to	separate	between	a	belief	and	its	manifestation	or	to	determine	the	existence	of																																									 																					
27 	John	 R.	 Bowen,	 Islam,	 Law	 and	 Equality	 in	 Indonesia:	 An	 Anthropology	 of	 Public	 Reasoning	
(Cambridge	University	Press	2003)	253.	
28	The	European	Convention	of	Human	Rights,	entered	into	force	3	September	1953.	213	U.N.T.S.	221;	
E.T.S.	5.	The	Convention	has	been	amended	through	14	protocols.		29	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 despite	 the	 Protestant	 roots	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion,	 equality,	tolerance	and	freedom	of	the	conscience	their	importance	are	not	questioned	at	all.	
30	Lourdes	 Peroni,	 ‘On	 Religious	 and	 Cultural	 Equality	 in	 European	 Human	 Rights	 Convention	 Law’,	
(2014)	NQHR	32	231,	233.	
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the	belief	in	the	first	place.	The	act	could	be	a	mere	tradition	practiced	because	it	is	
simply	 a	 tradition.	 Although	 the	 ECtHR	 does	 not	 use	 the	 language	 “true”	 versus	
“false”	 religion,	 this	 type	 of	 thinking	 is	 evident	 when	 it	 determines	 whether	 a	
particular	manifestation	is	“truly”	religious.	
The	 ECtHR	 also	 adopts	 the	 Protestant	 theology	 when	 it	 picks	 out	 certain	
phenomena,	 questions,	 and	 approaches	 when	 deciding	 applications	 concerning	
religious	 freedom	that	are	specific	 to	some	cultures	and	are	only	 intelligible	within	
the	Christian	and	more	specifically	Protestant	religious	framework.	The	intelligibility,	
for	example,	that	“religion	lends	to	conscientious	objection	among	Jews,	Christians,	
and	Muslims	 is	not	accessible	 to	members	of	other	 cultures,	 so	 the	 law	effectively	
caters	to	preferences	of	some	groups	but	not	of	others.”31	One	cannot,	for	example,	
speak	of	a	universal	right	of	freedom	of	conscience	without	assuming	that	it	is	in	the	
nature	of	human	beings	to	have	a	conscience	that	plays	a	role	in	moral	reasoning.		
The	 ECtHR	 also	 questions	whether	 a	 particular	manifestation	 is	 an	 intrinsic	
requirement	to	one’s	“belief”	and	asks	for	doctrinal	confirmation.	The	language	that	
the	 ECtHR	 uses	 (such	 as	 belief,	 doctrines	 or	 sacred	 books)	 and	 the	 judicial	
interpretations	 are	 not	 applicable	 to	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 because	 non-
Abrahamic	 cultures	 do	 not	 need	 doctrines	 that	 dictate	methods	 of	worship	 nor	 is	
justification	needed	for	practicing	a	tradition.32	When	these	cultures	come	in	contact	
with	 the	ECtHR,	 they	need	 to	prove	 that	 their	 traditions	 are	 a	 variant	of	what	 the	
ECtHR	considers	to	qualify	as	religion.	They	need	to	show	and	prove	that	they	have	
																																								 																					
31	Prakash	 Shah,	 ‘The	 Moral	 Basis	 of	 Anti	 Caste	 Legislation’	 Public	 Spirit	 25/09/2013	 available	 at	
http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/the-moral-basis-of-anti-caste-legislation/	 [last	 accessed	 in	 November	
2017].	
32	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…10	-22.	
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items	 such	 as	 books,	 doctrines,	 beliefs,	 or	 sacred	 texts	 that	 are	 intrinsic	 to	 their	
beliefs	 and	 customs.	 They	 must	 also	 prove	 that	 these	 practices	 are	 a	 result	 of	 a	
“belief”	rather	than	a	mere	custom.	Consequently,	when	identifying	which	cultural	or	
traditional	 practices	 require	 protection	 under	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 or	 protection	 against	
discrimination	on	 the	ground	of	 religion,	 the	ECtHR	 is	 involved	 in	 “doing	 theology”	
but	in	a	secular	guise.	
Since	the	wording,	as	well	as	 the	 judicial	 interpretations	and	applications	of	
Article	9	ECHR,	are	biased	in	favour	of	the	Christian	Protestant,	this	is	automatically	
discriminatory	 against	 applicants	 who	 do	 not	 have	 a	 Protestant	 background,	 and	
even	more	biased	 against	 those	of	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions.	 In	 Chapters	 5	 and	6,	
the	judgments	are	divided	into	three	groups	to	assess	the	influence	of	Protestantism	
on	each	denomination:	Non-Abrahamic	traditions;	Abrahamic	religions;	and	“Other”	
Christians.		
Methodology	
Despite	 the	breadth	of	 the	 literature	 found	on	 freedom	 for	 religion	 in	general	 and	
Article	9	 in	particular,	 there	 is	considerable	repetition.	Many	scholars	have	tried	to	
set	definitions	on	what	religion	is	and	how	religion	is	defined	under	ECHR	law,	while	
others	 have	 pointed	 to	 the	 wide	margin	 of	 appreciation	 granted	 by	 the	 ECtHR	 to	
national	courts	and	authorities,	which	results	in	the	dominant	culture	setting	its	own	
rules	with	 regards	 to	what	 is	 considered	as	 religion.	Other	 academic	 literature	has	
focussed	 on	 the	 incoherence	 and	 inconsistency	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 pointing	 to	 a	 bias	
mainly	towards	people	wearing	religious	symbols.		
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S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 is	 amongst	 the	 very	 few	 scholars	 to	 provide	 a	 novel	
approach	to	studying	religion	and	his	work	inspired	this	thesis.	He	has	revisited	some	of	 the	 issues	 taken-for-granted	 in	religious	 and	 social	 science	 disciplines	 and	 has	
brought	forward	new	insights	into	the	whole	question	of	religion	and	secularism,	and	
their	 claimed	 universality.	 Furthermore,	 Balagangadhara	 in	 a	 very	 unique	method,	
examines	 the	 twin	dynamic	of	Christianity	of	 secularisation	and	proselitysation.	He	
explains	 in	 a	 novel	way	 how	 the	 Secular	 provokes	 religious	 conflict	 and	 distortion	
amongst	cultures	where	religion	does	not	exist	and	how	despite	secularism	the	West	
remains	 a	 religious	 culture.	 Balagangadhara	 further	 elaborates	 on	 how	 religion	
requires	practices	to	be	defended	and	justified	by	reference	to	doctrines.		
Using	this	concept	of	religion	as	a	foundation	of	the	research,	how	the	ECtHR	
approaches	 the	 concepts	 of	 religious	 freedom	 and	 religious	 symbols,	 and	 how	 it	
views	 traditional	 and	 customary	 practices	 were	 analysed.	Whether	 the	 ECtHR	 has	
developed	its	case	law	since	it	started	considering	Article	9	cases	and	whether	non-
Abrahamic	 applicants	 do	 have	 a	 claim	 to	 religious	 freedom	 under	 the	 current	
framework	of	Article	9	were	also	considered.	The	main	challenge	was	to	determine	
which	 case	 law	 to	 look	 at	 in	more	detail.	 A	 selection	of	 cases	 concerning	 religious	
freedom,	as	well	as	commentaries	on	the	cases,	the	writing	and	wording	of	Article	9,	
and	 scholarship	 concerning	 freedom	 of	 religion	 more	 generally	 is	 utilised.	 	 Close	
attention	is	paid	to	relevant	theological	literature	as	well	as	the	literature	that	led	to	
the	formation	of	the	hypothesis	discussed	and	defended	in	this	thesis.			
Structure	of	this	thesis	
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This	thesis	is	divided	into	three	parts.	In	the	first	part	(Chapter	1)	scholarly	work	on	
freedom	of	religion	is	examined	to	illustrate	that	Article	9	has	not	been	analysed	the	
way	 this	 thesis	 intends	 to	 do,	 and	 also	 to	 show	 possible	 relationships	 between	
previous	 studies	 and	 this	 thesis.	 Particular	 attention	 is	 given	 to	 literature	and	 case	
commentaries	 where	 a	 Protestant	 effect	 on	 European	 legal	 systems	 is	 discussed.	
Although	many	scholars	find	the	ECtHR	to	be	biased	against	applicants	wearing	the	
headscarf	 for	 example,	 none	 have	 gone	 beyond	 this	 idea	 and	 questioned	whether	
Article	 9	 in	 itself	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 Protestant	 faith	 or	 could	 even	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
continuation	 of	 the	 Protestant	 Theology.	 Given	 the	 claim	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 the	
Protestant	 roots	 of	 human	 rights	 weighs	 heavily	 on	 their	 interpretation,	 counter	
arguments	 of	 scholars33	who	 have	 called	 for	 a	 harmonistic	 perspective	 between	
human	 rights	 and	 other	 traditions	 will	 be	 examined.	 Moreover,	 considerations	 to	
scholars	 who	 have	 argued	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	 approach	 to	 culture	 and	 legal	
interpretation	will	 be	 put	 forward.34	Furthermore,	 the	 bias	 towards	 the	 Protestant	
faith	will	be	examined	in	light	of	relevant	scholarship	on	neutrality.	
In	 the	 second	 part	 (Chapters	 2,	 3,	 and	 4),	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 is	
discussed	and	a	guide	to	the	history	and	emergence	of	religious	freedom	in	Europe	is	
provided.	 Based	 on	 Balagangadhara’s	 theory	 and	 concept	 of	 what	 religion	 is,	 a	
possible	hidden	and	non-vocalised	theological	pattern	behind	the	ECtHR’s	 language	
concerning	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 is	 tested.	 Furthermore,	 the	 role-played	 by	 religion,	
precisely	by	the	Protestant	Reformation,	in	the	development	of	human	rights	law	in	
general	 and	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 in	 particular	 is	 examined.	 It	 is	 demonstrated	 that	 the	
																																								 																					33	Scholars	such	as	Abdullah	Saeed	and	Abdullahi	An-Naim.	34	Scholars	such	as	Roger	Cotterrell	
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Protestant	 Reformation	 was	 a	 revolution	 that	 not	 only	 affected	 Western	 legal	
systems,	 but	 one	 that	 determined	 the	 shape	 of	 Article	 9	 ECHR.	 A	 historical	 and	
chronological	 approach	 is	 taken	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 development	 of	 religious	
freedom	 in	 Europe	 starting	 with	 the	 Protestant	 reformation	 and	 concluding	 with	
Article	9	ECHR.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 go	 back	 to	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 of	 the	 Protestant	
Reformation	and	then	proceed	to	the	Enlightenment	period	when	studying	religious	
freedom	 in	 “modern”35	Europe.	 This	 shows	 that	 the	 Protestant	 revolution	 is	 not	
merely	 an	 episode	 of	 the	 past,	 but	 a	 living	 memory	 with	 an	 on-going	 historical	
continuity	 that	 influences	 the	 present	 and	 future	 and	 continues	 to	 have	 a	 crucial	
impact	 on	 the	Western	 legal	 tradition	 and	 culture.36	Events	 prior	 to	 the	 sixteenth	
century	 do	 not	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	 hypotheses	 in	 this	 thesis	 which	
concerns	the	 link	between	the	Protestant	 theology,	 the	secular	State,	and	Article	9	
ECHR.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 Luther’s	division	between	 the	political	
and	the	religious	realm	was	an	institutional	break	that	directly	led	to	the	separation	
between	 the	 State	 and	 Church,37	while	 Calvin’s	 doctrines	 created	 the	 space	 for	
freedom	of	 conscience.38		Both	Luther	and	Calvin	adopted	 the	 theology	of	 the	 two	
separate	kingdoms,	which	is	a	crucial	concept	in	this	thesis.			
Key	 pieces	 of	 national	 legislation	 as	 well	 as	 international	 conventions	 are	
analysed	to	demonstrate	 the	origins	of	human	rights	and	how	the	 idea	of	 religious																																									 																					
35	The	word	“modern”	is	used	to	refer	to	post-1945	Europe.	
36	Harold	J.	Berman,	Law	and	Revolution	II:	The	Impact	of	The	Protestant	Reformation	on	the	Western	
Legal	Tradition	(first	published	2003,	Harvard	university	Press	2006)	xii.	
37	Randy	 Beck,	 “The	 City	 of	 God	 and	 the	 Cities	 of	men:	 A	 Response	 To	 Jason	 Carter,”	 Georgia	 Law	
Review	41	(2006)	124.	
38	Kristine	 Kalanges,	 ‘Religious	 Liberty	 in	Western	 and	 Islamic	 Law:	 Toward	 a	World	 Legal	 Tradition’	
(Oxford	University	Press,	2012)	38.	
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freedom	 emerged,	 travelled	 from	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 and	 made	 its	 way	 in	 the	
international	and	European	legal	systems.	The	wording	of	various	 legal	 instruments	
entailing	the	ideas	of	religious	freedom	such	as	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	
Rights,	 the	 1981	 Declaration	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Intolerance	 and	
Discrimination	Based	on	Religion	or	Belief,	Article	18	of	 the	 International	Covenant	
on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (ICCPR)	 and	 other	 instruments	 are	 examined.	 This	
historical	 and	chronological	 approach	demonstrates	 the	continuation	and	presence	
of	the	Protestant	theology	in	international	law.	
In	the	third	part	(Chapters	5	and	6)	the	hypothesis	set	out	in	Chapter	2	and	3	
is	tested	in	the	light	of	the	case	law	of	Article	9	ECHR.	A	broad	overview	of	judgments	
is	 assessed	 in	 addition	 to	 some	 inadmissibility	 decisions.	 The	 bias	 towards	 the	
Protestant	theology	 is	 illustrated	and	the	 judgments	that	are	analysed	 in	depth	are	
related	 to	 ideologies	of	 the	Protestant	 faith	 such	as	proselytism,	 religious	 symbols,	
and	idolatry.	It	is	shown	that	the	ECtHR	attempts	to	distort	non-Abrahamic	traditions	
to	fit	into	the	Protestant-biased	Article	9	by	using	secularised	religious	language	and	
by	 favouring	 orthodoxy	 over	 orthopraxy.	 The	 consequences	 for	 non-Abrahamic	
applicants	 before	 the	 ECtHR	 are	 illustrated.	 Close	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 the	
interpretation	 and	 application	 of	 Article	 9	 rather	 than	 whether	 the	 applicant	
application	was	successful	or	not.	
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Chapter	1	
Literature	Review	
1.1	Overview	
In	 this	 chapter	 the	 scholarly	 work	 concerning	 freedom	 of	 religion	 is	 examined	 to	
illustrate	that	Article	9	has	not	been	analysed	the	way	this	thesis	intends	to	do	and	to	
show	 possible	 relationships	 between	 previous	 studies	 and	 this	 thesis.	 Particular	
attention	is	given	to	literature	and	case	commentaries	where	a	Protestant	effect	on	
European	 legal	 systems	 is	 discussed.	Although	many	 scholars	 find	 the	ECtHR	 to	be	
biased	against	applicants	wearing	religious	symbols	and	the	headscarf	 in	particular,	
none	have	gone	beyond	this	initial	observation	to	question	whether	Article	9	itself	is	
linked	 to	 the	 Protestant	 faith	 or	 could	 even	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	
Protestant	theology.		
Given	the	claim	in	this	thesis	that	the	Protestant	roots	of	human	rights	weigh	
heavily	upon	interpretation,	counter	arguments	of	scholars	such	as	Abdullah	Saeed,	
who	 has	 called	 for	 a	 harmonistic	 perspective	 between	 human	 rights	 and	 other	
traditions,	are	also	examined.	It	will	be	shown	that	the	idea	of	“harmonisation”	does	
not	deviate	from	the	concepts	of	belief,	texts	and	doctrines	present	in	the	Protestant	
theology	and	that	harmonisation	is	in	conformity	with	the	Protestant	values	and	the	
claim	of	the	universality	of	human	rights.	Authors	such	as	Roger	Cotterrell,	who	have	
argued	 for	 a	more	 nuanced	 approach	 to	 culture	 and	 legal	 interpretation,	 are	 also	
considered.	Furthermore,	bias	towards	the	Protestant	 faith	 is	examined	 in	the	 light	
of	relevant	scholarship	on	neutrality.	
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1.2	Christianity,	the	Protestant	Theology	and	the	Law	
Modern	human	rights	law	has	helped	to	ignite	a	great	awakening	of	religion	
and	 religious	 demands	 internationally.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 scope	 for	 the	 protection	 of	
religion	 has	 substantially	 expanded.39	Consequently,	 the	 right	 to	 religious	 freedom	
has	received	significant	attention	in	the	 legal	context	 in	Europe	in	recent	years	and	
caused	 some	 controversy,	 especially	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 place	 of	 religion	 in	 the	
public	sphere.	This	includes	religious	dress	codes,	religious	symbols,	special	religious	
dietary	 needs	 in	 prisons	 as	 well	 as	 religious	 accommodation	 in	 the	 workforce.	 As	
Lorenzo	 Zucca	 notes	 that	 “[i]t	 does	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 that	 religion	 is	 not	
welcome	but	keeps	knocking	at	the	door	with	increasingly	more	difficult	demands.”40			
Europe’s	 relationship	 with	 religion	 however	 remains	 complicated	 despite	
decades	of	international	treaties	and	conventions	guaranteeing	religious	freedom	to	
people	 of	 different	 faiths	 and	 beliefs.	 Being	 a	 culturally	 and	 religiously	 diverse	
continent,	Europe	is	increasingly	being	challenged	by	concepts	and	ideas	of	religious	
freedom	in	general	and	the	role	of	religion	in	society	in	particular.	This	has	prompted	
many	scholars	to	study	religion,	religious	freedom	and	the	role	of	religion	in	society.	
Some	have	written	about	Christianity	and	law.	Heinhard	Steiger,	for	example,	
explains	 that	 the	 era	 of	 international	 law,	 from	 the	 thirteenth	 to	 the	 eighteenth	
century	 was	 an	 era	 of	 the	 “international	 law	 of	 Christianity”,	 where	 the	 law	 was	
entrenched	in	religious	principles.	Steiger	notes	that	“Christianity	formed	the	major	
intellectual	foundation	of	legal	order	for	the	entire	epoch”,	which,	“brought	Europe	
																																								 																					
39	John	Witte	Jr.,	‘Introduction’	in	John	Witte	Jr.	and	Frank	S.	Alexander	(eds),	Christianity	and	Human	
Rights	(Cambridge	University	Press	2010)	8.	
40	Lorenzo	Zucca,	“The	Crisis	of	the	Secular	State:	A	Reply	to	Professor	Sajó”	(2009)	I.CON	(7)	3	494.		
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together,	….	under	the	political	idea	of	res	publica	Christiana.”41	Sameul	Moyn	states	
that	 “Europe	 and	 therefore	 the	 modern	 world	 drew	 nearly	 everything	 from	
Christianity	in	the	long	term.”42	He	explains	that	“mainstream	secular	observers	are	
generally	unaware	of	….	the	Christian	incarnation	of	human	rights,	which	interferes	
with	 their	 preferred	 understandings	 of	 today’s	 highest	 principles”.43	In	 his	 view,	
Christians	were	the	ones	“who	did	much	and	perhaps	most	to	welcome	and	define	
the	 idea	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 1940s,	 and	 some	 of	 its	 core	 notions	 such	 as	 the	
importance	of	human	dignity.”44		
Other	 scholars	have	 recognised	 the	 significant	 impact	of	Christianity	on	 the	
law	which	is	reflected	in	European	public	life	and	translated,	for	example,	into	public	
holidays	 and	 working	 week	 schedules	 which	 rely	 on	 the	 Christian	 calendar. 45	
Consequently	 much	 has	 been	 written	 concerning	 the	 manifestation	 of	 religious	
practices	in	public.	However,	the	scholarly	work	concerning	Article	9	has	been	mostly	
limited	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 religion	 focussing	 closely	 on	 the	 inconsistency,	
incoherence,	 and	 allegedly	 biased	 decisions	 of	 the	 ECtHR,	 especially	 judgments	
concerning	 religious	 clothing	 and	 symbols	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 the	 veils	 or	
headscarves	and	its	use	of	a	wide	margin	of	appreciation.	
In	 recent	 critical	 writing	 it	 has	 also	 been	 argued	 that	 the	 framework	 for	
studying	religion	within	the	contemporary	human	sciences	derives	 from	a	Christian	
background,	even	as	it	extends	to	the	realm	of	comparative	religion.	The	main	claim	
																																								 																					
41	Heinhard	Steiger,	‘From	the	International	Law	of	Christianity	to	the	International	Law	of	the	World	
Citizen’	(2001)	Journal	of	the	History	of	International	Law	(3)	180,	184.	
42	Samuel	Moyn,	Christian	Human	Rights,	(University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2015)	6.	
43	Ibid.,	at	4.	
44	Ibid.,	at	7.	
45	Ibid.,	at	5.	
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is	 that	 religion	bears	 the	hallmarks	of	 a	 theological	 account.	 For	example,	 Timothy	
Fitzgerald	has	argued	that	the	word	“religion”	should	not	be	used	at	all	within	social	
science	 because	 of	 the	 history	 of	 its	 association	 with	 Christian	 theology. 46	
Balagangadhara	claims	that	religion	should	be	treated	as	a	phenomenon	in	the	world,	
and	 that	 reference	 to	 the	 description	 “religion”	 should	 be	 restricted	 to	 the	
Abrahamic	religions:	Judaism,	Christianity	and	Islam.47	In	his	view,	the	assertion	that	
all	 cultures	 in	 the	 world	 have	 religion,	 an	 idea	 which	 has	 also	 been	 adopted	 and	
elaborated	 within	 the	 human	 sciences,48	is	 itself	 a	 claim	 of	 Protestant	 theology,	
albeit	since	secularised.	However,	despite	the	considerable	amount	of	 literature	on	
freedom	 of	 religion,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 lack	 of	 scholarly	 literature	 linking	 the	 idea	 of	
Protestantism	to	the	wording	and	interpretation	of	Article	9	of	the	ECHR.		
1.2.1	Protestantism	and	the	Western	World	
There	is	no	doubt	that	the	Protestant	reformation	changed	the	way	the	West	thinks	
about	 law,	 religion	 and	 culture.	 John	 Witte	 Jr.	 observes	 that	 the	 Protestant	
Reformation	 was	 a	 human	 rights	 movement. 49 	Jacob	 De	 Roover	 argues	 that	
Protestant	 doctrine	 remains	 the	 implicit	 background	 of	 the	 modern	 human	 rights	
ideas	 and	 concepts	 in	 the	West	 with	 regards	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion,	 thought	 and	
conscience.	This	effect	was	evident	on	many	levels;	the	re-organisation	of	the	dogma,	
reduction	of	the	sacraments	and	the	restoration	of	spiritual	symbolism	as	opposed	to	
																																								 																					
46	Timothy	Fitzgerald,	The	Ideology	of	Religious	Studies,	(Oxford	University	Press	2000)	4.	
47	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	heathen	 in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	 the	West,	and	 the	Dynamic	of	Religion	
(first	 published	 1994,	 2nd	 edn,	 New	 Delhi:	Manohar	 2005).	 The	 citation	 used	 in	 this	 dissertation	 is	
taken	from	the	2005	edition.	
48	Tomoko	Masuzawa,	The	Invention	of	World	Religions	or,	how	European	Universalism	was	Preserved	
in	the	Language	of	Pluralism,	(University	of	Chicago	Press	2005)	16-18.	
49	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Law,	 Religion,	 and	Human	 Rights:	 A	Historical	 Protestant	 Perspective’	 (1998)	 The	
Journal	of	Religious	Ethics	26(2),	257-262.	
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pilgrimages	and	 the	cult	of	 religious	objects.	The	 reformation	guided	spiritual	 rules	
such	as	dress	and	diet	and	rejected	any	kind	of	worship	of	non-biblical	saints.	“The	
timeless	 language	and	phrases	of	Luther's	German	Bible	and	German	Mass	capture	
the	imagination	of	a	modern	German	as	much	as	the	magisterial	language	of	the	King	
James	Bible	and	the	Book	of	Common	Prayer	captures	the	 imagination	of	a	modern	
English-speaker.”50		
All	 these	 changes	 had	 a	 great	 influence	 on	 the	 law	 in	 general	 and	 human	
rights	 in	 particular.	 The	 unmistakable	marks	 of	 the	 Lutheran	 Reformation	 are	 still	
present	 in	 modern	 Western	 law	 and	 politics.	 Today	 every	 Western	 legal	 system	
protects	the	freedom	of	conscience,	and	Luther’s	original	understandings	of	equality,	
liberty,	 human	 dignity,	 and	 religious	 freedom	 are	 at	 the	 cornerstones	 of	 the	
constitutional	orders.		
In	 addition	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 Reformation	 on	 vital	 aspects	 in	 society	 such	 as	
marriage,	education	and	care	for	the	needy,51	the	Reformation	had	significant	impact	
on	 the	 concept	 of	 rights	 and	 human	 rights	 the	 “concurrent	 rise	 of	 the	 modern	
philanthropic	 citizen	 is,	 in	 no	 small	 measure,	 a	modern	 institutional	 expression	 of	
Luther's	ideal	of	the	priesthood	of	all	believers,	each	called	to	give	loving	service	to	
neighbours.	Sixteenth-century	Lutherans	and	twenty-first-century	Westerners	seem	
to	share	the	assumption	that	 the	State	has	a	role	 to	play	not	only	 in	 fighting	wars,	
punishing	 crime	 and	 keeping	 peace	 but	 also	 in	 providing	 education	 and	 welfare,	
fostering	charity	and	morality,	and	facilitating	worship	and	piety.	They	also	seem	to																																									 																					
50	John	 Witte	 Jr.	 ‘From	 gospel	 to	 law:	 the	 Lutheran	 Reformation	 and	 its	 Impact	 on	 Legal	 Culture’	
(2017)	ECC	LJ	19(3)	271,	287	
51	For	an	analysis	on	the	effect	of	the	Protestant	Reformation	on	the	marriage,	education	and	welfare	
system,	 see	 John	Witte	 Jr.	 ‘From	 gospel	 to	 law:	 the	 Lutheran	 Reformation	 and	 its	 Impact	 on	 Legal	
Culture’	(2017)	ECC	LJ	19(3)271.	
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share	the	assumption	that	law	has	not	only	a	basic	use	of	coercing	citizens	to	accept	
a	morality	of	duty	but	also	a	higher	use	of	 inducing	citizens	to	pursue	a	morality	of	
aspiration.”52		
1.2.2	Protestantism	and	Other	Religions		
Despite	 the	 impact	of	 the	Protestant	 thought	on	 the	Western	human	 rights,	 some	
scholars	 such	as	Abdullah	Saeed	argue	 that	 there	could	be	a	harmonistic	approach	
between	human	rights	and	other	traditions	and	religions;	in	particular,	the	view	that	
Islam	can	be	reconciled	with	human	rights.53	It	 is	 therefore	 important	here	 to	note	
that	the	fact	that	all	Abrahamic	religions	believe	in	human	rights	and	universality	 is	
undeniable.	However	each	religion	interprets	this	in	its	own	dictated	and	interpreted	
way.	 In	 just	 the	 same	 way	 as	 the	 Protestants	 believe	 that	 God	 has	 given	 man	 a	
conscience	and	choice	to	follow	his	word	without	coercion.	The	Islamic	thought	also	
recognises	 that	 “God	 grants	 rights	 to	 human	 beings,	 it	 is	 human	 authorities	 who	
realise	 and	 enforce	 them	 in	 communities.”	 Abdullah	 Saeed	 argues	 that	 “Islamic	
understanding	 of	 human	 rights	 is	 not	 in	 conflict	 with	 internationally	 accepted	
standards	and	norms.	An	understanding	of	 these	views,	principles	and	strategies	 is	
extremely	important	for	engaging	successfully	in	the	discourse	on	Islam	and	human	
rights.”54	He	further	notes	that	Muslims	as	well	as	other	traditions	should	have	the	
opportunity	to	“reframe	universal	rights	in	such	a	way	that	reflects	the	contexts	and	
																																								 																					
52	John	 Witte	 Jr.	 ‘From	 gospel	 to	 law:	 the	 Lutheran	 Reformation	 and	 its	 Impact	 on	 Legal	 Culture’	
(2017)	ECC	LJ	19(3)	271,	287	
53	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 interpretation	of	 Sharia	 law	 and	 its	 link	 to	 human	 rights	 and	 the	
analysis	of	how	Sharia	law	and	human	rights	can	be	harmonised	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	
54	Abdullah	Saeed,	Human	Rights	and	Islam;	An	Introduction	to	Key	Debates	between	Islamic	law	and	
International	Human	Rights	Law,	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2018)	23	
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values	that	are	most	relevant	to	them”.55	However,	as	Zachary	Calo	correctly	notes,	
“[t]he	 idea	 of	 human	 rights,	 particularly	 the	 underlying	 idea	 of	 human	 dignity,	 is	
replete	with	echoes	of	the	sacred.”56	
The	 “believers”	 of	 the	 three	 Abrahamic	 religions	 are	 bounded	 in	 almost	
similar	 theological	 concepts,	 they	 “are	 united	 as	 a	 community	 in	God,	where	 they	
relate	 to	 each	 other	 as	 equals:	 the	 chosen	 people	 of	 God	 for	 the	 Jews,	 the	
communitas	or	ecclesia	for	the	Christians,	and	the	Umma	for	the	Muslims.	Each	is	a	
Jew	or	a	Christian	or	a	Muslim	only	 in	God.	As	such,	 in	each	of	these	communities,	
there	is	formal	equality	of	all.”57	Consequently	“secularized	concepts	within	Christian	
theology	 such	 as	 the	 freedom	of	 religion,	 secularism,	 and	 laıcite	 are	 encoded	 into	
legal	 instruments,	 used	 for	 building	 legal	 theories,	 or	 taken	 up	 by	 academics,	 law	
reformers,	and	others	to	argue	for	legal	change.”58	In	just	the	same	way	in	which	the	
process	 of	 secularisation	 modernised	 concepts	 of	 rights	 within	 the	 Protestant	
thought	the	same	happens	to	other	Abrahamic	religions	where	the	debates	become	
as	to	how	one	could	harmonise	between	human	rights	and	these	religions.	The	root	
concept	 remains	 religion	 and	 the	 justification	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	 religious	 texts,	
while	giving	it	a	“modern”	twist.	
It	is	crucial	to	note	that	although	the	roots	of	human	rights	are	rooted	in	the	
Protestant	theology,	and	despite	the	fact	that	people	from	the	Protestant	faith	could	
																																								 																					
55	Ibid.	
56	Zachary	R.	Calo,	‘Religion,	Human	Rights,	and	Post-Secular	Legal	Theory,’	(2011)	ST.	JOHN’S	L.	REV.	
85	495,	495		
57	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 Between	 Ignorance	 and	 Deception	 Satish	 Deshpande’s	 idea	 of	 Reservations,	
Dailyo.in	8	September	2015	avaliable	at	https://www.dailyo.in/politics/satish-deshpande-patidar-reservation-system-india-dalits-obcs-hardik-patel/story/1/6119.html		
58	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	45(1)	JLP,	58-75,	59.	
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have	 a	 more	 intelligible	 stance	 of	 the	 concepts	 found	 in	 the	 ECHR,	 there	 is	 no	
epistemological	discontinuity	between	Protestantism	and	Islam	and	no	disparities	on	
idea	 of	 intelligibility.	 The	 conditions	 that	 feed	 one	 faith	 feeds	 the	 other,	 i.e.	 God,	
beliefs,	 doctrines,	 texts	 etc,	 hence	 “This	 intelligibility	 condition	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	
acceptance	of	topoi	and	the	theories	constituted	by	them.”59		
Muslim	applicants	 therefore	do	not	 have	 to	distort	 themselves	 to	 fit	 in	 the	
Protestant	 ambit	 of	 Article	 9,	 though	 they	 could	 be	 discriminated	 against	 when	 it	
comes	to	the	manifestation	of	certain	religious	symbols.60		Beliefs	for	example	enable	
individuals	 to	 generate	questions	on	 the	purpose	and	meaning	of	 life	where	 these	
questions	becomes	 inherent	within	 the	 framework	of	 religion,	while	assuming	 that	
man	is	an	intentional	being	where	his	actions	are	explanatory	intelligible,	i.e.	have	a	
cause	 and	 a	 meaning,	 which	 means	 that	 his	 actions	 should	 be	 justified	 and	
meaningful,	these	are	inherent	in	all	Abrahamic	religions.		
Furthermore,	one	cannot	speak	of	a	universal	 freedom	of	conscience	 if	one	
does	 not	 accept	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 human	 beings	 to	 have	 a	 conscience	 or	
religion	 in	 the	 first	place,	 that	plays	a	 role	 in	moral	 reasoning.	Abrahamic	 religions	
share	 similar	 religious	 characteristics	 and	 concepts.	 The	 concept	 of	 say,	 truth	 and	
falsity,	 good	 and	 evil,	 doctrines,	 belief	 etc.	 are	 present	 in	 all	 three	 Abrahamic	
religions	 and	 can	 hence	 be	 harmonised,	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 so	 as	 to	 fit	 into	 the	
Protestant	model	of	human	rights.	However,	this	harmonisation	does	not	make	the	
fact	that	the	ECHR	in	general	and	the	reliance	of	the	ECtHR	on	texts,	beliefs,	doctrinal																																									 																					59	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 Sarah	 Claerhout	 and	 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Liberal	 Political	 Theory	 and	 the	
Cultural	Migration	of	Ideas:	The	Case	of	Secularism	in	India’,	(2011)	Political	Theory	39(5)	571–599.	
60	For	 further	 analysis	 on	 what	 is	 religion	 please	 refer	 to	 chapter	 2	 and	 for	 an	 analysis	 on	Muslim	
applicants	and	Article	9	please	refer	to	chapter	6.	
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justifications,	 less	 problematic.	 Nor	 does	 it	 explain	 whether	 the	 concept	 of	
secularism	 is	 indeed	 intelligible	 to	Muslims	 who	 believe	 in	 the	 unity	 between	 the	
State	 and	 religious	 matters.	 Talal	 Asad	 for	 example	 notes	 that	 the	 separation	
between	the	State	or	politics	and	religion	is	analogous	to	the	distinction	between	the	
spiritual	and	temporal,	a	 fundamental	principle	of	the	Protestant	thought,	which	 in	
turn	 is	 unintelligible	 in	 Islamic	 law.61	On	 the	 other	 hand	 it	 might	 be	 argued	 that	
scholars	such	as	Abdullahi	An-Naim	note	the	relevance	and	 importance	of	Western	
human	rights	and	the	secular	State	 for	non-Christians.	An-Naim	 is	convinced	that	a	
relationship	between	Muslims	and	God	does	not	require	 interference	or	delegation	
by	 another	 person.	 He	 notes	 “The	 fact	 that	 knowing	 and	 upholding	 Shari’a	 is	 the	
permanent	 and	 inescapable	 responsibility	 of	 every	Muslim	means	 that	 no	 human	
being	 or	 institution	 should	 control	 this	 process.”62	However	 in	 just	 as	much	 as	 the	
concept	 of	 secularism	 depends	 on	 theological	 assumptions,	 so	 does	 An-Naim’s	
advocacy	 for	a	 secular	 state	 relies	on	his	deeply	 Islamic	 theological	 claims	 for	non-
interference	by	States	in	matters	of	religion.	
Consequently,	 this	 harmonisation	 will	 inevitably	 be	 moulded	 through	 the	
Christian	 parameters	within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 theological	 explanations	 as	 to	what	
freedom	of	 religion	entails	and	 there	seems	 to	be	no	accommodation	of	 traditions	
that	fall	outside	a	doctrinal	or	theological	scope.	
																																								 																					
61	Talal	 Asad,	 Formation	 of	 the	 Secular:	 Christianity,	 Islam,	 Modernity,	 (Stanford	 University	 Press,	
2003)	209.	62	Abdullahi	Ahmed	An-Na’im,	Islam	and	the	secular	state:	Negotiating	the	future	of	Shari`a,	Harvard	
University	Press,	Cambridge	2008)	14.	
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An-Naim’s	 and	 Saeed’s	 ideas	 and	 concepts	 about	 God,	 beliefs,	 religion,	
equality,	morality	and	most	 importantly	 the	concept	of	 rights	and	universality,63	do	
not	 much	 differ	 from	 that	 of	 the	 Protestant	 line	 of	 thought	 (or	 the	 Abrahamic	
religions	 in	 general),	 which	 according	 to	 Balaganaghdara	 are	 what	 religions	 are.64	
Therefore	 attempts	 to	 harmonise	 various	 traditions	 with	 the	 existent	 framework	
from	within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 Protestantism	 is	 possible.	However,	 any	 attempt	 to	
harmonise	some	aspects	of,	fore	example,	Islam,	as	he	argues,	could	definitely	fit	it	in	
the	 religious	 framework	of	human	 rights	and	Article	9.	 	By	accepting	 to	harmonise	
segments	of	the	Islamic	law,	Saeed	pushes	Islamic	doctrines	into	conformity	with	the	
dominant	 Christian	 culture.	 Furthermore,	 the	 “omitted”	 parts	 could	 potentially	 be	
seen	as	a	confirmation	that	these	parts	are	considered	as	violations	of	human	rights	
or	 false	 practices	 in	 just	 the	 same	way	 as	 Protestants	 labelled	 certain	 practices	 as	
idolatry	and	false	practices.		
Consequently,	despite	secularisation	or	attempted	harmonisation,	theological	
beliefs	are	still	embedded	in	the	ECHR	and	the	ECtHR.	Secular	concepts	are	thought	
to	be	universal	 in	all	cultures	and	therefore	these	 legal	systems	are	assumed	to	be	
inclusive	 systems	 taking	 into	 account	 diverse	 cultures	 and	 traditions.65	Questions	
about	 God	 become	 questions	 about	 the	 meaning	 of	 life;	 being	 a	 good	 Christian	
becomes	having	good	morals	and	ethics;	God	becomes	the	lawgiver	and	the	voice	of	
God	becomes	the	conscience	and	idolatry	becomes	violators	of	human	rights.	When	
terms	change	only	linguistically	it	is	thus	presumed	that	harmonisation	is	possible.		
																																								 																					63	For	a	further	analysis	see	section	2.5	and	3.5.	
64	For	further	explanation	please	refer	to	section	3.2.2	Religion(s)	as	Variant	Models	of	Christianity.	
65	Ibid.	
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1.3	The	Protestant	Framework,	Symbols,	Culture	and	Article	9	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 overarching	 questions,	 scholars	 have	 also	 considered	 the	
interpretation	and	application	of	Article	9	by	the	judges	of	the	ECtHR	and	suggested	
a	Protestant	bias	 in	 the	approach	which	has	been	 taken.	The	problems	highlighted	
are	most	usually	illustrated	by	the	judgments	concerning	religious	dress	and	religious	
symbols.	Whilst	 the	wearing	 of	 religious	 symbols	may	 be	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 an	
individual’s	expression	of	cultural	and	religious	identity,	it	may	also	be	seen	by	other	
members	 of	 Western	 society	 as	 indicator,	 especially	 with	 Islam,	 of	 religious	
extremism	associated	with	religious	fundamentalism	and	proselytism.66	Islamic	dress	
in	 particular	may	 be	 portrayed	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 failed	 integration	 of	Muslims	 in	
European	societies,	as	many	in	the	West	find	it	difficult	to	understand	how	rational	
women	would	freely	choose	to	veil.67	
Armin	 Steinbach	 states	 that	 in	 ECtHR	 jurisprudence,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	
judgments	has	not	been	on	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	“internal	 freedom	of	religion	(the	
right	 to	believe	or	 not	 believe),	 but	 rather,	 the	 freedom	of	 religious	 expression.”68	
Tom	 Lewis	 argues	 that	 the	 ECtHR’s	 	 “protection	 of	 the	 right	 to	manifest	 religious	
belief	through	clothing,	has	been	noticeably	weak.”69	He	suggests	that	the	ECtHR	 is	
unable	 to	 identify	 “why	 religious	 freedom	 is	 valued	 in	 the	 first	 place.”70 		 This	
undoubtedly	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 Protestant	 idea	 of	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	
																																								 																					
66	Dominic	 McGoldrick,	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Religion:	 The	 Islamic	 Headscarf	 Debate	 in	 Europe	 (Hart	
Publishing	2010)	17-18.	
67	Ibid.,	at	17.	
68 	Armin	 Steinbach,	 ‘Burqas	 and	 bans:	 the	 wearing	 of	 religious	 symbols	 under	 the	 European	
Convention	of	Human	Rights’,	(2015)	C.J.I.C.L.	4(1),	29-52,	30-31.	
69	Tom	Lewis	‘What	not	to	Wear:	Religious	Rights,	the	European	Court	and	the	Margin	of	Appreciation’	
(2007)	I.C.L.Q.	56(2)	395-414,	395.	
70	Ibid.	
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Christian	from	the	monastic	rules	and	freedom	of	the	conscience	from	the	temporal	
world,	 which	 then	 passed	 through	 the	 process	 of	 secularisation	 to	 come	 to	 its	
modern	form	as	religious	freedom.	
This	discrepancy	in	analysing	the	meaning	of	symbols	by	the	ECtHR	provides	
evidence	 that	 “courts	 and	 legislators	 tend	 to	 secularise	 the	 meaning	 of	 religious	
symbols	and	 interpret	them	according	to	the	sensitivities,	prejudices,	and	claims	of	
the	majority”,71	which	happens	to	be	Christianity	in	Europe.	It	should	be	noted	here	
that	although	the	ECtHR	does	interpret	at	times	religious	symbols	 incoherently,	the	
hypothesis	in	this	thesis	is	that	it	regards	symbols	as	“deaf	and	dumb”	in	other	words	
a	secularised	version	of	idolatry	that	can	easily	be	removed.	(See	Chapter	7)	
Some	 scholars	 also	 regard	 the	 burqa	 ban	 as	 a	 coercive	 measure	 that	
undermines	 Muslim	 women’s	 dignity	 as	 autonomous	 individuals	 by	 stating	 that	
veiled	women	are	unable	to	make	individual	choices	or	think	for	themselves,	72	and	
that	 it	 therefore	 criminalises	 an	 aspect	 of	 their	 identity	 and	 personality.73	In	 the	
public	 sphere,	 for	 example,	 they	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 "good	 role	 models”	 for	
schoolchildren	because	the	burqa	portrays	the	unequal	treatment	of	women.74		
																																								 																					
71	Paolo	 Ronchi,	 ‘Crucifixes,	 Margin	 of	 Appreciation	 and	 Consensus:	 The	 Grand	 Chamber	 Ruling	 in	
Lautsi	v	Italy’,	(2011)	Ecclesiastical	Law	Journal	13	287-297	p.294	and	Susanna	Mancini,	The	Power	of	
Symbols	 and	 Symbols	 of	 Power:	 Secularism	 and	 Religion	 as	 Guarantors	 of	 Cultural	 Convergence,	
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Baker,	 ‘Religion	 and	 Human	 Rights:	 Principles	 and	 Practice’,	 in	 Frank	 Cranmer,	Mark	 Hill	 QC,	 Celia	
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74	Erica	Howard,	"Bans	on	the	Wearing	of	Religious	Symbols	in	British	Schools:	A	Violation	of	the	Right	
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Eva	 Brems	 has	 noted	 that	 while	 in	 Eweida	 v	 United	 Kingdom	 the	 ECtHR	
required	 real	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 any	 “encroachment	 on	 the	 interests	 of	 others”,	
this	 approach	 was	 not	 adopted	 in	 other	 judgments75 	including	 S.A.S.	 v	 France.	
Myriam	Hunter-Henin	argues	that,	"[d]enying	adults	choices	in	the	name	of	dignity	is	
problematic	when	autonomy	is	more	and	more	regarded	as	an	essential	component	
of	dignity.”76		
Gabriel	 Moens	 observes	 that	 limiting	 freedom	 of	 religion	 to	 religious	
supporters	who	act	on	 their	belief,	does	not	work	 in	a	heterogeneous	society	with	
various	 religions	but	works	 in	 a	 society	with	 a	unified,	 dominant	 and	homogenous	
religion.77		 In	 his	 view,	 such	 societies	 tend	 to	 have	 a	 harmonious	 agreement	 as	 to	
what	 religiously	motivated	acts	 are	 socially	 adequate	which	 in	 turn	become	 legally	
permissible.	 This	 approach	 will	 in	 most	 cases	 result	 in	 rejecting	 claims	 from	 the	
minorities	 whose	 practices	 and	 beliefs	 are	 poorly	 accommodated	 and	 designed.	78	
Others	 have	 also	 argued	 that	 this	 approach	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 risky	 situation	 where	
minorities	will	be	respected,	if	and	only	if,	the	majority	approves	of	such	respect.79	
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Roger	 Cotterrell	 has	 argued	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	
culture	 and	 legal	 interpretation.	 Cotterrell	 writes	 on	 the	 “jurisprudence	 of	
difference”80	and	argues	that		
“[C]ulture	should	not	be	seen	as	a	unity.	It	consists	of	diverse	components	–	
relating	 to	 ultimate	 values	 and	 beliefs,	 traditions,	 emotional	 allegiances	 and	
instrumental	social	relations	–	and	law	relates	to	these	components	in	different	ways.	
Culture	 is	 a	 bounded	 unity	 only	 in	 the	 dangerous,	 pathological	 case	 of	 absolute	
cultural	 divisions	 –	which	 state	 law	 should	 oppose.	 The	 concept	 of	 legal	 culture	 is	
equally	problematic	when	 it	 suggests	bounded	cultural	unities.	But	when	culture	 is	
conceptualised	 in	 terms	 of	 fluid	 networks	 of	 community	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	
analyse	not	only	issues	of	multiculturalism,	but	also	the	ways	in	which	transnational	
regulation	 serves	 social	 networks	 that	 extend	 beyond	 the	 boundaries	 of	 nation	
states.”81	
This	approach	is	certainly	important	but	it	is	somewhat	optimistic	for	cultural	
diversity,	 although	 recognised	 by	 law,	 is	 recognised	 from	within	 the	 framework	 of	
Christian	 theology.	 Protestantism	 has	 shaped	 the	 learning	 process	 of	 the	Western	
culture	which	Balagangadhara	also	calls	the	configuration	of	learning.	It	is	therefore	
vital	 here	 to	 explain	 the	 concept	of	 the	meta-learning	which	 shows	how	 the	West	
seeks	knowledge	“about”	a	certain	phenomenon,	thereby	shaping	the	culture’s	way	
of	going	about	in	the	world.		
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1.3.1	S.N.	Balagangadhara	and	the	Concept	of	Culture	
Balaganagdhara	 is	amongst	 the	 few	scholars	who	have	raised	questions	as	 to	what	
makes	something	a	cultural	rather	than	an	individual	difference.82	He	argues	that	it	is	
individuals	who	differ	in	many	ways	and	individuals	who	meet	each	other	rather	than	
cultures.	 He	 questions	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 one	 could	 acknowledge	 cultural	
differences	 as	 opposed	 to	 say	 individual	 or	 social	 differences.	 Consequently	 he	
introduces	the	term		“culturality”,	 in	addition	to	the	present	concepts	as	“sociality”	
and	 “personality”.	 To	 explain	 this	 concept	 one	 needs	 an	 example.	 Usually	
socialisation	 is	 the	 process	 in	 which	 people	 are	 taught	 to	 become	 	 established	
members	of	a	society	whereby	the	process	primarily	focuses	on	patterns	of	conduct,	
norms,	 rules,	 values	 etc.). 83 	Balagangadhara	 argues	 that	 during	 this	 process	 of	
teaching	 an	 important	meta-message	 is	 carried,	 informing	 the	 person	 how	 he/she	
should	 learn.	 The	 emphasis	 therefore	 shifts	 from	 the	 content	 of	what	 is	 taught	 to	
how	it	is	taught,	and	this	meta-learning	of	the	western	culture	becomes	the	central	
parameter	for	distinguishing	cultural	differences.	Consequently	differences	between	
cultures	are	a	result	of	differences	in	the	configuration	of	learning;	irrespective	what	
one	 learns;	one	 learns	 it	 in	 a	particular	way	 in	which	his	or	her	 culture	has	 taught	
them.	One	 learns	 how	 to	 learn.	 In	 the	Western	 culture	 religion	 has	 generated	 this	
particular	 configuration	 of	 learning	 and	 meta-learning	 where	 it	 has	 become	
dominant	 and	 where	 theoretical	 frameworks	 have	 subordinated	 other	 learning	
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processes.84		As	a	result	the	person’s	culturality	“consists	of	the	specific	way	one	has	
learned	to	use	the	resources	of	the	society	to	which	one	belongs.	How	an	individual	
builds	its	culturality	is	a	research	question	for	the	future	Science	of	Cultures.”85	
Balagangadhara	 observes	 that	 the	 European	 culture	 has	 a	 theologically	
grounded	approach	 to	 asking	questions	 about	 the	nature	of	 the	universe,	 religion,	
and	man	and	configures	a	theory	of	learning	and	meta-learning	which	shows	how	the	
West	 seeks	 knowledge	 “about”	 a	 certain	 phenomenon.	 This	 kind	 of	 learning	
generates	a	theoretical	knowledge	“about”	the	world	which	results	in	the	process	of	
“going	about”	the	world.	Consequently	this	culture	became	a	culture	that	privileges	
knowledge	 contained	 in	 beliefs,	 theories,	 and	 doctrines	 over	 knowledge	 acquired	
through,	 traditions,	 practice,	 customs	 and	 rituals.	 These	 cultures,	 and	 equally	 the	
Western	 legal	 systems,	 demand	 that	 the	 secular	 realm	 remains	 free	of	 customary,	
non-textual,	 “idolatrous”	 traditions.	 Accordingly	 they	 reconstruct	 traditions	 and	
customs	so	as	 to	make	them	conform	to	 the	model	of	Christianity.86		Furthermore,	
when	 the	West	 encountered	 various	 cultures	 during	 colonialism	 they	 thought	 that	
they	had	a	clear	understanding	of	 that	culture	and	by	merely	describing	what	 they	
experienced	 and	 saw,	 they	 thought	 they	 were	 giving	 a	 factual	 description	 and	
understanding	 of	 that	 culture–	 however	 in	 reality	 they	were	 structuring	 their	 own	
experiences	of	those	cultures.		
																																								 																					
84	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	398-400.	
85 	Harry	 van	 den	 Bouwhuijsen,	 “Conversation	 of	 mankind	 or	 Comparative	 Science	 of	 Cultures?	
Reading	 Balagangadhara,	 Reconceptualising	 India	 Studies	 Paper”	 presented	 May	 28,	 2013	 for	 the	
India	Platform,	Ghent.	
86	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…	396-403.	
	 46	
Balagangadhara	explains	 that	“[t]he	 language	the	West	uses	 to	speak	about	
other	 cultures	 is	 that	 of	 a	 secularised	 Christian	 theology.	 Within	 this	 linguistic	
practice,	the	practices	one	encounters	in	other	cultures	threaten	to	become	radically	
unintelligible	 if	 they	 are	 not	 described	 as	 religions.”87	Religion	 answers	 questions	
about	the	meaning	of	the	world	thus	posing	meaning	problems	as	well	(i.e.	what	 is	
the	 meaning	 of	 man,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 man	 and	 the	 cosmos),	 thus	
people	accept	questions	brought	forth	by	religion	even	if	they	are	not	familiar	with	
the	 doctrines.	 To	 put	 this	 argument	 in	 context	 of	 the	 legal	 texts,	 and	 given	 the	
theological	background	to	the	type	of	questions	and	relationships	made	upon	them,	
the	Christian	Protestant	cultural	and	religious	background	to	Article	9	will	inherently	
colour	the	legal	texts	and	their	interpretation	in	the	Western	culture.	
1.4	Neutrality,	Secularism	and	the	ECtHR	
Given	 its	 theological	 background,	 Article	 9	 is	 biased	 towards	 applicants	 of	 the	
Protestant	faith	and	discriminatory	against	non-Protestant	applicants	in	general	and	
non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 in	 particular.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 when	 non-Abrahamic	
traditions	encounter	the	Protestant	biased	ECHR	and	ECtHR,	problems	of	distortion,	
unintelligibility	and	discrimination	arise.	These	problems	develop	because	Protestant	
Christianity	 is	 still	 embedded	 in	 the	 background	 of	 the	 legal	 systems	 and	 the	
interpretation	and	language	which	the	ECtHR	uses	when	deciding	on	Article	9	cases,	
despite	 secularisation	 and	 the	 use	 of	 secularised	 language.	 The	 ECtHR	 therefore																																									 																					
87	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Chapter-wise	 Questions	 and	 Answers	 to	 understand	 “The	 Heathen	 in	 His	
Blindness:	 Asia,	 the	 West	 and	 the	 Dynamic	 of	 Religion”,	 Hipkapi,	 March	 7,	 2011.	 Available	 at	http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/07/chapter-wise-questions-and-answers-to-understand-the-heathen-in-his-blindness-asia-the-west-and-the-dynamic-of-religion/		See	also	sections	4.4.	of	this	
thesis,	and	also	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	
of	Religion	(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005),	233-238.	
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forces	 non-Abrahamic	 cultures	 to	 distort	 their	 traditions	 in	 order	 to	 fit	 into	 the	
Protestant	biased	ECtHR’s	framework,	so	as	to	qualify	for	protection	under	Article	9	
ECHR.	 It	 picks	 out	 certain	 phenomena,	 questions,	 and	 approaches	 when	 deciding	
applications	concerning	religious	freedom	that	are	specific	to	some	cultures	and	are	
only	 intelligible	 within	 the	 Christian	 and	 more	 specifically	 Protestant	 religious	
framework.	 The	 intelligibility,	 for	 example,	 that	 “religion	 lends	 to	 conscientious	
objection	among	Jews,	Christians,	and	Muslims	is	not	accessible	to	members	of	other	
cultures,	 so	 the	 law	 effectively	 caters	 to	 preferences	 of	 some	 groups	 but	 not	 of	
others.”88	Having	 said	 this	 one	 would	 question	 how	 can	 the	 concept	 of	 neutrality	
tackle	this	issue	(if	any).		
In	 the	 political	 theory	 debates	 it	 is	 commonly	 agreed	 that	 it	 is	 a	 central	
principle	of	liberalism	that	the	state	should	be	neutral	towards	different	conceptions	
of	the	good	 life.89		The	principle	of	neutrality	 involves,	at	the	minimum,	that	States	
should	 allow	 their	 citizens	 to	 pursue	 and	 define	 their	 lives	 and	 goals	 as	 they	 see	
appropriate	while	 the	 State	 confines	 itself	 to	 provide	 a	 “neutral	 framework	within	
which	 different	 and	 potentially	 conflicting	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good	 can	 be	
																																								 																					
88	Prakash	 Shah,	 ‘The	 Moral	 Basis	 of	 Anti	 Caste	 Legislation’	 Public	 Spirit	 25/09/2013	 available	 at	http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/the-moral-basis-of-anti-caste-legislation/	 [last	 accessed	 in	
November	2017].	
89	See	for	example,	John	Rawls,	Political	Liberalism	(Columbia	University	Press	1993);	Ronald	Dworkin,	
‘Liberalism’	 in	Stuart	Hampshire	(ed),	Public	and	Private	Morality	(Cambridge	University	Press	1978);	
Charles	 Larmore,	 ‘Political	 Liberalism’	 (1990)	 18(3)	 Political	 Theory	 339;	 Will	 Kymlicka,	 ‘Liberal	
Individualism	and	Liberal	Neutrality’	 (1989)	99	Ethics	883	and	Peter	 Jones,	 ‘The	 Ideal	of	 the	Neutral	
State’	in	Robert	E.	Goodin	and	Andrew	Reeve	(eds),	Liberal	Neutrality	(Routledge	1989).	
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pursued.” 90 	Hence	 States	 should	 refrain	 from	 promoting	 or	 imposing	 one	
controversial	view	of	the	good	life.91	
In	order	to	prevent	interference	in	the	internal	affairs	of	the	religious,	States	
may	invoke	“neutrality.92	However	Peter	Petkoff	and	Malcolm	Evans	argue	that	this	
in	 itself	prompts	such	 interferences.93	The	ECtHR	observes	that	the	“State’s	duty	of	
neutrality	and	impartiality,	as	defined	in	its	case-law,	is	incompatible	with	any	power	
on	the	State’s	part	to	assess	the	legitimacy	of	religious	beliefs,	and	requires	the	State	
to	ensure	that	conflicting	groups	tolerate	each	other,	even	where	they	originated	in	
the	same	group.”94	The	ECtHR	has	stressed	at	various	times	that	the	Convention	was	
meant	to	maintain	and	promote	the	values	and	 ideals	of	a	democratic	society,	and	
that	 political	 democracy	 is	 not	 just	 a	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 the	 European	 public	
order.95		 Consequently	 the	notion	of	 neutrality	 in	 religious	matters	 is	 now	 strongly	
recognised	 in	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 ECtHR.	 However	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	
concept	of	neutrality	is	unproblematic.	As	Julie	Ringleheim	notes,		“as	references	to	
neutrality	have	multiplied,	the	meaning	afforded	to	this	notion	has	become	blurred.	
It	has	come	to	mean	different	things	in	different	rulings.	And	there	are	clear	tensions																																									 																					
90	Will	 Kymlicka,	 ‘Liberal	 Individualism	 and	 Liberal	 Neutrality’	 (1989)	 99	 Ethics	 883;	 see	 also	 Peter	
Jones,	 ‘The	 Ideal	 of	 the	 Neutral	 State’	 in	 Robert	 E.	 Goodin	 and	 Andrew	 Reeve	 (eds),	Liberal	
Neutrality	(Routledge	1989)	9	
91	Peter	 Jones,	 ‘The	 Ideal	of	 the	Neutral	 State’	 in	Robert	E.	Goodin	and	Andrew	Reeve	 (eds),	Liberal	
Neutrality	(Routledge	1989)	20.	
92	For	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	connection	between	the	protestant	theology	and	the	emergence	of	
the	secular	and	neutrality	refer	to	section	4.12	and	4.13	for.	See	also	sections	7.5	and	7.6	for	a	deeper	
analysis	on	whether	the	ECtHR	could	be	neutral.	
93	Malcolm	Evans	and	Peter	Petkoff,	 ‘A	Separation	of	Convenience?	The	Concept	of	Neutrality	 in	the	
Jurisprudence	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’,	(2008)	Religion,	State	&	Society	36(3)	205-223,	
at	205.	See	also	See	also	Javier	Martínez-Torrón,	‘Freedom	of	Religion	in	the	European	Convention	on	
Human	 Rights	 Under	 the	 Influence	 of	 Different	 European	 Traditions	 Universal	 Rights	 in	 a	World	 of	
Diversity	–	The	Case	of	Religious	Freedom’,	329,	334.	
94	Metropolitan	Church	of	Bessarabia,	paras	118	and	123,	and	Hasan	and	Chaush	v	Bulgaria,	para.	62.			
95		 See	 Refah	 Partisi	 (Welfare	 Party)	 and	 Others	 v	 Turkey;	 United	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Turkey	 and	
Others	v	Turkey,	Moscow	Branch	of	the	Salvation	Army	v	Russia.			
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between	 some	 of	 these	 interpretations.”96	Consequently,	 further	 specification	may	
be	needed	when	it	comes	to	the	 implementation	of	neutrality	 in	certain	situations.	
Given	this	general	requirement	of	neutrality,	two	requirements	are	clearly	identified	
by	 the	 ECtHR;	 the	 duty	 of	 non-interference	 and	 that	 of	 impartiality	 and	 non-
discrimination.97	
First,	with	regard	to	disputes	that	are	exclusively	religious,	neutrality	entails	a	
duty	of	non-interference.	Second,	where	the	state	has	to	take	a	decision	affecting	a	
religious	 community,	 in	 particular	 when	 determining	 its	 legal	 status,	 it	 must	 act	
impartially	and	without	discrimination.		
		 In	legal	doctrine,	and	in	addition	to	religion,	neutrality	is	usually	only	applied	
to	beliefs	that	are	very	analogous	to	religion,	such	as	humanism.	However,	scholars	
such	 as,	 Ronald	 Dworkin,	 John	 Rawls,	 Robert	 Nozick	 and	 Will	 Kymlicka	 apply	
neutrality	 to	 “conceptions	 of	 the	 good	 life”	 or	 to	 so-called	 “comprehensive	
doctrines”	 and	 no	 merely	 to	 religion.98	Wouter	 De	 Been	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 puts	
forward	a	re-explanation	of	the	concept	of	"inclusive”	state	neutrality,	he	argues	that	
the	 request	 to	 totally	 remove	 religious	 symbols	 from	the	public	 sphere	 is	 indeed	a	
form	of	secular	iconoclasm.99		
																																								 																					
96	Julie	 Ringelheim	 ‘State	 Religious	 Neutrality	 as	 a	 Common	 European	 Standard?	 Reappraising	 the	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights	Approach’,	OJLR	(2017)	6(1),	24–47	
97	Ibid	
98	Ronald	 Dworkin,	 A	 Matter	 of	 Principle	 (Oxford	 University	 Press	 1985);	 John	 Rawls,	 A	 Theory	 of	
Justice	 (Harvard	 University	 Press	 1971)	 John	 Rawls,	 Political	 Liberalism	 (Columbia	 University	 Press	
1993);	 Robert	 Nozick,	 Anarchy	 State	 and	 Utopia	 (Blackwell	 Publishing	 1974)	 and	 Will	 Kymlicka,	
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99	Wouter	 De	 Been,	 “The	 Quest	 for	 Neutrality	 and	 the	 Stench	 of	 History,”	 in:	 Jeroen	 Temperman	
(ed.)	The	 Lautsi	 Papers:	 Multidisciplinary	 Reflections	 on	 Religious	 Symbols	 in	 the	 Public	 School	
Classroom,	Leiden	and	Boston:	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	2012)	183.	
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Some	 scholars	 argued	 that	 neutrality	 bared	 conceptual	 controversies,	 with	
the	concept	of	impartiality	being	the	least	controversial.100	They	divided	the	concepts	
into	four	stances;	the	first	displays	neutrality	as	being	equidistant	between	the	state	
and	 all	 religions	 without	 favouring	 one	 over	 the	 other.	 The	 second	 stance	 is	 that	
under	 neutrality	 the	 State	 treats	 all	 religions	 on	 a	 strictly	 equal	 basis.	 	 The	 third	
stance	is	that	of	the	equal	respect	one	whereby	the	State	is	permitted	to	differences	
in	 treatment	 if	 these	differences	are	 justified	or	where	 fundamental	 rights	 are	not	
engaged.	 The	 fourth	 strand	 of	 neutrality	 is	 that	 of	 objectivity	 where	 States	 “treat	
religions	equally	as	subjective	belief	systems	so	that,	at	best,	the	State	is	indifferent	
towards	them,	or	at	worst,	they	are	seen	as	equally	irrelevant	or	misguided.”		
Other	scholars	have	written	about	secularism	and	neutrality	and	some	have	
also	 clearly	 identified	 the	 link	 between	 the	 Protestant	 theology	 and	 secularism.	
Despite	the	fact	that	secularism	and	neutrality	presumed	to	act	as	effective	tools	to	
manage	diversity,	 there	still	 is	 considerable	amount	of	bias	 towards	 the	Protestant	
line	 of	 thought	 when	 applying	 secularism	 or	 neutrality.	 Malcolm	 Evans	 and	 Peter	
Petkoff		 note,	 “neutrality	 emerges	 as	 a	 multi-layered	 concept	 which	 nevertheless	
derives	 from	 the	paradigm	of	 the	 separation	of	 religion	and	 state.”101	They	 further	
argue	that	neutrality	is	often	used	to	display	a	bias	towards	a	particular	worldview102	
																																								 																					
100Ian	Leigh,	“The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	and	Religious	Neutrality”	 in	Religion	 in	a	Liberal	
State,	 Gavin	 D’Costa	 Malcolm	 Evans	 Tariq	 Modood	 and	 Julian	 Rivers	 (eds),	 (Cambridge	 University	
Press,	2013)	
101	Malcolm	Evans	and	Peter	Petkoff,	‘A	Separation	of	Convenience?	The	Concept	of	Neutrality	in	the	
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or	 societal	 paradigm,	 rather	 than	 representing	 unbiased	 perspectives	 of	 legal	
reasoning.103	
Lorenzo	Zucca	argues	that	the	interpretation	of	secularism	being	that	of	the	
relationship	between	 the	State	and	Church	 is	an	old-fashioned	model	and	 that	 the	
“new	model	of	secularism	is	concerned	with	the	way	in	which	modern	secular	states	
deal	with	the	presence	of	diversity	in	the	society.”104	
Other	 academics	 question	 whether	 the	 secular	 public	 sphere	 is	 indeed	
neutral.	 Balagangadhara	 for	 example	 goes	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 ideas	 of	
recognising	 secularism	 as	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 State	 and	 religion.		
Balagangadhara	 argues	 that	 secularism	 emanated	 from	 Protestant	 theological	
concepts,	and	that	what	 is	called	“the	secular”	 is	religion	that	was	secularised	or	 in	
other	 words,	 religion	 in	 a	 different	 guise.105	He	 states	 that	 distinguishing	 between	
the	“secular”	and	“religion”	is	made	from	within	and	by	a	religion.		
Jakob	De	Roover	notes	that	secularisation	 is	the	transformation	of	recurring	
themes	within	a	 theological	 tradition	of	 reasoning	 (tropes)	 into	 the	common	sense	
notions	of	a	society	or	culture	where	they	constitute	the	conceptual	resources(topoi)	
for	the	development	of	new	ideas	and	theories.		
																																								 																					
103	Ibid.	
104	Lorenzo	Zucca,	A	secular	Europe:	law	and	religion	in	the	European	constitutional	landscape	(Oxford	
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It	 while	 some	 of	 these	 ideas	 and	 theories	 become	 detached	 from	 the	
theological	tropes	(linguistic	theory),	others	do	not,	but	remain	tied	to	 it	 in	specific	
ways	(liberal	secularism).		
Prakash	 Shah	 argues	 that	 the	 Lautsi	 judgment	 presents	 an	 excellent	
illustration	of	this	process	of	secularisation.	The	“ostensibly	atheistic	demand	for	the	
removal	of	the	crucifix	is	really	the	iconoclasm	at	the	heart	of	Christianity	presented	
in	secular	form.”106	
According	 to	 Balagangadhara	 secularisation	 entails	 the	 spread	 of	 Christian	
ideas	in	a	non-theological	guise	to	become	a	part	of	the	common	sense	of	a	culture.	
Jacob	 De	 Roover	 states	 that	 Christian	 assumptions	 on	 the	 aim	 of	 human	 life	 and	
nature	 become	 innate	 elements	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 secularism.107	Furthermore,	 Triloki	
Madan	argues	 that	 secularism	did	not	emerge	 simply	 from	engaging	 in	 rationalism	
and	repudiating	religion.	It	emerged	from	the	dialectic	of	Protestantism	and	modern	
science.108	Scientific	 ideas	replaced	the	Christian	conceptions	of	the	world	and	man	
through	a	process	called	‘secularization’.	Hence,		
“Secularization	is	not	a	process	in	which	religion	was	banned	from	public	life	
–	 and	 so	 from	science	–	but	 a	process	by	which	originally	Christian	 conceptions	of	
man	 and	 world	 lost	 their	 recognizably	 Christian	 character,	 acquiring	 the	 status	 of	
																																								 																					
106	Prakash	 Shah,	 ‘Does	 Durkheim	 Enhances	 Our	 Understanding	 of	 Law	 and	 Religion’	 Legal	 Studies	
Research	 Paper	 No.	 212/2015	 at	 p.9.	 Available	 at	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694566	[last	accessed	in	January	2016].	
107	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Secularism,	 Colonialism	 and	 Indian	 Intellectuals’	 April	 2,	 2011	 available	 at	http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/02/secularism-colonialism-and-indian-intellectuals/	
[accessed	in	December	2016].	
108	Triloki	Nath	Madan,	‘Secularism	in	Its	Place’	(1987)	The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies	46(4),	747-759.	
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‘natural’	 characteristics	of	man	and	world,	 thereby	becoming	part	of	 the	 ‘common	
sense’	of	a	culture.”109		
Alessandro	 Ferrari,	 for	 example,	 noted	 that	 Western	 secularism	 is	 more	
hostile	to	non-	Christian	religions	than	to	Christians	and	used	the	expression	“double	
standard	 secularism”	 to	 refer	 to	 this	 assumption.	 Furthermore,	 Ferrari	 states	 that	
Christians	can	more	easily	than	non-Christians	access	the	secular	public	sphere,	since	
their	 organisational	 and	 doctrinal	 characteristics	 are	 more	 compatible	 with	
the	“secular	profile	that	distinguishes	the	public	sphere.”110	
Nader	Hashimi	states	that	“those	involved	in	the	discussion	assume	they	are	
talking	 about	 the	 same	 idea	 when	 in	 reality	they	 have	 rather	 distinct	 concepts	 in	
mind”	and	that	“one	way	of	advancing	conceptual	clarity	with	respect	to	secularism,	
especially	its	political	variant,	is	to	be	sensitive	to	the	different	histories	of	secularism,	
of	which	there	are	many.”111	Others	simplify	the	concept	and	state	that	secularism	is	
the	 “one	 that	 denies	 the	 existence	 or	 relevance	 of	 a	 transcendental	 or	 divine	
dimension	to	public	affairs.”112		
Carolyn	Evans	maintains	that	it	difficult	for	the	ECtHR	to	draw	a	universal	or	
near-universal	European	conception	of	secularism	to	narrow	the	“too	wide”	margin	
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of	appreciation	set	for	Article	9	cases.113	On	the	other	hand,	Brenna	Bhandar	argues	
that	the	“concept	of	multiculturalism	is	premised	on	a	concept	of	culture	that	is	very	
much	 related	 to	 a	 religious	 belief.”114	This	 concept	 of	 culture	 she	 states	 is	 derived	
from	 a	 deeply	 entrenched	 “notion	 of	 consciousness	 for	 which	 religious	 faith	 is	
essential.	And	this	religious	faith	and	its	reconciliation	with	the	culture	of	European	
Enlightenment	 thought	 is…	 Christian	 in	 its	 form	 and	 content.”115	Myriam	 Hunter-
Henin	also	observes	that	“the	differences	between	secularism	and	multiculturalism,	
often	 associated	 respectively	 with	 French	 and	 British	 traditions,	 should	 not	 be	
exaggerated.”	She	states	that	
“if	multiculturalism	rests	on	the	recognition	of	diversity	which	it	then	seeks	to	
accommodate,	 whereas	 secularism	 purports	 to	 construct	 a	 transcending	 common	
unity,	 both	multiculturalism	 and	 secularism	 are	 deployed	 as	 techniques	 to	 govern	
difference	 that	 is	 perceived	 to	 violate	 dominant	 norms	 and	 values	 defined	 in	
reference	to	the	Christian	cultural	heritage	of	the	nation-state.”116		
Both	secularism	and	multiculturalism	are	seen	as	regulatory	tools	to	manage	
diversity,117	but	within	the	boundaries	of	the	Christian	culture.	Unlike	in	France,	the	
																																								 																					
113	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	 press	 2001)	 see	 also	 George	 Letsas	 ‘Two	 concepts	 of	 the	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 2006	
O.J.L.S.	26(4),	705-732.	
114	Brenna	Bhandar,	 ʻThe	Ties	that	Bind	Multiculturalism	and	Secularism	Reconsidered’	 (2009)	JLS	36	
301-326,	324.	
115	Ibid.,	at	323.	
116 	Myriam	 Hunter-Henin,	 ‘Why	 the	 French	 don’t	 like	 the	 Burqa:	 Laicite,	 National	 Identity	 and	
Religious	 Freedom’	 (2012)	 x	 International	 and	 Comparative	 Law	Quarterly	 36	 613.	 See	 also	 Brenna	
Bhandar,	ʻThe	Ties	that	Bind	Multiculturalism	and	Secularism	Reconsidered’	(2009)	JLS	36	301-26.	
117 	Myriam	 Hunter-Henin,	 ‘Why	 the	 French	 don’t	 like	 the	 Burqa:	 Laicite,	 National	 Identity	 and	
Religious	Freedom’	(2012)	61	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	613.	
	 55	
principle	of	“laicïté”	in	Italy	is	not	seen	as	a	leeway	to	resist	the	Catholic	heritage	of	
the	country	but	rather	a	way	of	encompassing	it.118	
Michel	 Rosenfeld	 sets	 out	 the	 secular	 model	 of	 the	 Enlightenment,	 which	
states	that	religion	should	be	expelled	from	the	public	sphere	but	with	religions	and	
their	adherents	enjoying	equal	protection	within	the	private	sphere.	Moreover	States	
should	 neither	 favour	 nor	 disfavour	 religion,	 hence	 be	 neutral	 with	 respect	 to	
religion.119	However,	 Rosenfeld	 acknowledges	 that	 this	 model	 is	 challenging	 and	
cannot	 be	 attained	 in	 reality.	 William	 Twining	 correctly	 states	 that	 “[a]	 just	
International	 order	 and	 a	 healthy	 cosmopolitan	 discipline	 of	 law	 need	 to	 include	
perspectives	that	account	of	the	standpoints,	interests,	concerns,	and	beliefs	of	non	
Western	people	and	traditions.”120	When	addressing	how	practical	conflicts	between	
law	and	religion	in	secular	democracies	are	managed,	Lorenzo	Zucca121	contends	that	
it	 is	 rather	 simplistic	 to	assume	 that	 religion	can	be	manifested	privately	while	 the	
law	rules	the	public	sphere	because	secular	States	do	not	have	adequate	arguments	
to	prevent	religion	from	having	a	strong	presence	or	role	in	the	public	sphere.	Zucca	
also	argues	that	this	simplistic	idea	of	separation	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	it	is	
accurate.	Moreover	“the	rise	of	new	religious	demands	that	are	at	odds	with	secular	
laws,	make	the	distinction	between	private	and	public	spheres	more	obsolete.”122	He	
																																								 																					
118	Alessandro	 Ferrari,	 ʻDe	 la	 politique	 à	 la	 technique:	 laïcité	 narrative	 et	 laïcité	 du	 droit.	 Pour	 une	
comparaison	 France/Italieʼ,	 in	 Le	 Droit	 ecclésiatique	 en	 Europe	 et	 à	 ses	 marges	 XVIIIème	 -XXème	
siècles,	 eds.	 Brigitte	 Basdevant-Gaudemet	 and	 François	 Jankowiak	 (2009)	 333-45.	 See	 also	 Lautsi	 v	
Italy.	
119	Michel	Rosenfeld,	 ‘Introduction:	Can	Constitutionalism,	 Secularism	and	Religion	be	Reconciled	 in	
an	Era	of	Globalization	and	Religious	Revival?’,		(2009)	Cardozo	Law	Review	30(6)	2333-	2368,	2333.	
120
	William	 Twining,	 General	 Jurisprudence:	 Understanding	 Law	 from	 a	 Global	 Perspective,	
(Cambridge	University	Press	2008)	438.	
121	Lorenzo	 Zucca,	 A	 Secular	 Europe:	 Law	 and	 Religion	 in	 the	 European	 Constitutional	 Landscape,	
(Oxford	University	Press,	2012).	
122	Ibid.,	at	47.	
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argues	that	the	real	problem	with	secularism	is	the	inability	of	the	secular	States	to	
cope	with	diversity.123	
While	 most	 academics	 argue	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 religious	 freedom	 emanated	
from	 the	 secular	 philosophy	 of	 the	 Enlightenment, 124 	some	 demonstrate	 that	
religious	 freedom	 and	 its	 toleration	 emanated	 from	 Christian	 theology. 125 	For	
example,	Benjamin	Kaplan	argues	that	it	is	only	a	“myth”	to	attribute	tolerance	as	“a	
heritage	of	the	Enlightenment”.126	He	explains	that	“religious	tolerance	became	the	
paradigmatic,	first	tolerance	in	the	Western	history,	the	matrix	out	of	which	emerged	
the	modern	concept	of	tolerance	as	applied	to	all	forms	of	difference-	ethnic,	cultural,	
and	racial	as	well	as	religious.”127		Similarly,	Perez	Zagorin	argues	that	the	“religious	
roots”	 of	 toleration,	 which	 has	 undergone	 significant	 secularisation,	 cannot	 be	
discarded.	 Moreover,	 he	 states	 that	 the	 work	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 and	 seventeenth	
century	Christian	thinkers	has	shaped	the	modern	concepts	of	religious	freedom.128		
When	the	supposedly	secular	law	ends	up	verifying	the	religiosity	of	certain	practices	
it	 ends	up	 loosing	 its	 secularity	 and	 the	 attempt	 to	be	 religiously	 neutral	 becomes	
and	inevitable	failure.	As	Jakob	De	Roover	convincingly	puts	it		
“No	 court	possesses	 an	 impartial	 scientific	 conception	of	 religion;	 there	are	
no	 shared	 secular	 criteria	 that	 enable	 one	 to	 identify	 and	 delimit	 the	 sphere	 of	
																																								 																					
123	Ibid.,	at	23-24.	
124	See	Rex	Ahdar	and	Ian	Leigh,	Religious	Freedom	in	the	Liberal	State	(Oxford	University	Press,	2005)	
70.	
125	Johnson	Luke	T.,	 ‘Religious	Rights	and	Christian	Texts’	 in	Witte	and	van	der	Vyver	 (eds),	Religious	
Human	Rights,	 (Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	1996)	See	also	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	 in	His	
Blindness….	 Asia,	 the	West,	 and	 the	Dynamic	 of	 Religion	 (first	 published	 1994,	 2nd	 edn,	 New	Delhi:	
Manohar	2005).	
126	Benjamin	Kaplan,	Divided	by	Faith:	Religious	Conflict	and	the	Practice	of	Toleration	in	Early	Modern	
Europe,	(Cambridge,	2007)	4-5.	
127	Ibid.	
128	Perez	Zagorin,	How	the	Idea	of	Religious	Toleration	Came	to	the	West	(Princeton,	2003)	24–33.	
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religion	in	a	manner	neutral	to	all	religions.	Consequently,	in	such	cases,	judges	and	
other	 secular	 authorities	 are	 bound	 to	 smuggle	 in	 one	 particular	 theological	
conception	 of	 religion.	 That	 is,	 a	 specific	 religious	 language	 becomes	 the	 meta-
language	to	discuss	and	decide	on	matters	of	religion	in	courts	of	law	and	serves	as	
the	 standard	 to	 reject	 certain	 practices	 as	 not	 “truly”	 religious.”129	Neutrality	 thus	
begins	 to	 revolve	 around	 the	 concept	 of	 truth.130	Consequently	 by	 deciding	 that	
“certain	 things,	which	are	believed	 to	be	 religious	by	 some	group,	 are	actually	not	
truly	religious,	our	courts	implicitly	reject	these	practices	as	false	religion.	When	this	
happens,	 they	 insert	 Protestant	 structures	 into	 the	 different	 forms	 of	 religion	 and	
tradition	that	exist	in	our	liberal-democratic	societies.”131	When	the	secular	law	ends	
up	verifying	the	religiosity	of	certain	practices,	this	 leads	to	the	 law	loosing	 its	own	
secularity.	Consequently,	despite	the	alleged	neutrality	and	secularity	of	the	law	and	
the	ECtHR	Protestant	Christianity	“continues	to	shape	significant	aspects	of	both	the	
state	and	state	law.	This	is	an	embarrassment	for	liberal	theories	of	rights	and	their	
assumption	of	state	neutrality.”132	
1.5	Empirical	Studies	
It	is	important	to	also	consider	the	empirical	research	that	has	been	put	forward	to	
prove	that	Article	9	ECHR	is	more	intelligible	to	the	members	of	the	Protestant	faith.	
Silvio	 Ferrari	 has	 undertaken	 a	 remarkable	 quantitative	 analysis	 regarding	 the	
																																								 																					
129	Jakob	De	Roover,	The	seular	 law	and	the	Realm	of	False	Religion”	De	Roover	Jakob,	‘Secular	Law	
and	 the	 Realm	 of	 False	 Religion’	 in	Winnifred	 Fallers	 Sullivan,	 Robert	 A.	 Yelle,	 and	Mateo	 Taussig-
Rubbo	(eds)	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford	University	Press,	2011)	2.	
130	For	further	analysis	please	refer	to	chapter	6	
131	Jakob	De	Roover,	The	seular	 law	and	the	Realm	of	False	Religion”	De	Roover	Jakob,	 ‘Secular	Law	
and	 the	 Realm	 of	 False	 Religion’	 in	Winnifred	 Fallers	 Sullivan,	 Robert	 A.	 Yelle,	 and	Mateo	 Taussig-
Rubbo	(eds)	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford	University	Press,	2011)	2.	
132	Peter	 Dunchin,	 ‘Islam	 in	 the	 Secular	 Nomos	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights’	 (2011)	
Michigan	Journal	Of	International	Law	32(4)	663,	744.		
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violations	of	Article	9	on	a	country-by-country	basis.	The	findings	are	interesting	and	
can	be	analysed	in	various	ways,	but	in	this	section,	the	reason(s)	behind	the	lack	of	
judgments	in	Protestant	countries	will	be	examined.	It	is	important	to	note	that	any	
quantitative	 analysis	 should	 be	 approached	 with	 utmost	 caution	 and	 that	 various	
approaches	could	be	taken.			
Ferrari	considered	100	decisions	handed	down	by	the	ECtHR	on	Article	9	from	
1959	 until	 2009. 133 	The	 countries	 considered	 were	 the	 following:	 Armenia	 (1	
decision),	Austria	 (1	decision),	Bulgaria	 (4	decisions),	Denmark	 (2	decisions),	France	
(15	 decisions),	 Georgia	 (1	 decision),	 Germany	 (7	 decisions),	 Greece	 (11	 decisions),	
Italy	 (2	 decisions),	 Latvia	 (3	 decisions),	 Luxembourg	 (1	 decision),	 Macedonia	 (1	
decision),	 Moldova	 (4	 decisions),	 Poland	 (2	 decisions),	 Russia	 (5	 decisions),	 San	
Marino	 (1	 decision),	 Spain	 (1	 decisions),	 Sweden	 (2	 decisions),	 Switzerland	 (5	
decisions),	 Turkey	 (22	 decisions),	 Ukraine	 (3	 decisions),	 United	 Kingdom	 (6	
decisions).134	
Ferrari	 then	 grouped	 these	 countries	 based	 on	 the	 predominant	 religious	
affiliation	 of	 population	 as	 follows:	 19	 Catholic	 countries	 (23	 decisions),	 4	Muslim	
countries	 (22	 decisions),	 11	 Orthodox	 countries	 (29	 decisions),	 5	 Protestant	
countries135	(4	decisions)	and	7	mixed	countries	(21	decisions).	The	data	revealed	30	
violations	out	of	the	100	decisions	given	by	the	ECtHR.	136	
																																								 																					
133	Silvio	Ferrari,	The	Strasbourg	Court	and	Article	9	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights:	A	
Quantitative	Analysis	of	the	Case	Law,	in	The	Lautsi	Papers:	Multidisciplinary	Reflections	On	Religious	
Symbols	In	The	Public	School	Classroom	13	and	n.2	(Jeroen	Temperman,	ed.,	2012)	13.	
134	Silvio	Ferrari,	The	Strasbourg	Court	and	Article	9	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights:	A	
Quantitative	Analysis	of	the	Case	Law,	in	The	Lautsi	Papers:	Multidisciplinary	Reflections	On	Religious	
Symbols	In	The	Public	School	Classroom	13	and	n.2	(Jeroen	Temperman,	ed.,	2012)	15.	
135	The	countries	being,	Denmark,	Germany,	Latvia,	Sweden	and	the	United	Kingdom.	
136	Silvio	Ferrari,	The	Strasbourg	Court	and	Article	9	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights:	A	
Quantitative	Analysis	of	the	Case	Law,	in	The	Lautsi	Papers:	Multidisciplinary	Reflections	On	Religious	
Symbols	In	The	Public	School	Classroom	13	and	n.2	(Jeroen	Temperman,	ed.,	2012)	16.	
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The	 data	 also	 revealed	 the	 decisions	 that	 declared	 a	 violation	 of	 Article	 9	 were	
distributed	as	follows:	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights137	
Decisions	declaring	a	violation	of	Article	9	distributed	according	to	the	religious	demography	of	the	
respondent	states	(as	a	percentage	of	all	decisions	concerning	religious	issues	for	the	countries):	
		 Catholic	countries	(19	countries)	 2	decisions	(9%)	
	Muslim	countries	(4	countries)	 1	decision	(5%)	
	Orthodox	countries	(11	countries)	 23	decisions	(79%)	
	 Protestant	countries	(5	countries)	 No	decisions	
	Mixed	countries	(7	countries)	 4	decisions	(19%	
Source:	 Silvio	 Ferrari,	 The	 Strasbourg	 Court	 and	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	
Rights:	A	Quantitative	Analysis	of	the	Case	Law.	
	
The	 data	 indicated	 that	 Orthodox	 countries	 have	 the	 highest	 numbers	 of	
Article	9	violations,	(79	%	of	the	applications	were	declared	to	have	been	in	violation	
of	Article	9)138,	while	strikingly	the	Protestant	countries	considered	were	never	held	
to	be	in	violation	of	Article	9.	Despite	the	fact	that	these	Protestant	countries	have	a	
State-Church	 system,	 which	 could	 in	 theory	 cause	 problems	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
religious	 freedom,	 the	numbers	 show	 that	 such	was	not	 the	case.	 It	was	 therefore	
revealed	 that	 countries	 where	 the	 people	 are	 of	 non-orthodox	 religion	 are	 less	
frequently	found	to	be	in	violation	of	Article	9.	This	raises	the	question	of	how	these	
numbers	could	be	read	and	what	could	be	the	reasons	behind	these	differences.		
First,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 Ferrari’s	 figures	 support	 the	 case	 law	
analysis	in	this	thesis	which	indicates	that	the	ECtHR	has	a	biased	approach	in	favour	
of	 the	 Protestant	 faith.	 The	 figures	 confirm	 that	 ECtHR’s	 approach	 is	 not	 about																																									 																					
137Ibid.,	at	17.	
138	Ibid.,	at	31.	
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privileging	any	Christian,	but	rather	particularly	Protestant	Christians.	It	could	also	be	
concluded	from	the	data	that	the	high	number	of	violations	of	Article	9	by	Orthodox	
countries,	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	concept	of	religious	freedom	in	these	Orthodox	
countries	is	not	the	same	as	the	one	adopted	by	the	ECtHR.	For	example,	the	notion	
of	 true	 proselytism	 that	 is	 protected	 by	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 is	 strongly	 resisted	 in	
Orthodox	 countries.	 Recalling	 the	 Protestant	 faith,	 proselytism	 is	 an	 essential	
element	to	the	spreading	of	the	faith	and	could	not	be	opposed	or	resisted	unless	it	
amounts	 to	 “improper”	 proselytism	 or	 proselytism	 that	 is	 carried	 out	 through	
coercion.	
		 On	the	other	hand,	the	low	number	of	cases	shows	the	substantial	similarity	
between	the	notion	of	religion	in	the	Protestant	countries	and	the	ones	adopted	by	
the	ECtHR,	in	other	words	the	emphasis	that	the	ECtHR	places	on	the	“primacy	of	the	
internal	dimension”	over	“the	detriment	of	the	 importance	attached	to	 its	external	
manifestations”.139	The	notion	of	religion	that	is	present	in	the	ECtHR	better	suits	the	
Protestant	faith	than	the	other	faiths	and	religions	and	therefore	there	was	no	clash	
between	the	two.	As	Carolyn	Evans	has	noted,	the	ECtHR	protects	“the	cerebral,	the	
internal	and	the	theological	over	the	active,	the	symbolic	and	the	moral	dimensions	
of	religion	and	belief.”140	
	
	
	
																																								 																					
139	Ibid.,	at	32.	
140	Carolyn	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Freedom	 In	European	 Human	 Rights	Law:	 The	 Search	 For	 a	 Guiding	
Conception’	in	M	Janis	and	C	Evans	(eds),	Religion	and	International	Law	(The	Hague,	1999),	385,	396.	
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1.6	Conclusion		
The	notion	of	“religion”	and	“religious	freedom”	contained	in	the	ECHR	has	not	been	
adequately	theorised	by	reference	to	cultural	background.	When	this	background	is	
inserted,	 it	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 range	 of	 problems	 that	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 tackled	
adequately	 in	 the	 jurisprudence	 or	 the	 academic	 literature.	 Scholarly	 work	
concerning	 Article	 9,	 law	 and	 religion,	 and	 religious	 freedom	 has	 been	 mostly	
concerned	with	the	inconsistency,	incoherence	and	the	biased	decisions	of	the	ECtHR,	
especially	judgments	concerning	religious	clothing	and	symbols	with	particular	focus	
on	veils	and	headscarves.	It	has	been	noted	by	many	that	the	ECtHR	has	consistently	
ruled	against	Muslim	women	who	have	relied	upon	Article	9	ECHR	to	enforce	their	
human	 rights.141	However,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 scholarly	work	 concerning	 the	
possibility	that	the	burqa	and	veil	judgments	of	the	ECtHR	could	be	a	continuation	of	
the	 arguments	 held	 between	 the	 Protestants	 and	 the	 Catholics	 in	 the	 sixteenth	
century,	 in	 fact	 a	 disguised	 continuation	 of	 iconoclasm.	 There	 is	 also	 limited	
scholarship	 on	 a	 possible	 link	 between	 religion,	 religious	 freedom,	 the	wording	 of	
Article	 9	 ECHR	 and	 the	 Protestant	 theology.	 Although	 some	 scholars	 have	 pointed	
out	 that	 human	 rights	 law	emanated	 from	 religious	backgrounds	 and	 that	modern	
rights	law	has	a	Christian	backdrop,	no	literature	has	gone	beyond	this	to	specifically	
link	 the	Protestant	 theology	 to	Article	 9	 ECHR.	 Furthermore,	 the	 concepts	of	 truth	
and	falsity	play	a	crucial	role	 in	Protestant	faith	specifically	and	are	reflected	in	the	
language	of	the	ECtHR	even	in	cases	where	the	ECtHR	attempts	to	invoke	the	notion	
of	neutrality.	Therefore,	for	the	ECtHR	to	consider	whether	an	act	is	religious	of	not	it																																									 																					
141	Mohammad	Mazher	Idriss,	‘Criminalisation	of	the	Burqa	in	the	UK’	J.	Crim.	L.	2016,	80(2),	124-137	
at	133.	
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has	 to	 have	 pronouncements	 about	 “truth”	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 the	 ECtHR	 fails	 to	 be	
neutral.		
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Chapter	2	
What	is	Religion?	
2.1	Overview		
In	 this	 chapter	 a	 new	way	 of	 looking	 at	 Article	 9	 utilising	 Balagangadhara’s	 theory	
and	 concept	 of	 religion142	is	 examined.	 In	 my	 view	 his	 theory	 grants	 new	 insights	
which	have	not	been	adequately	considered	by	scholars	in	the	field	and	fills	a	gap	in	
the	 scholarship	 discussed	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapter.	 An	 outline	 of	 his	 theoretical	
framework	and	hypothesis	is	presented.		As	mentioned	earlier,	Balagangadhara	in	an	
exceptionally	 novel	 approach,	 examines	 the	 twin	 dynamic	 of	 Christianity	 of	
secularisation	 and	 proselitysation.	 He	 explains	 in	 a	 unique	 way	 how	 the	 secular	
provokes	religious	conflict	and	distortion	amongst	cultures	where	religion	does	not	
exist.	Furthermore	he	illustrates	how	despite	secularism	the	West	remains	a	religious	
culture.	Balagangadhara	further	elaborates	on	how	religion	requires	practices	to	be	
defended	and	justified	by	reference	to	doctrines.	
According	to	Balagangadhara,	religion	should	be	treated	as	a	phenomenon	in	
the	 world,	 and	 the	 description	 “religion”	 should	 be	 restricted	 to	 the	 Abrahamic	
religions:	 Judaism,	 Christianity	 and	 Islam.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 assertion	 that	 all	
cultures	 in	 the	 world	 have	 religion,	 an	 idea	 which	 has	 also	 been	 adopted	 and	
																																								 																					
142	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	of	Religion	
(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005).	
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elaborated	within	the	human	sciences,143	is	itself	a	claim	of	Christian	theology,	albeit	
since	secularised.144			
Using	 this	 theory,	 the	 universality	 of	 religion	 is	 questioned	 and	 what	
constitutes	 religion	 is	 examined.	 It	 is	 asked	what	makes	 Christianity	 a	 religion	 and	
what	qualifies	for	protection	by	legal	systems.	It	is	demonstrated	that	attempting	to	
define	religion	 in	the	 legal	systems	 is	 futile.	Furthermore	 it	 is	shown	that	there	 is	a	
failure	 to	 differentiate	 between	 what	 constitutes	 a	 religious	 practice	 and	 what	
constitutes	a	traditional	practice	as	both	are	approached	similarly.		
Key	questions	in	this	chapter	would	include	what	religion	is	and	what	makes	
something	 into	 religion,	 more	 precisely	 what	 makes	 Christianity	 a	 religion.	 Other	
themes	to	address	are	whether	all	cultures	have	religion	and	the	difference	between	
tradition	 and	 religion.	 	How	 religion	has	 been	 secularised,	 and	what	 the	 impact	 of	
these	 questions	 on	 human	 rights	 law	 generally	 and	 on	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 ECHR	
specifically,	will	be	analysed.	
2.2	What	is	Religion?	
2.2.1	The	Word	“Religion”	
In	order	 to	enjoy	 freedom	of	 religion	or	 (freedom	 from	 religion),	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
have	religion	in	the	first	place.	Religion	is	assumed	to	be	a	universal	phenomenon	in	
all	 cultures.	However,	 the	 framework	 for	 studying	 religion	derives	 from	a	Christian	
background,	 even	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 comparative	 religion.	 The	 main	 claim	 is	 that																																									 																					
143		See	also	From	Tomoko	Masuzawa,	‘Secular	Theories	on	Religion,	A	Selection	of	Recent	Academic	
Perspectives’	 in	Mikael	Rothstein	and	Tim	Jensen	(eds),	Theology	to	World	Religions:	Ernst	Troeltsch	
and	the	Making	of	Religionsgeschichte	(University	of	Copenhagen	Tusculanum	Press	2000)	149-166.	
144	Peter	 Harrison,	 ‘Religion’	 and	 the	 religions	 in	 the	 English	 Enlightenment	 (Cambridge,	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	1990)	1.	
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religion	bears	the	hallmarks	of	a	theological	account.	Scholars	such	as	Fitzgerald	have	
argued	that	the	word	“religion”	should	not	be	used	at	all	within	the	social	sciences	
because	of	 the	history	of	 its	association	with	Christian	 theology.145	Balagangadhara	
proves	 that	 the	 word	 “religion”	 and	 its	 description	 are	 associated	 with	 Christian	
theology.146		
The	secularisation	of	religion	and	the	establishment	of	secular	States	changed	
the	meaning	 of	 terms	 relating	 to	 religion	 and	 changed	 the	 concepts	 behind	 these	
terms	 to	 make	 them	 consistent	 with	 Christian	 theology.	 According	 to	 the	 Oxford	
Classical	Dictionary,	 “[n]o	word	 in	either	Greek	or	 Latin	 corresponds	 to	 the	English	
‘religion’	 or	 ‘religious’.” 147 	In	 fact,	 the	 only	 tradition	 that	 satisfies	 the	 modern	
Western	 criterion	 of	 religion	 as	 a	 purely	 private	 pursuit	 is	 Protestant	 Christianity,	
which,	 like	the	Western	view	of	“religion”,	was	also	a	creation	of	the	early	modern	
period.		
The	lack	of	a	parallel	 in	other	languages	is	also	important	to	note.	In	Arabic,	
the	 word	“din”	signifies	 a	 way	 of	 life,	 and	 the	 Sanskrit	 dharma	covers	 duties,	 law,	
politics,	 and	 social	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	 piety.148	There	 was	 no	 concept,	 idea	 or	
thought	of	“religious	freedom”	or	religion	in	the	ancient	years;	the	entity-concept	of	
religion	was	simply	absent.	“Modernity”	has	given	specific	names	where	they	did	not	
																																								 																					
145	Timothy	Fitzgerald,	The	Ideology	of	Religious	Studies	(Oxford	University	Press,	2000)	3-7.		
146	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	of	Religion	
(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005).	
147	H.J.	Rose,	s.v.	 ‘Religion,	Terms	Relating	to’,	 in	the	Oxford	Classical	Dictionary,	M.	Cary	et	al.,	eds.,	
Oxford,	1949.	
148	Karen	 Armstrong,	 “the	Myth	 of	 Religious	 Violence”	 The	Guardian,	 Thursday	 25	 September	 2014	
available	 at	 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/25/-sp-karen-armstrong-religious-
violence-myth-secular	[last	accessed	in	January	2015].	
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previously	 exist. 149 	The	 ancient	 Greeks	 and	 the	 ancient	 Egyptians	 for	 example	
thought	 about	 gods,	God150	and	nature	 but	 not	 about	 religion	 as	 such.	As	 Cantwill	
Smith	observes:	
	“…religion	was	not	a	distinct	entity	in	the	lives,	or	in	the	minds	of	the	people	
under	 consideration,	 yet	 it	 is	 so	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 modern	 people,	 we	 in	 order	 to	
understand	them	must	or	may	use	(impose?)	our	conceptualisation	and	analyses	 in	
our	interpretations.”151	
	
2.2.2	Religion(s)	as	Variant	Models	of	Christianity	
Given	 that	 the	 word	 “religion”	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 has	 evolved	 and	modified	 in	 the	
West	making	 religion	 into	 an	entity	 it	 seems	 impossible	 to	 therefore	 identify	what	
religion	 is.	 In	 his	 book,	 The	 Heathen	 in	 His	 Blindness	 Balagangadhara	 argues	 that	
Abrahamic	 religions	are	what	 religions	are	and	that	“Christian	anthropology”	 is	 the	
cornerstone	 of	 knowledge	 about	 “other	 religions”,	 which	 are	 reconstructed	 as	
“diverse”	religions	based	on	the	model	of	Christianity.152	Balagangadhara	shows	that	
our	daily	language	refers	to	“at	least”	Christianity	as	a	religion,	and	this	prototypical	
approach	allows	one	to	study	only	the	entity	(or	an	example)	of	religion	and	not	the	
concept,	because	one	has	already	identified	at	least	one	aspect	of	religion	that	being	
Christianity.	In	order	to	argue	that	Christianity	is	not	a	religion	one	needs	to	make	an	
epistemic	 decision	 which	 requires	 a	 theory	 on	 religion.	 Since	 there	 is	 no	 theory	
rivalling	 theology	 that	 would	 help	 to	 identify	 religion,	 Balagangadhara	 utilises																																									 																					
149	For	 a	detailed	anayliss	of	 the	development	of	 the	word	 religion	 see	Wilfred	Cantwell	 Smith,	The	
Meaning	and	End	of	Religion	(First	Fortress	Press	Edition,	1991)	51-79.	
150	Wilfred	Cantwell	Smith,	The	Meaning	and	End	of	Religion	(First	Fortress	Press	Edition,	1991)	54.	
151	Ibid.,	55.	
152	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	of	Religion	
(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005)	292-298.	
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language	use	 (within	 European	 languages)	which	points,	 at	 least,	 to	 Christianity	 as	
religion	without	being	certain	that	it	is	even	a	religion.153		
Balagangadhara	 demonstrates	 that	 when	 Christianity	 refers	 to	 itself	 as	
religion	 it	 provides	 us	 with	 “its”	 concept	 of	 religion	 and	 helps	 itself	 identify	 its	
religious	rivals.	In	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness	it	is	explained	that	what	distinguishes	
religious	rivalry	from	other	kinds	of	rivalry,	is	rivalry	with	respect	to	doctrinal	aspects,	
differences	 in	 beliefs	 and	 differences	 in	 the	 nature	 and	 existence	 of	 God. 154	
Balagangadhara	explains	that	actions	and	practices	which	are	embodiments	of	those	
beliefs,	 and	doctrinal	differences,	 crystallise	 this	 religious	 rivalry.	Christianity	based	
the	description	of	its	rivals	on	sets	of	beliefs	and	doctrines	about	God,	through	which	
it	 divided	 true	 religions	 from	 false	 religions.	 Though	 Christianity	 faced	many	 rivals	
throughout	history	only	a	few	were	considered	to	be	religious	rivals.	Although	Islam	
and	 Judaism	 also	 considered	 themselves	 to	 be	 religious	 rivals	 under	 the	 same	
description	given	by	Christianity,	the	Indian	traditions	and	the	Roman	religio	did	not	
identify	 themselves	 as	 religious	 rivals	 in	 the	 description	 given	 by	 Christianity.	 This	
shows	that	to	be	able	to	judge	the	superiority	or	truth	of	one	religion	in	comparison	
to	the	other	one	needs	to	do	so	from	within	the	framework	of	religion.155	
This	indicates	that	scholars	can	write	about	religion	while	failing	to	appreciate	
that	 they	 are	 adopting	 a	Christian	definition.	 Kevin	 Schilbrack,	 for	 example,	 argues	
																																								 																					
153	Note	that	even	Islam	and	Judaism	may	not	have	a	word	for	religion	so	that	is	more	unreliable	
154	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…..	295-296.	
155	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Orientalism,	 Postcolonialism	 and	 the	 	 ‘Construction’	 of	 Religion’	 in	 Esther	
Bloch,	 Marianne	 Keppens	 and	 Rajaram	 Hegde	 (Eds),	 Rethinking	 Religion	 in	 India:	 the	 Colonial	
Construction	 of	 Hinduism	 (Routledge	 2010)	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
https://www.academia.edu/4228198/Orientalism_Postcolonialism_and_the_Construction_of_Religio
n		
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that	 although	 one	may	 accept	 that	 religion	 is	 a	 social	 construction,	 this	 does	 not	
mean	that	religion	does	correspond	to	a	reality:	
“Since	 religion	 is	 a	 social	 construction,	 the	 only	 reality	 that	 religious	
phenomena	have,	they	have	by	tradition,	convention,	or	agreement.	It	follows	that	if	
people	had	never	thought,	spoken,	and	acted	in	religious	ways,	or	if	they	ceased	to	
think,	 speak,	 and	 act	 in	 these	 ways,	 then	 what	 are	 often	 described	 as	 religious	
phenomena	would	not	exist.	 If	everyone	were	 to	cease	 to	 recognise	holy	days,	 for	
instance,	there	would	be	no	more	holy	days….	to	say	that	something	exists	merely	by	
convention	(or	merely	rhetorically,	or	merely	by	linguistic	agreement)	is	not	at	all	the	
same	as	saying	that	the	entity	does	not	exist.”156	
Schilbrack	does	not	clarify	what	he	means	by	“religious	ways”,	cease	to	act	in	
“these	 ways”	 or	 most	 importantly	 what	 he	 means	 by	 “religious	 phenomena”.	 He	
relies	on	conventional	ideas	and	linguistic	practices	of	a	society	or	a	community	that	
teaches	people	to	use	specific	words.	These	linguistic	practices	are	not	merely	words	
but	they	contain	a	cultural	history.	157	This	cultural	history	for	the	West	is	the	history	
of	Christianity.158	Schilbrack	uses	the	words	with	ad	hoc	accounts	groomed	to	fit	into	
his	presupposed	definition	of	what	religion	is.	He	also	uses	the	term	“holy	days”,	and	
again	 does	 not	 theorise	 or	 explain	what	 he	means	 by	 holy	 and	 in	what	ways	 holy	
relates	to,	for	example,	Non-	Abrahamic	traditions.	He	uses	theological	 language	to	
prove	 that	 although	 religion	 is	 a	 social	 construction	 it	 is	 not	 an	 imaginary	 concept	
and	it	is	universal	in	all	cultures,	yet	it	could	be	“described”	in	various	forms.	He	does																																									 																					
156	Kevin	Schilbrack,	‘Religions:	Are	There	Any?’	(2010)	Journal	of	the	American	Academy	of	Religion,	
December	78	(4),	1112–1138.	
157	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…	24.	
158	Ibid.	
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not	differentiate	between	practices	that	are	performed	out	of	belief	and	others	that	
are	carried	out	of	tradition.		
According	to	Schilbrack,	the	term	“religion”	is	used	as	a	model	or	a	template	
in	 order	 to	 interpret	 a	 phenomenon.	 However,	 it	 is	 also	 not	 clear	 how	 he	 can	
conclude	that	this	phenomenon,	which	he	 is	referring	to,	 is	actually	a	religious	and	
not	a	psychological	phenomenon.	He	adds	that:	
“[o]ne	 can	 employ	 the	 concept	 of	 “religion”	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 appropriate,	
even	 if	 the	 people	 in	 question	 themselves	 do	 not	 use	 the	 term.	 Even	 when	 the	
practices	 so	 labelled	 do	 not	 include	 that	 idea,	 one	 can	 re-describe	 a	 practice	 as	
religion.”159	
		 Schilbrack	 is	 therefore	 caught	 in	 a	 terminological	 game	 of	 how	 “best”	 to	
describe	and	define	religion	in	order	to	show	that	religion	exists	in	all	cultures	albeit	
taking	various	shapes.	Moreover,	what	is	the	purpose	of	describing	something	when	
its	 foundation	 is	not	 included,	and	 if	 the	 idea	 is	not	 included	how	can	one	tell	 that	
whether	what	 he	 is	 describing,	 according	 to	 the	 culture	 being	 described,	 is	 in	 fact	
religion?	 To	 answer	 these	 questions	 it	 is	 important	 to	 examine	 the	 differences	
between	a	theory	and	a	definition	and	to	consider	the	function	of	both.	
2.3	 The	 Difference	 Between	 a	 Theory	 and	 a	 Definition:	 The	 Problem	 with	 a	
Definition.	
Balagangadhara	 shows	 that	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 theory	 on	 religion,	 the	 definitional	
approach	cannot	 identify	whether	 the	characteristics	of	Christianity	are	 indeed	 the																																									 																					
159	Kevin	Schilbrack,	‘Religions:	Are	There	Any?’	(2010)	Journal	of	the	American	Academy	of	Religion,	
December	78	(4),	1112–1138.	
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characteristics	of	religion,	since	one	still	 lacks	knowledge	on	what	religion	 is.	When	
accepting	that	“at	least”	Christianity	is	a	religion	what	one	actually	has	is	an	ad	hoc	
theory	 and	 a	 presupposition	 of	what	 religion	 is.	 Balagangadhara	 notes	 that	 if	 one	
rejects	the	idea	that	Christianity	is	at	least	what	religion	is,	then	one	needs	a	theory	
to	show	what	else	religion	is.	160	
The	problem	with	a	definition	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	words	or	language	used	
to	 define	 religion	 have	 an	 ad	 hoc	 theological	 framework. 161 	Definitions	 use	
vocabulary	 that	 entail	 and	 convey	 theological	 concepts	 to	 define	 religion.	 While	
concepts	and	definitions	on	religion(s)	are	plentiful,	a	theory	that	is	independent	of	
ad	 hoc	 theories	 has	 always	 been	 lacking.	 Over	 time	 definitions	 shift,	 and	 what	 is	
religious	or	not	changes	from	the	early	to	medieval	to	“modern”	times.		
Talal	Assad	notes	that	there	cannot	be	a	universal	definition	of	religion	“not	
only	because	its	constituent	elements	and	relationships	are	historically	specific,	but	
because	 that	 definition	 is	 itself	 the	 historical	 product	 of	 discursive	 processes”	162.	
These	definitions,	however,	will	“never	be	universally	applicable	when	one	addresses	
different	 cultural	 milieu	 or	 historical	 periods.”163	More	 importantly,	 definitions	 do	
not	explain	how	religion	functions,	 they	do	not	test	claims	or	examine	what	makes	
something	 into	 a	 religion	 and	what	makes	 other	 phenomena	not	 a	 religion.164	It	 is	
only	theories	that	can	provide	such	distinctions.	Whatever	definition	one	chooses	to	
																																								 																					
160	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…..	169-171,	272-273.	
161	Ibid.,	at	289-291.	
162	Talal	Asad,	Genealogies	of	Religion:	Discipline	and	Reasons	of	Power	in	Christianity	and	Islam	(Johns	
Hopkins	University	Press,	1993)	29.	
163	Richard	King,	Orientalism	and	Religion:	Postcolonial	Theory,	India	and	‘the	Mystic	East’	(Routledge	
1999)	10.	
164	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	of	Religion	
(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005)	22-23,	247-265.	
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give	 to	 “religion”	 (for	 example,	 beliefs	 in	 superhuman,	 spiritual,	 responses	 to	 the	
Divine	or	transcendent,	a	human	product)	it	remains	the	case	that	these	definitions	
commit	 the	 fallacy	 of	petitio	 principii:	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 proposition	 is	 presupposed	
where	it	is	the	truth	that	should	be	proven,	in	this	case	that	religion	is	universal.165		
Christianity	for	example	explains	religion	in	such	a	“naturally”	theological	way	
that	 it	 even	 lends	 intelligibility	 to	 atheists	 when	 they	 attempt	 to	 discuss	 their	
scepticism	 about	 religion.	 Atheists	 can	 only	 explain	 atheism	 using	 theological	
vocabulary	and	concepts	–	 their	comparator	 is	 theism;	hence	theological	 ideas	and	
language	become	our	everyday	words	although	disguised	in	secular	forms.	However,	
this	language	is	unintelligible	to	people	from	a	culture	with	no	religion.166			
Balagangadhara	 examines	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 theory	 and	 a	
definition.167	He	 explains	 that	 a	 theory,	 unlike	 a	 definition,	 clarifies	 debates	 by	
following	 strategies	 for	 testing	 claims	 through	 providing	 counter-examples.	
Definitions	merely	become	a	sort	of	a	terminological	game.	Consequently,	questions	
about	religion	and	religious	experiences	and	practices	cannot	be	answered	by	giving	
definitions	to	religion	such	as	saying	it	is	the	universal	belief	in	the	“Divine”	or	“super	
power”.168	The	notions	of	belief,	spiritual,	divine,	and	power	are	too	vague	to	provide	
us	with	any	real	test.169	In	the	absence	of	a	theory,	debates	will	be	carried	on	without	
real	knowledge	as	to	why	the	debate	is	taking	place.	The	origin	of	the	debate	fades	
																																								 																					
165 	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Secularized	 Christian	 Theology	 and	 Evolutionary	 Explanations	 of	 Religion’	
Hipkapi,	 23	 June	 2012	 available	 at	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2012/06/23/secularized-christian-
theology-and-evolutionary-explanations-of-religion/		
166	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…		232-234,	424.	
167	Ibid.,	at	247-279.	
168	Ibid.	
169	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005).		
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away	 and	 the	 debate	 becomes	 only	 linguistically	 intelligible.	 Definitions	 and	
descriptions	 of	 religion	 have	 presupposed	 ideas	 of	 the	 universality	 of	 religion	
incorporating	a	pre-theoretical	 intuition.	These	 intuitions	are	shaped	and	sustained	
by	a	religious	framework	that	has	shifted	into	the	background.170	They	are	therefore	
presupposing	 “the	 truth	 of	 a	 proposition	 whose	 truth	 they	 should	 prove,	 namely,	
that	religion	is	universal.”171		
When	Emile	Durkheim	for	example	formulated	a	theory	on	religion,	which	is	
supposedly	neutral	and	scientific	in	nature,	he	was	only	able	to	do	so	by	reference	to	
theology	 and	 hence	 failed	 to	 draw	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 sacred	 and	 profane	
without	religious	presuppositions.	He	defines	religion	as	
“[a]	unified	system	of	beliefs	and	practices	relative	to	sacred	things,	that	is	to	
say	set	apart	and	forbidden,	beliefs	and	practices	which	unite	into	one	single	moral	
community,	called	a	church,	all	those	who	adhere	to	them."172	
This	provides	a	 characterisation	of	 religion	without	using	 categories	 specific	
to	 any	 particular	 religion	 but	 ends	 up	 using	 categories	 specific	 to	 a	 religion.	 If	
secularism	means	the	separation	between	religion	and	all	social	aspects	of	 life,	and	
one	 accepts	 the	 definition	 above,	 which	 says	 that	 religion	 is	 a	 system	 of	 social	
unification,	then	secularism	would	imply	the	annihilation	of	religion.	This	shows	that	
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172	Emile	Durkheim,	The	Elementary	Forms	of	the	Religious	Life,	(New	York	Free	Press,	1965)	62.	
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secularism	 becomes	 inconsistent	 with	 common	 definitions	 of	 religion	 when	
interpreted	in	the	terms	provided	in	those	definitions.173	
Balagangadhara	explains	that	since	it	is	difficult	to	classify	the	phenomena	of	
the	dispute	or	debate	(in	our	case	religion)	and	that	what	we	actually	classify	is	the	
description	 of	 the	 dispute,	 definitions	 become	 a	 classificatory	 problem,174	and	 the	
theoretical	 background	of	 the	 prevailing	 account	 remains	 hidden.	He	 explains	 that	
the	problem	arises	at	“the	level	of	the	facts	we	want	to	classify	because	assembling	
these	facts	become	dependent	on	the	classificatory	systems	that	are	used.”175	To	be	
able	to	classify	a	certain	phenomenon	as	religion,	one	needs	to	know	what	religion	is	
and	not	 just	 associate	 a	 certain	phenomenon	with	 a	 given	 term.	 This	 classification	
cannot	 provide	 knowledge	 about	 the	 particular	 phenomenon.	 Consequently,	 if	 we	
are	trying	to	understand	“what”	religion	is	(which	starts	as	a	referential	problem),	by	
using	 definitions	 the	 answer	 becomes	 a	 classificatory	 one.	 	 Moreover,	 definitions	
serve	as	a	reference	to	a	certain	phenomenon	and	cannot	provide	counter-examples	
and	knowledge.		
For	 example,	 when	 the	 ECtHR	 tries	 to	 determine	 whether	 something	 is	
religion,	 it	 ends	 up	 using	 classificatory	 descriptions	 and	 definitions	 entailing	 a	
theological	Christian	framework	of	religion	and	the	theological	language	that	makes	
the	debate	concrete	goes	into	to	the	background	and	becomes	invisible.	
	
																																								 																					
173 	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Vacuity	 of	 Secularism’	 Hipkapi,	 April	 2,	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/02/the-vacuity-of-secularism/		
174	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…		258-	276.	
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2.4	Religion	as	an	Explanatory	Intelligible	Account	
Balagangadhrara	formulates	a	theory	of	religion	that	is	free	from	ad	hoc	theological	
presuppositions.	He	states	that	for	an	act	to	be	intelligible	it	has	to	include	a	purpose	
and	 a	 cause,	 and	 religion	 is	 an	 explanatory	 intelligible	 account	 of	 the	 cosmos	 and	
itself	because	it	combines	a	causal	and	an	intentional	account,	the	cause	of	creating	
the	world	and	the	will	of	 the	Creator.	One	can	therefore	know	God’s	 intentions	by	
studying	the	Cosmos	and	His	revelation.	This	hypothesis	could	explain	the	necessity	
of	 worship,	 faith	 and	 truth.	 Moreover,	 it	 could	 explain	 the	 tendency	 of	 the	
Abrahamic	 religions	 to	 religious	 rivalry	 and	 the	mutual	misunderstanding	 between	
these	 religions	 and	 heathen	 traditions.	 Balagangadhara	 observes	 that	 Judaism,	
Christianity	 and	 Islam	 share	 the	 common	 structure	 that	makes	 them	 into	different	
instances	of	religion.	176	
First,	religion	shows	the	purpose	and	intention	of	God	in	creating	the	cosmos,	
which	becomes	the	perfect	embodiment	of	His	will.	Second,	it	shows	God’s	purpose	
through	His	revelation.	Third,	 it	confirms	this	truth	by	accepting	God’s	purpose	and	
his	revelation.	As	a	result	the	Christian	doctrine	claims	universality	and	unconditional	
truth	as	the	revelation	of	God.	In	order	to	govern	the	universe,	there	has	to	be	one	
will	 and	 one	 true	 doctrine	 that	 conveys	 this	 one	 will	 to	mankind.177	Consequently,	
since	 this	doctrine	 is	 said	 to	have	 the	 “Divine	 truth”,	 it	 cannot	accept	and	 tolerate	
other	 “religious”	 doctrines	 as	 being	 equally	 true,	 and	 it	 cannot	 but	 be	 intolerant	
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towards	 all	 traditions	 and	 doctrines178	which	 it	 views	 as	 having	 rivalling	 doctrines	
that	express	the	will	or	plan	of	God.	These	doctrinal	or	religious	rivals	are	presented	
by	Christianity	either	as	“the	corruptions	of	the	devil	of	the	true	doctrine	or	as	pale	
and	 erring	 variants	 of	 its	 own	 doctrine	 (which	might	 contain	 some	 “rays	 of	 light”,	
that	is,	traces	of	divine	revelation.”)179		Intolerance	becomes	a	property	of	a	religious	
person	as	 he	 or	 she	 cannot	 accept	 other	 religions	 as	 “equally”	 true.180		A	 religious	
person	 therefore	experiences	 the	Cosmos	as	an	 intelligible	entity	and	as	a	 causally	
explainable	 one.	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 people	 of	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 cannot	
comprehend	 this	 kind	 of	 experience,	 to	 them	 the	 cosmos	 is	 not	 experienced	 as	
explanatorily	intelligible.		
Furthermore,	 according	 to	 Balagangadhara	 the	 doctrines	 will	 dictate	 the	
method	 of	 the	worship	 how	 to	 fulfil	 God’s	 purpose.	 It	 is	 faith	 that	 distinguishes	 a	
“true”	 religious	 Christian	 from	 another	 Christian	 in	 name	 only.181	Balagangadhara	
further	 explains	 that	 “belief”	 enables	 individuals	 to	 generate	 questions	 on	 the	
meaning	and	purpose	of	life	and	hence	these	questions	become	inherent	within	the	
framework	 of	 religion.	 He	 explains	 that	 the	 only	 way	Westerners	 makes	 sense	 of	
“practices”	of	other	cultures	 is	by	construing	them	as	religions.	The	Heathen	shows	
that	non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 cannot	 see	 themselves	 in	 the	description	of	 religion	
given	 above,	whether	 in	 terms	 of	 religious	 rivalry,	 the	 relationship	 between	 belief	
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and	practice	or	in	the	way	“belief”,	“worship”	and	“faith”	are	described.	182		
2.5	The	Universality	of	Religion		
Religion	 is	 not	 a	 universal	 in	 all	 cultures,	 but	 a	 cultural	 phenomenon	 and	 the	
assumption	 and	 assertion	 of	 its	 universality,	 an	 idea	which	 has	 also	 been	 adopted	
and	elaborated	within	human	sciences,	 is	 itself	a	claim	of	Christian	theology,	albeit	
since	 secularised.183	Christianity	 claims	 that	 all	 people	 once	 had	 knowledge	 of	 the	
true	religion	that	was	corrupted	later	on	and	that	Christianity	was	the	only	rational	
and	 complete	 religion	 that	 promised	 a	 true	 knowledge	 and	 access	 to	 the	 divine.	
Although	Christianity	claims	that	others	also	know	of	“religion”,	it	is	said	to	be	“false”	
religion,	 but	 is	 still	 a	 “form”	of	 religion.184		 In	 his	 Institute	 of	 the	 Christian	Religion	
John	Calvin	said	that	
“….	[t]here	is	no	nation	so	barbarous,	no	race	so	brutish,	as	not	to	be	imbued	
with	the	conviction	that	there	is	a	God.	Even	those	who,	in	other	respects,	seem	to	
differ	 least	 from	 the	 lower	 animals,	 constantly	 retain	 some	 sense	 of	 religion	 …...	
Since,	then,	there	never	has	been…	any	city,	any	household	even,	without	religion….	
a	sense	of	Deity	is	inscribed	on	every	heart.	Nay,	even	idolatry	is	ample	evidence	of	
this	fact.	For….	when	he	chooses	to	worship	wood	and	stone	rather	than	be	thought	
to	 have	 no	God,	 it	 is	 evident	 how	 very	 strong	 this	 impression	 of	 a	Deity	must	 be;	
																																								 																					
182	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	 in	His	 Blindness….	 294-302.	 See	 also	 Sadhguru	 Jaggi	 Vasudev,	
‘Idols	 in	 the	Hindu	Way	of	Life-	Why	are	They	Worshiped?’	 Isha	Foundation	Blog,	 January	28,	2014-	
available	 at	 http://isha.sadhguru.org/blog/yoga-meditation/demystifying-yoga/hindu-idols-gods-
worship/#disqus_thread	who	 states	 that	 in	 ancient	 Indian	 tradition	 a	 temple	was	 not	 considered	 a	
place	 for	 worship	 or	 a	 place	 of	 prayer	 or	 place	 of	 God,	 it	 was	 rather	 a	 “place	 of	 energy	 where	
everyone	could	go	and	make	use	of	it.”	
183	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	at	200-201.	
184	Ibid.,	at	54-64.	
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since	 it	 is	more	difficult	 to	obliterate	 it	 from	the	mind	of	man,	than	to	break	down	
the	feelings	of	his	nature….”185	
Christian	apologetics	argued	that	 the	original	 religion	that	God	had	given	to	
humanity	at	the	time	of	creation	was	corrupted	everywhere	and	was	only	restored	
through	God’s	revelation	in	Christ.186	The	Christian	apologetic	Justin	Martyr	wrote	in	
his	Hortatory	Address	to	the	Greeks	that	
“[t]he	advent	of	 our	Saviour	Jesus	 Christ;	who,	 being	 the	Word	 of	 God….	
restored	 to	us	 the	 knowledge	of	 the	 religion	of	 our	 ancient	 forefathers,	which	 the	
men	who	lived	after	them	abandoned	through	the	bewitching	counsel	of	the	envious	
devil,	and	turned	to	the	worship	of	those	who	were	no	gods.”187		
In	his	Retractationes188	St.	Augustine	says,	
“	[for]	the	truth	itself,	which	is	now	named	the	Christian	religion,	existed	and	
was	 not	missing	 among	 the	 ancients	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 human	 race,	 until	
Christ	came	“in	the	flesh”	from	whom	the	true	religion,	which	already	existed,	began	
to	be	called	Christian.”189		
																																								 																					
185	John	Calvin,	The	Institutes	of	the	Christian	Religion,	Henry	Beveridge	(trans.)	(MI:	Christian	Classics	
Ethereal	 Library,	 Grand	 Rapids,	 2002)	 35.	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
http://ntslibrary.com/PDF%20Books/Calvin%20Institutes%20of%20Christian%20Religion.pdf		
186	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘Incurably	Religious?	Consensus	Gentium	and	the	Cultural	Universality	of	Religion’	
(2014)	 61(1)	 NUMEN,	 5-32	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
https://www.academia.edu/2043491/Incurably_Religious_Consensus_Gentium_and_the_Cultural_Un
iversality_of_Religion	
187		Justin	Martyr,	“Hortatory	Address	to	the	Greeks”	In	The	Ante-Nicene	Fathers:	The	Writings	of	the	
Fathers	 Down	 to	 A.D.	 325,	 vol.	 1,	 in	 Rev.	 Alexander	 Roberts	 &	 Sir	 James	 Donaldson	 (eds)	 (Wm.	 B.	
Eerdmans	 Michigan	1989)	 289	 an	 electronic	 copy	 is	 available	 at	 http://lf-
oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1969/1333.01_Bk.pdf		
188	St..	Augustine	of	Hippo,	Retractationes	I,	13.	
189	Meredith	F.	Eller	and	Augustine,	‘The	“Retractationes”	of	St.	Augustine	Church	History’,	18	(3)	(Sep.,	
1949)	172-183.	
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Following	from	the	above,	one	can	conclude	that	although	humankind	drifted	
into	false	religion	from	the	creation	until	the	revelation	of	God	in	Christ,	it	did	at	all	
times	 retain	 the	 traces	 of	 the	 “true”	 original	 gift	 of	 God.	 Since	 the	 Creator	 had	
provided	humanity	with	an	awareness	of	his	 existence,	 it	 seemed	 to	have	become	
“theologically	impossible	that	people	without	religion	could	exist.”190	From	the	early	
Christian	 fathers	 to	 the	 Age	 of	 Enlightenment,	 the	 belief	 that	 religion	 is	 universal	
“rested	 on	 Christian	 theology	 and	 its	 references	 to	 an	 imaginary	 consensus	
gentium,” 191 	that	 presupposes	 the	 universality	 of	 religion	 across	 all	 human	
societies.”192	This	 assumption	 of	 the	 universality	 of	 religion	 was	 not	 empirically	
tested	 but	 was	 the	 presupposition	 of	 a	 Christian	 theological	 framework193		 that	
describes	other	cultures	as	having	an	expression	of	religion.	Balagangadhara	explains	
that	the	West	uses	a	secularised	Christian	theological	language	when	speaking	about	
other	 cultures	 and	 “within	 this	 linguistic	 practice,	 the	 practices	 one	 encounters	 in	
other	cultures	threaten	to	become	radically	unintelligible	if	they	are	not	described	as	
religions.”194		
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(2014)	NUMEN	61(1)	5-32.	
192	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘Incurably	Religious?	Consensus	Gentium	and	the	Cultural	Universality	of	Religion’	
(2014)	NUMEN	61(1)	5-32.	
193	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	of	Religion	
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The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	at	233-238.	
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Non-	 Western	 cultures	 have	 not	 tried	 to	 generate	 an	 alternative	 “factual”	
descriptions	 of	 the	 same	 world.195	Balagandgadhara	 calls	 this	 situation	 a	 “colonial	
consciousness”,	which	he	defines	as	“a	process	 that	hinders	access	 to	experience,”	
where	the	colonised	act	as	though	they	see	entities	and	facts	in	the	world	which	in	
fact	do	not	belong	 to	 their	 social	or	cultural	world,	 so	 they	use	 the	 thought,	 idiom	
and	the	language	of	the	colonisers	to	describe	what	they	think	exist	in	their	society	
but	which	in	reality	does	not.196	This	applies	to	religion	so	that	often	people	of	non-
Abrahamic	 traditions	accept	 that	what	 they	are	practising	 is	actually	a	 religion	and	
not	a	tradition.	
Christianity	has	not	only	shaped	the	way	people	think	about	religion	but	has	
also	affected	the	choice	of	what	 religion(s)	are	 in	 the	world.	 It	 shows	that	because	
the	seed	of	religion	is	thought	to	be	planted	in	the	souls	of	every	human	being,	even	
the	 heathens	who	 “bow	 down	 to	wood	 and	 stone”197	were	 seen	 as	 having	 innate	
knowledge	of	religion,	God	and	worship,	albeit	a	false	one.198	It	is	false	because	there	
can	 only	 be	 one	 true	 God,	 one	 true	 doctrine,	 and	 therefore	 one	 truth.	
Balagangadhara	shows	that	although	theories	on	religion	say	that	every	culture	can	
develop	its	own	religion,	all	those	theories	presuppose	the	universality	of	religion	as	
their	 starting	point.	 So	 instead	of	empirically	examining	whether	 those	 cultures	do	
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indeed	 have	 religion,	 they	 presuppose	 the	 existence	 of	 religion	 and	 try	 to	 find	
religious	 scriptures	 and	 doctrines	 of	 these	 cultures.	 However,	 what	 they	 actually	
examine	is	what	makes	religion	a	universal	in	all	cultures	and	not	whether	religion	is	
universal	or	not.199		
2.6	The	“Construction”	of	Religions	and	the	Discovery	of	“False	Religions”.		
Having	set	out	Balagangadhara’s	theory	on	religion	in	the	previous	sections,	and	with	
an	 illustration	of	his	 ideas	 in	practice,	how	 the	West	has	 constructed	 religions	and	
discovered	 “false”	 religions	 is	 examined	 in	 this	 section.	When	European	 (Christian)	
missionaries,	travellers,	and	scholars	encountered	and	colonised	other	cultures,	they	
presupposed	 the	 existence	 of	 religion	 in	 those	 cultures	 and	 societies	 and	 were	
searching	for	religion(s).200	
For	example,	Ramchandra	N.	Dandekar	argues	that	Hinduism	“can	hardly	be	
called	a	religion	at	all	in	the	popularly	understood	sense	of	the	term”	as	it	does	not	
recognise	God	to	be	central	to	it	nor	does	it	claim	to	have	any	particular	prophet	as	
its	founder.	He	adds	that	“Hinduism	is	not	a	system	of	theology	–	it	does	not	make	
any	dogmatic	affirmation	regarding	the	nature	of	God….	 It	does	not…recognise	any	
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particular	book	as	 its	 absolutely	authoritative	 scripture.”201	Dandekar	explains	 that,	
religious	practices	in	Hinduism	are	not	obligatory	and	there	is	no	specific	moral	code,	
moreover	he	states	 that	“it	does	not	accept	any	doctrine	as	 its	dogma”202	and	as	a	
religion	Hinduism,	“does	not	convey	any	definite	or	unitary	 idea….	Hindus	may	not	
necessarily	have	much	 in	 common	as	 regards	 faith	or	worship…	yet,	Hinduism	had	
persisted	 through	 centuries	 as	 a	 distinct	 religious	 entity.” 203 	Hindu	 tradition	
therefore	does	not	have	any	property,	belief	or	practice	that	allows	one	to	recognise	
it	as	religion.	 	Similarly	 in	The	Meaning	and	End	of	Religion,	Wilfred	Cantwell	Smith	
argues	that	Hinduism	is	a	construction	of	the	West	and	is	not	an	entity,	it	is	a	name	
that	 is	 given	 by	 the	 West	 to	 a	 “prodigiously	 variegated	 series	 of	 facts”204	and	 “a	
notion	in	men’s	minds	that	cannot	but	be	inadequate.”205		
Without	empirical	 investigation	the	West	found	what	they	already	expected	
to	find,	that	all	cultures	had	a	kind	of	religion,	although	it	was	a	false	one.	However	
what	 they	 actually	 found	 was	 an	 imaginary	 experiential	 entity,	 which	 they	
“constructed”	 and	 called	 religion	 and	 started	 describing	 systematically. 206 	It	 is	
imaginary	because	it	does	not	have	existence	outside	the	experience	of	the	Western	
culture.	 Accordingly,	 they	 started	 searching	 for	 doctrines,	 “beliefs”	 and	 “gods”	 in	
these	societies,	then	study	scriptures	in	an	attempt	to	find	“beliefs”	in	them.	This	is																																									 																					
201 	Ramchandra	 Narayan	 Dandekar,	 ‘Hinduism’	 (Brill	 1971)	 237	 quoted	 also	 in	 Will	 Sweetman,	
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202	Ibid.	
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the	process	through	which	the	West	was	able	to	identify	and	“construct”	Hinduism207,	
Buddhism	and	Jainism	as	distinct,	but	“false”	religions.		
The	 reason	 the	 West	 admits	 that	 Indians	 once	 had	 a	 true	 religion	 is	 to	
maintain	 the	 Christian	 theology,	 which	 claims	 that	 all	 people	 were	 given	 at	 some	
point	the	revelation,	the	Vedas	being	the	Indian	version.208	Similar	to	the	Protestant	
conflict	with	the	Catholics,	wherein	the	former	were	accused	of	corrupting	the	“true”	
religion	 and	 getting	 indulged	 in	 idolatrous	 practices,	 Brahmans	 were	 accused	 of	
corrupting	 the	 people	 by	 keeping	 knowledge	 away	 from	 the	 people	 and	 involving	
them	in	idolatrous	practices	such	as	worshipping	the	false	gods	of	Hinduism.		
It	was	a	common	belief	amongst	Christians	that	non-Christians	were	morally	
corrupt,	because	they	lacked	access	to	the	“true”	doctrines.	This	moral	corruption	of	
non-Christians	 was	 a	 theological	 fact,	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 that	 degeneracy	 was	
revealed	by	their	practices.209	Sexual	traditions	for	example,	human	dignity,	and	the	
treatment	 of	 and	 behaviour	 towards	 women	 in	 different	 cultures	 and	 traditions	
became	 an	 indication	 of	 this	moral	 deficiency.	 These	 themes	 continue	 to	 have	 an	
effect,	in	a	secular	guise,	on	the	ECtHR	especially	when	the	ECtHR	links	for	example	
the	veil	phenomena	with	gender	equality	and	respect	for	others.		
The	 European	 story	 about	 Brahmanism	 echoes	 the	 Protestant	 theology	 of	
“false”	 religion,	by	 identifying	 the	Brahmans	as	 the	priests	and	Brahmanism	as	 the	
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foundation	 of	 false	 religion. 210 	Accordingly	 with	 the	 advances	 in	 the	 Western	
exploration	 among	 cultures,	 religions	 were	 “constructed”	 in	 India	 and	 different	
phenomena	 came	 to	 be	described	 as	 religions,	 later	 becoming	 religious	 rivals	with	
Christianity.		
	 Consequently	the	West	“constructed”	Buddhism,	which	was	seen	an	“oriental	
wisdom”211	as	a	reformative	or	a	distinct	“civilised	religion”	to	face	the	corruption	of	
Hinduism	and	Brahmanism.212	Philip	Almond	notes	that	“….	there	was	an	imaginative	
creation	 of	 Buddhism	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 and	 that	 the	
Western	 creation	 of	 Buddhism	 progressively	 enabled	 certain	 aspects	 of	 Eastern	
cultures	to	be	defined,	delimited,	and	classified.”213	
		 These	“religions”	says	Balagangadhara,	are	the	“imaginative	creations	of	the	
Western	 savants	 and	 of	 the	 culture	 to	 which	 they	 belong.”214	Almond	 says	 that	
“discourse	about	Buddhism	provides...,	a	mirror	in	which	was	reflected	an	image	not	
only	of	the	Orient,	but	of	the	Victorian	world	also.”215		
The	 West	 drew	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 “doctrinal	 cores”	 and	 common	
practices	of	the	people	by	creating	a	difference	between	a	doctrinal	or	philosophical	
Hinduism	 (or	 ethical	 doctrines	 that	were	 akin	 to	Western	 concepts)	 and	 a	 popular	
Hinduism	 (the	 cults	 and	 rituals	 which	 were	 condemned	 and	 seen	 as	 idolatrous,	
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corrupt	and	 immoral),	which	 represented	 the	current	practice.216	Buddha	was	 seen	
as	another	Martin	Luther	who	fought	the	Brahmanic	priestly	caste217	and	Buddhism	
was	often	called	the	Protestantism	of	Asia.218	
Similarly,	 Protestants	 did	 not	 reject	 Catholics	 by	 saying	 they	 were	 not	
Catholics,	but	by	portraying	them	as	worshipers	of	the	Devil.	Calvin,	for	example,	did	
not	 reject	 Catholicism	 by	 saying	 that	 the	 Roman	 Catholic	 Church	 was	 not	 “really”	
Catholic,	but	by	calling	it	the	“Devil’s	church.”	It	was	in	the	name	of	Christianity	that	
Calvin	rejected	Catholicism.	If	therefore	in	one	argument	“caste”	is	presupposed	and	
the	argument	takes	place	within	that	framework,	in	the	other,	Christianity	or	religion	
is	presupposed	and	the	argument	again	takes	place	over	who	is	a	truly	religious	or	a	
Christian	person.		
2.7	The	Difference	Between	a	Religion	and	a	Tradition	
The	West	presupposed	religions	in	all	cultures	but	did	not	appreciate	the	difference	
between	 a	 religion	 and	 tradition.	 Books,	 belief	 in	 God,	 prophet(s)	 and	 most	
importantly	 doctrines	 are	 essential	 requirements	 to	 make	 Christianity,	 Islam	 and	
Judaism	 into	religions,	and	without	them	they	cannot	be	recognised	as	religions.219	
These	same	essential	requirements	are	not	crucial	to	make	other	traditions	such	as	
“Hinduism”,	 “Buddhism”	and	 “Jainism”	 into	a	 religion,	 yet	 they	are	 still	 considered	
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(by	the	ECtHR	as	well)	to	be	“religions”.220	How	can	the	properties	that	make	some	
phenomena	 into	 religion	 be	 both	 unessential	 and	 essential	 simultaneously?	
Balagangadhara	explains	that	this	contradiction	lies	in	the	context	of	religious	studies	
and	the	presupposition	of	the	universality	of	religion	and	religious	experiences	when	
studying	various	cultures.221	
Balagangadhara	 identifies	 the	difference	between	 religion	 and	 tradition.	He	
explains	how	the	Roman	religio222	was	practiced	only	because	it	was	a	traditio	passed	
on	by	the	ancestors;	the	Romans	did	not	look	for	a	definite	or	a	necessary	correlation	
between	 belief	 and	 practice.	 To	 the	 Romans,	 religio	 was	 not	 associated	 with	
doctrinal	or	theological	analysis,	and	belief	did	not	justify	a	practice,	hence	one	could	
not	have	religio	if	one	lacks	traditio.		According	to	the	Romans,	having	a	traditio	is	a	
requirement	to	having	a	religio.	Since	Christians	were	unable	to	establish	themselves	
as	people	with	a	shared	tradition,223	they	were	not	accepted	as	a	religion	and	were	
thus	viewed	by	the	Pagans	as	“atheists”224	lacking	religio.	Christians	therefore	had	to	
show	that	Christianity	was	indeed	a	religion	without	a	tradition.		
To	demonstrate	 the	existence	of	 their	 religion,	Christians	 tried	 to	break	 the	
connection	 between	 traditio	 and	 religio.	 They	 started	 looking	 for	 doctrines	 rather	
than	traditional	practices,	and	mandated	that	 in	order	for	something	to	be	called	a	
religion,	 it	 should	entail	 doctrines	which	are	based	on	God’s	 revelation	and	books,	
prophets,	Gods,	otherwise	it	is	considered	to	be	a	“false”	religion.	They	transformed	
the	 requirement	 in	 a	 way	 that	 instead	 of	 showing	 they	 were	 true	 to	 traditional																																									 																					
220	Ibid.,	at	11-22.	
221	Ibid.,	at	22.	
222	Ibid.,	at	39-53.	
	
224	The	use	of	the	word	atheism	or	atheist	here	is	different	from	how	the	word	is	discussed	later	on	in	
the	dissertation	where	I	refer	to	atheism	as	a	form	of	secularized	theism.	
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practice,	they	argued	that	their	doctrines	were	ancient	and	therefore	true.	Christians	
therefore	 claimed	 that	 they	not	only	had	 religion	but	 that	 they	were	 the	only	 true	
religion,	while	asserting	that	others	have	false	doctrines	and	religions.	Consequently	
Christianity	was	a	religion	precisely	because	it	was	not	tradition.225		
To	 strengthen	 its	 theological	 argument,	 Christianity	 established	 a	 link	
between	beliefs	and	practices,	which	were,	according	to	the	Romans,	two	separate	
paths.	The	Christians	started	criticizing	practices	in	order	to	criticise	beliefs	and	show	
that	 paganism	was	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 set	 of	 false	 or	 corrupt	 beliefs.226	Previously	
there	was	no	 compulsory	or	 essential	 link	between	practices	 and	beliefs;	 practices	
were	carried	out	of	tradition	(as	previously	noted).	Christians	however,	believed	that	
all	 practices	 emanated	 from	 beliefs,	 and	 to	 be	 able	 to	 criticise	 the	 beliefs	 of	 the	
pagans	they	had	to	criticise	their	practices	first.	
Christians	 therefore	 claimed	 that	 practices	 alone,	 without	 belief,	 are	 a	
seduction	 by	 the	 “Devil”,	 which	 will	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 these	 false	 paths.	 The	
importance	 of	 the	 antiquity	 of	 a	 custom	 or	 tradition	 was	 diminished	 in	 so	 far	 as	
religion	was	 concerned.	 Consequently,	 all	 the	 pagan	 cults,	 with	 their	multitude	 of	
practices,	ceremonies	and	rituals,	all	these	others,	became	mere	exemplifications	of	
another	religion,	namely	a	false	one.	
The	 difference	 between	 the	 Christians	 and	 the	 Romans/Greeks	 lies	 in	 the	
attempt	 to	 link	between	 the	act	of	practice	and	belief.	 To	 the	Romans	and	Greeks	
belief	was	not	 a	 core	 requirement	 for	 practice	 and	 engaging	 in	 a	 tradition	did	not	
need	reasoning	or	theoretical	justification	to	practice	and	uphold	ancestral	customs.	
																																								 																					
225	.N.	Balaganagadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…53	
226	S.N.	Balaganagadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…53	
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In	Christianity,	without	belief,	practice	is	deemed	futile	for	it	is	not	sufficient	to	only	
believe	 in	 God;	 this	 belief	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 translated	 into	 worship.	 It	 is	 through	
worship	 of	 God	 that	 one	 confirms	 to	 be	 part	 of	 God’s	 plan	 and	 it	 is	 worship	 that	
sustains	belief.		
Since	 a	 set	 of	 beliefs	 became	 the	 central	 characteristic	 for	 any	 religion(s),	
including	the	belief	that	God	should	be	worshiped	in	a	particular	way,	human	actions	
therefore	 required	 beliefs	 to	 justify	 them.	 Tradition,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 did	 not	
require	any	 justification	 in	order	 to	be	practiced.	 Traditions	are	 inherited	practices	
that	are	learnt	by	means	of	transmission	through	following	instructions	and	imitation.	
Thus,	unlike	 religious	practices,	 they	have	no	authority	 to	determine	whether	 they	
are	required	or	who	belongs	to	a	certain	tradition.	Stories	told	within	a	tradition	do	
not	 claim	 the	 truth	 like	 religious	 stories	 and	 there	 is	 no	 obligation	 to	 practice	 a	
tradition.227		Moreover,	 traditions	 are	 adaptive	 and	 flexible	meaning	 that	 they	 are	
able	to	“change”	or	modify	which	is	certainly	not	the	case	with	religion.228	
2.8	Religion	Spreads	Through	Secularisation		
Balagangadhara	 shows	 that	 the	 universalisation	 of	 religion	 has	 a	 double	 dynamic	
through	which	 it	 universalises:	 conversion	 and	 proselytisation.	 Although	 seemingly	
ironic,	proselytisation	and	secularisation	move	along	each	other	to	spread	religion.229	
This	 dynamic	 is	 behind	 the	 formation	 and	 development	 of	 the	 Western	 culture.	
Jakob	De	Roover	says	that	
																																								 																					
227 		 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘To	 Follow	 our	 Forefathers:	 The	 nature	 of	 Tradition’	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/02/to-follow-our-forefathers-the-nature-of-tradition-s-n-
balagangadhara/		
228	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 Is	 Tradition	 Akin	 to	 Following	Moral	 Obligations?	 23	March	 2011,	 Hipkapi	
Blog	available	at		
229	On	the	link	between	secularization	and	proselytisation	see	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	his	
Blindness...,389-392.	
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“[s]ecularised	 religion	 spreads	 in	 the	 form	 of	 certain	 attitudes	 towards	 life,	
society	 and	 the	 world:	 one	 begins	 to	 look	 at	 human	 lives,	 actions	 and	 historical	
events	 as	 carriers	 of	 meaning,	 intention	 or	 purpose;	 one	 views	 practices	 as	 the	
embodiments	of	beliefs	or	doctrines;	one	conceives	of	all	cultural	ethics	as	bodies	of	
norms;	one	approaches	 society	 as	 a	 system	constituted	by	 a	 legal	 framework;	 one	
experiences	 natural	 phenomena	 as	 linked	 to	 each	 other	 by	 an	 underlying	 order,	
whose	 regularities	 should	 be	 disclosed.	 This	 formulation	 in	 terms	 of	 attitudes	 is	
promising	as	a	step	towards	an	explanation	of	secularisation.”230	
The	 process	 of	 secularisation	 spreads	 Christian	 theological	 themes	 in	 a	
secular	 guise.	 Balagangadhara	 notes	 that	 “what	 is	 called	 ‘the	 secular’	 is	 religion	
secularised	 or	 is	 religion	 in	 a	 different	 set	 of	 clothes.”231	The	 ECtHR	 applies	 this	
religiously	secular	language,	when	shifting	language	from	religion	to	ethics	and	when	
assessing	Article	9	applications,	especially	when	trying	to	define	and	discuss	concepts	
such	 as	 beliefs,	 truth	 and	 falsity.	 (For	 an	 analysis	 on	 the	 secularised	 language	 the	
ECtHR	uses	see	Chapter	6).	
Timothy	 Fitzgerald	 questions	 the	 extent	 to	which	 religious	 practices	 can	 be	
distinguished	 from	 non-religious	 or	 secular	 practices.232	However,	 Balagangadhara	
argues	that	there	is	no	binary	distinction	between	the	“religious”	and	the	“secular”,	
																																								 																					
230	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Christian	 Attitudes	 and	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 as	 the	Mechanism	 of	 Secularization’	
Hipkapi,	 1	 April	 2011	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/01/law-
secularization-and-religious-attitudes/		
231	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	‘Is	The	Distinction	Between	‘Secular’	and	‘Religious’	Neutral?		Hipkapi,	March	
2,	 2011	 available	 at	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/02/is-the-distinction-between-secularand-
religious-neutral-s-n-balagangadhara/	See	also	part	4.5	of	this	thesis	Human	Rights	and	Christianity.	
232	Timothy	 Fitzgerald,	Discourse	 on	 Civility	 and	 Barbarity:	 A	 Critical	 History	 of	 Religion	 and	 Related	
Categories	 (Oxford	 University	 Press	 2007)	 see	 also	 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘On	 the	 Dark	 Side	 of	 the	
“Secular”:	 	Is	 the	 Religious-Secular	 Distinction	 a	 Binary?’	 available	 at	
https://www.academia.edu/6379024/On_the_Dark_Side_of_the_Secular_Is_the_Religious-
Secular_Distinction_a_Binary	
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but	a	triad	instead:	true	religion,	false	religion,	and	the	secular;	or,	the	religious,	the	
idolatrous	 (or	 the	 profane),	 and	 the	 secular.	 He	 explains	 that	 the	 “realm	 of	 the	
secular	 today	 includes	 practices	 that	were	 once	 considered	 as	 expressions	 of	 false	
religions	 but	 live	 on	 in	 the	 secular	 today	 as	 possibly	 religious	 acts.” 233	
Balagangadhara	notes	 that	what	 courts	make,	 are	 judgments	 about	 the	 “religious”	
nature	of	the	acts	of	religion.	Liberal	States	and	courts,	he	says,	do	not	actually	ask	
whether	a	certain	manifestation	is	idolatrous	or	not,	but	what	they	do	ask	is	whether	
these	 practices	 are	 “truly”	 (or	 actually)	 religious.234	Consequently,	 they	 “take	 an	
agnostic	 stance	 towards	 “falsity”	 by	 transforming	 claims	 about	 falsity	 into	 claims	
about	beliefs	 regarding	truth.”235	It	 remains	up	to	 the	courts	 to	determine	whether	
these	acts	may	qualify	as	“true”	religious	acts	and	therefore	are	could	be	protected	
under	 religious	 freedom. 236 	Furthermore,	 for	 the	 ECtHR	 to	 stay	 consistent	 in	
determining	whether	practices	of	the	applicants	under	Article	9	cases	are	religious,	it	
has	 to	 have	 recourse	 to	 the	 pronouncements	 about	 truth.	 Consistent	 with	 the	
practice	 of	 embracing	 Abrahamic	 theologies	 to	 solve	 religious	 problems,	 and	
although	courts	do	not	 “define”	who	an	authority	 is,	 they	merely	accept	 the	 claim	
that	religious	authorities	determine	the	“truth”	in	religious	matters.237	
	 Secularists	 and	 Christians	 alike	 maintain	 that	 conversion	 is	 part	 of	 the	
universal	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 and	 is	 therefore	 a	 fundamental	 human	 right.238	
However,	the	concept	of	conversion	claims	it	is	a	religious	duty	to	spread	the	“true”	
																																								 																					
233	Ibid.	
234	Ibid.	
235	Ibid.			
236	See	for	example	Kovalkovs	v	Latvia	(35021/05)	[2012]	E.Ct.	H.R.	280	(ECHR).	
237	For	a	further	analysis	see	Chapter	5	on	Kokkinakis	v	Greece[1993]	260	A	ECtHR.	
238	See	for	example	Kokkinakis	v	Greece	at	para	48;	where	the	ECtHR	speaks	of	“improper	proselytism	
and	true	evangelism.”	
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religion	to	include	more	people	into	the	“true”	religion.239	Hence	freedom	to	convert	
assumes	 that	 religions	 are	 rival	 movements	 competing	 with	 each	 other	 to	 win	
converts	 into	 the	 “true”	 religion.	 Religious	 conversion	 and	 proselytisation	 are	
therefore	 neither	 secular	 nor	 neutral;	 they	 are	 an	 intrinsic	 drive	within	Abrahamic	
religions	to	win	converts	into	the	“true”	religion.		
Non-Abrahamic	 cultures,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 consider	 every	 “religion”	 to	 be	
equally	 true,	 and	 there	 is	 nothing	 such	 as	 “false	 religion”.	 Religious	 conversion	
therefore	 from	 falsity	 to	 truth	 is	 meaningless. 240 	To	 non-Abrahamic	 cultures	 a	
religion	 is	 a	 tradition	 with	 specific	 sets	 of	 ancestral	 practices	 that	 characterises	 a	
human	 community. 241 	The	 traditions	 are	 maintained	 because	 they	 make	 some	
community	 into	a	community	and	not	because	they	contain	some	“exclusive	truth”	
binding	the	believer	to	God.	Hence	any	attempt	to	 interfere	with	the	tradition	of	a	
community	 will	 be	 seen	 as	 illegitimate,	 since	 all	 traditions	 are	 part	 of	 the	 human	
quest	for	truth.242	Freedom	to	convert	or	proselytise	does	not	make	sense	to	cultures	
that	do	not	view	others	in	terms	of	“religious”	rivals.		
2.9	Conclusion	
In	the	Western	culture,	it	is	assumed	that	in	the	heart	of	every	human	being	there	is	
a	 sense	 of	 divinity	 which	 God	 has	 implanted	 when	 creating	 humankind.	 This	
presumption	 is	 not	 empirically	 tested	 but	 is	 derived	 from	 a	 theological	 Christian	
background.	Christians	believe	that	the	Bible	has	recorded	the	history	of	humankind																																									 																					
239	For	Christ	had	ordered	Christians	to	“go	and	make	disciples	of	all	nations.”	The	Gospel	of	Mathew	
28:19.	
240	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conflict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1)	67-92.	
241	Ibid.	
242	Ibid.	
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up	 until	 the	 revelation	 of	 Jesus,	 therefore	 the	 stories	 other	 people	 believe	 about	
their	past	are,	according	 to	Christianity,	 false	 ideas	about	 the	human	past	because	
the	real	truth	is	contained	in	the	Bible.	Christians	believe	in	two	revelations	of	God,	
one	is	the	revelation	of	God	in	nature,	everything	that	is	there	in	nature	reflects	the	
will	of	this	single	God,	and	the	second	revelation	is	the	Bible	in	which	God	not	only	
reveals	who	He	is	but	tells	humans	how	to	worship	Him.			
The	moral	theory	of	our	modern	world	is	the	idea	of	the	medieval	theology	of	
conscience.243		 It	 speaks	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 psychology	 of	 human	 beings,	 which	 talks	
about	 conscience,	 morals,	 ethics	 and	 superego.	 However,	 conscience	 is	 how	 the	
Christian	God	speaks	to	humanity	and	how	he	makes	humanity	listen	to	his	word.244	
Moreover,	freedom	of	conscience	remains	a	fundamental	element	in	both	Christian	
theology	and	legal	systems,	and	in	Christian	theology	the	“true”	God	does	not	accept	
unwilling	 followers	 who	 had	 been	 forced	 into	 His	 worship	 as	 that	 would	 be	 a	
violation	to	this	freedom	that	God	has	given	to	man.	In	the	European	legal	systems	
and	 specifically	 Article	 9,	 religion	 is	 being	 reduced	 and	 collapsed	 into	 freedom	 of	
conscience	assuming	the	comprehensiveness	of	it	without	studying	it	from	within	its	
cultural	background,245	taking	for	granted	the	Christian	ethical	and	moral	backdrops	
to	freedom	of	conscience.		
																																								 																					
243	S.N.	 Balagangadhra,	 “...We	 Shall	 Not	 Cease	 From	 Exploration...”An	 Invitation	 Disguised	 As	 a	
Position	 Paper	 Composed	 At	 the	 Behest	 of	 ARENA	 for	 the	 Theme	 “Decolonizing	 Social	 Sciences”,	
available	at	https://www.academia.edu/4214176/We_Shall_Not_Cease_from_Exploration		
244	S.N.	Balagangadhara	Documentary	on	 Indian	 traditions:	Beware	of	God,	 July	4,	 2012	available	at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2012/07/04/eshi-films-on-indian-traditions-beware-of-god/	
245	Cecile	 Laborde,	 ‘The	Politics	of	Religious	Freedom:	Protecting	Freedom	of	Religion	 in	 the	Secular	
Age’,	 The	 Immanent	 Frame:	 Secularism,	 Religion	 and	 the	 Public	 Sphere,	 available	 at	
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/23/protecting-freedom-of-religion-in-the-secular-age/	[last	accessed	
March	2017].	
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The	 West	 has	 studied	 religion	 through	 what	 might	 be	 called	 a	 religious	
hermeneutical	 circle 246 	framed	 by	 secularised	 Christian	 theological	 backgrounds,	
which	 remain	 consistent	 with	 the	 themes	 of	 the	 Bible.	 The	 religious	 doctrine	 of	
Christianity	has	become	 the	 framework	within	which	 religion	 is	 studied.247	Timothy	
Fitzgerald	has	argued	that	there	is	“no	coherent	non-theological	theoretical	basis	for	
the	study	of	religion	as	a	separate	academic	discipline.”248		
These	 findings	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 interpretation	 and	 application	 of	
Article	 9	 of	 the	 ECHR	particularly	when	 a	 culture	 is	 further	 away	 from	 the	 idea	 of	
religion	that	 is	presupposed	in	Article	9	which	 is	based	on	Protestantism.	 It	 is	 likely	
that	Article	9	 introduces	a	 skew	or	a	distortion	when	assessing	cases	presented	by	
non-Christian	 religions	 and	 different	 groups	 and	 reconstructs	 them	 through	 the	
“agency	of	 the	dominant	 culture	 to	 remake	 them	as	 a	 variety	 of	 ‘religions’	 on	 the	
model	 of	 Christianity”249	The	 Western	 universalistic	 attitude	 is	 driving	 minorities	
living	in	the	West	to	distort	their	culture	and	tradition,	out	of	a	reaction	to	a	Western	
drive	to	universalise	their	own	civilisation	and	“secularise”	Christian	beliefs,250	as	well	
as	what	contradicts	or	what	is	“foreign”	to	these	beliefs.		
Article	9	 judgments	reveal	a	distorted	and	selective	approach	to	freedom	of	
religion	for	as	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness	shows	us	it	is	in	the	nature	of	religion	to	
																																								 																					
246	On	 the	 study	of	meaning	 and	expression	 in	human	behaviour	 and	 the	 ‘hermeneutical	 circle’	 see	
Charles	 Taylor,	 ‘Interpretation	 and	 the	 sciences	 of	Man’	 The	 Review	 of	metaphysics,	 Vol.	 25(1)	 Sep	
1971	p.	3-51,	18.	
247	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	12.	
248	Timothy	Fitzgerlad,	The	Ideology	of	Religious	Studies	(oxford	University	Press	2000)	3.	
249	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP	45(1)	58-75.	
250Daniel	 Philpott,	 ‘Religious	 Freedoms	 and	 the	 Undoing	 of	 the	Westphalia	 State	 Michigan’	 (2004)	
Journal	of	 International	 law	25(4)	981-998,	987.	 	On	Islamic	countries	challenging	the	universality	of	
human	rights	see	Articles	(24)	(25)	of	the	Cairo	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	in	Islam	(CDHRI)	and	The	
Organisation	of	the	Islamic	Conference	established	on	September	25,	1969.	
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distort	 traditions	 in	 a	 “secular”	 way	 and	 present	 them	 as	 “false”	 religions.	
Consequently,	Balagnagadhara’s	theory	was	utilised	in	this	thesis	as	it	is	believed	to	
be	 the	 perfect	 benchmark	 from	 which	 to	 examine	 the	 ECtHR	 jurisprudence.	 The	
belief-centred	approach	 that	 the	ECtHR	takes	explains	how	manifestations,	 such	as	
wearing	 particular	 apparel,	 are	 seen	 as	 “symbols”	 in	 the	 Western	 legal	 systems	
generally	 and	 in	 the	ECtHR	particularly,	 exemplifying	beliefs	 and	 leaving	 it	 open	 to	
various	 interpretations	 as	 to	 what	 these	 “symbols”	 represent.	 This	 is	 makes	 it	
difficult	 for	 people	 outside	 the	 common	 European	 understanding	 of	 religion	 and	
religious	practice	to	make	sense	of	Article	9	without	having	to	distort	themselves	to	
fit	into	the	current	system	which	has	a	Christian	theological	backdrop.		This	may	lead	
to	 a	 situation	where	minority	 traditions	 are	 recognised	 in	 the	 legal	 systems	 if	 and	
only	if	the	majority,	where	in	the	West	happens	to	be	Christianity	approves	of	such	
recognition251	and	most	 importantly	 interprets	and	dictates	 the	way	 through	which	
this	recognition	is	applied.		
If	on	the	other	hand	we	accept	that	that	some	cultures	do	not	have	religion,	it	
follows	 that	 they	 also	 do	 not	 have	 a	 claim	 to	 religious	 freedom	under	 the	 current	
framework	of	Article	9.	While	 this	might	prevent	some	cultures	 from	obtaining	 the	
protection	 of	 Article	 9,	 it	 could	 be	 defended	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 treating	 them	 as	
having	religion	merely	distorts	their	character,	and	presents	a	false	picture	of	reality.	
Since	 this	 scenario	 of	 dropping	 the	 “universalistic”	 reference	 to	 religion	 is	 purely	
hypothetical,	 in	the	contemporary	 legal	context,	 the	chapters	to	follow	will	analyse	
the	consequences	of	applying	the	current	human	rights	 law	framework	on	religious																																									 																					
251	The	ECtHR	relies	on	a	general	folk	understanding	of	religion,	which	the	majority	can	relate	to.		An	
example	of	this	is	clearly	illustrated	in	how	the	Court	seeks	the	approval	of	the	majority	through	the	
approval	given	by	the	churches	e.g.	in	Lautsi	v	Italy.	
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freedom	in	Article	9.	More	specifically,	the	impact	of	having	a	Protestant	backdrop	to	
the	development	of	the	idea	of	religious	freedom	will	be	examined.	
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Chapter	3	
The	Historical	Background	to	Religious	Freedom	
3.1	Overview		
In	 this	 chapter	 the	 development	 of	 religious	 freedom	 in	 Europe	 is	 examined.	 It	 is	
discussed	how	religious	freedom	is	situated	within	European	intellectual	history	and	
how	 religious	 freedom	 came	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 central	 claims	 within	 Christian	
Protestant	 theology	 in	 association	with	 linked	 ideas	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	 secular	 or	
neutral	 state.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	concept	of	 religious	 freedom,	secularism	and	
neutrality	 have	 emanated	 from	 and	 depend	 on	 a	 number	 of	 deeply	 rooted	
Protestant	 assumptions	 regarding	 the	 nature	 and	 the	 aim	 of	 human	 life.252	These	
concepts	adopt	ideas	of	the	Protestant	theology	that	claim	that	the	world	is	split	into	
a	 temporal	 carnal	 sphere	 and	 a	 spiritual	 religious	 realm,	 and	 universalises	 these	
concepts	 for	 human	 societies	 through	 the	 process	 of	 secularisation.	 As	 previously	
discussed,	 Christian	 assumptions	 on	 the	 purpose	 of	 human	 life	 and	 its	 nature	 are	
innate	 elements	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 secularism.253	“[S]ecularism	 suggests	 that	 plural	
societies	will	fall	apart,	if	they	fail	to	adopt	the	Protestant	norm	of	separation	of	the	
religious	and	the	political.”254		 It	 is	also	argued	that	“modern”255	human	rights	have	
interlocking	legal	and	religious	dimensions,	whereby	human	rights	theories	and	ideas	
																																								 																					
252	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Secularism,	 Colonialism	 and	 Indian	 Intellectuals’	 April	 2,	 2011	 Hipkapi	 blog,	
available	 at	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/02/secularism-colonialism-and-indian-intellectuals/	
[accessed	in	July	2014].	
253	Ibid.	
254	Ibid.	
255	The	word	modern	is	used	to	refer	to	post-1945	human	rights	law.	
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(such	as	natural	rights)	make	no	sense	unless	one	presupposes	the	truth	of	Christian	
theology	and	religion.256		
3.2	Religion	as	a	Universal	Worldview	
Christianity	 defined	 religion	 and	 “Christian	 anthropology”	 is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	
knowledge	 about	 “other	 religions”.	 This	 has	 been	 successful	 to	 the	 extent	 that	
religion	has	become	a	worldwide	concept.	Accordingly,	one	could	question	whether	
there	is	a	relationship	between	this	worldwide	concept	and	worldviews,	(i.e.	a	view	
about	the	world	or	the	perspective	or	totality	of	beliefs	that	a	person	has).		
In	The	Heathen	in	his	Blindness	Balagangadhara	demonstrates	that	religion	is	
the	only	model	that	is	able	to	pass	for	“worldview”	or,	in	other	words,	a	secularised	
or	neutral	concept	of	religion;	other	examples	seem	obscure	when	replaced	by	the	
word	 “worldview.”	 As	 a	 result,	 this	 worldview	 becomes	 a	 secularised	 version	 of	
religion,	more	specifically	Christianity.	Balagangadhara	shows	how	if	we	replace	the	
word	 “worldview”	 with	 religion	 we	 can	 barely	 see	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 meaning.	
Worldviews	are	often	accepted	as	concepts	answering	“deep	questions”	such	as	for	
example	 the	 meaning	 of	 life.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 these	 questions	 are	 a	 product	 of	
religion	and	not	a	precondition	of	it,	as	for	example	the	question	on	the	meaning	of	
life	 can	 merely	 be	 presented	 within	 a	 religious	 framework.	 Consequently,	 a	
worldview	could	only	answer	such	questions	by	complementing	an	existing	religion	
or	 using	 secularised	 religious	 concepts	 to	 dispute	 existing	 religious	 concepts.	
Worldview	is	therefore	the	secularisation	of	religion.																																									 																					
256	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	 ‘We	Shall	Not	Cease	From	Exploration’	An	Invitation	Disguised	As	a	Position	
Paper	 Composed	 At	 the	 Behest	 Of	 ARENA	 for	 the	 Theme	 “Decolonizing	 Social	 Sciences”	 1985	
electronic	 copy	 available	 at	 http://www.cultuurwetenschap.be/pages/annex-01	 [Last	 accessed	
September	2014].	
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The	Enlightenment	thinkers	were	therefore	able	to	build	their	“neutral”	and	
“rational”	thoughts	(as	opponents	of	religion	and	organised	religious	institutions)	by	
adopting	 ideas	 from	 Protestant	 Christianity.	 Even	 in	 our	 “modern”	 times	 when	
Western	 academics	 assume	 they	 are	 neutrally	 or	 scientifically	 studying	 various	
cultures	and	“belief”	systems	in	other	cultures,	the	framework	which	they	are	using	
is	that	of	a	Christian	theology.257		Through	the	process	of	secularisation,	this	Christian	
theology	 that	 informed	 them	 moves	 more	 to	 the	 background	 and	 becomes	
invisible. 258 	Secularised	 concepts	 within	 Christian	 theology	 such	 as	 secularism,	
freedom	of	religion,	and	laïcité	are	“encoded	into	legal	instruments,	used	for	building	
legal	theories,	or	taken	up	by	academics,	law	reformers,	and	others	to	argue	for	legal	
change.”	259	In	 India	 for	 example,	 there	 is	 no	 unique	 or	 radical	 explanation	 for	 the	
creation	 and	 the	 origin	 of	 the	world	 or	 the	 cosmos.	 There	 are	 various	 stories	 and	
numerous	Gods	which	people	find	equally	true,	more	specifically	their	being	true	or	
false	 is	 irrelevant	 and	 insignificant;	people	 are	 indifferent	 to	 their	 falsity	 or	 truism.	
These	stories	lack	the	object	and	the	status	of	being	knowledge	claims,	they	impart	
knowledge	 without	 being	 knowledge	 claims	 themselves.	 This	 makes	 religion	
impossible	 in	 a	 culture	 where	 the	 question	 about	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 cosmos	 is	 a	
meaningless	one.			
	
	
																																								 																					
257	Prakash	Shah,	 ‘In	Pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	Law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	45(1)	JLP,	58-75	
electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07329113.2013.773197#.UwvMWvR_s00		
258	Ibid.		
259	Ibid.		
	
	 98	
3.3	How	is	Christianity	De-Christianised?	
After	Western	intellectuals	divided	religions	on	the	basis	of	“true”	and	“false”,	they	
argued	 that	 cultures	 having	 a	 false	 religion	 are	 cultures	 having	 the	 “wrong”	 set	 of	
ethics	and	morals.	This	 idea	of	 true	and	 false	 religion	made	 it	a	 “religious	duty”	 to	
spread,	by	conversion	and	proselytisation,	the	“true”	religion	 in	those	cultures	that	
are	 lacking	 it.	 Balagangadhara	 argues	 that	 religion	 universalises	 in	 a	 secular	 form,	
(that	is	as	a	worldview),	but	religion	stays	at	the	core	of	this	universalisation	process,	
the	culture	remains	religious	and	the	Western	culture	has	become	a	culture	precisely	
because	of	the	universalisation	of	religion	through	its	two	dynamics-	proselytisation	
and	 secularisation.	 He	 explains	 that	 religion	 secularises	 itself	 and	 becomes	 a	 de-
Christianised	 “religion”	while	 disguising	 itself	 in	 secular	 garbs,	which	 results	 in	 the	
victory	of	religion,	but	in	a	different	set	of	clothes;	worldviews	Balagangadhara	says	
are	 those	 set	 of	 clothes.	 Religion	 therefore	 became	 universal	 by	 secularising	 itself	
and	 losing	 some	 of	 its	 Christian	 characteristics.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 secularisation,	
Christianity	 casts	 of	 the	 theological	 structures	 of	 its	 Christian	 features.	 Those	
specifically	Christian	features	spread	secular	or	neutral	 ideas	 in	the	world.	The	 idea	
that	 religion	 is	 universal	 is	 one	 example	 of	 this	 process.260	The	 appreciation	 for	
conversion	and	proselytism	 is	 clearly	 evident	 in	 the	 stances	 the	ECtHR	 takes	when	
deciding	on	such	cases.261		
	
																																									 																					
260	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	16.	
261	See	 for	 example	 Kokkinakis	 v	 Greece….	 Insert	 more	 cases	 on	 Proselytism	 and	 conversion	 For	 a	
further	analysis	see	chapter	Five.	
	 99	
3.4	The	Secularised	Language	of	Christianity		
Balagangadhara	 observes	 that	 “in	 the	 name	 of	 science	 and	 ethnology,	 biblical	
themes	become	our	regular	stock-in-trade…”262	The	secular	language	used	(which	is	
a	Christian	one	in	origin)	has	become	the	sole	language	in	which	the	Western	culture	
structures	 experiences	 of	 various	 traditions	 and	 practices	 and	 consequently	 claims	
that	those	cultures	have	religion.	He	says:	
“In	 the	 process	 of	 secularising	 itself,	 Christianity	 does	 not	 disappear.	 It	
continues	 to	 remain	 a	 religion,	 distinguishing	 itself	 from	 other	 religions	 and	
distinguishing	itself	from	other	entities	including	the	secularised	variant	of	itself.”263	
The	supposedly	secular	world	of	today	is	still	a	Christian	world	that	is	not	free	from	
religion,	 but	 is	 an	 extension	 to	 the	 Christian	 world	 that	 has	 disguised	 itself	 in	 a	
“secular	garb”.		
In	 the	 light	of	what	has	been	 said	and	 in	 just	 the	 same	process	of	how	 the	
Western	 culture	 passed	 through	 the	 phases	 of	 secularisation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 de-
Christianised	 Christianity,	 the	 theological	 Christian	 framework	 of	 the	 legal	 systems	
and	specifically	Article	9	has	moved	also	into	the	background	and	became	invisible.	
The	 ECtHR	 uses	 secularised	 Christian	 concepts	 and	 language	 that	 has	 a	 Christian	
theological	 presupposition	 and	 utilises	 them	 as	 if	 they	 are	 universal	 concept.	 For	
example,	debates	often	take	place	in	the	ECtHR	as	to	whether	a	particular	practice	is	
an	intrinsic	part	of	a	religion	or	belief	(crucifix,	chastity	ring,	veil)	or	is	just	a	cultural	
requirement	 with	 no	 links	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 doctrinal	 truth	 and	 obligation.	 It	 is	
important	 to	 ask,	 what	 if	 the	 practice	 is	 neither	 intrinsic	 nor	mandatory	 but	 is	 of	
significant	importance	or	is	an	ancestral	tradition,	how	would	the	ECtHR	assess	such																																									 																					
262	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…	226-227	
263	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…		269.	
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an	importance?	The	extent	to	which	this	mandated	requirement	is	indeed	a	priority	
in	 the	ECtHR,	and	 the	extent	 to	which	 judges	are	 likely	 to	undermine	 the	persons’	
own	understanding	of	their	belief	and	tradition,	is	often	complicated	and	has	a	deep	
theological	background.264		
It	 is	 important	 to	 question	 whether	 it	 is	 ever	 possible	 for	 non-Abrahamic	
traditions	 to	 access	 the	 legal	 systems	without	 distorting	 themselves	 to	 fit	 into	 the	
theological	 language	used	above.	 In	 a	 recent	 keynote	 speech	Sir	 James	Munby,	 an	
English	judge	and	president	of	the	Family	Division	of	the	High	Court	of	England	and	
Wales,	 stated	 that	 “[h]appily	 for	 us,	 the	 days	 are	 past	 when	 the	 business	 of	 the	
judges	was	the	enforcement	of	morals	or	religious	belief.”265	However	it	is	not	known	
on	what	grounds	Munby	would	address	concepts	of	morality	and	tolerance,	or	more	
importantly	“respecting	and	protecting	the	right	to	hold	sincere	beliefs	on	the	other”	
which	he	strongly	advocates	for.266	What	does	he	consider	to	be	“sincere”	beliefs?	It	
seems	that	he	is	simply	unaware	that	he	is	consistently	upholding	Christian	values	in	
disguise.	
The	 concepts	of	equality,	 tolerance,	neutrality	 and	morality,	 in	other	words	
the	Christian	normative	principles,	 the	moral	 “ought	 to”	and	“ought	not	 to”,267	are	
																																								 																					
264	For	detailed	analysis	of	Article	9	cases	and	the	language	of	the	ECtHR	see	chapters	5,	6	and	7	in	this	
thesis.	
265	Sir	James	Munby,	President	of	the	Family	Division	of	the	High	Court,	in	a	speech	addressing	family	
lawyers	 at	 the	 Law	 Society’s	 Family	 Law	 Annual	 Conference.	 Andrew	 brown,	 Judges	 can	 sidestep	
religion,	 but	 they	 can't	 avoid	 morality	 available	 at	
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2013/nov/05/judges-religion-morality-speech-
sir-james-munby-christian-valuesSee	also		http://www.iclr.co.uk/law-morality-debate-goes/		
266	Andrew	 brown,	 ‘Judges	 can	 Sidestep	 Religion,	 but	 They	 Can't	 Avoid	 Morality’	 The	 Guardian,	 5	
November	 2013	 available	 at	
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2013/nov/05/judges-religion-morality-speech-
sir-james-munby-christian-values	
267 	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Colonial	 Experience:	 Normative	 Ethics	 I’	 March	 2,	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/02/colonial-experience-normative-ethics-101-s-n-balagangadhara/	
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concepts	that	have	a	Christian	theological	backdrop,	which	have	been	incorporated	
in	 the	Western	 legal	 systems,	 after	 going	 through	 the	process	of	 secularisation,	 as	
secular	 and	 universal	 concepts	 or	worldviews.	 These	 concepts	make	 sense	 if	 their	
theological	background	is	taken	into	consideration.268	Equality	for	example	presents	
itself	 clearly	 in	 the	 Church	 as,	 “there	 is	 neither	 Jew	 nor	 Gentile,	 neither	 slave	 nor	
free,	nor	is	there	male	and	female,	for	you	are	all	one	in	Christ	Jesus.”269			
Christianity	 transformed	ethics	of	 virtue	 into	normative	Christian	ethics	and	
those	Christian	ethics	were	incorporated	into	Western	law	in	general	and	in	human	
rights	law	more	specifically.	One	might	argue	that	the	concept	of	ethics,	justice	and	
equality	is	an	old	one	and	that	for	example	Aristotle	has	already	addressed	this	issue	
extensively.	 	However,	Aristotle	 explains	 that	 justice	 consists	 in	what	 is	 lawful	 and	
fair,	 with	 fairness	 involving	 equitable	 distributions	 and	 the	 correction	 of	 what	 is	
inequitable.	 Even	 though	 he	 talks	 of	 social	 equality,	 he	 talks	 about	 it	 in	 terms	 of	
proportionality	 rather	 than	equality.	Second,	he	believes	aristocracy	 to	be	 the	best	
regime,	which	is	not	similar	to	the	Christian	belief	of	equality.	Aristotle	explains	the	
concept	of	ethics	by	exemplifying	 it	as	a	person	who	possesses	excellent	character,	
which	is	developed	partly	as	a	result	of	the	person's	upbringing,	and	partly	as	a	result	
of	 his	 habit	 of	 action.270	This	 kind	 of	 virtue	 and	 ethics	 is	 not	 related	 to	 any	 divine	
being	 or	 a	 fulfilment	 of	 any	 divine	 plan.	 It	 is	 attributed	 to	 traditional	 humanly	
practice	 and	 upbringing.	 Most	 importantly,	 unlike	 Christian	 morality	 and	 ethics,	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
see	 also	 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Moral	 Domain	 not	 Defined	 by	 Norms’	 March	 23,	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/03/moral-domain-not-defined-by-norms-s-n-balagangadhara/			
268	Prakash	Shah,	‘Legal	Response	to	Religious	Diversity,	or	to	Cultural	Diversity?’	in	Silvio	Ferrari		(ed),	
Routledge	Handbook	of	Law	and	Religion	(Routledge,	2015)	119-132.	
269	Galatians	3.28.	
270	Aristotle,	Nicomachean	Ethics	(W.	D.	Ross	tr,	Batoche	Books,	Kitchener	1999).	
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Aristotle	 does	 not	 believe	 that	 one	 tries	 to	 live	well	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 some	 further	
divine	 goal.	 Christian	 writers	 changed	 the	 meaning	 of	 terms,	 and	 changing	 the	
concepts	 behind	 them	 to	make	 them	 consistent	 with	 Christian	 theology.	 So	 while	
many	 terms	existed	prior	 to	Christianity	 they	have	not	only	been	appropriated	but	
also	changed	in	the	process.	“Religio”	is	one	of	them,	ethics	is	another.	
Following	from	the	above	it	would	appear	that	under	European	legal	systems	
“non-Christian	religions	and	cultures	would	be	“recognised”	according	to	the	terms	
already	established	by	the	secularisation	of	Christian	theology	through	its	Protestant	
lineage.”271	Moreover,	a	“Christian	framework	would	explicitly	or	implicitly	be	at	play	
when	construing	what	 is	required	for	the	protection	of	other	‘religions’.	This	would	
have	consequences	for	disputants	in	concrete	legal	contexts	depending	on	the	type	
of	 claims	 being	made.”272	Consequently,	 the	Western	 legal	 systems,	 and	 especially	
human	 rights	 law,	becomes	 the	place	where	Christian	concepts	can	 flourish.273	The	
claim	 that	 the	 essence	 of	 religion	 is	 unstructured	 and	 is	 rather	 a	 feeling	 or	 an	
intuition	is	incorrect;	it	exhibits	a	very	structured	experience	because	it	presupposes	
some	concepts	and	requires	one	to	experience	those	concepts	in	a	particular	way	in	
order	to	have	religious	experiences.		
The	idea	that	“religious	experience”	is	found	in	all	cultures	is	a	secular	form	of	
replacing	 the	 idea	 of	 how	 God	 revealed	 himself	 to	 Mankind. 274 	These	 themes	
																																								 																					
271	Jakob	De	Roover	and	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	‘Liberty,	Tyranny	and	the	Will	of	God:	The	Principle	of	
Toleration	 in	Early	Modern	Europe	and	Colonial	 India’	(2009)	History	of	Political	Thought30	(1)	111–
139.	
272	Ibid.	
273	Harold	 Berman,	 ‘The	 influence	 of	 Christianity	 upon	 the	 Development	 of	 Law’	 Oklahoma	 Law	
Review	12	(86)	available	at	http://www.classicapologetics.com/b/berminfl.pdf	
274	Balagangadhara	 notes	 that	 Christianity	 was	 faced	 with	 a	 Christological	 dilemma	 when	 it	 had	 to	
choose	between	the	Christ	centred	or	the	God	centred	approach	to	explain	religion.	Claiming	that	God	
revealed	himself	exclusively	in	Christ	prevents	the	revelation	to	be	seen	as	universal	because	it	might	
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become	 embedded	 in	 the	 language	 when	 one	 talks	 about	 religion	 or	 when	 one	
explains	certain	practices.	 In	the	absence	of	an	alternative	theory,	religious	themes	
have	become	the	basis	on	which	one	builds	“scientific”	theories	of	religion.	Atheists,	
for	 example,	 who	 reject	 the	 existence	 of	 God	 try	 to	 find	 alternatives	 in	 a	 secular	
world,	but	how	could	they	adapt	in	this	“new	secular”	world	if	this	world	is	entirely	
new?	 The	 answer	 is	 that	 these	 ideas	 are	 not	 entirely	 new.	 Atheists	 “accept	 the	
doctrines	 of	 a	 de-Christianised	 Christianity	 and,	 for	 these	 to	 be	 continually	
transmitted	and	make	sense	to	those	who	accept	them,	this	religion	requires	to	be	
present	 in	 the	 background.”275	In	 his	 essay	 Postmodernist	 Bourgeois	 Liberalism,	
Richard	Rorty	says	that	“freeloading	atheists”	continue	to	rely	on	the	Judeo-Christian	
legacy	 of	 concern	with	 human	dignity	 despite	 their	 rejection	of	 the	 revealed	 truth	
that	 alone	 could	 support	 this	 concern.	 For	 Rorty,	 God	 is	 dead,	 but	 secularised	
Christian	morality	continues.276	
3.5	Christianity	and	Human	Rights	
When	religion	 is	secularised	and	 loses	 its	Christian	characteristic	 it	gives	rise	to	the	
modern	 forms	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 “secularised”	 ethics,277	which	 are	 incorporated	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
not	 be	 accepted	 among	 cultures	 of	 non-Christian	 background,	 i.e.	 it	 ceases	 to	 become	 universal,	
furthermore	it	will	make	God	appear	as	a	Christian	God.	If	on	the	other	hand	the	emphasis	on	Christ	is	
shifted	to	stress	on	the	revelation	of	God	as	such,	then	Christianity	will	face	the	possibility	of	claiming	
multiple	 revelations	 of	 the	 Divine	 such	 as	 the	 revelation	 of	 God	 in	 Rama,	 Shiva,	 Buddha…	 and	will	
sacrifice	its	Christian	nature.	The	two	approaches	present	a	dilemma	to	the	Christian	theology	and	the	
uniqueness	of	God’s	revelation	in	Jesus	will	have	to	be	sacrificed	in	order	to	prove	the	universality	of	
Christianity.	 Christianity	 can	 therefore	be	universal	 if	 it	 ceased	being	 specifically	Christian.	 The	only	
way	out	of	this	dilemma	was	to	adopt	the	concept	of	the	“One	who	reveals	Himself	and	not	to	the	one	
in	whom	such	a	revelation	occurs”	that	is,	the	uniqueness	of	God’s	revelation	in	Jesus	will	have	to	be	
sacrificed	 in	 order	 to	 present	 a	 God	whose	 revelation	 is	 universal.	 By	 sacrificing	 the	 Christ-centred	
approach,	theism	becomes	more	of	a	‘universal’	philosophy	of	religion.	See	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	
Heathen	in	His	Blindness…	p.	182-185	
275 	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Secularization	 and	 World	 views’	 March	 15	 2011,	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/15/secularization-and-world-views/	
276	See	also	Michael	J.	Perry,	‘The	Morality	of	Human	Rights:	a	Non	Religious	Grounds?	(2005)	Emory	
Research	Paper	No.	05-6,University	School	of	Law	Public	Law	&	Legal	Theory	Research	Paper	Series.	
97-150,	97.	
277	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP	45(1)	58-75.		
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into	 the	Western	 legal	 systems	 as	 secular	 concepts.	 These	 “secular”	 concepts	 are	
thought	to	be	universal	in	all	cultures	and	therefore	these	legal	systems	are	assumed	
to	 be	 inclusive	 systems	 taking	 into	 account	 diverse	 cultures	 and	 traditions.278	As	 a	
result	one	cannot	accept	the	concepts	of	normative	ethics	and	the	theories	of	human	
rights	without	at	the	same	time,	accepting	Christian	theology	as	true.	In	creating	this	
secularised	 version	 of	 the	 legal	 system,	 Christians	 are	 also	 helping	 in	 prepare	 the	
hearts	and	minds	of	humankind	to	“receive	the	Christian	faith	and	grow	in	Christian	
hope	and	 love.	They	bear	witness	to	their	own	 love	for	 justice,	which	 is	one	of	the	
marks	of	a	Christian,	to	their	belief	that	law	can	be	an	instrument	of	justice,	and	to	
their	desire,	with	God’s	help,	to	convert	law	and	justice	into	instruments	of	Christian	
Love.”279	As	Charles	Curran	says,		
“[h]uman	dignity	comes	 from	God’s	 free	gift;	 it	does	not	depend	on	human	
effort,	 work,	 or	 accomplishments.	 All	 human	 beings	 have	 a	 fundamental,	 equal	
dignity	because	all	share	the	generous	gift	of	creation	and	redemption	from	God	...	
Consequently,	 all	 human	beings	have	 the	 same	 fundamental	 dignity,	whether	 they	
are	brown,	black,	red,	or	white;	rich	or	poor,	young	or	old;	male	or	female;	healthy	or	
sick.280		
Sameul	 Moyn	 notes	 that	 “Europe	 and	 therefore	 the	 modern	 world	 drew	
nearly	everything	from	Christianity	in	the	long	term.”281	Zachary	Calo	further	explains	
that	human	rights	has	a	clear	“religious	heritage	and	sometimes	even	speaks	in	what	
could	 be	 heard	 as	 religious	 language,”	 and	 he	 observes	 that	 “[t]he	 idea	 of	 human																																									 																					
278	Ibid.	
279	Harold	Berman,	‘The	influence	of	Christianity	upon	the	Development	of	Law’	(1959)	12	Okla.	L.	Rev,	
86	electronic	copy	available	at	available	at	http://heisenberg.library.emory.edu/berman/049.pdf			
280	Charles	 E.	 Curran,	 Catholic	 Social	 Teaching:	 A	 Historical	 and	 Ethical	 Analysis	 1891–	 PRESENT:	 A	
Historical,	Theological	and	Ethical	Analysis,	(Georgetown	University	Press,	2002)	132.	
281	Samuel	Moyn,	Christian	Human	Rights,	(University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2015)	6.	
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rights,	particularly	the	underlying	idea	of	human	dignity,	is	replete	with	echoes	of	the	
sacred.”282			
Archbishop	 Rowan	Williams	 adds	 that	 a	 “universal	 principle	 of	 legal	 rights	
requires	 both	 a	 certain	 valuation	 of	 the	 human	 as	 such	 and	 a	 conviction	 that	 the	
human	 subject	 is	 always	 endowed	with	 some	degree	 of	 freedom	over	 against	 any	
and	 every	 actual	 system	 of	 human	 social	 life.	 Both	 of	 these	 things	 are	 historically	
rooted	 in	 Christian	 theology.”283	But	 Aaron	 Petty	 notes	 that	 from	 the	 Eighteenth	
century	 onward,	 European	 legal	 systems	 began	 to	 see	 themselves	 as	 “potentially	
universal,	 pursuing	 the	 law	 of	 reason	 of	 the	 Enlightenment,	 unmoored	 from	 their	
Christian	 origins.”284	The	 Christian	 foundations	 of	 the	 legal	 systems	 remained,	 of	
course,	albeit	silently.	Furthermore,	in	the	twentieth	century,	Christianity	played	the	
dominant	 role	 in	 shaping	 and	 forming	 international	 law	 and	 the	 subsequent	 legal	
systems.285	As	 a	 result,	 “mainstream	accounts	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 international	 law	
are	insensitive,	and	in	some	cases	even	blind,	to	the	communal	dimensions	of	goods	
such	as	religion.	One	place	in	which	the	silent	influence	of	Christianity	is	manifested	
is	in	Article	9	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.”286		
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283	Williams	Rowan,	‘Civil	and	Religious	Law	in	England:	A	Religious	Perspective’,	Lecture	delivered	by	
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284	Aaron	R.	 Petty,	 ‘Religion,	 Conscience,	 and	Belief	 in	 the	 European	Court	 of	Human	Rights’	 (2016)	
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285	Ibid.	
286	Ibid.	
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Malcolm	 Evans	 says	 that	 “human	 rights	 and	 religion	 do	 not	mix	 very	 easily	
and	attempts	to	make	them	do	so	are	fraught	with	difficulties	and	dangers.”287	This	
view	 is	 however,	 debatable	 given	 the	 strong	 Christian	 influence	 on	 the	 origins	 of	
human	rights	and	human	rights	law.	The	religious	origins	of	the	“universal	ethics”288	
are	 greatly	 indebted	 to	 the	Bible,	 under	one	God,	 the	 creator	of	 all	 that	 exists;	 all	
humankind	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 unity	 with	 no	 race	 existing	 for	 itself	 alone.	 The	 Bible	
contains	 a	 variety	 of	 injunctions,	which	 are	 formulated	 in	 the	 terms	of	 duties	 that	
correspond	to	secular	conceptions	of	rights	for	others.	For	example,	“thou	shall	not	
kill”	implicitly	refers	to	the	right	to	life,	just	like	“thou	shall	not	steal”	implies	a	right	
to	property.289	We	tend	to	speak	of	equality	as	if	it	is	some	kind	of	neutral	universal	
“secular”	notion.	However,	its	basis	lies	in	the	Protestant	notion	of	the	priesthood	of	
all	believers	so	it	is	not	necessarily	a	universal	subscribed	value.290		
The	 Protestant	 theology	 abolished	 priesthood	 by	 turning	 everyone	 into	 a	
priest.	 Karl	 Marx	 says	 that	 Luther	 turned	 priests	 into	 laymen	 because	 he	 turned	
laymen	 into	priests.”291	It	was	 therefore	“no	 longer	a	case	of	 the	 layman’s	 struggle	
against	 the	priest	 outside	 himself	but	 of	 his	 struggle	 against	 his	own	 priest	 inside	
																																								 																					
287	Quoted	from	Tom	Lewis	‘What	not	to	wear:	Religious	Rights,	the	European	Court	and	the	margin	of	
appreciation’	(2007)	I.C.L.Q.		56(2)	395-414.	
288	By	Universal	ethics	I	mean	a	code	of	ethics	that	are	supposed	to	be	universally	applicable.	
289	Michline	 Ishay,	The	Human	Rights	Reader,	Major	Political	Essays,	Speeches,	and	Documents	From	
the	Bible	to	Present.	(Routledge	1997)	xv.	
290	Prakash	Shah,	‘Ethnic	and	religious	diversity	in	Britain,	where	are	we	going?’	in	Geraldine	Healy,	Gill	
Kirton,	Mike	Noon	(eds),	Equality,	Inequalities	and	Diversity:	Contemporary	Challenges	and	Strategies	
(Palgrave	MacMillan,	2011)	77-92.	
291Works	 of	 Karl	 Marx	 1843,	 ‘A	 Contribution	 to	 the	 Critique	 of	 Hegel’s	 Philosophy	 of	 Right	
Introduction’,	available	at	http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm		
The	 full	 quotation	 reads:	 “Luther,	 we	 grant,	 overcame	 bondage	 out	 of	devotion	by	 replacing	 it	 by	
bondage	out	of	conviction.	He	shattered	faith	in	authority	because	he	restored	the	authority	of	faith.	
He	 turned	 priests	 into	 laymen	 because	 he	 turned	 laymen	 into	 priests.	 He	 freed	 man	 from	 outer	
religiosity	 because	 he	 made	 religiosity	 the	 inner	 man.	 He	 freed	 the	 body	 from	 chains	 because	 he	
enchained	the	heart.”	
	 107	
himself,	 his	 priestly	 nature.”292	It	 did	 so	 by	 transforming	 religious	 obligations	 into	
moral	and	legal	societal	ethics,293	which	were	later	on	incorporated	in	European	legal	
systems	as	universal	 concepts	of	mankind.294	This	 “equality”	 can	also	 resemble	 the	
concept	of	“agape”,	the	love	that	is	personified	in	Christ295	that	“as	I	have	loved	you,	
love	 you	 also	 one	 another.”296	Consequently,	 toleration	 becomes	 the	 brotherhood	
(Fraternité)	 that	 stands	 side	 by	 side	 to	 equality	 (Egalité)	 and	 liberty	 (Liberté)	 and	
travels	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	European	culture	to	become	universal.297		
If	one	is	suggesting	that	the	Christian	religion	rejected	coercion	and	violence,	
how	would	 one	 justify	 the	 importance	 of	 revolution	 and	 the	 violence	 used	 during	
colonial	 movements?	 John	 Locke	 referred	 to	 revolution	 as	 an	 inevitable	 way	 of	
achieving	rights	against	feudal	oppressions;	this	might	be	a	reflection	of	the	narrative	
of	“the	Cleansing	of	the	Temple”	the	only	time	where	Jesus	had	used	physical	force	
in	an	attempt	to	“cleanse”	the	temple	from	corruption.298	John	Locke	believed	that	
rebellions	 were	 an	 appropriate	 means	 to	 achieve	 or	 restore	 fundamental	 rights	
against	 tyranny,	 and	 that	 revolutions	 happen	 only	 over	 a	 long	 period	 of	 serious	
“human	 rights	 abuses”	 (that	 were	 mentioned	 in	 the	 Bible	 in	 more	 theological	
																																								 																					
292 	Works	 of	 Karl	 Marx	 1843,	 ‘A	 Contribution	 to	 the	 Critique	 of	 Hegel’s	 Philosophy	 of	 Right	
Introduction’,	 available	 at	 http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-
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293	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	20.	
294	See	Article	1	of	 the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	which	says	that	“[a]ll	members	of	 the	
human	family	are	born	free	and	equal	in	dignity	and	rights	.	.	.	and	should	act	towards	one	another	in	
a	spirit	of	brotherhood.”	
295	Harold	Berman,	‘The	influence	of	Christianity	upon	the	Development	of	Law’	(1959)	Oklahoma	Law	
Review	(12)	(86)	available	at	http://www.classicapologetics.com/b/berminfl.pdf	
296	The	Bible	of	John	13:24;	15:12	
297	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	44.	
298		Gospel	of	Mark	11:15–19,	11:27–33,	Matthew	21:12–17,	21:23–27	and	Luke	19:45–48,	20:1–8.	
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language)	 and	 not	 upon	 “every	 little	 mismanagement	 in	 public	 affairs.”299 	This	
probably	explains	how	this	has	emerged	into	our	modern	era	wherein	any	abuse	of	
human	 rights	 law,	 that	 as	 explained	 is	 of	 Christian	 background,	 has	 to	 have	
significant	legal	consequences.	
Moreover,	 this	 concept	 of	 toleration	 and	 revolution	 against	 human	 rights	
abuses	can	only	make	sense	in	societies	where	different	religious	and	cultural	groups	
are	seen	as	deviants	of	 the	majority’s	hierarchical	 religious	doctrines.	Therefore,	 in	
light	of	what	has	been	said,	 it	 is	hard	to	talk	about	tolerance,	 in	say,	Asian	cultures	
which	 are	 not	 structured	 around	 such	 comprehensive	 religious	 doctrines.		
Balagangadhara	says:	
“As	western	Christianity	expanded,	 so	did	 the	Christian-religious	world.	 The	
earlier	 civic,	pagan	world	 contracted	and	marginalised	 in	 this	process.	 “Idolatry”,	 a	
theological	concept,	drew	the	boundaries.	After	having	gone	through	purgatory	and	
neutralised	of	its	sin,	once	a	practice	was	admitted	into	the	Christian	world,	it	could	
find	a	place	 in	this	world.	 It	 is	thus	that	a	“secular”	world	was	to	emerge	 later,	but	
within	 the	 Christian	world.	 It	 is	 a	 Christian-secular	world	 that	 came	 into	 being,	 as	
generated	within	a	religious	world.	That	is	why	the	secular	world	is	in	the	grips	of	a	
religious	world.”300		
Coming	to	the	contemporary	picture,	Balagangadhara	writes:	
“In	other	words,	I	suggest	to	you,	the	western	experience	of	other	cultures	…	
is	 no	different	 from	 that	 of	 the	 early	 Christians.	 It	 is	 not	 called	 “idolatrous”,	 to	 be	
																																								 																					
299	John	Locke,	Two	Treatises	on	Government:	A	Translation	into	Modern	English	(Lewis	F.	Abbot	tr,	ISR	
2009)	229.	
300	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…	444.	
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sure,	 but	 that	 is	 because	 the	 “secular”	 world	 of	 ours	 is	 also	 a	 de-Christianised	
religious	world.301		
Nowadays,	pagan	traditions	and	practices	are	not	referred	to	as	idolatrous	or	
embodiment	 of	 false	 religions.	 However,	 in	 our	 “modern”	 era	 the	 classification	 of	
certain	religions	and	cultures	as	false	or	idolatrous	is	now	referred	to	in	the	secular	
world	as	“violators	of	human	rights	law,	gender	equality	and	the	rule	of	law.”302		
Assuming	that	religion	is	a	relic	of	no	social	role,	which	will	gradually	disappear	as	a	
social	 phenomenon	 and	 that	 it	 remains	 a	mere	 personal	 belief,	 is	 a	myth	 because	
religion	 has	 not	 yet	 faded	 away	 in	 the	 face	 of	 “modernity.”303	Menski	 notes	 that	
“states	not	only	cannot	avoid	considering	religion,	but	have	an	interest	in	doing	so	in	
an	increasingly	multicultural	environment.	Europe	cannot	just	disregard	religion	in	all	
its	various	manifestations	 in	the	21st	century.”304	One	might	therefore	assume	that	
religion	has	diminished	 in	 the	West,	but	all	what	actually	happened	 is	 that	 religion	
has	put	on	a	“secular	garb”	it,	as	Balagangadhara	says,	universalised	as	a	worldview.	
Charles	Taylor	claims	that	“in	our	 ‘secular’	societies	you	can	engage	fully	 in	politics	
without	ever	encountering	God.”305	Jakob	De	Roover	argues	 that	 the	secularisation	
of	Western	political	 thought	has	not	produced	 independent	 rational	principles,	but	
transformed	 theological	 ideas	 into	 the	 “topoi”	 of	 a	 culture.306	Religion	 has	 been	
secularised	in	such	a	way	that	one	does	not	have	to	only	talk	about	or	encounter	God	
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to	 have	 theologically	 framed	 ideas.	 This	 Western	 culture	 remains,	 therefore,	
religiously	secular:	 it	 is	a	secular	world	within	the	sphere	of	a	religious	world	and	is	
created	 by	 religion.307	Christianity	 secularises	 itself	 in	 the	 form	 of	 de-Christianised	
Christianity.	
Consequently,	 one	 could	 explicitly	 state	 that	 Law	 and	 religion	 are	
interdependent,	and	therefore,	
“[r]eligion	gives	 law	its	spirit	and	inspires	 its	adherence	to	ritual	and	justice.	
Law	gives	religion	its	structure	and	encourages	its	devotion	to	order	and	organisation.	
Law	 and	 religion	 share	 such	 ideas	 as	 fault,	 obligation,	 and	 covenant	 and	 such	
methods	as	ethics,	rhetoric,	and	textual	interpretation.	Law	and	religion	also	balance	
each	 other	 by	 counterpoising	 justice	 and	 mercy,	 rule	 and	 equity,	 discipline	 and	
love.”308		
Even	 in	“secular”	States,	 law	has	never	been	 free	 from	the	 impact	of	either	
theology	 or	 the	 church309 .	 Although	 laws	 on	 freedom	 of	 religion	 consisted	 of	
separating	religion	from	the	State,	this	separation	 in	 itself	 is	of	Protestant	theology	
and	 is	 religious	 in	 origin	 and	 therefore	 fails	 to	 be	 intelligible	 outside	 its	 religious	
framework.		
																																								 																					
307	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Orientalism,	 Postcolonialism	 and	 the	 	 ‘Construction’	 of	 Religion’	 in	 Esther	
Bloch,	 Marianne	 Keppens	 and	 Rajaram	 Hegde	 (Eds),	 Rethinking	 Religion	 in	 India:	 the	 Colonial	
Construction	 of	 Hinduism	 (Routledge	 2010)	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
https://www.academia.edu/4228198/Orientalism_Postcolonialism_and_the_Construction_of_Religio
n		
308	John	Witte	Jr.,	‘Introduction’	in	John	Witte	Jr.	and	Frank	S.	Alexander	(eds),	Christianity	and	Human	
Rights	(Cambridge	University	Press	2010)	14.	
309	See	the	Vatican’s	comments	on	Lautsi	v	Italy	[GC],	no	30814/06,	18	March	2011,	ECHR	2412,	(2012)	
54	EHRR	3-	where	they	Vatican	said	that	it	was	shocked	by	the	ruling,	calling	it	“wrong	and	myopic”	
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3.6	The	Configuration	of	Learning	in	the	Western	Culture	and	its	Effect	on	the	Legal	
Systems.	
Christianity	 has	 shaped	 the	 learning	 process	 of	 the	 Western	 culture,	 which	
Balagangadhara	calls	the	configuration	of	learning,	thereby	shaping	the	culture’s	way	
of	 going	 about	 in	 the	 world.	 He	 observes	 that	 the	 European	 culture	 has	 a	
theologically	 grounded	 approach	 to	 asking	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
universe,	 religion,	 and	man	 and	 configures	 a	 theory	 of	 learning	 and	meta-learning	
which	 shows	how	 the	West	 seeks	 knowledge	 “about”	 a	 certain	 phenomenon.	 This	
kind	of	 learning	generates	a	theoretical	knowledge	“about”	the	world	which	results	
in	 the	 process	 of	 “going	 about”	 the	 world.	 Consequently	 this	 culture	 became	 a	
culture	 that	privileges	knowledge	contained	 in	beliefs,	 theories,	and	doctrines	over	
knowledge	acquired	through,	traditions,	practice,	customs	and	rituals.	These	cultures,	
and	equally	the	Western	legal	systems,	demand	that	the	secular	realm	remains	free	
of	 customary,	 non-textual,	 “idolatrous”	 traditions.	 Accordingly	 they	 reconstruct	
traditions	and	customs	so	as	to	make	them	confine	to	the	model	of	Christianity.310			
In	 Interpretation	 and	 The	 Sciences	 of	 Man,	 Charles	 Taylor	 points	 out	 the	
danger	 in	 trying	 to	 interpret	 human	 behaviour	 and	 universalise	 human	 concepts	
across	cultures.	He	argues	that	the	usual	methods	that	researchers	use	to	interpret	
and	 analyse	 human	 sciences	 are	 deeply	 flawed,	 and	 that	 the	 empiricist	 positivist	
methods	 that	 are	 being	 used	 are	 distorted.	 He	 notes,	 “inter-subjective	 meanings	
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cannot	 be	 a	 property	 of	 a	 single	 person	 because	 they	 are	 rooted	 in	 social	
practice.”311		
Taylor	believes	that	a	researcher	may	be	able	to	 interpret	other	cultures	by	
working	 hard	 on	 developing	 his	 “right	 intuition”	 to	 interpret	 cultural	 behaviour.	
However,	if	one	goes	with	Balagangadhara’s	theory	of	learning,	then	there	is	no	way	
that	a	person’s	intuition	will	be	strengthened	to	develop	in	a	way	to	make	sense	of	a	
culture	 whose	 “going	 about”	 the	 world	 is	 entirely	 different	 from	 a	 culture	 where	
performative	knowledge	is	dominant.	This	intuition	will	only	remain	subjective	to	the	
person	 describing	 the	 phenomenon	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 West	 this	 intuition	 has	
religious	 roots).	 It	 is	 subjective	 to	 the	experience	and	understanding	of	 the	person	
defining	a	particular	culture	or	phenomenon.	Consequently,	this	way	of	“going	about”	
of	 the	western	culture	has	expanded	 to	all	domains	of	 the	human	 life.	On	 the	one	
hand	it	creates	the	need	to	have	theoretical	accounts	about	any	and	every	aspect	of	
life	 and	 the	world	 in	 order	 to	 cope	with	 it.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 knowledge	 is	 reduced	 to	
verbal	and	textual	knowledge.	
Furthermore,	 in	 The	 Heathen	 in	 his	 Blindness	 he	 shows	 that	 differences	
between	 cultures	 are	 a	 result	 of	 differences	 in	 the	 configuration	 of	 learning;	
irrespective	what	 one	 learns;	 one	 learns	 it	 in	 a	 particular	way	 in	which	 his	 or	 her	
culture	has	taught	them.	One	learns	how	to	learn.	In	the	Western	culture	religion	has	
generated	 this	 particular	 configuration	 of	 learning	 and	meta-learning	where	 it	 has	
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become	 dominant	 and	 where	 theoretical	 frameworks	 have	 subordinated	 other	
learning	processes.312			
Balagangadhara	identifies	a	discontinuity	of	epistemology	between	the	West	
and	 non-Abrahamic	 cultures, 313 	unlike	 the	 “cultural	 continuity”	 between	 the	
Christian	West	 and	 the	 Post-Reformation	world,	which	 explains	why	 despite	 being	
“defeated”	 by	 Protestantism,	 Catholicism	 survived.	 In	 the	West,	 it	 is	 religion	 that	
lends	 structure	 to	 its	 way	 of	 going	 about	 in	 the	 world,	 it	 generates	 theoretical	
knowledge,	 and	 knowing-about	 is	 predominantly	 how	 it	 guides	 its	 goings-about.	
Religion	answers	questions	about	 the	 “meaning”	of	 the	world	and	posing	meaning	
problems	as	well	(what	is	the	meaning	of	man,	does	the	cosmos	have	a	meaning).314	
People	accept	questions	brought	forth	by	religion	even	if	they	are	not	familiar	with	
the	doctrines	of	religion.	Therefore,	practices	and	acts	must	have	a	meaning	in	one-
way	or	another.	In	cultures	that	have	no	religion,	knowledge	is	shifted	from	learning	
“to	 go	 about”	 the	 world	 to	 learning	 “how”	 to	 go	 in	 the	 world	 (experiential	
knowledge).	This	knowledge	is	acquired	through	practical	and	performative	learning	
which	dominate	the	configuration	of	learning	rather	than	explanatory	knowledge.	By	
postulating	necessary	and	intelligible	connections	of	parts	of	the	world	together	and	
asking	about	“meanings	of	certain	phenomena”,	religion	provides	a	fertile	soil	for	the	
growth	and	expansion	of	sciences.	Religion	transformed	science	into	a	social	process	
by	 slowly	 universalising	 itself	 by	 means	 of	 proselytisation	 and	 secularisation.	 For	
example,	in	Indian	culture,	rituals	and	traditions	lend	identity	to	its	configuration	of																																									 																					
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learning,	 this	 culture	 imparts	 practical	 knowledge,	 and	 performative	 knowledge	
dominates	 there.	 However,	 European	 legal	 systems	 “privilege	 the	 knowledge	
contained	 in	 doctrines,	 theories,	 beliefs,	 and	 principles	 over	 practical	 knowledge,	
performativity,	rituals	and	customs.”315			
3.7	Freedom	of	Conscience	and	the	Law	
The	 moral	 and	 ethical	 theory	 of	 the	 modern	 world	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 medieval	
theology	of	conscience.316		However	conscience	 is	how	the	Christian	God	speaks	 to	
humanity	and	how	he	makes	humanity	listen	to	his	word.317	Freedom	of	conscience	
remains	a	fundamental	element	in	both	the	Christian	theology	and	legal	systems.	In	
the	Christian	theology	the	“true”	God	does	not	accept	unwilling	followers	who	had	
been	forced	 into	His	worship	as	that	would	be	a	violation	of	the	freedom	that	God	
has	given	to	man.	In	European	legal	systems	and	specifically	under	Article	9,	religion	
is	 being	 reduced	 and	 collapsed	 into	 freedom	 of	 conscience318	and	 the	 Christian	
ethical	and	moral	backdrops	to	freedom	of	conscience	are	taken	for	granted.	
John	 Witte	 Jr.	 correctly	 observes	 that	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 was	 a	
human	rights	movement.319	Before	the	Protestant	Reformation	there	was		
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Age’,	 The	 Immanent	 Frame:	 Secularism,	 Religion	 and	 the	 Public	 Sphere,	 available	 at	
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/23/protecting-freedom-of-religion-in-the-secular-age/	[last	accessed	
March	2017].	
319	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Law,	Religion,	 and	Human	Rights:	A	Historical	 Protestant	Perspective’	 (1998)	 The	
Journal	of	Religious	Ethics	26(2)	257-262,	257-258.	
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“[o]ne	universal	Catholic	faith	and	Church,	one	universal	system	of	canon	law	
and	sacramental	life,	one	universal	hierarchy	of	courts…	[The	reformists]	began	their	
movements	with	a	call	 for	 freedom	from	this	ecclesiastical	 regime-	 freedom	of	 the	
individual	 conscience	 from	 intrusive	 canon	 laws	 and	 clerical	 controls,	 freedom	 of	
political	officials	from	ecclesiastical	power	and	privileges,	freedom	of	the	local	clergy	
from	central	papal	rule	and	oppressive	princely	controls.	"Freedom	of	the	Christian"	
became	the	rallying	cry	of	the	early	Reformation.”320		
The	 influence	 of	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 on	 the	Western	 legal	 systems	
and	philosophy	and	the	modern	Western	culture	is	unsurprising.	Such	a	fundamental	
Reformation	 of	 both	 political	 institutions	 and	 religious	 beliefs	 in	 various	 European	
countries	could	not	have	taken	place	without	important	changes	in	legal	thought.321	
At	the	root	of	the	Reformers’	political	and	theological	beliefs	was	a	distinctive	legal	
philosophy.	The	“modern”	Western	legal	philosophy,	that	of	natural	law	theory	and	
legal	positivism,	can	be	seen	as	an	extension	of	Luther’s	 legal	philosophy322	and	his	
“two	 Kingdoms”,	 the	 earthly	 and	 the	 heavenly.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 natural	 law,	
Luther’s	 legal	 philosophy	 suggests	 that	within	every	person	 there	exists	 a	 sense	of	
justice,	 in	 other	 terms,	 a	 conscience.	 Consequently,	 Luther’s	 legal	 philosophy	
“defines	 law	as	 the	will	 of	 the	 state	 expressed	 in	 a	 body	of	 rules	 and	enforced	by	
coercive	sanctions.	It	sharply	separates	law	and	morals.”323	Luther	and	his	followers	
believed	that	God	embedded	moral	insights	in	the	conscience	of	every	person.	Those																																									 																					
320	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Law,	Religion,	 and	Human	Rights:	A	Historical	 Protestant	Perspective’	 (1998)	The	
Journal	of	Religious	Ethics	26(2)	257-262	258.	
321	Harold	Berman	and	 John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘The	Transformation	of	Western	Legal	Philosophy	 in	Lutheran	
Germany’	(1989)	Southern	California	Law	Review	62(6)	1573-1650.	
322	Ibid.	
323	Harold	Berman	and	 John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘The	Transformation	of	Western	Legal	Philosophy	 in	Lutheran	
Germany’	(1989)	Southern	California	Law	Review	62	(6)	1573-1650.	
	 116	
moral	 insights	correspond	to	the	Bible,	which	is	seen	as	the	only	source	of	spiritual	
knowledge.		
As	discussed	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	 the	West	has	studied	religion	 through	
religion,	 through	what	might	be	called	a	religious	hermeneutical	circle324	framed	by	
secularised	 Christian	 theological	 backgrounds,	 which	 remain	 consistent	 with	 the	
themes	of	the	Bible.	The	religious	doctrine	of	Christianity	has	become	the	framework	
within	which	 religion	 is	 studied.325	Timothy	 Fitzgerald	 has	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 “no	
coherent	 non-theological	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 the	 study	 of	 religion	 as	 a	 separate	
academic	discipline.”326		Furthermore,	religion	exhibits	reflexivity	by	including	what	it	
says	about	itself;	hence	religious	language	becomes	both	the	object	language	and	its	
own	meta-language.	Accordingly,	 the	possibility	of	a	“science	of	religion”	resides	 in	
our	 willingness	 to	 accept	 theology	 as	 science.	 The	 distinction	 therefore	 between	
what	is	religion,	what	is	thought	to	be	religion	and	what	is	secular	is	drawn	within	the	
framework	of	religion.327		
It	 is	therefore	not	surprising	that	although	international	law	after	the	Treaty	
of	 Westphalia328	emerged	 as	 a	 fundamentally	 European	 and	 “secular”	 concept,	 it	
remained	 very	 much	 influenced	 by	 Christian	 religious	 dictates.329	Heinhard	 Steiger	
said	that	the	era	of	international	law	from	the	thirteenth	to	the	eighteenth	centuries	
																																								 																					
324	On	 the	 study	of	meaning	 and	expression	 in	human	behaviour	 and	 the	 ‘hermeneutical	 circle’	 see	
Charles	Taylor,	‘Interpretation	and	the	sciences	of	Man’	(1971)	The	Review	of	Metaphysics	25(1)	3-51,	
18.	
325	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	12.	
326	Timothy	Fitzgerlad,	The	Ideology	of	Religious	Studies	(oxford	University	Press	2000)	3	
327	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…	267-270,	444-445.	
328 Peace	 Treaty	 of	 Westphalia	 of	 October	 24,	
1648,	http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp			[Accessed	October	14,	2014].	
329	Mashood	Baderin,	‘Religion	and	International	Law:	Friends	or	Foes’	(2009)	E.H.R.L.R.	(5)	637-658.	
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was	an	era	of	“international	law	of	Christianity”	with	the	law	ingrained	with	religious	
principles.	He	 stated	 that	 “Christianity	 formed	 the	major	 intellectual	 foundation	of	
legal	 order	 for	 the	 entire	 epoch”,	 that	 “brought	 Europe	 together,	 not	 only	 into	 an	
intellectual-religious	unit,	but	also	under	the	political	idea	of	a	res	publica	Christiana”,	
a	term	he	identified	as	still	“used	in	treaties	as	late	as	the	18th	Century.”330		
3.8	The	Reformation	
Sixteenth	 Century	 reformers	 such	 as	Martin	 Luther,	 John	 Calvin,	Menno	 Simmons,	
Thomas	Cranmer	and	others,	 started	 their	 reformation	movement	within	a	 call	 for	
freedom	 of	 the	 individual	 conscience	 from	 clerical	 controls,	 canon	 laws	 and	
ecclesiastical	rule.	The	call	was	also	for	freedom	of	the	local	clergy	from	the	central	
Papal	 rule,	 the	 oppressive	 princely	 control	 and	 freedom	 of	 political	 officials	 from	
ecclesiastical	 power	 and	 privileges,	 freedom.331	Martin	 Luther	 stated	 in	 his	 trial	 in	
1521,	at	the	Imperial	Diet	of	Worms	that		
“[u]nless	 I	 am	 convicted	 by	 Scripture	 and	 plain	 reason,	 I	 do	 not	 accept	 the	
authority	 of	 popes	 and	 councils,	 for	 they	 have	 contradicted	 each	 other—my	
conscience	is	captive	to	the	Word	of	God.	I	cannot	and	I	will	not	recant	anything,	for	
to	go	against	conscience	is	neither	right	nor	safe.	God	help	me.	Amen.”332		
The	unleashing	of	the	Protestant	Reformation	led	by	Martin	Luther	in	1517	in	
Germany	started	as	an	emphatic	call	 for	 freedom,	 freedom	from	the	“two	swords”																																									 																					
330	Heinhard	 Steiger,	 “From	 the	 International	 Law	 of	 Christianity	 to	 the	 International	 Law	 of	World	
Citizen”	 (2001)	Journal	 of	 the	 History	 of	 International	 Law	 3	 180-184.	 See	 also	 section	 4.5	 in	 this	
thesis.	
331	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Law,	Religion,	 and	Human	Rights:	A	Historical	 Protestant	Perspective’	 (1998)	 The	
Journal	of	Religious	Ethics	26(2)	257-262.	
332 	Words	 of	 Martin	 Luther	 at	 the	 Imperial	 diet	 of	 Worms	 on	 April	 18,	 1521,	 available	 at	
http://www.luther.de/en/worms.html	[Last	accessed	November	2017].	
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regime.333	The	Church	was	to	be	freed	from	the	tyranny	of	the	pope,	the	laity	was	to	
be	freed	from	the	domination	of	the	clergy,	and	the	conscience	had	to	be	freed	from	
the	strictures	of	the	canon	law.334	“Freedom	of	the	Christian"335	was	the	battle	cry	of	
the	early	Protestant	Reformation.		
"The	Lutheran	reformation	was	not	limited	to	that	of	Church	and	theology	it	
rapidly	extended	into	a	reformation	of	law	and	the	state	as	well.	The	“deconstruction	
of	the	canon	 law	for	the	sake	of	the	Gospel	gave	way	to	reconstruction	of	the	civil	
law	on	the	strength	of	the	Gospel.”336		
Lutheran	 theologians	 were	 joined	 by	 Lutheran	 jurists	 to	 compose	 legal	
reforms	of	the	State,	Church	and	society	building	on	the	foundation	of	the	Protestant	
theology.	The	strength	of	the	Lutheran	reformation	lay	 in	the	fact	that	 it	combined	
both	 legal	 and	 theological	 reforms,	 hence	 was	 so	 resilient	 and	 resolute.337	Luther	
realised	that	it	is	a	blessing	in	the	temporal	world	to	give	an	institutional	form	to	the	
theological	framework	he	had	built.	In	its	essence,	the	Lutheran	Reformation	became	
both	 a	 legal	 and	 a	 theological	 reformation	 movement.	 It	 “struck	 new	 balances	
between	law	and	Gospel,	rule	and	equity,	order	and	faith,	structure	and	spirit.”338		
3.9	The	Separation	of	the	Two	Kingdoms	
The	 Reformation	 divided	 the	 world	 into	 two	 separate	 kingdoms,	 that	 of	 the	 soul																																									 																					
333	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Facts	 and	 Fictions	About	 the	History	 of	 Separation	of	 Church	 and	 State,’	 	 (2006)	
Journal	of	Church	and	State	48	15-46	
334	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Between	Sanctity	 and	Depravity:	 Law	and	Human	Nature	 in	Martin	 Luther’s	 Two	
Kingdoms’	(2003)	Villanova	LR	48	727-762,	742.	
335	Jaroslav	Pelikan,	 et	 al.,	 (eds.)	 and	 (trans)	 ‘Freedom	of	 a	Christian’	 in	 Luther’s	works	 	 (31)	 327-77	
(1955-68)	5.	
336	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Between	Sanctity	 and	Depravity:	 Law	and	Human	Nature	 in	Martin	 Luther’s	 Two	
Kingdoms’	(2003)	Villanova	LR	48	727-762,	732.	
337	Ibid.	
338	Ibid.,	at	733.	
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(spirit)	and	that	of	the	body	(flesh).	It	is	believed	that	as	bodies	Christians	lived	in	the	
temporal	world	(earth)	and	as	souls	they	lived	in	the	spiritual	kingdom.	According	to	
the	 Protestant	 theology,	 the	 conversion	 from	 the	 temporal	 to	 the	 spiritual	 gave	
spiritual	 liberty	 to	 all	mankind	 and	 especially	 to	 the	 clergy	 of	 the	 Roman	 Catholic	
Church.	 The	 Protestant	 Reformation	 insisted	 that	 everybody	was	 a	 priest	 and	 that	
every	human	being	possessed	the	true	Christian	liberty.	Although	the	body	remained	
subject	to	human	authority	and	coercive	law,	for	it	is	intrinsically	sinful,	the	spiritual	
kingdom	 became	 free	 from	 human	 laws,	 works,	 idolatry	 and	 false	 worship.	 The	
Reformation’s	 notion	 of	 Christian	 liberty	 implies	 that	 all	 human	 laws	 that	 are	
imposed	 on	 people	 in	 the	 spiritual	 sphere	 go	 against	 “true”	 religion	 and	 result	 in	
false	worship.	It	is	believed	that	in	this	separation	Christians	were	liberated		
“[a]	Christian	is	at	once	a	lord,	subject	to	no	one,	and	a	priest	who	is	servant	
to	everyone.	All	vocations	are	equal,	all	have	direct	access	to	God.	This	is	the	origin	
of	 a	 Christian's	 dignity	 and	 liberty.”339	Moreover	 "every	 Christian	 is	 by	 faith	 so	
exalted	above	all	things	that,	by	virtue	of	a	spiritual	power,	he	is	[a]	lord."340	
The	 Protestant	 Reformation	 changed	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 spiritual	
and	 the	 temporal	 world	 significantly.	 The	 Protestant	 theology	 said	 that	 all	 human	
beings	live	simultaneously	in	the	two	worlds	and	every	soul	should	be	left	free	to	be	
saved	by	the	Spirit	of	God.		Consequently,	every	human	being	lives	in	two	kingdoms,	
the	earthly/temporal	(or	secular)	and	the	spiritual	(or	religious).	In	the	secular	sphere,	
people	 should	 always	 obey	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 secular	 authorities	 while	 pursuing	 as	
																																								 																					
339	Quoted	from	Roger	Ruston.	Rev.	of	John	Witte,	Jr.,	‘God's	Joust,	God's	Justice:	Law	and	Religion	in	
the	Western	Tradition’	(2008)	Ecc.	L.J.	10(3)	368-370.	
340	Luther’s	Works	vol.	31,	354.	
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bodies	 the	 preservation	 of	 their	 earthly	 interests,	whereas	 in	 the	 religious	 sphere,	
while	striving	for	the	salvation	of	their	souls,	God	only	has	authority	with	no	human	
intervention,	and	therefore	remains	a	solely	individual	issue341	since	“God	alone	was	
the	 Lord	of	our	 souls.”342		This	 generated	 the	embedded	normative	belief	 that	“the	
state	 and	 its	 laws	 ought	 not	 to	 intrude	 upon	 religion.”343	From	 this	 theological	
Protestant	 framework,	 the	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 elaborated	 their	 theories	 of	
toleration	and	liberty	of	conscience.		
3.10	Liberation	of	Conscience	in	the	Protestant	theology		
The	 Protestant	 theology	 required	 all	 Christians	 to	 go	 through	 the	 process	 of	
“conversion”	which	is	the	process	of	subjection	to	God’s	Will,	 instead	of	submitting	
oneself	 to	 the	 wills	 of	 other	 “sinful”	 human	 beings,	 in	 order	 to	 possess	 Christian	
liberty.	Thus,	in	matters	of	faith,	Christians	were	to	be	free	from	human	intrusion.344	
The	Reformers	explicitly	refuted	the	 idea	that	 it	 is	the	duty	of	the	Church	per	se	 to	
develop	human	law	and	were	sceptical	about	the	human	ability	to	create	an	earthly	
law	 that	would	 reflect	 eternal	 law.345	This	Protestant	 scepticism	made	possible	 the	
development	of	a	Christian	legal	positivism,	which	treats	law	as	being	in	and	of	itself,	
as	law,	morally	neutral	solely	as	a	means	of	exercising	political	power.		
The	primary	aim	of	a	Christian	to	become	free	was	to	subject	oneself	to	the	
Will	of	God	and	true	Christians	strived	to	surrender	their	purposes	to	the	divine	law																																									 																					
341	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Secularism,	 Colonialism	 and	 Indian	 Intellectuals’	 April	 2,	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/02/secularism-colonialism-and-indian-intellectuals/	 [accessed	 in	
October	2014]	
342	Ibid.	
343	Ibid.	
344	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	71.	
345	Harold	Berman,	‘The	influence	of	Christianity	upon	the	Development	of	Law’	(1959)	Oklahoma	Law	
Review	(12)	86	electronic	copy	available	at	http://www.classicapologetics.com/b/berminfl.pdf	
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of	their	Creator.	Christianity	in	the	medieval	period	was	a	religion	of	the	monasteries.	
The	process	of	conversio,	the	subjection	to	God’s	will	and	turning	to	God	to	reform	to	
his	 image,	 shaped	 the	 life	 of	 Christian	 monks	 and	 became	 the	 answer	 to	 what	 it	
means	to	lead	a	Christian	life.346	In	Churches	of	the	medieval	period,	the	two	realms,	
that	of	the	soul	and	that	of	the	body,	resembled	the	spiritual	estate	of	the	clergy	and	
the	 temporal	 estate	 of	 the	 laity.	 Priests	 were	 spiritual	 and	 were	 given	 religious	
authority	 over	 the	 laymen	 and	 Christian	 liberty	 only	 because	 they	 turned	 towards	
God.	The	laymen	remained	confined	to	the	earthly	carnal	world.347		
Although	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 rejected	 most	 of	 the	 theology	 of	
medieval	Christianity,	 it	 adopted	 the	 twofold	 scheme	of	 the	 spiritual	and	 temporal	
realm	but	 gave	 it	 “a	 radical	 twist.”348	The	Protestant	Reformation	did	not	 limit	 the	
process	of	Conversion	to	the	clergy,	 it	rather	extended	this	process	to	all	Christians	
equally	 because	 the	 Protestant	 reformers	 believed	 that	 Christian	 liberty	 should	 be	
given	to	all	believers.		
As	a	result	of	this	development,	the	distinction	between	the	two	realms	was	
changed	in	a	way	that	would	be	decisive	for	the	shape	of	the	modern	legal	thought	
of	 the	 West	 and	 consequently	 the	 “modern”	 human	 rights	 law.	 “True”	 religion	
required	freedom	of	the	soul	from	earthly	laws	and	therefore	the	spiritual	kingdom	
became	 the	 sphere	 of	 freedom	 or	 liberty.	 The	 realm	 of	 the	 body	 was	 to	 remain	
subject	to	coercive	laws	and	human	authority.	The	temporal	kingdom	turned	into	the	
realm	of	law	and	coercion	that	could	be	regulated	by	the	state,	as	Tertullian	said:																																									 																					
346	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	72.	
347	Ibid.,	at	358.	
348	Ibid.	
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	“You	think	that	others,	too,	are	gods,	whom	we	know	to	be	devils.	However,	
it	 is	 a	 fundamental	 human	right,	 a	privilege	of	nature,	 that	 every	 man	
should	worship	according	 to	 his	 own	 convictions:	 one	man's	religion	neither	 harms	
nor	 helps	 another	 man.	 It	 is	 assuredly	 no	 part	 of	 religion	to	 compel	religion—	 to	
which	free-will	and	 not	 force	 should	 lead	 us—	 the	sacrificial	 victims	 even	 being	
required	of	a	willing	mind.”349		
Tertullian	attacks	false	gods	whom	he	calls	“the	devils”	and	attacks	idolatry	as	
well.	However,	Tertullian’s	quote	is	significant	because	it	shows	us	that	for	centuries	
to	 come,	 freedom	 to	 choose	 between	 God	 and	 the	 Devil	 remains	 essential	 to	
Christianity.	His	words	reveal	the	importance	of	freedom	of	conscience,	for	the	true	
God	is	not	willing	to	accept	followers	who	are	forced	to	worship	Him.	The	concept	of	
false	worship	and	 idolatry	started	 to	emerge,	any	 interference	with	 the	conscience	
and	 any	 intermediary	 between	 man	 and	 God	 was	 regarded	 as	 false	 worship	 and	
therefore	false	religion.	
When	comparing	the	bondage	of	human	works	of	the	Roman	Catholic	Church	
to	the	Protestant	liberty	of	Christians	Luther	says	
“That	stewardship,	however,	has	now	been	developed	into	so	great	a	display	
of	power	and	so	 terrible	a	 tyranny	that	no	heathen	empire	or	other	earthly	power	
can	 be	 compared	with	 it,	 just	 as	 if	 laymen	were	 not	 also	 Christians.	 Through	 this	
perversion	the	knowledge	of	Christian	grace,	faith,	liberty,	and	of	Christ	himself	has	
altogether	 perished,	 and	 its	 place	 has	 been	 taken	 by	 an	 unbearable	 bondage	 of	
																																								 																					
349	Quintus	 Tertullian,	 ‘Tertullian	 To	 Scapula’,	 Ch.	 2	 available	 at	 http://carm.org/tertullian-scapula	
[accessed	in	September	2014].	
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human	works	and	laws	until	we	have	become,	as	the	Lamentations	of	Jeremiah	say,	
servants	 of	 the	 vilest	men	 on	 earth	who	 abuse	 our	misfortune	 to	 serve	 only	 their	
base	and	shameless	will.”350	
The	Reformation’s	notion	of	Christian	liberty	implied	that	all	human	laws	that	
are	imposed	on	the	Christian	in	the	spiritual	sphere	went	against	true	religion.	Hence	
the	Reformers	began	to	denounce	the	canon	 law	and	traditions	of	 the	Catholics	as	
idolatry.	 Luther	 clearly	 expressed	 that	 his	 “conscience	 is	 captive	 to	 the	 Word	 of	
God.”351	This	freedom	from	spiritual	laws	became	the	basis	of	liberty	of	conscience	in	
modern	 Europe. 352 	Humans	 could	 therefore	 legitimately	 resist	 any	 human	 laws	
infringed	 upon	 conscience	 and	 faith	 (such	 as	 in	 Article	 9(1)	 but	 this	 required	 a	
boundary	to	be	drawn	between	what	is	spiritual	and	what	is	temporal.	
Calvin	says	that	these	two	worlds,	
“	 [l]et	 us	 first	 consider	 that	 there	 is	 a	 twofold	 government	 in	 man….	 one	
aspect	 is	spiritual,	whereby	the	conscience	 is	 instructed	 in	piety	and	 in	reverencing	
God;	the	second	is	political,	whereby	man	is	educated	for	the	duties	of	humanity	and	
citizenship	 that	 must	 be	 maintained	 among	 men.	 These	 are	 usually	 called	 the	
“spiritual”	and	 the	 “temporal”	 jurisdiction	 (not	 improper	 terms)	by	which	 is	meant	
that	the	former	sort	of	government	pertains	to	the	 life	of	the	soul,	while	the	 latter	
has	to	do	with	the	concerns	of	the	present	life…	For	the	former	resides	in	the	inner	
mind,	while	 the	 latter	 regulates	only	outward	behaviour.	 The	one	we	may	 call	 the																																									 																					
350 	Martin	 Luther	 1520a:	 608	 also	 available	 at	
http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/FullText.aspx?qc=AdHoc&q=3153&qp=16		
351 	Words	 of	 Martin	 Luther	 at	 the	 Imperial	 diet	 of	 Worms	 on	 April	 18,	 1521,	 available	 at	
http://www.luther.de/en/worms.html	[Last	accessed	November	2017].	
352	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	111.	
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spiritual	 kingdom,	 the	 other,	 the	 political	 kingdom.	 Now	 these	 two,	 as	 we	 have	
divided	them,	must	always	be	examined	separately.353	
This	 ideology	of	 the	 two	 kingdoms,	 is	 clearly	 reflected	 in	Article	 9	whereby	
everyone	 is	granted	absolute	 freedom	of	 thought	conscience	and	religion,	no	State	
or	magistrate	could	interfere	with	this	right	but	when	it	comes	to	manifestations	and	
visible	(temporal)	appearances,	the	State	can	interfere	and	restrict	manifestations.	
3.11	The	Conversion	Process	and	the	Sin	of	Idolatry	
In	 the	 Eleventh	Century	 the	belief	 had	become	dominant	 that	 the	Roman	Catholic	
church	 had	 a	 mission	 to	 reform	 society	 or	 the	 temporal	 world	 and	 that	 this	
reformation	was	to	take	place	through	the	priests	for	they	have	reached	a	superior	
position	 in	 this	hierarchy	and	have	gained	spiritual	authority	over	 the	 laity.354	They	
were	hence	not	 only	 superior	 to,	 but	 responsible	 for	 the	 laity.	 Consequently	 “true	
Christians”	 could	 not	 but	 obey	 the	 church	 as	 strictly	 as	 possible.	 More	 popular	
movements	were	formed	as	a	response	to	the	Church	reform,		
“[w]ho	 have	 rejected	 not	 only	 the	 achievement	 but	 the	 objective	 of	 the	
Gregorian	 reform,	 the	 ideal	of	 a	hierarchically	organised	 church	which	 claimed	 the	
right	to	intervene	in	every	area	of	life	and	thought.”355	
The	 need	 to	 live	 in	 a	monastery	 and	 submit	 oneself	 to	 the	monastic	 rules	
soon	after	diminished.	This	gradual	“secularisation”	built	 the	momentum	it	needed																																									 																					
353	1559	Institutes	3.19.15;	Battles	edition,	See	also	R.	Scott	Clark,	‘A	Cross	and	a	Twofold	Kingdom’	13	
January	 2014	 The	 Hiedelblog	 available	 at	 http://heidelblog.net/2014/01/a-cross-and-a-twofold-
kingdom-2/		
354		 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘A	 Kingdom	 of	 Another	 World:	 Christianity,	 Toleration	 and	 the	 History	 of	
Western	Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	70-78.	
355	Robert	I.	Moore,	The	Formation	of	a	Persecuting	Society:	Authority	and	Deviance	in	Western	Europe	
950-1250		(2nd	edn.	Blackwell	Publishing	2007)	18	(emphasis	added).	
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to	 erupt	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 Reformation.	 Every	 human	 being	was	worthy	 of	
gaining	liberty	if	they	turned	to	the	spiritual	world	and	rejected	the	temporal	carnal	
one,	 accordingly	 the	 clergy’s	 authority	 over	 the	 laymen	 could	 not	 be	 justified	
anymore.	The	development	of	“true”	Christianity	was	hindered	by	 the	Church,	and	
hence	 the	 clerics	were	 viewed	as	 “false	 shepherds”	or	 “wolves”,	 rather	 than	 “true	
shepherds”,	who	averted	people	 from	turning	 into	“true”	Christians.	Consequently,	
every	Christian	was	to	experience	the	process	of	directly	surrendering	to	God’s	Will,	
without	 the	 interference	 or	 the	 intermediary	 of	 the	 church,	 this	 was	 no	 longer	 a	
privilege	 to	 the	 clergy.	Moreover,	 Christians	 should	 realise	 that	 it	 is	God	 only	 that	
they	should	rely	on.356		
Luther	insisted	that	for	Christians	to	possess	the	Christian	liberty,	they	should	
go	through	the	experience	to	the	subjection	to	God’s	will.	The	notion	of	conversion	
was	 extended	 to	 all	 believers	 making	 everybody	 into	 a	 priest.	 Protestantism	
abolished	 priesthood	 only	 by	 turning	 everyone	 into	 a	 priest.	 Karl	Marx	 states	 that	
Luther	
“[t]urned	priests	into	laymen	because	he	turned	laymen	into	priests.	He	freed	
man	from	outer	religiosity	because	he	made	religiosity	the	inner	man.	He	freed	the	
body	from	chains	because	he	enchained	the	heart….	 it	was	no	 longer	a	case	of	the	
layman’s	 struggle	 against	 the	priest	 outside	 himself	but	 of	 his	 struggle	 against	
his	own	priest	inside	himself,	his	priestly	nature.”357	
																																								 																					
356	John	Calvin,	The	Institutes	of	the	Christian	Religion,	Henry	Beveridge	(trans.)	(MI:	Christian	Classics	
Ethereal	Library,	Grand	Rapids,	2002)	35.	
357Works	 of	 Karl	 Marx,	 ‘A	 Contribution	 to	 the	 Critique	 of	 Hegel’s	 Philosophy	 of	 Right’,	 Matthew	
Carmody	 (Eds)	 2009	 (first	 published	 in	 Deutsch-Französische	 Jahrbücher,	 7	 &	 10	 February	 1844	 in	
Paris	available	at	https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm		
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All	Believers	became	subject	to	vocation	and	conversion.	Luther	accused	the	
Roman	Catholic	Church	of	claiming	that	the	“sacramental	works	of	the	priests	had	an	
active	role	 to	play	 in	 the	salvation	of	 the	 laymen,”358	and	this	was	not	 tolerated	by	
Luther	because	it	meant	the	mediation	of	men	(who	are	sinful	and	corrupt	in	nature)	
between	 other	 human	 beings	 and	 God.	 This	 intervention	 prevents	 human	 beings	
from	becoming	righteous	before	of	God,	instead	all	human	beings	were	supposed	to	
do	is	surrender	to	God	and	have	faith	in	his	will.		
According	to	the	Protestant	Reformation,	it	was	important	to	show	and	stress	
that	the	Church	and	the	State	are	separate	entities,	and	the	Church	therefore	is	not	a	
legal	or	a	political	authority	and	shall	therefore	not	possess	any	“sword”,	or	have	any	
daily	responsibility	for	law	or	authority.	The	church	had	to	separate	itself	from	legal	
affairs	and	limit	its	mission.359	While	doing	this,	the	clergy	should	resume	preaching	
against	injustice	and	advising	the	magistrate	when	asked	to	do	so.	However,	formal	
legal	 authority	 between	 the	 State	 and	 the	 church	 should	 continue	 to	 cooperate	 in	
implementing	laws	set	by	the	State.360	“The	magistrate	was	God's	vice-regent	called	
to	elaborate	natural	law	and	to	reflect	divine	justice	in	his	local	domain.”361	To	allow	
the	 intervention	 between	 the	 Church	 and	 the	 State	 is,	 as	 Calvin	 says,	 “unwisely	
mingle	 these	 two	 [institutions]	 which	 have	 a	 completely	 different	 nature.” 362																																									 																					
358	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	101.	
359	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 ‘Rights	 and	 Liberties	 in	 Early	Modern	 Protestantism’	 in	 John	Witte	 Jr.	 and	 Frank	
Alexander	 (eds.),	Christianity	and	Human	Rights	an	 Introduction,	 (Cambridge	University	Press,	2010)	
138-142.	
360	Ibid.	
361	John	Witte	 Jr.,	 Facts	 and	 Fictions	 About	 the	 History	 of	 Separation	 of	 Church	 and	 State,’	 	 (2006)	
Journal	of	Church	and	State	48	15-46	
362	Ioannis	 Calvini	 Institutio	 Religionis	 Christianae	 (1559),	 translated	 as	 Institutes	 of	 the	 Christian	
Religion,	ed.	John	T.	McNeill,	trans.	Ford	Lewis	Battles	(Philadelphia:	The	Westminster	Press,	1960),	bk.	
3,	Ch.	19.15;	bk.	4,	Ch.	11.3;	bk.	4,	Ch.	20.1-2.	See	further	John	Witte,	Jr.,	‘Moderate	Religious	Liberty	
in	 the	 Theology	 of	 John	 Calvin’	 (1996)	 Calvin	 Theological	 Journal	 31	 359-403	 available	 at	
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Calvinists	just	like	Lutherans	and	other	reformists	insisted	on	the	separation	between	
the	 State	 and	 Church	 while	 often	 referring	 to	 St.	 Paul's	 “wall	 of	 separation,”363	
metaphor.	 Calvin	 required	 that	 the	 two	 kingdoms,	 the	 spiritual	 and	 the	 earthly	 be	
"examined	separately."	For	there	is	“a	great	difference	...	between	ecclesiastical	and	
civil	power.”364	
The	Reformists	claimed	that	the	Catholic	clerics	and	laymen	set	up	their	own	
human	selves	as	idols	through	a	belief	of	“justification	of	works,”	through	their	own	
righteousness	excluding	the	Word,	Faith	and	Christ.	To	think	that	one	can	go	through	
the	 trials	 of	 a	 monastic	 life,	 rather	 than	 the	 justification	 of	 faith,	 is	 to	 deny	 the	
spiritual	nature	of	Christianity	and	necessity	of	divine	grace	and	was	considered	as	
the	biggest	idolatry.	No	law	or	work	should	therefore	act	as	an	intermediary	between	
God	and	man	otherwise	it	could	mean	idolatry,	he	said:		
“Therefore	 fasting,	wearing	a	 hair	 shirt,	 holy	 activity	 and	 the	monastic	 rule	
and	whole	way	of	life	and	the	Carthusians,	the	strictest	of	orders,	are	all	works	of	the	
flesh;	for	they	imagine	that	they	are	holy	and	will	be	saved	not	through	Christ,	whom	
they	fear	as	a	stern	judge,	but	through	the	observance	of	their	monastic	rule.	They	
think	about	God,	about	Christ,	and	about	the	divine	not	on	the	basis	of	the	Word	of	
God	 but	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 own	 reason.	 On	 this	 basis	 they	 imagine	 that	 their	
monastic	habit,	their	diet,	and	the	whole	conduct	are	holy	and	are	pleasing	to	Christ;	
they	hope	not	only	to	placate	Him	with	the	asceticism	of	their	life	but	to	obtain	from																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/calvin/	[Last	accessed	October	2014].	
363 	Thomas	 Jefferson’s	 Letter	 to	 the	 Danbury	 Baptists,	 January	 1,	 1802	 available	 at	
https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html	[last	accessed	November	2017].	
364	R.	 Scott	 Clark,	 ‘A	 Cross	 and	 a	 Twofold	 Kingdom’	 13	 January	 2014	 The	 Hiedelblog	 available	 at	
http://heidelblog.net/2014/01/a-cross-and-a-twofold-kingdom-2/	 	 see	 also	 Richard	 C.	 Gamble,	 ed.,	
Calvin's	Thought	on	Economic	and	Social	Issues	and	the	Relationship	of	Church	and	State	(New	York:	
Garland,	1992).	
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hi	a	recompense	for	their	good	works	and	their	righteousness.	And	so	the	thoughts	
that	they	imagine	to	be	most	spiritual	are	not	only	the	most	unspiritual	but	even	the	
most	wicked;	for	they	exclude	and	despise	the	Word,	faith,	and	Christ,	and	they	seek	
to	wash	 away	 their	 sins	 and	 to	 obtain	 grace	 and	 eternal	 life	 by	 trust	 in	 their	 own	
righteousness.	Therefore	all	 forms	of	worship	and	religion	apart	from	Christ	are	the	
worship	of	idols.”365	He	adds	that	
“[i]n	Popedom	they	make	priests,	not	 to	preach	and	 teach	God's	Word,	but	
only	to	celebrate	mass,	and	to	roam	about	with	the	sacrament…..	The	papists	in	their	
ordinations	make	no	mention	of	preaching	and	teaching	God's	Word,	therefore	their	
consecrating	 and	 ordaining	 is	 false	 and	 wrong,	 for	 all	 worshiping	 which	 is	 not	
ordained	of	God,	or	erected	by	God's	Word	and	command,	 is	worthless,	yea,	mere	
idolatry.”366	
It	is	evident	from	Luther’s	words	that	there	all	kinds	of	religious	celebrations	
and	 orthopraxy	 were	 regarded	 as	 mere	 idolatry.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 Article	 9	
judgments	 (see	 Chapter	 5	 for	 an	 analysis).	 Christianity,	 from	 its	 first	 beginnings,	
claimed	 to	be	 the	pure	and	unique	 revelation	of	God.	 It	was	when	 the	Devil	 lured	
people	to	worship	“false”	gods,	 that	the	original	 revelation	was	corrupted	by	sinful	
idolaters.	According	to	Christian	theology,	this	corruption,	allowed	human	additions	
																																								 																					
365	Martin	Luther’s	Works,	Lectures	on	Galatians	5-6	vol	27	pp.	88		(emphasis	added)	
366	Martin	Luther,	Table	Talk,	William	Hazlitt	(trn)	(The	Lutheran	Publication	Society,	1997)	available	at	
http://www.reformed.org/master/index.html?mainframe=/documents/Table_talk/table_talk_4.html		
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to	the	pure	godly	revelation	in	the	form	of	myths	and	rites	that	were	fabricated	by	
prelates	and	priests.367		
The	 Reformers	 noted	 that	 the	 clergy	 and	 the	 pope	 had	 created	 numerous	
rituals	and	canons	claiming	that	they	are	necessary	for	salvation	as	they	are	part	of	
God’s	 revelation,	 and	 forced	 them	 on	 the	 believers.	 The	 most	 striking	 accusation	
made	against	the	Roman	Catholics	is	that	it	entailed	“shameless	human	inventions.”	
These	 charges	 of	 idolatry	 were	 extended	 at	 a	 later	 stage	 by	 the	 Enlightenment	
philosophers	to	all	of	Christianity	and	to	all	“religions”	of	humanity.”	The	“atheists”	
among	 them	 said	 that	 all	 of	 those	 idolatrous	 practices	 and	 beliefs	 were	 human	
constructions	 including	 the	 notion	 of	 God	 itself.	 The	 background	 of	 the	
Enlightenment	atheism	was	thus	not	free	from	theology;	the	atheists	were	therefore	
only	able	to	build	on	the	claims	of	Christian	theology.	Had	the	Enlightenment	atheists	
not	 rely	 on	 the	 Christian	 idea	 that	 it	 is	 fundamentally	 wrong	 for	 religion	 to	 be	 a	
human	invention,	the	impact	of	their	charges	would	have	vanished.368		
Protestants	claimed	that	the	teachings	of	Christian	liberty	make	us	free	from	
the	redundant	spiritual	laws,	and	it	is	only	God	and	having	faith	in	Him	that	man	can	
gain	salvation.	The	soul	or	spirit	is	free	but	the	body	is	sinful	and	should	be	subject	to	
temporal	 law,	as	 long	as	 this	 law	does	not	 infringe	upon	ones	 faith.	As	Calvin	says,	
“we	must	carefully	note	that	Christian	freedom	is,	in	all	its	parts,	a	spiritual	thing.”369	
The	freedom	of	a	Christian	should	be	limited	to	the	spiritual	sphere	and	here	should	
be	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 soul	 and	 body,	 between	 civil	 jurisdiction	 and	 God’s																																									 																					
367 	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Dawkin’s	 Delusion	 or	 the	 God	 Delusion?’	 23	 June	 2012	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2012/06/23/dawkins-delusion-or-the-god-delusion/	 [Last	 accessed	 June	
2014].	
368	Ibid.	
369	Calvin,	Institutes	vol	1:	840	
	 130	
spiritual	Kingdom.370		
3.12	The	Enlightenment	as	a	Variant	of	Protestantism		
Although	the	Enlightenment	period	is	commonly	believed	to	be	a	secular	movement	
that	strongly	opposed	religion,	in	fact	it	echoed	the	principles	of	Protestantism	but	in	
a	 secular	 garb.	 The	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 were	 not	 opposing	 religion,	 but	 were	
“against	 revealed	 religion	 or	 a	 transcendental	 justification	 for	 religion.” 371 	The	
Enlightenment	thinkers	were	able	to	build	their	“neutral”	and	“rational”	thoughts	(as	
opponents	 of	 religion	 and	 organised	 religious	 institutions)	 by	 adopting	 ideas	 from	
Protestant	Christianity.		
The	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 secularised	 the	 Christian	 belief	 of	 the	 Biblical	
claim	that	religion	is	a	divine	Gift	from	God	to	mankind	into	the	anthropological	“fact”	
that	 all	 cultures	 have	 a	 religion. 372 	Nineteenth	 and	 twentieth-century	 scholars	
adopted	 this	piece	of	 theology	although	 secularised,373	and	Protestant	 values	were	
imposed	 by	 law	 as	 values	 and	 ethics	 embodying	 universal	 secular	 reasons.374	The	
Enlightenment’s	moral	and	political	philosophy,	their	psychology	and	sociology,	and	
their	 anthropology	 all	 consists	 of	 accounts	 that	make	 sense	 only	 if	 one	 accepts	 a	
number	of	deeply	held	Christian	assumptions,	one	of	which	 is	 the	assertion	of	 the	
																																								 																					
370	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	108.	
371	Triloki	Nath	Madan,	‘Secularism	in	its	Place’	(1987)	The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies	46(4)	747-759.	
372	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Secularized	 Christian	 Belief:	 Religion	 is	 a	 Cultural/Human	 Universal’	 March	 3	
2011	 available	 at	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/03/secularized-christian-belief-religion-is-a-
culturalhuman-universal/		
373	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…	Chapter	3.	
374	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘Christian	Attitudes	and	the	Rule	of	Law	as	the	Mechanism	of	Secularization’	April	
1,	2011,	available	at	http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/01/law-secularization-and-religious-attitudes/	
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universality	 of	 religion375	and	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 separation	 between	 State	 and	
religion.	 The	 supposedly	 secular	 world	 of	 today,	 which	 resembles	 that	 of	 the	
Enlightenment	 period,	 is	 a	 Christian	 world	 that	 is	 not	 free	 from	 religion.	 The	
supposed	atheism	of	 the	Enlightenment	 is	 “theism	 in	disguise”.376	As	Waldron	also	
says		
“Lockean	equality	if	not	fit	to	be	taught	as	a	secular	doctrine	it	is	a	conception	
of	 equality	 that	makes	 no	 sense	 except	 in	 the	 light	 of	 a	 particular	 account	 of	 the	
relation	 between	 man	 and	 God…Locke	 accorded	 basic	 equality	 the	 strongest	
grounding	that	a	principle	could	have:	it	was	an	axiom	of	theology.”377	
The	 call	 for	 freedom	 from	 ecclesiastical	 power	 resembles	 the	 call	 for	
separation	between	State	authorities	on	freedom	of	conscience.	According	to	Robert	
Fitch:	
“[i]t	 was	 from	 the	Enlightenment	that	 we	 received	 the	 worthy	 ideals	 of	
freedom,	 equality,	 peace,	 toleration,	 humanitarianism.	 But	 where	 did	 the	
 Enlightenment	get	these	ideals?	[Not	from	the	Greek	philosophers]	…	The	fact	is,	the	
ideals	of	the	 Enlightenment	are	a	rational	dilution	of	the	ideals	of	Christianity.	…	The	
doctrine	of	equality	is	simply	the	legal	and	political	expression	of	the	ideal	of	human	
brotherhood.	 …	 [T]he	 Christian	 ideal	 of	 love	 is	 variously	 translated	 as	
humanitarianism,	as	equality,	and	as	toleration.”	378			
																																								 																					
375 	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘Atheism:	 A	 Secularized	 Theism’	 March	 5	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/05/atheism-a-secularized-theism-jakob-de-roover/		
376	Ibid.		
377	J.	Waldron,	God,	Locke,	and	Equality:	Christian	Foundations	in	Locke's	Political	Thought,	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2004)	82.	
378	Robert	E.	Fitch,	‘Can	there	be	Morality	without	Religion?’	in	Arthur	Harding	(ed.),	Religion,	Morality	
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When	religion	is	secularised	and	loses	its	Christian	characteristic	 it	gives	rise	
to	 the	 modern	 frameworks	 of	 human	 rights	 which	 are	 incorporated	 into	 the	
European	legal	systems	and	human	rights	 law	as	secular	concepts.	When	religion	is	
secularised	and	takes	the	form	of	“universal”	normative	morals	and	ethics	which	are	
incorporated	 in	 human	 rights	 law	 it	 also	 becomes	 universal,	 and	 is	 thought	 to	
become	 intelligible	 to	 non-Abrahamic	 cultures	 and	 traditions. 379 	However,	 one	
cannot	accept	 these	 ideas	and	 theories	of	human	rights	without	at	 the	same	time,	
accepting	Christian	theology	as	true.		
In	creating	this	secularised	version	of	the	European	legal	systems,	Christians	
are	 also	 helping	 in	 preparing	 the	 hearts	 and	minds	 of	 humankind	 to	 “receive	 the	
Christian	faith	and	grow	in	Christian	hope	and	love.	They	bear	witness	to	their	own	
love	for	justice,	which	is	one	of	the	marks	of	a	Christian,	to	their	belief	that	law	can	
be	an	instrument	of	justice,	and	to	their	desire,	with	God’s	help,	to	convert	law	and	
justice	 into	 instruments	 of	 Christian	 Love.”380	Modern	 forms	 of	 ethics,	 toleration	
secularism	 and	 neutrality	 are	 vital	 elements	 of	 Christian	 theology	 and	 this	 is	 the	
reason	 as	 to	why	 it	 is	 able	 to	 develop	 and	 elaborate.	 “This	 Christian	 theology	 has	
gone	 secular	 and	 that	 is	 why	 the	 claim	 is	 capable	 of	 relatively	 autonomous	
development	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 theory.”	 However,	 this	 development	 makes	 sense	
because	 these	 claims	 are	 part	 of	 some	 religion.	 “In	 other	 words,	 de-Christianised	
Christianity	 can	 take	 hold	 and	 spread	 if	 and	 only	 if	 Christianity	 is	 present	 in	 the	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
and	Law	(Dallas:	Southern	Methodist	University	Press,	1956)	6-7.	
379	Shah	Prakash,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP	45(1)	58-75.		
380	Berman	Harold,	‘The	Influence	of	Christianity	upon	the	Development	of	Law’,	(1959)	Oklahoma	Law	
Review	(12)	86	86-101.	
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culture.”381		
3.13	The	Emergence	of	the	Secular	
As	already	noted,	secularism	did	not	emerge	simply	from	engaging	in	rationalism	and	
repudiating	 religion.	 It	 emerged	 from	 the	 dialectic	 of	 Protestantism	 and	 modern	
science.382	Scientific	 ideas	replaced	the	Christian	conceptions	of	the	world	and	man	
through	a	process	called	“secularisation”.	Secularisation	therefore	is	not,			
“a	process	in	which	religion	was	banned	from	public	life	–	and	so	from	science	
–	but	a	process	by	which	originally	Christian	conceptions	of	man	and	world	lost	their	
recognizably	 Christian	 character,	 acquiring	 the	 status	 of	 ‘natural’	 characteristics	 of	
man	and	world,	thereby	becoming	part	of	the	“common	sense”	of	a	culture.”383		
Based	 on	 the	 twofold	 kingdom	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 spiritual	 and	 the	
secular	 began	 to	 emerge	 and	 determine	 the	 political	 debates	 on	 toleration.	
Punishing	 and	 fighting	 against	 and	 for	 true	 faith	 with	 the	 sword	 constitutes	
interference	 in	Christ’s	world	since	faith	 is	 located	 in	the	consciences	and	hearts	of	
man.	However,	 the	boundaries	of	 the	two	kingdoms	of	 life	should	be	respected	by	
secular	powers,	and	one	should	distinguish	“between	true	or	false	faith	on	the	one	
hand	and	 the	works	and	deeds	of	 true	or	 false	 faiths	on	 the	other.”384	This	 in	 turn	
gives	 the	 secular	 authority	 the	 right	 to	 curb	 false	worship	 and	damaging	doctrines	
																																								 																					
381	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Secularization	 and	 World	 views’	 Hipkapi,	 March	 15	 2011,	 available	 at		
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/15/secularization-and-world-views/		
382	Triloki	Nath	Madan,	‘Secularism	in	Its	Place’	(1987)	The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies	46(4)	747-759,754	
383	Harry	van	den	Bouwhuijsen,	Conversation	of	mankind	or	Comparative	Science	of	Cultures?	Reading	
Balagangadhara,	 Reconceptualising	 India	 Studies’,	 Paper	 presented	 May	 28,	 2013	 for	 the	 India	
Platform,	Ghent.	See	also	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness…437-440.	
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Government	 Has	 the	 Right	 to	 Wield	 the	 Sword	 in	 Matters	 of	 Faith”	 (8	 May	 1530)	 available	 at	
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among	 men	 whenever	 they	 are	 deemed	 as	 public	 crimes.	 Thus	 the	 external	
manifestation	of	faith	becomes	subject	to	discipline	and	punishment	by	means	of	the	
secular	 law.	 “God	 provides	 secular	 government	 throughout	 the	whole	 world	 even	
among	the	heathen	and	the	godless;	but	he	gives	his	spiritual	government	only	to	his	
people.”385		
For	Luther,	secular	government	includes	much	more	than	political	authorities	
and	governments;	it	includes	everything	that	contributes	to	the	preservation	of	this	
earthly	 life.386	Luther	distinguishes	all	 this	 from	the	 spiritual	 reality	of	grace,	of	 the	
word	of	God,	and	of	faith	and	describes	it	as	an	“external	matter,”387	that	is,	related	
to	our	bodies,	and	also	as	the	“secular	sword.”388	
After	the	second	half	of	the	sixteenth	century,	the	Reformists	set	out	for	their	
members	 what	 to	 believe	 and	 how	 to	 worship,	 and	 the	 period	 witnessed	 firm	
theological	 boundaries	 and	 fixed	 doctrinal	 orthodoxies	 as	well	 as	 the	 formation	 of	
confessional	 churches. 389 Although	 the	 Reformation	 was	 “the	 result	 of	 the	
secularisation	 of	 the	 monastic	 structure	 of	 conversion,	 this	 secularisation	 of	
conversion	was	 also	 theologised	 into	 several	 doctrinal	 schemes.”390	The	 Protestant	
churches	started	to	define	their	own	sets	of	doctrines,	in	an	attempt	to	establish	the	
boundary	between	the	true	religion	and	that	of	its	false	adversary,	and	hence	began	
to	 interpret	 the	“correct”	Word	of	God.	As	a	 result,	various	movements	within	 the	
																																								 																					
385	Luther	Vol	13,	193.	
386	Luther	Vol	21,	29.	
387	Luther	Vol	30,	76.	
388Luther	vol	45,	101,	and	vol	46,	242,	see	also	Paul	Althaus,	 ‘The	Ethics	of	Martin	Luther’,	 (Fortress	
press,	1972)	47.		
389	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	119.	
390	Ibid.,	at	125.	
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reformation	became	rivals	of	one	another	and	of	the	Roman	Catholic	Church.	This	in	
turn	made	is	a	need	for	the	Reformation	to	establish	a	secondary	religious	authority	
in	addition	to	the	Scripture.	The	spiritual	authority	challenges	that	the	Church	faced	
allowed	 the	 identification	 of	 heresy	 and	 protection	 of	 religious	 truth.	 Therefore,	
various	churches	started	making	claims	about	universal	religious	truth	of	its	specific	
set	of	doctrines	however	staying	within	the	boundaries	of	the	Scripture	for	 it	 is	the	
Word	of	God	and	His	Will.		
Some	 thinkers	 like	 John	 Milton	 argue	 that	 the	 Protestant	 Churches	 that	
forced	religion	“deserve	as	little	to	be	tolerated	themselves.”391	However,	in	England	
in	 the	 Seventeenth	 century,	 it	 was	 argued	 that	 liberty	 of	 conscience	 ought	 to	 be	
granted	 to	 all	 mankind	 including	 Muslims,	 Jews,	 pagans	 and	 Catholics.392	Milton	
redefined	liberties,	civil	rights	and	religious	teachings	and	strongly	defended	freedom	
of	speech	and	press,	freedom	of	the	conscience,	separation	between	the	State	and	
Church,	equality	of	all	biblical	faiths	in	front	of	the	law	and	the	disestablishment	of	a	
national	religion.393	The	idea	of	granting	liberty	of	conscience	to	all	human	kind	can	
be	traced	back	to	1612	when	Thomas	Helwys	said:	
“For	our	Lord	the	King	is	but	an	earthly	king,	an	he	has	no	authority	as	a	king	
in	earthly	 causes…	For	men’s	 religion	 to	God	 is	between	God	and	 themselves.	 The	
king	shall	not	answer	for	it.	Neither	may	the	King	Judge	between	God	and	men.	Let																																									 																					
391	A	Complete	Collection	of	 the	Historical,	Political	 and	Miscellaneous	Works	of	 John	Milton	Vol.	1,	
551		See	also	John	Witte	Jr.,	‘Rights	and	Liberties	in	Early	Modern	Protestantism’	in	John	Witte	Jr.	and	
Frank	Alexander	 (eds.),	Christianity	and	Human	Rights	an	 Introduction,	 (Cambridge	University	Press,	
2010)	148-153.	
392	Norah	 Carlin,	 'Toleration	 for	 Catholics	 in	 the	 Puritan	 Revolution’	 In	 Grell	 and	 Scribner,	 (Eds.),	
(Cambridge	University	Press,	1996)	p.216-230.	See	also	John	Coffey,	‘Puritanism	and	Liberty	Revisited:	
The	Case	for	Toleration	in	the	English	Revolution’	(1998)	The	Historical	Journal	41(4)	961-985.	
393	John	Witte	Jr.,	 ‘Prophets,	Priests,	and	Kings	of	Liberty:	John	Milton	and	the	Reformation	of	Rights	
and	Liberties	in	England’	(2008)	Emory	Law	Journal	57	1528-	1604,	1601.	
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them	 be	 heretics,	 Jews	 or	 whatsoever,	 it	 appertains	 not	 to	 the	 earthy	 power	 to	
punish	them	in	the	least	measure.”394	
The	concept	of	toleration	was	extended	by	some	thinkers395	to	false	religion	
but	many	 forms	 of	 worship	were	 seen	 as	 violations	 of	 the	Will	 of	 God—including	
religions	that	were	to	be	tolerated.396	Catholics	were	still	seen	as	heretics	and	Islam	
and	 Judaism	 were	 seen	 as	 defective	 worship	 whilst	 pagans	 remained	 idolaters.	
Though	different	sects	and	religions	were	seen	as	heretics	and	idolaters,	Protestants	
extended	the	liberty	of	conscience	to	followers	of	all	forms	of	worship.397	
The	 threat	 to	 the	 divine	 order	 was	 the	 sin	 of	 idolatry,	 and	 Protestantism	
attempted	to	 transform	a	community	 into	a	“pure	Christian	church”	by	eliminating	
iconoclasm	 for	 they	 believed	 that	 the	 use	 of	 symbols,	 relics	 images	 and	 items	 of	
worship	were	material	of	 the	temporal	world.398	In	 just	 the	same	way	as	Christians	
rejected	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 pagans	 as	 idolatrous	 or	 at	 some	points	 indifferent	 to	
religion	Reformists	did	the	same	with	the	Roman	Catholics,	who	were	viewed	as	the	
pagans	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 and	 seventeenth	 century.	 The	 established	 doctrinal	
boundary	(Ecclesiastic	 law)	set	by	the	Reformists	allowed	them	to	determine	which	
practices	 and	 beliefs	 were	 idolatrous	 and	 are	 hence	 harmful	 to	 religion,	 other	
practices	were	acknowledged	as	indifferent	to	religion.	Church	laws	therefore	had	to	
																																								 																					
394	Thomas	Helwy,	A	Short	Declaration	of	 the	Mystery	of	 Iniquity,	 (ca.	1550-	ca1612)	Richard	Groves	
(Ed)	(Classics	of	Religious	Liberty	1,	Macon	GA,	Mercer	University	Press,	1998)	53.	
395	Such	as	Roger	Williams,	William	Walwyn,	Leonard	Busher.	
396	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	247.	
397	Ibid.	
398	Ibid.,	at	135.	
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distinguish	between	idolatrous	acts	and	truly	religious	ones.399		
3.14	The	link	between	the	Protestant	Reformation	and	Freedom	of	Religion		
As	 discussed,	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 had	 a	 tremendous	 influence	 on	 the	
concept	of	freedom	of	conscience	and	freedom	of	religion	and	subsequently	on	the	
wording	of	Article	9	ECHR.	The	“two	kingdoms”	of	Luther	and	Locke,	those	being	the	
private	realm	of	the	conscience	and	the	public	realm	of	the	(sinful)	body,	which	may	
be	punished	by	 the	magistrate	 (state),	are	 reflected	today	 in	 the	split	between	the	
assertion	of	religious	freedom	in	Article	9(1)	of	the	ECHR	and	the	limitations	thereto	
as	expressed	in	Article	9(2)	and	presuppose	a	Protestant	theology.		
The	Protestant	background	is	an	appropriate	framework	to	make	sense	of	the	
assumptions	 within	 Article	 9	 and	 claims	 made	 upon	 it.	 Article	 9(1)	 constitutes	 an	
intrinsic	 freedom	 of	 the	 individual’s	 conscience,	 the	 personal	 beliefs	 or	 religious	
creeds	often	called	the	forum	internum,400	where	in	theory	it	is	almost	impossible	for	
the	 State	 to	 breach	 or	 interfere	 with401	because	 these	 beliefs	 are	 held	 silently,	
without	manifestation	yet.	Article	9(2)	is	a	qualified	right,	which	entails	a	narrow	and	
general	 limitation	 clause.	 It	 is	 the	 dividing	 line	 between	 freedom	 of	 the	 internal	
conviction,	or	forum	internum	and	freedom	to	manifest	religion	in	the	public	sphere	
(the	 expression	 of	 that	 conviction).402	Article	 9(1)	 is	 said	 to	 resemble	 the	 private	
realm	of	the	conscience	in	Luther’s	two	Kingdoms	(where	no	mankind	may	interfere)																																									 																					
399	Ibid.,	at	142.	
400	C	v	UK	App	No	10358/83	see	also	Van	den	Dungen	v.	The	Netherlands,	(1995)	DR80,	p.	147	
401 	Ascot	 Krishnaswami,	 Special	 Rapporteur	 of	 the	 Sub	 -Commission	 on	 the	 Prevention	 of	
Discrimination	and	Protection	of	Minorities,	Study	of	Discrimination	in	the	Matter	of	Religious	Rights	
and	 Practices,	 E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1	 (1960)	 at	 p.16	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
http://prf.berkeley.edu/files/2011/06/Krishnaswami_19601.pdf	[last	accessed	in	April	2014].	
402	Françoise	 Tulkens,	 ‘The	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Church	 State	 Relations:	
Pluralism	vs.	Pluralism’	(2009)	Cardozo	law	Review	30(6)	2575-	2591	
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and	Article	9(2)	 is	 the	public	 realm	of	 the	 (sinful)	body,	which	may	be	punished	by	
the	magistrate	(State).		
During	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 it	 was	 essential	 to	 determine	 whether	
certain	practices	or	beliefs	belonged	to	the	spiritual	or	 temporal	worlds.	Today	the	
ECtHR	 determines	 whether	 practices	 belong	 to	 Article	 9(1)	 or	 Article	 9(2)	 ECHR.		
According	 to	 the	 Protestant	 theology,	 practices	 that	 belonged	 to	 the	 spiritual	
kingdom	 or	 the	 realm	 of	 religion	 were	 practices	 that	 concerned	 the	 soul	 alone,	
where	 Christ	 alone	 can	 rule	 and	 God	 alone	 can	 judge,	 and	 the	 followers	 of	 these	
beliefs	 or	 practices	 ought	 to	 be	 left	 totally	 free.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 practices	 that	
belonged	to	the	temporal	Kingdom	or	the	State,	were	practices	that	were	thought	to	
inflict	 potential	 harm	 to	 the	 lives	 of	 others,	 then	 the	 authority	 or	 law	 could	
legitimately	 interfere	with	these	practices	and	beliefs.	 	Again	this	 is	reflected	in	the	
way	 the	 ECtHR	 assesses	 claims	on	 freedom	of	 religion	where	 it	 evaluates	whether	
certain	manifestations	are	 regarded	as	manifestations	or	beliefs	 that	are	protected	
under	the	forum	internum	in	Article	9(1)	or	the	forum	externum	in	Article	9(2).	
3.15	Conclusion		
The	 distinction	 between	 the	 temporal	 and	 spiritual	 realm	 became	 crucial	 to	 the	
Protestant	 Reformation	 theology	 and	was	 the	 culmination	 of	 a	 Christian	 tradition.	
This	separation	and	distinction	is	understandable	only	within	a	Christian	culture,	with	
reference	 to	 a	 specific	 set	 of	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	 nature	 and	 goal	 of	 human	
existence.403	It	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	normative	 conceptions	 about	 the	 separation	
																																								 																					
403	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘The	Vacuity	of	Secularism’	(2011)	Economic	and	Political	Weekly	(37)	4047-4053	
Electronic	copy	available	at	http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/02/the-vacuity-of-secularism/	accessed	
June	2014.		
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between	 the	 religious	 and	 the	 temporal,	 where	 secular	 authorities	 should	 refrain	
from	 interfering	 in	 the	 religious	 sphere	 since	 it	 is	 God’s	 territory.	 This	 is	 clearly	
reflected	today	in	the	split	between	the	assertion	of	religious	freedom	in	Article	9(1)	
of	the	ECHR	and	the	limitations	thereto	as	expressed	in	Article	9(2).		
Furthermore,	 secularism	 is	 said	 to	 be	 “a	 gift	 of	 Christianity	 to	mankind,”404	
that	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 Protestant	 theology	 and	 should	 not	 be	 imposed	 and	
transferred	to	non-western	cultures	and	societies.405	In	the	discourse	of	secularism,	
the	conceptions	on	the	separation	between	the	State	and	the	Church	have	emanated	
from	 the	 “theological	 frame	 that	 gave	 them	 significance,	 and	 transformed	 into	
universal	 precepts	 for	 the	 government	 of	 human	 societies.”406	This	 belief	 of	 the	
separation	between	the	State	and	Church	has	not	emerged	out	of	a	reaction	or	as	a	
solution	to	the	difficulties	of	plural	societies,	but	it	has	emanated	as	shown	from	the	
foundations	of	the	Protestant	theology	and	doctrine.		
By	claiming	that	Catholics	were	idolatrous	and	engaged	in	false	worship,	the	
Reformation	divided	various	Christian	sects	against	each	other.	It	was	Calvin’s	or	the	
Protestant’s	 suspicion	of	 icons	 that	made	 its	way	 into	 the	 judgments	of	 the	ECtHR	
where	these	claims	are	still	echoing.407	(This	will	be	considered	in	details	in	Chapter	
6).	 The	 main	 problem	 that	 Protestants	 identified	 with	 Catholicism	 was	 their	
idolatrous	practices	within	worship,	while	they	were	indifferent	to	the	realm	of	the	
																																								 																					
404	Triloki	Nath	Madan,	‘Secularism	in	Its	Place’	(1987)	The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies	46(4)	747-759.	
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407	See	the	claim	in	Lautsi	and	Others	v.	 Italy,	Application	no.	30814/06,	judgment	of	18	March	2011	
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“secular”	 for	 it	 contained	 the	 set	 of	 “sanitised	 practices.”408	The	 Enlightenment	
continued	along	this	path	and	assured	freedom	of	conscience	and	religion	while	the	
State	became	secular,	and	ostensibly	free	from	any	religion.409:	
	“This	 phase	 of	 secularisation	 was	 a	 consequence	 of,	 and	 implicitly	 carried	
forward,	Protestant	 critiques	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 required	a	 secular	 state	as	 a	way	of	
guaranteeing	that	no	man-made	accretions	should	influence	true	worship.	Otherwise	
it	would	amount	to	idolatry.”410		
The	 ECtHR	 does	 not	 accept	 that	 some	 “religions”	 may	 not	 always	 require	
beliefs	 but	 they	 require	 mere	 practices	 and	 these	 practices	 require	 objects.	 The	
ECtHR	 continues	 to	 underestimate	 orthopraxy,	 symbols	 and	 the	 sensory	 (sight)	
requirements	for	religious	beliefs	and	practices411	and	still	requires	the	“believer”	to	
abolish	objects,	which	is	a	clear	expression	of	Protestant	theology.	The	description	of	
the	cross	for	example	as	a	mute	and	passive	symbol	in	the	Lautsi	case	is	reminiscent	
of	 16th	 century	 iconoclastic	 language.	 Orthodoxy	 or	 a	 dogmatic/belief-centred	
approach	(doctrines	and	beliefs)	remains	crucial	 in	assessing	claims	in	the	ECtHR	as	
opposed	to	orthopraxy	or	a	practice-centred	approach	(objects	and	practices	based	
on	tradition	rather	than	doctrines).	
																																									 																					
408	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 “Secular	 Law	 and	 the	 Realm	 of	 False	 Religion”	 in	 Winnifred	 Fallers	 Sullivan,	
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Chapter	4	
The	Emergence	of	Religious	Freedom	in	the	International	and	European	
Legal	Systems	
4.1	Overview	
In	this	chapter,	the	relationship	between	law	and	religion	is	examined	including	the	
link	 between	 human	 rights	 and	 Christianity.	 A	 chronological	 approach	 is	 adopted	
encompassing	the	major	national	and	 international	 instruments.	 It	 is	demonstrated	
that	 conceptual	 differences	 between	 a	 traditional	 practice	 and	 a	 religious	 practice	
are	not	reflected	in	international	treaties,	in	Western	legal	systems,	or	in	the	ECtHR	
case	law.	The	chapter	concludes	with	an	examination	of	whether	the	drafting	of	laws	
relating	to	freedom	of	religion	has	changed	very	much	over	time,	culminating	in	the	
wording,	judicial	interpretation	and	application	of	Article	9	ECHR.		
4.2	 How	 did	 the	 Idea	 of	 Religious	 Freedom	 Make	 its	 way	 in	 International	 and	
European	Legal	Systems?	
Following	the	Reformation,	European	intellectuals	considered	the	idea	of	toleration	
as	a	central	way	to	devise	a	modus	vivendi	amongst	religious	groups.412	The	concept	
of	 toleration	 was	 a	 catalyst	 from	 which	 various	 other	 ideas	 such	 as	 freedom	 of	
thought,	conscience,	and	religion	emanated.	It	allowed	different	people	from	diverse	
faith	 groups	 a	 mutual	 space	 whereby	 interactions	 could	 be	 facilitated. 413 	But	
although	the	concept	of	freedom	of	thought,	conscience,	and	religion	emerged	early	
on,	 its	 recognition	 in	 national	 law	 took	 a	 long	 time	 and	 was	 a	 gradual	 process.																																									 																					
412 	Prakash	 Shah,	 ‘Toleration:	 Opportunities	 and	 Strains	 of	 a	 Historic	 European	 Ideal’	 Synergy	
Magazine	 of	 the	 European	 Law	 Students’	 Association,	 No.	 56)	 available	 at	
https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2014/09/29/toleration-opportunities-and-strains-of-a-historic-
european-ideal/	
413	Ibid.	
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Tolerance	was	 narrowly	 granted	 to	 a	 few	 specified	 beliefs	 or	 religions,	 but	 not	 to	
traditional	practices	as	such.414		
Prior	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 freedom	of	 conscience,	 thought,	 and	 religion	 being	
acknowledged	 in	national	 laws,	 the	 first	 step	was	 securing	 international	 treaties	 to	
protect	certain	rights	for	groups	or	 individuals	claiming	a	belief	or	religion	different	
from	that	of	the	majority	in	the	country.		
“Such	 treaty	 stipulations	 date	 back	 to	 the	 time	 when	 law	 was	 felt	 to	 be	
personal	rather	than	territorial,	and	to	follow	an	individual	even	when	he	lived	in	a	
country	other	than	his	own.”415		
For	 example,	 the	 treaty	 signed	 by	 Francis	 I	 and	 Suleiman	 I	 of	 the	Ottoman	
Empire	 in	 1536	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 treaties	 granting	 such	
“capitulations”.416	The	treaty	granted	the	French	merchants	in	Turkey	individual	and	
religious	freedom	and	became	the	“model	for	many	later	treaties	of	this	sort	as	the	
capitulation	system	spread	during	the	seventeenth,	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	
centuries.”417	
Further	examples	 include	 the	Peace	of	Nuremberg	 (1532)	and	 the	Treaty	of	
Passau	 which	 made	 way	 for	 “religious	 liberty”	 in	 Europe	 following	 the	 Protestant	
Reformation.	However,	 it	was	 the	Religious	Peace	of	Augsburg	 (1555)	 that	was	 the	
real	starting	point	of	religious	liberty	in	Europe.418	This	provided	that	Catholic	princes	
were	to	enjoy	a	status	equal	to	the	Lutheran	rulers	and	princes	within	the	empire.	It																																									 																					
414	The	study	of	Ascot	Krishwasnami.	
415	Ibid.	
416	Ibid.	
417	Ibid.	
418	Malcolm	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Liberty	 and	 International	 law	 in	 Europe’	 	 (Cambridge	University	 Press,	
1997)	45.	
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allowed	the	lay	princes	to	determine	which	of	the	two	religions	to	be	adopted	within	
their	territories	which	was	the	first	step	towards	the	“abandonment	of	the	theory	of	
empire	based	upon	a	common	religion”.419		
Nevertheless,	 this	 was	 still	 a	 long	 way	 from	 the	 protection	 of	 religious	
freedom	 as	 it	 was	 also	 provided	 that	 “all	 other	 who	 do	 not	 adhere	 to	 the	
abovementioned	 two	 religions	 are	 not	 included	 in	 this	 peace,	 but	 instead	 are	
thoroughly	excluded	from	it.”420	Peace	was	considered	to	be	more	of	a	territorial	and	
political	 rather	 than	 a	 religious	 settlement.	 The	 only	 concession	 to	 individual	
conscience	made	was	that	the	Peace	granted	Lutheran	or	Catholic	subjects	the	right	
to	move	to	a	territory	where	the	religion	of	the	Prince	was	more	agreeable.	Hence	a	
“limited	 concession	 to	 the	 beliefs	 of	 the	 subjects	 of	 the	 ecclesiastical	 rulers”421	
existed	and	did	not	purport	to	extend	a	general	freedom	of	religion	to	their	subjects.		
Subsequently,	 the	 Pacification	 of	 Ghent	 (1576)	 drew	 a	 distinction	 between	
the	positions	on	the	toleration	of	heretics.	The	Treaty	confirmed	the	status	of	Roman	
Catholicism	as	the	official	religion	of	all	other	States	and	granted	freedom	of	religion	
to	 the	 Calvinists	 of	 Zeeland	 and	 Holland.422	Afterwards,	 the	 Peace	 of	 Westphalia	
(1648)	was	a	pivotal	point	in	the	struggle	for	religious	liberty	within	the	Empire	with	
an	 intent	 to	 protect	 members	 of	 dissenting	 religions.	 The	 significance	 of	 these	
treaties,	amongst	other	things,	was	that	they	showed	the	relative	acceptance	of	the	
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international	community	to	humanitarian	intervention.423	However,	it	is	important	to	
note	 that	 when	 addressing	 religion	 the	 Treaty	 reflected	 the	 concept	 of	 religious	
freedom	in	Protestantism.	Article	XXVIII	reads	
	“[t]hat	those	of	the	Confession	of	Augsburg,	and	particularly	the	Inhabitants	
of	Oppenheim,	shall	be	put	in	possession	again	of	their	Churches,	and	Ecclesiastical	
Estates,	as	they	were	in	the	Year	1624.	As	also	that	all	others	of	the	said	Confession	
of	Augsburg,	who	shall	demand	 it,	 shall	have	 the	 free	Exercise	of	 their	Religion,	as	
well	in	public	Churches	at	the	appointed	Hours,	as	in	private	in	their	own	Houses,	or	
in	others	chosen	for	this	purpose	by	their	Ministers,	or	by	those	of	their	Neighbours,	
preaching	the	Word	of	God.”424	
The	treaty	granted	people	who	demand	to	exercise	their	religion,	freedom	to	
do	 so	 but	 it	 differentiated	 between	 the	 private	 exercise	 of	 religion	 and	 the	 public	
manifestation	of	religion.	Freedom	was	unregulated	and	absolute	when	exercised	in	
private	 in	 one’s	 own	 house.	 However,	 when	 exercised	 in	 public	 there	 were	
restrictions.	 The	 religious	 freedom	 of	 the	 State	 predominated	 over	 the	 religious	
freedom	of	the	individual	making	its	utility	to	true	religious	freedom	questionable.	
In	the	Summer	of	1789,	the	French	Revolution	started	and	there	was	a	violent	
clash	between	 the	State	and	 the	Catholic	Church.	 	Possessions	of	 the	Church	were	
seized	and	priests	were	made	to	swear	allegiance	to	the	Republic.425	Before	the	term	
laïcité	was	used,426	and	during	the	Revolution,	anticlerical	attitudes	were	developed																																									 																					
423	Natan	Lerner,	Religion,	Secular	Beliefs	and	Human	Rights	2nd	rev.	ed.	(Brill,	2012)	57-58.	
424	Article	XXVIII	of	the	Treaty	of	Westphalia,	October	24,	1648.	
425	Henri	Astier,	‘The	Deep	Roots	of	French	Secularism’,	BBC	News	Online,	Wednesday	1	Septemeber	
2004,	 available	 on	 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3325285.stm	 [Last	 accessed	 March	
2017].	
426	The	word,	laïc,	which	is	as,	T.	Jeremy	Gunn	says,	“generally,	but	imperfectly,	translated	as	“secular,”	
appeared	the	first	time	in	Article	2	of	the	French	Constitution	of	1958.	The	Article	states	“France	is	an	
indivisible,	secular	[laïc],	democratic,	and	social	republic.	It	ensures	the	equality	before	the	law	of	all	
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between	 the	 French	 Left	 and	 the	 Catholic	 Clergy.	 In	 1879	 and	 amid	 the	 dominant	
political	 class,	 these	 anticlerical	 attitude	 from	 the	 revolutionary	 period,	 remerged	
significantly.	Many	important	French	laws	that	affected	relations	between	the	State	
and	 the	 church	were	 enacted	 between	 1879	 and	 1905.	 These	 laws	 are	 said	 to	 be	
“among	 the	 founding	 documents	 of	 laïcité	 and	 the	modern	 French	 State.”427	Gunn	
notes	that		
“with	regard	to	matters	involving	religion,	the	prestige	and	importance	of	the	
1905	Law	in	France	compares	to	that	of	the	First	Amendment’s	religion	clauses	in	the	
[American]	Bill	of	Rights.	Although	the	phrase	separation	of	Church	and	State	does	
not	 appear	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	 1905	 Law,	 the	 title	 itself	 is	 of	 sufficient	 importance	
legally	 and	 rhetorically	 to	 institute	 the	 term	 separation	 as	 a	 defining	 term	 in	 the	
French	 legal	 system,	 characterizing	 the	 relationship	 between	 religion	 and	 the	
state.”428	
“[B]ecause	 of	 the	 controversial	 origins	 of	 these	 laws	 and	 their	 association	
with	the	doctrine	of	laïcité,	for	many	French	citizens	the	word	evokes	anticlericalism,	
anti-	Catholicism,	and	sometimes	blatantly	antireligious	sentiments.	As	early	as	1880	
some	began	to	assert	that	the	word	“laïc”	was	actually	a	synonym	for	irreligious.”429	
Religion	 in	 France	 was	 brought	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 State	 again	 after	 the	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
of	 its	citizens,	without	distinction	as	to	origin,	race,	or	religion.	 It	respects	all	beliefs.”	See	T.	Jeremy	
Gunn,	‘Religion	and	Law	in	France:	Secularism,	Separation,	and	State	Intervention’,	Drake	Law	Review	
(57)	949-978,	953.	
427	T.	 Jeremy	 Gunn,	 ‘Religion	 and	 Law	 in	 France:	 Secularism,	 Separation,	 and	 State	 Intervention’,	
(2009)	Drake	Law	Review	57	949-978,	953.	
428	Ibid.,	at	956.	
429	Ibid.,	at	953.	See	also	Dale	Van	Kley,	The	Religious	Origins	of	the	French	Revolution:	From	Calvin	to	
the	Civil	Constitution,	1560-1791	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1996).	
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Revolution.	However	when	Napoleon	signed	a	Concordat	with	the	Vatican	in	1801,	a	
significant	amount	of	the	church's	former	status	was	restored.		
In	1789	the	French	national	assembly	passed	the	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	
Man	and	the	Citizen	to	remind	the	people	“of	their	rights	and	duties.”	It	was	said	to	
be	“a	crystallisation	of	Enlightenment	ideals”	and	summarised	the	“natural	and	civil	
rights	espoused	by	writers	like	John	Locke,	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau	and	Jefferson,	and	
entrenched	them	in	French	 law.”430	Freedom	of	religion	was	set	out	 in	Article	10	of	
the	Declaration431	as	follows:	
	“[n]o	 one	 shall	 be	 disquieted	 on	 account	 of	 his	 opinions,	 including	 his	
religious	 views,	 provided	 their	 manifestation	 does	 not	 disturb	 the	 public	 order	
established	by	law.”	
Shortly	after,	 the	drafters	of	 the	American	Bill	of	Rights	of	1791	guaranteed	
equal	religious	rights	as	follows:	
“Congress	 shall	 make	 no	 law	 respecting	 an	 establishment	 of	 religion,	 or	
prohibiting	the	free	exercise	thereof….”432.			
John	Witte	Jr.	explains	that	four	groups	contributed	to	the	development	and	
evolution	of	religious	liberty	in	early	American	constitutionalism	and	that	these	were	
the	 Evangelical,	 the	 Puritan,	 the	 Enlightened,	 and	 the	 civic	 republican.	 Their	
contribution	was	organised	around	six	distinct	themes:	religious	pluralism;	liberty	of	
conscience;	religious	equality;	free	exercise	of	religion;	disestablishment	of	religion;																																									 																					
430	Jennifer	Llewellyn	and	Steve	Thompson,	THE	DECLARATION	OF	THE	RIGHTS	OF	MAN	AND	CITIZEN	
Alpha	 History,	 2015	 [last	 accessed	 November	 2017],	
http://alphahistory.com/frenchrevolution/declaration-rights-of-man-and-citizen/.	
431	Declaration	 of	 the	 Right	 of	 Man	 and	 the	 Citizen,	26	 August	 1789,	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at:	
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/frenchdec.html	[accessed	14	January	2015].	
432	First	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	of	the	United	States.	
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and	the	separation	of	church	and	state.433	These	themes	reflect	many	of	the	principal	
ideas	of	Protestant	theology,	and	intersect	in	different	ways	and	to	varying	degrees	
with	 the	 key	 theological	 and	political	 views	discussed	 above.	 The	U.S.	 Constitution	
was	the	first	national	legal	framework	to	institutionalise	the	separation	between	the	
State	 and	 the	 Church	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 religious	 liberty.	 However,	 its	 approach,	
providing	 for	 both	 free	 exercise	 of	 religion	 and	 disestablishment,	 was	 very	 clearly	
entrenched	in	a	long	political	and	religious	history	rooted	historically	in	the	theology	
of	the	Protestant	Reformation.434		
4.3	The	Origins	of	Human	Rights	Law	
Christian	religious	heritage	is	strongly	visible	in	modern	concepts	of	human	rights.	As	
Zachary	Calo	notes,	 “[t]he	 idea	of	human	rights,	particularly	 the	underlying	 idea	of	
human	 dignity,	 is	 replete	 with	 echoes	 of	 the	 sacred.” 435 	According	 to	 Jürgen	
Habermas,	 the	 ideas	 of	 freedom,	 conscience	 and	 human	 rights	 emanated	 from	
Christian	and	Judaic	ethics:	
“[C]hristianity	 has	 functioned	 for	 the	 normative	 self-understanding	 of	
modernity	 as	 more	 than	 a	 mere	 precursor	 or	 a	 catalyst.	 Egalitarian	 universalism,	
from	 which	 sprang	 the	 ideas	 of	 freedom	 and	 social	 solidarity,	 of	 an	 autonomous	
conduct	 of	 life	 and	 emancipation,	 of	 the	 individual	morality	 of	 conscience,	 human	
rights,	 and	 democracy,	 is	 the	 direct	 heir	 to	 the	 Judaic	 ethic	 of	 justice	 and	 the	
Christian	ethic	of	 love.	This	 legacy,	substantially	unchanged,	has	been	the	object	of	
continual	 critical	 appropriation	 and	 reinterpretation.	 To	 this	 day,	 there	 is	 no																																									 																					
433	Kristine	Kalanges,	Religious	 Liberty	 in	Western	and	 Islamic	 Law:	 Toward	a	World	 Legal	 Tradition,	
(Oxford	University	Press,	2012)	41.	
434	Ibid.,	at	54.	
435	Zachary	R.	Calo,	‘Religion,	Human	Rights,	and	Post-Secular	Legal	Theory,’	(2011)	ST.	JOHN’S	L.	REV.	
85	495,	495		
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alternative	 to	 it.	 And	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 current	 challenges	 of	 a	 post	 national	
constellation,	we	continue	to	draw	on	the	substance	of	this	heritage.	Everything	else	
is	just	idle	postmodern	talk.”436	
In	Chapter	4	it	was	explained	that	to	love	one	another	in	the	sense	of	agape	
resembles	the	love	that	is	personified	in	Christ437	that	“as	I	have	loved	you,	love	you	
also	one	another.”438	This	is	to	see	a	person	in	a	way	in	which	one	is	the	child	of	God	
and	 people	 are	 brotherhood	 in	 humanity.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 act	
towards	them	in	a	particular	way	as	agape,	
“show[s]	you	the	full	humanity	of	others.	To	become	properly	aware	of	that	
full	 humanity	 is	 to	 become	 incapable	 of	 treating	 it	 with	 contempt,	 cruelty,	 or	
indifference.	 The	 full	 awareness	 of	 others’	 humanity	 that	 love	 involves	 is	 an	
essentially	motivating	perception.”439		
Once	 an	 underlying	 religious	 answer	 is	 given,	 these	 human	 rights	 become	
accepted.	However,	when	one	 tries	 to	 secularise	 the	concept	without	 reference	 to	
God	by	 claiming	 that	 these	 rights	 are	merely	ethical	 rights,	moral	duties,	or	duties	
towards	humanity,	the	result	is	a	secular	version	of	a	theological	belief.	One	ends	up	
taking	 a	 theological	 concept	 and	 trying	 to	 make	 it	 “secular	 by	 referring	 to	 …	 an	
ethical	 theory	 instead	 of	 God,	as	 though	 it	 is	merely	 a	 question	 of	 substitution	 of	
appropriate	 variables.”440	Upon	 doing	 so,	 one	 is	 faced	 with	 problems	 that	 do	 not	
																																								 																					
436	Jürgen	Habermas,	A	Conversation	About	God	 and	 the	World,	 in	 Time	of	 Transitions	 (Polity	 Press	
2006)	149-151	
437	Harold	Berman,	‘The	influence	of	Christianity	upon	the	Development	of	Law’	(1959)	Oklahoma	Law	
Review	(12)	86	86-101,	89.	
438	The	Bible	of	John	13:24;	15:12.	
439	Michael	J.	Perry,	‘The	Morality	of	Human	Rights:	a	Non	Religious	Grounds?’	(2005)	Emory	Research	
Paper	No.	05-6,University	School	of	Law	Public	Law	&	Legal	Theory	Research	Paper	Series.	97-150,	111.	
440	S.N.	 Balagangadhra,	 “...We	 Shall	 Not	 Cease	 From	 Exploration...”An	 Invitation	 Disguised	 As	 a	
Position	 Paper	 Composed	 At	 the	 Behest	 of	 ARENA	 for	 the	 Theme	 “Decolonizing	 Social	 Sciences”,	
available	at	https://www.academia.edu/4214176/We_Shall_Not_Cease_from_Exploration		
	 149	
arise	 in	 a	 theological	 belief.	 Because	 “variables”	have	been	 interpreted	differently,	
one	is	faced	with	questions	which	the	original	version	was	not	“designed”	to	handle.	
Consequently,	when	one	tries	to	defend	the	idea	of	“claim-	right”	without	referring	
to	God,	 then	 this	 person	 is	 using	 theological	 and	Christian	moral	 concepts	 that	 no	
social	 arrangement	 or	 legal	 system	 can	 abridge,	 because	 these	 rights	 are	 not	
coincidental	or	the	consequence	of	political	or	social	organisations.441	
	“Modern”	 human	 rights, 442 	such	 as	 religious	 freedom,	 freedom	 from	
discrimination	 on	 religious	 grounds,	 freedom	 of	 association	 and	 freedom	 of	
expression	are	protected	by	an	immense	body	of	international,	regional	and	national	
laws	and	jurisprudence.	Such	human	rights	have	helped	to	ignite	a	great	awakening	
of	 religion	 internationally	 and	 as	 a	 result	 the	 sphere	 of	 religion	 has	 substantially	
expanded. 443 	Therefore,	 “[i]t	 does	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 that	 religion	 is	 not	
welcome	 but	 keeps	 knocking	 at	 the	 door	 with	 increasingly	 more	 difficult	
demands.”444			
The	ability	of	States	to	cope	with	religious	and	cultural	diversity	has	remained	
a	 controversial	 issue	 and	 has	 hardly	 seen	 any	 substantial	 development	 during	 the	
twentieth	and	twenty	first	centuries.	Often	religious	and	cultural	diversity	is	not	seen	
as	 an	 asset	 of	 humanity,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 predicament.445	The	 idea	 of	 religious	
freedom	was	 seen	 as	 vital	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 a	 solution	 to	 this	 predicament	 and	 a	
																																								 																					
441	Ibid.	See	also	Chapter	4	part	4.5	in	this	thesis.	
442	By	modern	human	 rights	 I	 refer	 to	human	 rights	 systems	 that	 came	 into	existence	 just	 after	 the	
Second	World	War.	
443	John	Witte	Jr.,	‘Introduction’	in	John	Witte	Jr.	and	Frank	S.	Alexander	(eds),	Christianity	and	Human	
Rights	(Cambridge	University	Press	2010)	8.	
444	Lorenzo	Zucca,	 “The	Crisis	of	 the	Secular	State:	A	Reply	 to	Professor	Sajo”	 I.CON	2009	electronic	
copy	 available	 at	 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1343099	 [last	 accessed	
January	2015].	
445	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	1.	
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secular	model	of	 religious	 freedom	has	emerged.	The	model	entails	a	set	of	values	
and	 norms	 concerning	 the	 way	 in	 which	 a	 State	 and	 a	 plural	 society	 should	 be	
organised.	This	model	asserts	that	all	citizens	have	the	right	to	freedom	of	thought,	
conscience,	 and	 religion;	 that	 the	 State	 and	 its	 laws	 should	 not	 interfere	with	 the	
realm	of	 religion;	 and	 that	 the	 State	 should	 remain	neutral	 or	 secular.	 The	 secular	
religious	 freedom	model	 divides	 diverse	 societies	 into	 two	 realms:	 a	 realm	where	
citizens	 should	 always	 be	 left	 free	 to	 live	 according	 to	 their	 religious	 and	 moral	
values;	and	a	neutral	public	sphere	where	the	citizens	must	obey	the	coercive	laws	of	
the	State.446	
4.4	The	United	Nations	
The	concept	of	religious	freedom	struggled	to	afford	protection	to	specific	national	
minorities.	 In	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 there	 were	 some	 cases	 where	 national	
minorities	 were	 given	 international	 protection.	 For	 example,	 the	 Final	 Act	 of	 the	
Congress	 of	 Vienna447	guaranteed	 Poles	 living	 under	 Russian,	 Prussian,	 or	 Austrian	
sovereignty	the	protection	of	their	national	representation	and	institutions.448	At	this	
time,	 international	 law	 was	 concerned	 with	 minority	 rights	 in	 terms	 of	 national	
representation	 and	 national	 institutions,	 and	 with	 the	 duties	 and	 rights	 of	 States.	
However,	 there	 was	 a	 growing	 recognition	 of	 duties	 owed	 by	 States	 towards	
individuals	with	the	introduction	of	various	treaties	that	called	for	an	individual	right	
to	 freedoms	 and	 rights.	 A	 legal	 “international	 control	machinery”449	which	 allowed	
																																								 																					
446	Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 “Secular	 Law	 and	 the	 Realm	 of	 False	 Religion”	 in	 Winnifred	 Fallers	 Sullivan,	
Robert	A.	Yelle	&	Mateo	Tausig-Rubbo,	eds,	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford	University	Press,	2011)	43-61			
447	Article	I,	Section	2	of	the	final	Act	of	the	Congress	of	Vienna,	signed	on	June	9,	1815	
448	Stephen	Kertesz,	 ‘Human	Rights	 in	 The	Peace	Treaties’	 14	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	(Fall,	
1949)	627-646.	
449	A.	H.	 Robertson,	 'The	 European	Convention	of	Human	Rights:	 Educational	Aspects',	 (1970)	Am.J.	
Comp.	L.	18	355.	
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an	individual	to	bring	a	human	rights	complaint	against	a	state450	was	developed	and		
the	protection	of	religious	freedom	as	a	part	of	human	rights	law	became	an	object	
of	international	legal	concern.451		
In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 the	 focus	 was	 on	 a	 universal	
general	 protection	 of	 all	 human	 beings	 in	 all	 countries.452	In	 his	 speech	 to	 the	 US	
Congress	on	6	 January	1941,	President	Roosevelt	 set	out	 the	“four	freedoms”,	 that	
every	 person	 should	 be	 guaranteed:	freedom	from	 war;	freedom	from	 fear;	
freedom	of	 speech	 and	 expression;	 and	freedom	of	 religion.	 This	 was	 defined	 as	
“freedom	 of	 every	 person	 to	 worship	 God	 in	 his	 own	 way	 -	 everywhere	 in	 the	
world”.453	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 was	 worshiping	 God,	 the	 one	 God	 as	
opposed	to	gods	or	other	worshiped	figures.	Moreover	the	speech	emphasised	the	
concept	of	worship	as	opposed	to	practice,	and	the	inevitable	idea	of	the	God	when	
it	comes	to	worship.		
The	 international	 framework	 protecting	 religious	 freedom	 consists	 of	 four	
major	 documents:	 the	 1948	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (UDHR)454,	 the	
International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (ICCPR),455	the	 United	 Nations	
Declaration	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Intolerance	 and	 of	 Discrimination	
Based	 on	 Religion	 or	 Belief	 (1981	 Declaration), 456 	and	 the	 Vienna	 Concluding																																									 																					
450	Rex	Ahdar	and	Ian	Leigh,	Religious	Freedom	in	the	Liberal	State	(Oxford	University	Press,	2005)	105.	
451	Malcolm	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Liberty	 and	 International	 law	 in	 Europe’	 	 (Cambridge	University	 Press,	
1997)	173.	
452	Bruce	Dickson,	‘The	United	Nations	and	Freedom	of	Religion’	(1995)	I.C.L.Q.	44(2)	327-357.	
453	Franklin	 D.	 Roosevelt,	 Annual	 Message	 to	 Congress	 on	 the	 State	 of	 the	 Union	 January	 6,	 1941	
available	at	http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16092	[Last	accessed	November	2017].	
454	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	G.A.	Res.	217A	(III),	U.N.	GAOR,	3d	Sess.,	at	71,	U.N.	Doc.	
A/810	(Dec.	10,	1948).	
455	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	G.A.	Res.	2200A	(XXI),	21	U.N.	GAOR	Supp.	(No.	
16)	at	52,	U.N.	Doc.	A/6316	(1966),	Mar.	23,	1976,	999	U.N.T.S.	171.	
456	Declaration	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Intolerance	and	of	Discrimination	Based	on	Religion	
or	Belief,	G.A.	Res.	36/55,	U.N.	Doc.	A/RES/36/55	(Nov.	25,	1981).	
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Document	 	 (1989),	 (which	extended	 the	1981	Declaration’s	 religious	 liberty	norms,	
especially	to	religious	groups).457	
However,	 arguments	 claiming	 the	 universality	 of	 human	 rights	 are	
problematic	in	the	same	way	as	arguments	claiming	the	universality	of	religion	(See	
chapter	3).	According	to	David	Kennedy,	the	idea	of	human	rights	has	a	specific	place	
and	 time	 of	 origin,	 those	 being	 “post-	 enlightenment,	 rationalist,	 secular,	Western	
Modern,	Capitalist.”458		
4.5	The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	
The	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	sets	out	a	number	of	general	provisions	relating	to	
human	rights,459	but	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights460	contains	the	most	
detailed	 scheme	of	modern	human	 rights	 standards.	The	United	Kingdom	delegate	
referred	to	the	Declaration	as	“a	document	of	the	greatest	moral	force”461	while	P.C.	
Chang	the	Chinese	delegate,	stated	that	
“[i]n	 order	 to	 throw	 more	 light	 on	 the	 question,	 he	 wished	 first	 of	 all	 to	
explain	 to	 the	 Committee	 how	 the	 Chinese	 approached	 the	 religious	 problem.	
Chinese	 philosophy	 was	 based	 essentially	 on	 a	 firm	 belief	 in	 a	 Unitarian	 cause,	
expressed	on	the	human	plane	by	a	pluralistic	tolerance,	That	philosophy	considered	
that	 man's	 actions	 were	 more	 important	 than	 metaphysics,	 that	 the	 art	 of	 living	
																																								 																					
457	Concluding	 Document	 of	 the	 Third	 Follow-up	Meeting,	 Vienna,	 4	 November	 1986	 to	 19	 January	
1989.	
458	David	 Kennedy,	 The	 international	 Human	 Rights	 Movement:	 Part	 of	 the	 Problem?	 (2002)	 Harv.	
Hum.	Rts.	J.	15	101,	114-115.	
459	The	 general	 provisions	 set	 in	 the	 Charter	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 are	 insufficient	 for	 individual	
protection	 as	 they	 are	 too	 general	 and	 vague.	 (For	 provisions	 relating	 to	 religion	 see	 Articles	 1(3),	
13(b),	55(c)	and	76(c).	Moreover	the	provisions	are	insufficient,	as	they	cannot	be	enforced.	
460	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(adopted	10	December	1948	UNGA	Res	217	A(III)	(UDHR).	
461 	See	 comments	 of	 United	 Kingdom	 Delegate	 UN	 Doc.	 A/C.3/SR.179	 (1948)	 available	 at	
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL4/805/10/PDF/NL480510.pdf?OpenElement		
[Accessed	in	February	2015].	
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should	be	placed	above	knowledge	of	 the	 causes	of	 life,	 and	 that	 the	best	way	 for	
man	 to	 testify	 to	 the	 greatness	 of	 the	 Divinity	was	 to	 give	 proof	 of	 an	 exemplary	
attitude	in	this	world.”462		
The	Chinese	intervention	shows	that	in	cultures	like	China’s,	actions	are	more	
important	 than	 religion	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 relevant	 treaties	 and	 conventions.	
Practice,	the	art	of	living	and	attitude	are	the	essentials	to	a	firm	belief	and	are	above	
concepts	of	national	law	governing	human	behaviour.	Practice	and	actions	therefore	
have	greater	influence	than	knowing	about	the	causes	of	life,	which	is	often	doctrinal	
in	nature.		
As	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 is	 not	 legally	 enforceable,	 the	 United	 Nations	
concluded	 binding	 multilateral	 treaties	 such	 as	 the	 International	 Covenant	 on	
Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	 1966,	 and	 the	 ICCPR	 1966.463	Although	 draft	
articles	 relating	 to	 minority	 rights	 were	 submitted	 to	 UN	 Secretariat464	and	 the	
Human	 Rights	 Division,	minority	 rights	were	 not	 included	 in	 the	UDHR.	 There	was	
also	 major	 opposition	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 minority	 rights	 by	 the	 US	 delegate,	 Mrs	
Roosevelt,	 who	 said,	 “the	 best	 solution	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 minorities	 was	 to	
encourage	 respect	 for	 human	 rights.” 465 	The	 consequence	 of	 Mrs	 Roosevelt’s	
approach	was	that	“minority	rights	ceased	to	be	the	primary	vehicle	through	which																																									 																					
462	Peng	Chun	Chang,	the	Chinese	delegate	in	the	Commission	on	Human	Rights	of	the	United	Nations	
(emphasis	added).	
463	Rex	Ahdar	and	Ian	Leigh,	Religious	Freedom	in	the	Liberal	State	(Oxford	University	Press,	2005)	134.	
464	Part	C	of	General	Assembly	resolution	217	(III).	International	Bill	of	Human	Rights]	217	C	(III).	Fate	
of	Minorities,	states:	
Considering	that	 the	 United	 Nations	 cannot	 remain	 indifferent	 to	 the	 fate	 of	 minorities,	
Considering	that	it	is	difficult	to	adopt	a	uniform	solution	of	this	complex	and	delicate	question,	which	
has	 special	 aspects	 in	 each	 State	 in	 which	 it	 arises,	 Considering	the	 universal	 character	 of	
the	Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 Decides	not	 to	 deal	 in	 a	 specific	 provision	 with	 the	 question	 of	
minorities	in	the	text	of	this	Declaration.	
465 	UN	 Doc	 A/C.3/SR.161	 p.726	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL4/804/98/PDF/NL480498.pdf?OpenElement		
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religious	 freedoms	 were	 addressed	 on	 the	 international	 plane.” 466 	Moreover,	
challenges	 concerning	 the	 rights	 and	 treatments	 of	minorities	were	 thought	 to	 be	
effectively	addressed	through	the	individualist	perspective.467	
Article	18	of	the	UDHR	is	the	main	article	that	deals	with	freedom	of	religion.	
It	provides:	
“Everyone	has	the	right	to	freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion;	this	
right	includes	freedom	to	change	his	religion	or	belief,	and	freedom,	either	alone	or	
in	community	with	others	and	in	public	or	private,	to	manifest	his	religion	or	belief	in	
teaching,	practice,	worship	and	observance.”	
For	 the	 first	 time,	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 thought	 conscience	 and	 religion	
(the	absolute	rights)	and	the	right	to	manifest	religion	or	belief	in	worship,	teaching,	
practice	 and	 observance	 (the	 limited	 rights)	 were	 clearly	 distinguished	 from	 each	
other.468	In	the	drafting	of	Article	18	there	was	no	objection	to	an	absolute	freedom	
of	belief	which	was	agreed	to	be	a	fundamental	right.	However,	participants	agreed	
that	 the	manifestation	of	 the	belief	was	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 limitation	by	 the	 general	
limitation	clause	Article	29(2)	of	the	UDHR	which	provides:	
“[i]n	the	exercise	of	his	rights	and	freedoms,	everyone	shall	be	subject	only	to	
such	 limitations	 as	 are	 determined	 by	 law	 solely	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 securing	 due	
recognition	and	respect	for	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others	and	of	meeting	the	just	
requirements	 of	 morality	 public	 order	 and	 the	 general	 welfare	 in	 a	 democratic	
society.”																																									 																					
466	Malcolm	 Evans,	 Religious	 Liberty	 and	 International	 Law	 in	 Europe	 (Cambridge	 University	 Press	
1997)	183.	
467	Helen	 O’Nions,	Minority	 Rights	 Protection	 in	 International	 Law:	 The	 Roma	 of	 Europe,	 (Ashgate,	
2007)	190.	
468	Mark	Hill,	Russell	Sandberg	and	Norman	Doe,	Religion	and	Law	in	the	United	Kingdom	(Kluwer	Law	
International,	2011)	85	
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Article	 18	 influenced	 the	wording	 of	 the	 ICCPR	of	 1966,	 the	Declaration	on	
the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	 Intolerance	and	Discrimination	Based	on	Religion	or	
Belief	(1981),	and	most	importantly	the	ECHR.		
4.6	The	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(ICCPR)	
Article	 18	 of	 the	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 is	 closely	
modelled	on	Article	18	of	the	UDHR.	It	provides	as	follows:	
“1.	Everyone	shall	have	the	right	to	freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion.	This	
right	shall	include	freedom	to	have	or	to	adopt	a	religion	or	belief	of	his	choice,	and	
freedom,	either	individually	or	in	community	with	others	and	in	public	or	private,	to	
manifest	his	religion	or	belief	in	worship,	observance,	practice	and	teaching.	
2.	No	one	shall	be	subject	to	coercion	which	would	impair	his	freedom	to	have	or	to	
adopt	a	religion	or	belief	of	his	choice.	
3.	 Freedom	 to	 manifest	 one's	 religion	 or	 beliefs	 may	 be	 subject	 only	 to	 such	
limitations	as	are	prescribed	by	law	and	are	necessary	to	protect	public	safety,	order,	
health,	or	morals	or	the	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	of	others.	
4.	 The	 States	 Parties	 to	 the	 present	 Covenant	 undertake	 to	 have	 respect	 for	 the	
liberty	of	parents	and,	when	applicable,	 legal	guardians	to	ensure	the	religious	and	
moral	education	of	their	children	in	conformity	with	their	own	convictions.”	
Article	18	of	 the	 ICCPR	differs	 from	Article	18	of	 the	UDHR	 in	 four	 aspects:	
Firstly	Article	18	(1)	of	the	ICCPR	replaces	“freedom	to	change	his	religion	or	belief”	
which	was	in	Article	18	UDHR	the	“freedom	to	have	or	adopt	a	religion	or	belief	of	
his	 choice”.	 This	 change	 came	 as	 a	 compromise	 intended	 for	 Islamic	 Member	
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States469	which	objected	to	the	right	to	change	religion.	Secondly,	Article	18(2)	bans	
“coercion	which	would	impair	his	freedom	to	have	or	to	adopt	a	religion	or	belief	of	
his	 choice.”	 This	was	 aimed	 at	 States	 to	 prohibit	 the	 use	 of	 force	 or	 threat,	 penal	
sanctions	 policies,	 and	 practices	 that	 make	 citizens	 adhere	 to	 a	 specific	 religious	
belief.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 article	 does	 consider	 proselytism	 to	 be	 a	
coercive	 practice	 but	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 1981	 Declaration	 does	 not	 explain	 what	
conditions,	 conduct,	 or	 forms	 of	 communication	 would	 constitute	 coercion.	
Consequently	there	is	still	uncertainty	as	to	what	exactly	constitutes	coercion	under	
Article	18(2)	of	the	ICCPR.470		
Thirdly,	the	article	places	a	limitation	clause	on	freedom	to	manifest	religion	
if	necessary	and	prescribed	by	 law	under	what	 is	set	out	 in	the	Article.	Freedom	of	
thought	conscience	and	 religion	 remain	absolute.	Fourthly,	 in	18(4)	 there	 is	a	 right	
for	 parents	 or	 guardians	 “to	 ensure	 the	 religious	 and	 moral	 education	 of	 their	
children	 in	conformity	with	their	own	convictions.”	This	 is	an	 important	point	 for	 it	
allows	schools	to	offer	the	history	of	religion	and	“ethics”	if	given	in	a	“neutral”	and	
“objective”	way.471		
Article	27	of	 the	 ICCPR	ensures	 respect	 for	 religious	beliefs	 for	 the	 rights	of	
minority	communities.	This	Article	states	that	
“[i]n	 those	 States	 in	 which	 ethnic,	 religious	 or	 linguistic	 minorities	 exist,	
persons	 belonging	 to	 such	minorities	 shall	 not	 be	 denied	 the	 right,	 in	 community	
																																								 																					
469	Saudi	 Arabia,	 Yemen,	 Egypt,	 Afghanistan,	 the	 Saudi	 Arabian	 Delegate	 expressed	 concerns	 about	
proselytism	from	missionaries.	
470	Daniel	J.	Sullivan,	‘Advancing	the	Freedom	of	Religion	or	Belief	through	the	UN	Declaration	of	the	
Elimination	of	Religious	Intolerance	and	Discrimination’,	(1988)	Am	J	Int’l	L	82	487.		
471	For	further	analysis	see	Chapter	6.	
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with	 the	other	members	of	 their	 group,	 to	enjoy	 their	 own	 culture,	 to	 profess	 and	
practise	their	own	religion,	or	to	use	their	own	language.”472	
The	 significance	 of	 Article	 27	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 although	 the	 Article	
mentions	 the	 word	 “culture”,	 and	 that	 individuals	 have	 the	 right	 to	 enjoy	 their	
culture,	the	words	are	restricted	to	the	enjoyment	of	the	culture	whereas	the	religion	
is	to	be	professed	and	practiced.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	Article	distinguishes	
between	the	practicing	of	culture	and	the	enjoyment	of	culture,	for	the	Article	does	
not	specifically	indicates	the	right	to	“practice”	culture	but	rather	to	enjoy	it	(which	
could	reflect	the	absolute	freedom	of	the	forum	internum),	however	it	clearly	states	
the	right	to	practice	a	religion.		
4.7	What	is	a	Manifestation	of	Religion	under	Article	18	of	the	ICCPR?	
In	 its	General	Comment,473	the	Human	Rights	Committee’s	 aim	was	 to	 formulate	a	
comprehensive	list	of	basic	human	rights	and	freedoms;	the	formulation	was	rather	
restrictive.	 Worship,	 observance,	 practice	 and	 teaching,	 which	 constitute	 the	 four	
models	of	manifestation,	provide	an	“exhaustive	catalogue.”474	However,	due	to	the	
interpretation	 placed	 on	 these	 four	 forms,	 expressions	 of	 activities	 and	 behaviour	
that	flow	from	religious	convictions	are	not	regarded	as	manifestations	of	belief.	The	
scope	of	these	models	is	limited	to	acts	that	are	directly	and	closely	connected	with	
the	 formal	 practice	 of	 religious	 customs	 and	 rites.	 The	 limitation	 seems	 to	 cover	
parent’s	rights	regarding	religious	education	as	well	as	conscientious	objection	both	
of	 which	 are	 treated	 as	 a	 form	 of	manifestation	 under	 Article	 18	 only	 if	 they	 are																																									 																					
472	Article	27	of	the	ICCPR.	(emphasis	added).	
473	Human	Rights	Committee	General	Comment	No.	22	Article	18	(Forty-eighth	session,	1993)	para.	4.	
474	Malcolm	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Liberty	 and	 International	 law	 in	 Europe’	 	 (Cambridge	University	 Press,	
1997)	216.	
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considered	to	be	a	form	of	a	manifestation	of	a	religion	or	belief.475		
4.8	 The	 1981	 Declaration	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 all	 Forms	 of	 Intolerance	 and	
Discrimination	Based	on	Religion	or	Belief	
Article	2(1)	of	the	1981	Declaration	on	the	Elimination	of	all	Forms	of	Intolerance	and	
Discrimination	Based	on	Religion	or	Belief476	provides	that	“[n]o	one	shall	be	subject	
to	 discrimination	 by	 any	 State,	 institution,	 group	 of	 persons,	 or	 person	 on	 the	
grounds	of	religion	or	other	belief.”	Article	6	of	the	Declaration	gives	a	detailed	(but	
still	not	thorough)	list	of	the	incidents	of	freedom	of	religion.477	Moreover,	although	
the	 opening	 words	 refer	 to	 both	 religion	 and	 belief,	 the	 main	 concern	 of	 the	
Declaration	was	religion.478	The	right	to	freedom	of	thought,	conscience,	religion	or	
belief	shall	include:	
(a) To	 worship	 or	 assemble	 in	 connexion	 with	 a	 religion	 or	 belief,	 and	 to	
establish	and	maintain	places	for	these	purposes;	
(b) To	 establish	 and	 maintain	 appropriate	 charitable	 or	 humanitarian	
institutions;	
(c) To	make,	acquire	and	use	to	an	adequate	extent	the	necessary	articles	and	
materials	related	to	the	rites	or	customs	of	a	religion	or	belief;	
(d) To	write,	issue	and	disseminate	relevant	publications	in	these	areas;	
(e) To	teach	a	religion	or	belief	in	places	suitable	for	these	purposes;	
(f) To	 solicit	 and	 receive	 voluntary	 financial	 and	 other	 contributions	 from	
individuals	and	institutions;																																									 																					
475	Ibid.	
476	UN	Doc.	 A/36/51	 (1981).	 The	 Declaration	was	 adopted	 by	 General	 Assembly	 Res.	 36/55,	 36	 UN	
GAOR,	Supp.	(No.	51),	171.	
477	Rex	Ahdar	and	Ian	Leigh,	Religious	Freedom	in	the	Liberal	State	(Oxford	University	Press,	2005)	107.	
478	Malcolm	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Liberty	 and	 International	 law	 in	 Europe’	 	 (Cambridge	University	 Press,	
1997)	227.	
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(g) To	train,	appoint,	elect	or	designate	by	succession	appropriate	leaders	called	
for	by	the	requirements	and	standards	of	any	religion	or	belief;	
(h) To	 observe	 days	 of	 rest	 and	 to	 celebrate	 holidays	 and	 ceremonies	 in	
accordance	with	the	precepts	of	one’s	religion	or	belief;	
(i) To	 establish	 and	 maintain	 communications	 with	 individuals	 and	
communities	 in	 matters	 of	 religion	 and	 belief	 at	 the	 national	 and	
international	levels.	
The	 Declaration	 is	 also	 closely	modelled	 upon	 Article	 18	 of	 the	 ICCPR.	 It	 is	
important	to	note	that	the	Declaration	does	not	include	the	right	to	change	religion	
although	this	right	was	included	in	Article	18	of	the	Universal	Declaration	on	Human	
Rights.	Again,	 this	omission	was	a	result	of	 the	opposition	from	Islamic	States.479	In	
some	religions	and	cultures	changing	one’s	religion,	adopting	or	abandoning	another	
religion	is	considered	a	heresy	or	apostasy	which	are	regarded	as	crimes	that	may	be	
severely	punished.480	
4.9	The	European	Convention	on	Human	rights	(ECHR)	
4.9.1	Introduction	
The	ECHR	was	a	reaction	to	the	Second	World	War	where	Europe	had	to	deal	with	
enormous	economic	and	social	problems	and	legacies	of	the	Holocaust,	widespread	
violence	and	racism,	and	also	had	to	react	to	a	political	threat	from	the	Soviet	Union.	
There	 was	 an	 immediate	 need	 to	 create	 the	 Convention	 as	 part	 of	 an	 overall																																									 																					
479	Sullivan	Donna,	 ‘Advancing	the	Freedom	of	Religion	or	Belief	Through	the	UN	Declaration	on	the	
Elimination	 of	 Religious	 Intolerance	 and	Discrimination	 (1988)	 AJIL	 82	 487-520,	 495.	 See	 also	 Davis	
Derek,	 ‘The	 Evolution	of	 Religious	 Freedom	as	 a	Universal	Human	Right:	 Examining	 the	Role	 of	 the	
1981	United	Nations	Declaration	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Intolerance	and	of	Discrimination	
Based	on	Religion	or	Belief’,	(2002)	Brigham	Young	University	Law	Review	2(2),	229.	
480	Punishments	do	take	place	despite	views	that	argue	that	the	Quran’s	exact	wording	mandate	that	
"there	 shall	 be	 no	 compulsion	 in	 [acceptance	 of]	 the	 religion."(Quran,	 Surat	 Al	 Baqarah	 (The	 Cow)	
2:256)	This	Koranic	 injunction	can	be	understood	as	a	protection	 to	 freedom	of	 religious	belief	and	
expression	for	all	people.	
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“political	 plan	 for	 the	 unification	 of	 Europe”,481	that	 was	 considered	 by	 many	 the	
only	 answer	 to	 communism	 which	 was	 feared	 to	 spread	 throughout	 Europe.482		
Although	with	 regards	 to	 religion,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 drafting	 the	 ECHR,	 Europe	was	 a	
fairly	 homogeneous	 culture	 as	 Christianity	 had	 been	 the	 dominant	 religion	 for	
centuries.	
The	 Convention	 can	 therefore	 be	 considered	 a	 political	 as	 well	 as	 a	 legal	
instrument	and	its	strength	lies	in	the	fact	that	it	is	an	agreement	between	States483	
sharing	religious,	cultural,	political	and	economic	similarities.	By	contrast	to	today,	at	
the	time	of	drafting,	the	issue	was	with	religious	or	non-religious	people	rather	than	
with	people	of	various	religion(s),	traditions	or	cultures.484	Cultural	homogeneity	was	
assumed	even	while	social	diversity	was	recognised	with	regard	to	social	class,	social	
mobility	and	levels	of	wealth.	The	assumption	was	that	culture	in	the	sense	of	beliefs	
and	 values,	 allegiances	 and	 national	 sentiments,	 custom	 and	 traditions,	 was	
relatively	uniform.485	Many	of	the	delegates	were	explicit	about	the	role	they	saw	for	
the	 Christian	 religion	 in	 assisting	 with	 the	 development	 of	 human	 rights.486	There	
were	 no	 issues	 with	 people	 of	 “different”	 religions	 or	 even	 customs	 and	 national	
legal	systems	were	not	“strained	by	the	resulting	tensions.”487	Sir	David	Maxwell-Fyfe	
reflected	his	perception	of	 the	 liberal/Christian	homogeneity	of	 Europe,	 and	 called	
on	“those	nations	who	belong	to	and	revere	the	great	family	of	Western	Europe	and																																									 																					
481	Ralph	Beddard,	Human	Rights	and	Europe	(3rd	ed.	Cambridge	University	Press	1993)	19.	
482	Ibid.	
483 The	 States	 were:	 Belgium,	Denmark,	France,	 Ireland,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	
the	Netherlands,	Norway,	Sweden	and	the	United	Kingdom.	(All	Christian	States).	
484	Ralph	Beddard,	Human	Rights	and	Europe	(3rd	ed.	Cambridge	University	Press	1993)	225.	
485	Roger	 Cotterrell,	 ‘Law	 and	 Culture:	 Inside	 and	 Beyond	 the	Nation	 State’,	 Legal	 Studies	 Research	
Paper	No.	4/2009.	
486	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	39.	
487	Silvio	 Ferrari,	 ‘Individual	 Religious	 Freedom	and	National	 Security	 in	 Europe	 after	 September	 11’	
(2004)	Brigham	Young	University	Law	Review	2	357-384.	
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Christian	 civilization,”488 	that	 the	 protection	 and	 promotion	 of	 human	 rights	 is	
ensured.489	Europe	at	that	time	was	not	viewed	as	the	Continent	that	“has	tied	itself	
to	principles	that	it	does	not	believe	in.”490		
4.9.2	Background	to	the	Drafting	of	Article	9	
The	right	to	freedom	of	religion	was	included	in	the	freedoms	and	rights	protected	in	
the	 Convention	 from	 the	 earliest	 drafts.	 Many	 delegates	 stressed	 the	 need	 to	
condemn	“suppression	of	the	most	sacred	right	of	all—that	of	religious	belief	and	the	
works	 through	 which	 religious	 faith	 is	 manifested”491	and	 to	 include	 “freedom	 of	
religious	belief	in	a	list	of	fundamental,	undisputed	freedoms”.492	Others	referred	to	
religious	and	civil	 freedom	as	two	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	man	and	concluded	
that	“if	the	Council	of	Europe	achieves	no	other	end	than	the	guarantee	of	those	two	
rights,	 it	 will	 have	 justified	 its	 existence.”493	Most	 delegates	 noted	 the	 essential	
nature	of	religious	freedom	in	their	debates	and	indicated	the	importance	of	religion	
to	 their	 countries	 and	 referred	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 their	 own	 religious	 beliefs	 or	
experiences.494	
	
	
																																								 																					
488	Travaux	 préparatoires,	 vol.	 1,	 at	 124,	 First	 Session	 of	 the	 Consultative	 Assembly,	 speech	 by	
Maxwell-Fyfe	(United	Kingdom).	
489	Carolyn	Evans,	Freedom	of	Religion	…	39.	
490	Gareth	Davies,	‘Banning	the	Jilbab:	Reflections	on	Restricting	Religious	Clothing	in	the	Light	of	the	
Court	of	Appeal	in	SB	v	Denbigh	High	School’	(2005)	E.C.L.R.	1	511.	
491	Statement	of	Mr	Cinglani,	First	Session	of	the	Consultative	Assembly	from	the	collected	Edition	of	
Travaux	Préparatories,	vol.	1,	at	62.	
492	Statement	of	Mr	Teitgen	First	Session	of	 the	Consultative	Assembly	 from	the	collected	Edition	of	
Travaux	Préparatories,	vol.	1,	at	46.	
493	Statement	of	Mr	Everett,	First	Session	of	the	Consultative	Assembly	from	the	collected	Edition	of	
Travaux	Préparatories,	vol.	1,	at	102–104.	
494	The	delegates	being	 from	Belgium,	UK,	 Ireland,	 Italy	and	Greece;	 See	Carolyn	Evans,	Freedom	of	
religion	under	the	European	convention	of	Human	rights	(Oxford	University	press	2001)	39-40.	
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4.9.3	The	Travaux	Préparatoires		
Where	 a	 treaty	 is	 ambiguous,	 reference	 to	 the	travaux	 préparatoires	is	 generally	
accepted	 as	 a	 supplementary	 means	 of	 interpretation,495	and	 as	 a	 way	 of	 gaining	
insight	 into	 the	 views	 of	 treaty	 drafters.	However	 caution	 is	 needed	 regarding	 the	
use	of	the	travaux	préparatoires	of	the	Convention	due	to	the	selectivity	and	brevity	
of	the	materials	recorded.496	These	are	not	particularly	revealing	or	complete	when	
trying	to	understand	the	reasons	for	the	development	of	the	different	drafts	of	the	
Convention.497	Although	 some	 debates	 were	 included	 in	 the	 drafts	 many	 of	 the	
critical	 debates	 were	 not	 recorded.498		As	 there	 was	 also	 a	 limited	 amount	 of	 text	
written	 about	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	 people	 involved	 in	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	
Convention	there	remains	“an	amount	of	guesswork”499	in	trying	to	find	the	reasons	
behind	 the	 development	 of	 Article	 9.	 However,	 the	travaux	
préparatoires	demonstrate	 that	 freedom	 of	 religion	 was	 an	 essential	 and	
fundamental	 priority	 for	 the	 States	 and	 delegates	 involved	 in	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	
Convention.500		The	inclusion	of	this	right	in	the	Convention	was	so	obvious	and	self-
evident	 that	not	much	 time	was	 spent	by	 the	drafters	 in	 considering	 its	 scope	and	
meaning.		
																																									 																					
495	Article	32	of	The	Vienna	Convention	of	the	Law	on	Treaties,	Concluded	at	Vienna	on	23	May	1969.	
496	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	38.	
497	Ibid.,	at	34.	
498	Ibid.	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	drafting	of	the	European	convention	see	Travaux	Préparatoires,	vol.	
1,	at	xxx–xxxii,	introduction	by	A.	H.	Robertson.	The	draft	of	which	was	presented	to	the	Committee	of	
Ministers	of	the	Council	of	Europe	on	12	July	1949.	-	Robertson	notes	that	the	Travaux	Préparatories,	
“do	 not	 constitute	 an	 instrument	 providing	 an	 authoritative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 text	 of	 the	
Convention	 and	 the	 First	 Protocol,	 although	 they	 may	 be	 of	 such	 a	 nature	 as	 to	 facilitate	 the	
application	of	their	provisions”.		
499	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	38.	
500	Ibid	at	50.	
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4.9.4	The	First	Steps	in	the	Drafting	of	Article	9		
The	Consultative	Assembly	recommended	an	amendment	of	the	proposal	to	include	
“[t]he	 freedom	of	 religious	practice	and	 teaching,	as	 laid	down	 in	Article	18	of	 the	
Declaration	of	 the	United	Nations.”501		 The	new	 recommended	amendment	was	 to	
include	 a	 right	 to	 “[f]reedom	 of	 thought,	 conscience	 and	 religion	 as	 laid	 down	 in	
Article	18	of	the	Declaration	of	the	United	Nations”.502	The	amendment,	intended	to	
recognise	the	importance	of	religious	belief	(as	compared	to	practice)	as	well	as	the	
fact	that	non-religious	beliefs,	such	as	atheism,	were	to	be	covered	 in	the	scope	of	
the	 article	 on	 religious	 freedom,	 was	 accepted	 unanimously.503	In	 its	 final	 format	
Article	9	ECHR	states	that:	
1) Everyone	has	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	 thought,	 conscience	and	 religion;	 this	
right	 includes	 freedom	 to	 change	his	 religion	or	belief,	 and	 freedom,	either	
alone	or	 in	 community	with	others	and	 in	public	or	private,	 to	manifest	his	
religion	or	belief,	in	worship,	teaching,	practice	and	observance.			
2) Freedom	 to	manifest	 one’s	 religion	 or	 beliefs	 shall	 be	 subject	 only	 to	 such	
limitations	as	are	prescribed	by	law	and	are	necessary	in	a	democratic	society	
in	the	interests	of	public	safety,	for	the	protection	of	public	order,	health	or	
morals,	or	for	the	protection	of	the	rights	and	the	freedoms	of	others.			
																																								 																					
501	First	Session	of	the	Consultative	Assembly.	the	collected	Edition	of	Travaux	Préparatories,	vol.	1,	at	
168.	
502	Ibid.,	at	174.	
503	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	40-41.	
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Article	 9	 was	 closely	 modelled	 upon	 Article	 18	 of	 the	 UDHR504	and	 affords	
much	 the	 same	 protection	 as	 Article	 18.505	It	 also	 explicitly	 recognises	 the	 right	 to	
“change	religion.”506	However,	there	were	almost	no	amendments	and	few	recorded	
debates	on	the	Article	during	the	drafting	of	the	Convention.507	As	already	noted,	the	
most	 significant	 aspect	 of	 the	 drafting	 of	 Article	 9(1)	was	 that	 delegates	 regarded	
freedom	 of	 religion	 to	 be	 of	 great	 importance	 and	 accepted	 that	 an	 appropriate	
model	 for	 its	protection	was	provided	by	the	UDHR.	Apart	 from	the	representative	
from	Turkey,	who	spoke	against	the	inclusion	of	the	right	to	proselytise,508	there	was	
no	 recorded	debate	over	 issues	 regarding	 the	definition	of	belief	or	 religion	or	 the	
right	to	change	religion.	
Whilst	 the	protection	of	 religious	 freedom	was	uncontroversial,	 the	drafting	
of	 Article	 9(2)	 caused	 more	 controversy.	 Different	 wordings	 of	 this	 clause	 were	
proposed.	While	some	related	only	to	freedom	of	religion	others	were	broader	to	be	
applied	 to	 all	 rights.	 Despite	 still	 being	 general	 in	 nature	 the	 first	 approach	 was	
adopted.509	The	 debates	 on	Article	 9(2)	 are	 also	 not	well	 documented.	 The	United	
Kingdom	representative	was	the	first	to	suggest	an	amendment	whereby	the	general																																									 																					
504	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	UN	GA	Res.	217	A	III	adopted	and	proclaimed	on	December	
10	1948	
505	For	more	 information	on	 the	UDHR	and	 the	emergence	of	 religious	 freedom	 in	 the	 international	
and	European	legal	systems	see	chapter	4.	
506	The	recognition	to	change	religion	in	Article	18	UDHR	came	despite	challenges	from	some	Middle	
Eastern	countries	and	Islamic	States	which	pointed	out	that	the	right	to	change	religion	is	contrary	to	
the	Islamic	Law,	and	that	this	right	may	give	too	much	scope	to	Christian	missionaries	who	had	often	
been	involved	in	the	colonialisation	of	developing	states.	See	comments	of	Saudi	Arabian	Delegate	UN	
Doc.	 A/C.3/SR.127	 (1948)	 available	 at	 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL4/804/66/PDF/NL480466.pdf?OpenElement	 [Accessed	 in	 February	
2015].	
507	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	40-41.	
508	In	the	drafting	debates	over	the	Declaration	on	Religious	Intolerance	and	Discrimination	at	22	U.N.	
GAOR,	C.3	(1487th	mtg)	120,	U.N.	Doc.	A/C.3/SR.1487	(1967),	Turkey	spoke	against	the	inclusion	of	a	
right	to	proselytise.	
509	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	40-41.	
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limitation	 clause	 be	 replaced	 by	 a	 specific	 limitation	 for	 every	 right.	 The	 UK	
suggested	 that	 that	 freedom	of	 religion	be	 subject	 “only	 to	 such	 limitations	as	 are	
pursuant	 to	 law	 and	 are	 reasonable	 and	 necessary	 to	 protect	 public	 safety,	 order,	
health,	or	morals	or	the	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	of	others”.510	However	the	
draft	 used	 by	 the	 Committee	 later	 on,	maintained	 the	 use	 of	 a	 general	 limitation	
clause	as	such:		
“In	 the	 exercise	 of	 these	 rights,	 and	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 these	 freedoms	
guaranteed	 by	 the	 Convention,	 no	 limitations	 shall	 be	 imposed	 except	 those	
established	by	law,	with	the	sole	object	of	ensuring	the	recognition	and	respect	for	
the	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 of	 others,	 or	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 satisfying	 the	 just	
requirements	 of	 morality,	 public	 order,	 security,	 and	 national	 unity,	 or	 of	 the	
operation	of	administration	and	justice	in	a	democratic	society.”511	
But	 this	 was	 also	 eventually	 rejected.	 The	 United	 Kingdom	 proposed	 an	
amended	 draft	 Convention,	 which	 included	 a	 limitation	 provision	 for	 freedom	 of	
religion	almost	identical	to	that	used	in	the	final	text.512	The	only	distinction	was	that	
the	 clause	 did	 not	 include	 the	 provision	 that	 the	 limitation	 be	 necessary	 in	 a	
democratic	 society.	 The	 limitation	 clause	 produced	 by	 the	 Conference	 of	 Senior	
Officials,	appeared	in	its	present	form	in	the	draft	Convention:	
“Freedom	 to	manifest	one's	 religion	or	beliefs	 shall	 be	 subject	only	 to	 such	
limitations	as	are	prescribed	by	law	and	are	necessary	in	a	democratic	society	in	the	
																																								 																					
510Meeting	of	the	Committee	of	Experts,	6	Feb.	1950,	Doc.	A798	collection	of	Travaux	préparatoires,	
vol.	3,	at	206.	
511	Ibid.,	at	224	
512	Meeting	 of	 the	 Committee	 of	 Experts,	 6	 Mar.	 1950,	 Doc.	 CM/WP1	 (50)	 2,	 A915,	 collection	 of	
Travaux	préparatoires,	vol.	3,	286.	
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interests	 of	 public	 safety,	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 public	 health	 or	morals,	 or	 for	 the	
protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others.”513	
From	travaux	préparatoires	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	drafters	rejected	the	
broad	and	general	approach	to	the	limitation	clause	and	were	in	favour	of	a	tighter	
and	narrower	approach.	This	suggests	that	the	limitation	clause	of	Article	9(2)	should	
not	 be	 read	 expansively.514	However,	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	 only	 one	 reservation	
from	 Norway	 to	 Article	 9,	 which	 was	 later	 withdrawn,	 suggests	 an	 acceptance	 by	
Contracting	 States	 of	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	 belief	 and	 religion	 as	 set	 out.	 It	 also	
indicates	that	the	protection	of	freedom	of	religion	and	belief	had	a	high	priority	in	
the	Council	of	Europe	and	that	the	Contracting	Parties	had	a	commitment	to	making	
that	protection	effective.515		
4.10	The	Presence	of	the	Protestant	Theology	in	International	Treaties	
The	Protestant	theology	or	the	idea	of	the	“two	kingdoms”516	is	clearly	present	in	the	
above	mentioned	 laws	and	 treaties.	All	 preserved	 the	 separation	between	 internal	
beliefs	 and	 external	 manifestation	 of	 such	 beliefs.	 Absolute	 freedom	was	 granted	
only	to	opinions	and	views	of	an	internal	nature,	the	spiritual	realm,	in	today’s	terms	
the	forum	internum	or	the	passive	right.	There	remains	a	limitation	imposed	by	law	
on	the	manifestation	of	religion,	the	earthly	realm,	the	forum	externum	or	the	active	
right.																																									 																					
513	Draft	Convention	appended	to	the	draft	report;	Doc.	CM/WP	4	(50)	16,	appendix;	A	1445	collection	
of	travaux	préparatoires,	vol.	3,	218.	
514	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 Religion	 under	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	49-50.	
515	Ibid.	
516	As	discussed	earlier,	 the	 idea	 that	human	beings	 lived	 in	 two	worlds,	 the	 religious	 (spiritual)	and	
the	 secular	 (temporal)	 where	 in	 the	 temporal	 realm	 people	 ought	 to	 obey	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 secular	
authorities,	on	the	other	hand	secular	authorities	ought	not	intervene	with	the	spiritual	realm	of	the	
people.	
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The	 famous	 claim	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 that	 there	 should	 be	 “a	 wall	 of	
separation”	 between	 Church	 and	 State	 reflects	 Protestantism.	 In	 his	 letter	 dated	
January,	1802	to	the	Danbury	Baptists	he	wrote:	
“[B]elieving	with	you	that	religion	is	a	matter	which	lies	solely	between	Man	
&	his	God,	that	he	owes	account	to	none	other	for	his	faith	or	his	worship,	that	the	
legitimate	 powers	 of	 government	 reach	 actions	 only,	 &	 not	 opinions,	 I	
contemplate…..	 that	 their	 legislature	 should	 "make	 no	 law	 respecting	 an	
establishment	 of	 religion,	 or	 prohibiting	 the	 free	 exercise	 thereof,"	 thus	 building	 a	
wall	 of	 separation	 between	 Church	 &	 State.	 Adhering	 to	 this	 expression	 of	 the	
supreme	 will	 of	 the	 nation	 in	 behalf	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 conscience,	 I	 shall	 see	 with	
sincere	satisfaction	the	progress	of	 those	sentiments	which	tend	to	restore	to	man	
all	 his	 natural	 rights,	 convinced	 he	 has	 no	 natural	 right	 in	 opposition	 to	 his	 social	
duties.”517	
This	Protestant	doctrine	 remains	 the	 implicit	background	of	modern	human	
rights	 ideas	and	concepts	 in	 the	West	with	 regard	 to	 freedom	of	 religion,	 thought,	
and	 conscience.	 This	 wall	 of	 separation	 is	 incorporated	 in	 all	 international	 and	
regional	 instruments	 that	 protect	 religious	 freedom.	 Furthermore,	 the	 idea	 of	
secularism	 or	 toleration	 is	 dependent	 on	 a	 number	 of	 deeply	 rooted	 Christian	
assumptions	 concerning	 the	 nature	 and	 the	 aim	 of	 human	 life.	 It	 takes	 the	
conceptual	schemes	of	Christian	theology,	more	specifically,	its	division	of	the	world	
into	 a	 spiritual	 religious	 sphere	 and	 a	 temporal	 political	 sphere	 –	 as	 though	 these	
correspond	 to	 the	universal	 structure	of	human	 societies.	 Secularism	suggests	 that	
plural	societies	will	fall	apart	if	they	fail	to	adopt	the	Protestant	norm	of	separation																																									 																					
517	Thomas	Jefferson’s	Letter	to	the	Danbury	Baptist,	January	1,	1802.	
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of	the	religious	and	the	political.	As	a	result,	when	this	separation	is	applied	in	courts,	
questions	 regarding	 proof	 or	 relevance	 of	 belief	 (or	 religion)	 become	 inevitable	 in	
order	to	justify	the	manifestation	of	religion	and	therefore	qualify	for	the	protection.			
The	intelligibility	that	religion	lends	to	“conscientious	objection	among	Jews,	
Christians,	and	Muslims	 is	not	accessible	 to	members	of	other	 cultures,	 so	 the	 law	
effectively	caters	to	preferences	of	some	groups	but	not	of	others.”518	The	Christian	
freedom	 of	 conscience,	 which	 equally	 applies	 to	 Muslims	 and	 Jews,	 could	 easily	
become	 the	 grounds	 from	 which	 to	 challenge	 the	 ecclesiastic	 as	 well	 as	 civil	
authorities.	 When	 human	 laws	 infringe	 upon	 faith	 and	 conscience,	 they	 can	 be	
resisted	 legitimately.519	Hence	 the	 failure	 to	be	 religiously	neutral	 seems	 inevitable	
when	 courts	 decide	 that	 some	 practices	 do	 not	 fall	 under	 the	 scope	 of	 religious	
freedom	because	they	are	not	religious,	or	do	not	qualify	for	tax	emptions	and	state	
funding:	
“No	 court	possesses	 an	 impartial	 scientific	 conception	of	 religion;	 there	are	
no	 shared	 secular	 criteria	 that	 enable	 one	 to	 identify	 and	 delimit	 the	 sphere	 of	
religion	in	a	manner	neutral	to	all	religions.	Consequently,	in	such	cases,	judges	and	
other	 secular	 authorities	 are	 bound	 to	 smuggle	 in	 one	 particular	 theological	
conception	of	religion.”520	
	
																																									 																					
518	Prakash	Shah,	 ‘The	Moral	Basis	of	Anti	Caste	Legislation’	Public	Spirit	25/09/2013	electronic	copy	
available	at	http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/the-moral-basis-of-anti-caste-legislation/	[last	accessed	 in	
July	2014].	
519	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	109.	
520	Jakob	De	Roover	“Secular	Law	and	the	Realm	of	False	Religion”	in	Winnifred	Fallers	Sullivan,	Robert	
A.	Yelle	&	Mateo	Tausig-Rubbo,	eds,	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2011)	43.	
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4.11	Conclusion		
The	international	laws	discussed	above	recognise	at	least	in	words	that	everyone	has	
the	right	to	freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion	and	that	this	right	includes	
freedom	 to	 change	 religion	 or	 belief,	 and	 freedom,	 either	 alone	 or	 in	 community	
with	 others	 and	 in	 public	 or	 private,	 to	 manifest	 religion	 or	 belief	 in	 teaching,	
practice,	 worship	 and	 observance.	 However,	 this	 recognition	 does	 not	 solve	 the	
conceptual	problem	that	is	inherent	to	the	principles	of	religious	freedom	and	liberty	
or	 the	 lack	 of	 intelligibility	 (among	 non-Protestants	 applicants)	 of	 the	 separation	
between	 the	 spiritual	 and	 the	 worldly	 kingdom	 and	 the	 secularisation	 of	 the	
Protestant	theological	scheme.	
All	of	the	international	laws	that	include	provisions	on	freedom	of	religion	do	
not	actually	divert	from	the	idea	that	manifestation	of	the	freedom	in	public	should	
be	restricted	by	the	State	whilst	the	private	right	to	the	freedom	remains	absolute.	
There	is	also	no	deviation	from	the	Protestant	theological	concepts	of	belief,	worship	
and	God	 even	when	 trying	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 atheists;	 atheism	 is	 only	 in	 the	
form	 of	 “atheistic	 religiosity.” 521 	Atheism	 cannot	 be	 explained	 without	 using	
theological	 vocabulary	and	concepts	 (the	comparator	 is	 theism	and	 the	grounds	of	
the	ideas	emanate	from	the	non-existence	of	God,	hence	God	is	the	comparator	and	
not	a	non-religious	entity).522		
The	 Preambles	 of	 the	UDHR,	 the	 ICCPR,	 and	 the	 ICESCR	all	 refer	 to	 human	
beings	as	having	an	inherent	dignity.523	They	state	that	“the	inherent	dignity	.	.	.	of	all																																									 																					
521	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….,	318-320.	522	See	section	3.3	in	this	thesis.	
523	Article	 1	 of	 the	 UDHR,	 supra	 note	 27,	 reads	 “[a]ll	 human	 beings	 are	 born	 free	 and	 equal	 in	
dignity	.	.	.	.	[A]nd	should	act	towards	one	another	in	a	spirit	of	brotherhood.”.	
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members	of	the	human	family”524	and	“the	inherent	dignity	of	the	human	person”—
from	which,	both	covenants	declare,	“the	equal	and	inalienable	rights	of	all	members	
of	the	human	family	.	.	.	derive.”525	Moreover,	they	stress	that	human	beings	“should	
act	 towards	 one	 another	 in	 a	 spirit	 of	 brotherhood,”526	all	 of	 which	 are	 Christian	
theological	 concepts	 as	 explained.527	As	 Leo	Tolstoy	explains,	 “attempts	 to	 found	a	
morality	 outside	 religion	 are	 similar	 to	what	 children	 do	when,	wishing	 to	 replant	
something	they	 like,	they	tear	 it	out	without	the	roots	and	plant	 it,	 rootless,	 in	the	
soil…”528			
These	theological	concepts	and	ideas	(including	concepts	of	truth	and	falsity	
are	 conscientious	 objection)	 become	 a	 “topos”,	 where	 one	 can	 “only	 lend	
intelligibility	 to	 the	 resulting	 theory	 because	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 other	 topoi	 and	
theological	ideas	surrounding	it.”529	Therefore	one	is	unable,	for	example,	to	speak	of	
a	universal	 right	 to	 freedom	of	conscience	or	 freedom	of	 religion,	without	 likewise	
assuming	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	nature	of	human	beings	 to	have	a	 conscience	or	 religion	
that	plays	a	particular	role	in	moral	reasoning.530			
Consequently,	the	questions	the	ECtHR	asks	regarding	religiosity	and	religious	
belonging	 can	 only	 be	 asked	 if	 they	 are	 assumed	 to	 have	 universal	 relevance	 and	
intelligibility.	As	a	result	answers	from	Abrahamic	religions	come	to	assume	greater																																									 																					
524	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	adopted	Dec.	19,	1966,	999	U.N.T.S.	171,	172;	
International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	adopted	Dec.	16,	1966,	993	U.N.T.S.	
3,4,	UDHR,	supra	note	27,	pmbl.,	Art.	1.	
525	UDHR,	supra	note	27,	pmbl.,	Art.	1.	
526	Ibid.	
527	For	a	detailed	analysis	on	the	assumption	that	human	beings	have	innate	dignity	and	morals	see	
section	3.5	in	this	thesis.	
528	Leo	 Tolstoy,	A	 Confession	 and	 Other	 Religious	 Writings	(Translated	 by	 Jane	 Kentish)	 (London:	
Penguin,	1989)	150.	
529	Jakob	De	Roover	and	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	 ‘Liberal	Political	Theory	and	 the	Cultural	Migration	of	
Ideas:	The	Case	of	Secularism	in	India’,	(2011)	Political	Theory	39(5)	571–599.	
530	Ibid.	
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relevance	in	comparison	with	non-Abrahamic	traditions	where	the	applicants	cannot	
respond	to	“religious”	questions	without	distorting	themselves	because	they	lack	the	
theological	framework	to	make	sense	of	these	questions.531	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																					
531	Prakash	Shah,	‘Asking	about	reasonable	accommodation	in	England’	(2013)	IJDL	13(2-3)	83–112,	88.	
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Chapter	5	
Article	9	the	ECtHR	and	Non-Abrahamic	Traditions	
5.1	Overview	 	
This	chapter	will	specifically	examine	how	the	ECtHR	treats	non-Abrahamic	traditions	
in	 its	 application	of	Article	9.	 	 The	 status	of	other	Christians	 (non-protestants)	 and	
other	 Abrahamic	 religions	 are	 examined	 in	 the	 following	 chapter.	 It	 is	 essential	 to	
divide	the	types	of	situations	and	cases	into	three	groups:	Non-Abrahamic	traditions;	
other	Christians;	and	other	Abrahamic	religions,	due	to	the	fundamental	differences	
in	 the	 concept	 of	 religion	or	 tradition	 in	 each	denomination.	532	It	 is	 argued	 in	 this	
thesis	 that	 distortions	 are	 predicted	 to	 occur	 most	 strongly	 the	 further	 away	 a	
culture	 is	 from	the	 idea	of	 religion	presupposed	within	Article	9	which	 is	based	on	
Protestantism.	The	most	impact	is	therefore	on	Non-	Abrahamic	traditions	due	to	the	
lack	or	religion	in	these	cultures.		
Practices	 of	 Non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 do	 not	 require	 any	 justification	 for	
their	manifestations.	They	do	not	require	any	reference	to	any	religious	doctrines	or	
texts,	they	are	merely	inherited	traditions	and	customs	and	unlike	religious	practices	
traditions,	have	no	authority	to	determine	who	belongs	to	them	or	whether	a	certain	
culture	 requires	 them	 or	 not.	 In	 traditions	 where	 doctrinal	 justification	 for	
manifestation	 is	 not	 prevalent,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 separate	 between	 a	 belief	 and	 its	
manifestation	or	to	determine	the	existence	of	 the	belief	 in	the	first	place.	The	act	
could	be	a	mere	tradition	practiced	because	it	is	simply	a	tradition.	This	makes	Article	
9	in	its	current	format	unintelligible	to	Non-Abrahamic	traditions	unless	they	distort	
																																								 																					532	On	the	difference	between	religion	and	tradition	see	section	2.7	in	this	thesis.	
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themselves	to	fit	 into	the	confines	of	the	Protestant	format	of	Article	9.	The	ECtHR	
treats	all	cultures	as	having	religion	and	accepts	their	claims	as	potentially	involving	
the	 question	 of	 religious	 freedom.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 is	 taking	 the	 claim	 of	 Protestant	
theology	but	in	a	secularised	version.	Whilst	this	mostly	affects	applicants	from	non-
Abrahamic	 traditions,	 the	 wording	 and	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 is	 also	
detrimental	 to	 other	 Abrahamic	 religions	 (non-	 protestant).	 Although	 Abrahamic	
religions	can	more	easily	than	non-	Abrahamic	traditions	rely	on	textual	and	doctrinal	
proofs	to	justify	their	manifestations,	religious	symbols	and	rituals	are	interpreted	by	
the	 ECtHR	utilising	 Protestant	 thought.	 Religious	 symbols	 are	 often	 seen	 as	 having	
power	and	presence	rather	than	being	deaf,	dumb	or	mute.	
It	is	also	argued	in	this	chapter	that	the	ECtHR	falls	into	the	trap	of	attempting	
to	define	religion	under	Article	9	but	the	attempted	definitions	are	kept	within	the	
boundaries	 of	 theological	 claims.	 As	 a	 result,	 applicants	 who	 are	 considered	 not	
“religious”	such	as	those	who	adhere	to	traditional	or	customary	rituals	and	acts,	are	
either	distorted	to	fit	Article	9	or	fail	to	receive	protection	altogether.	Case	examples	
will	be	provided	throughout	the	chapter.	
Many	 of	 the	 judgments	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 show	 that	 the	 Protestant	 thought	 or	
belief,	and	Abrahamic	or	well	established	religions,	especially	individuals	within	these	
religions	who	 could	 rely	 on	 doctrinal	 proofs	 for	 their	 beliefs,	 are	more	 difficult	 to	
restrict	 and	 easier	 to	 interpret	 than	 other	 thoughts	 or	 traditions	 who	 base	 their	
manifestations	 on	 traditionally	 inherited	 customs	 or	 mere	 practices	 rather	 than	
doctrines	 and	beliefs.	 Such	examples	 range	 from	confiscating	 religious	 audio	 tapes	
and	 a	 cassette	 tape	 player,	 which	 the	 ECtHR	 considered	 as	 being	 not	 essential	 to	
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manifesting	 a	 religion,533	to	 removing	 incense	 sticks	 and	 massaging	 oils	 from	 an	
applicant’s	prison	cell	where	again	the	ECtHR	again	deemed	these	as	not	essential	for	
the	 manifestation	 of	 belief.534	Other	 applicants	 have	 had	 to	 prove	 that	 a	 certain	
tradition	is	a	religion	in	order	to	qualify	for	the	protection	of	Article	9.535In	the	light	
of	the	jurisprudence	of	the	ECtHR,	crucial	questions	remain.	Is	there	a	place	for	non-
Abrahamic	 tradition(s)	 or	 non-Protestant	 beliefs	 under	 Article	 9?	 What	 “proper	
object	 of	 the	 right	 to	 religious	 freedom”536	does	Article	 9	 protect?	 To	what	 extent	
does	the	ECtHR	allow	limitations?	These	questions	and	more	will	be	addressed	in	this	
chapter.	
As	discussed	 in	chapters	2	and	3,	questions	relating	to	religion	and	religious	
belonging	 make	 sense	 only	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 an	 Abrahamic	 religious	
framework. 537 	This	 framework	 depends	 on	 an	 explanatorily	 intelligible	 account	
(causal	 and	 intentional)538	to	 “frame	 experience	 and	 generate	 the	 kind	 of	 ethics	
required	to	formulate	questions	about	whether,	for	example,	one	is	obliged	by	one’s	
religion	to	cover	a	certain	part	of	one’s	body	or	not	to	work	at	a	certain	times	of	the	
week.” 539 	As	 a	 result,	 when	 religion-related	 questions	 are	 asked,	 distortions	
inevitably	occur	“with	differently	situated	participants	relaying	the	message	that	they	
understand	 religion	 as	 quite	 different	 sets	 of	 phenomena.”	 This	 reflects	 the	
prevailing	understanding	that	all	cultures	have	religion	(even	non-	Abrahamic	ones)	
																																								 																					
533	Austrianu	v.	Romania,	Application	no.	16117/02	(2013).	
534	Kovalkovs	v	Latvia	Application	no.	35021/05	[2012]	ECtHR	280	(ECHR).		
535	X.	v.	United	Kingdom,	Application	No.	7291/75	(1977).	
536	Peter	 Dunchin,	 ‘Islam	 in	 the	 Secular	 Nomos	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights’	 Michigan	
Journal	Of	International	Law	32(4)	663-747.	
537	Prakash	Shah,	‘Asking	for	Reasonable	Accommodation	in	England’,	(2013)	IJDL	13	(2-3)	83-112,	88-
89.	See	also	chapters	3	and	4	in	this	thesis.	
538	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	his	Blindness…	at	82–85.	
539	Prakash	Shah,	‘Asking	for	Reasonable	Accommodation	in	England’,	(2013)	IJDL	13	(2-3)	83-112,	89.	
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but	 that	 “they	 are	 not	 adequately	 recognised	 within	 the	 existing	 frameworks	 of	
religion.	This	view	can	be	held	as	if	it	is	consistent	with	the	feeling	that	Christianity	is	
the	benchmark	from	which	other	faiths	are	understood.”540		
5.2	How	Does	the	ECtHR	Define	Religion?	
Defining	 religion	 has	 been	 a	 controversial	 issue	 which	 has	 often	 proved	 futile,	
therefore	 the	 definition	 is	 usually	 kept	 very	 wide.	 International	 human	 rights	
instruments	 such	 as	 the	 ECHR	 define	 the	 “legal	 protection	 (rights)	 in	 terms	 of	
freedom	of	religion	or	prohibition	of	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	religion	thereby	
focusing	 legal	 inquiry	 on	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 the	 terms	 "freedom"	 or	
"discrimination.”541	Consequently,	 any	 attempt	 to	 define	 the	 content	 and	 scope	 of	
the	 right	 to	 religious	 liberty	 will	 “necessarily	 involve	 assumptions	 about	 the	
underlying	nature	of	religion	itself.”542	These	assumptions	are	normally	unarticulated	
and	 secularised	 concepts	 concerning	 the	 psychological,	 cultural	 and	 metaphysical	
aspects	 of	 religion.	 The	 risk	 then	 lies,	 as	 T.	 Jeremy	 Gunn	 says,	 in	 that	 the	 legal	
definition	 "may	 contain	 serious	 deficiencies	 when	 they	 (perhaps	 unintentionally)	
incorporate	particular	 social	 and	cultural	attitudes	 towards	 (preferred)	 religions,	or	
when	 they	 fail	 to	 account	 for	 social	 and	 cultural	 attitudes	 against	 (disfavoured)	
religions."543.		
																																								 																					
540	Ibid.	
541	Peter	 Dunchin,	 ‘Islam	 in	 the	 Secular	 Nomos	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights’	 (2011)	
Michigan	Journal	Of	International	Law	32(4)	663-747.	
542	Ibid.	
543	T.	 Jeremy	Gunn,	The	Complexity	of	Religion	and	the	Definition	of	"Religion"	 in	 International	Law,	
(2003)	16	Harv.	Hum.	RTs.	J.	189,	195.	
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Veit	 Bader	 explains	 that	 “[r]eligion	 is	 a	 complex,	 historically	 and	 socio-
culturally	 embedded,	 essentially	 contested	 concept.”544	He	observes	 that	 there	 are	
“two	widely	known	characteristics	of	religions	that	make	it	nearly	impossible	to	find	
a	common	and	objective	core	of	a	meaningful	term:	first,	the	huge	variety	of	types	of	
religions,	 and	 second,	 the	 increasing	 acknowledgment	 that	 definitions	 or	
observations	 of	 religions	 are	 inevitably	 rooted	 in	 competing	 religious	 and	 cultural	
traditions	themselves.	This	seems	to	exclude	any	possibility	of	independent,	neutral,	
transcultural	or	Universalist	definitions	or	second-order	observations	of	religions.”545	
According	 to	 Silvio	 Ferrari	 the	 ECtHR	 “has	 developed	 its	 own	 notion	
of	religion	which	 fits	 better	 with	 some	religions	than	 with	 others.”546	This	 has	 also	
been	 suggested	 by	 Julie	 Ringelheim	 who	 stated	 that	 “underlying	 the	 Court's	
case	law	is	the	idea	that	religion	is	primarily	an	inward	feeling”547	and	as	determined	
by	 the	 ECtHR	 in	 the	 case	 of	 97	 members	 of	 the	 Gldani	 Congregation	 of	 Jehovah	
Witnesses	v	Georgia;548	a	“matter	of	individual	conscience”.549	Carolyn	Evans	has	also	
noted	that	the	ECtHR	is	inclined	to	protect	more	strongly	“the	cerebral,	the	internal	
and	the	theological	…	dimensions	of	religion	and	belief”,	while	it	tends	to	ignore	the	
“active,	 the	 symbolic	 and	 the	 moral	 dimensions.”550	Malcolm	 Evans	 observes	 that	
“there	 is	 considerable	 advantage	 in	 being	 able	 to	 place	 one's	 belief	 within	 the																																									 																					
544	Veit	 Bader,	 ‘Religion	 and	 the	Myths	 of	 Secularization	 and	 Separation’,	 RELIGARE	Working	 Paper	
No.8/March	2011,	1.		
545	Ibid.	
546	Silvio	Ferrari,	 ‘Law	and	Religion	in	a	Secular	World:	a	European	Perspective’,	(2012)	Ecc.	L.J.	14(3)	
355-370,	367.	
547	Julie	Ringelheim,	 ‘Rights,	Religion,	and	The	Public	Sphere:	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	 in	
Search	of	a	Theory?’,	 in	L	Zucca	and	C	Ungureanu	 (eds),	Law,	State	and	Religion	 in	 the	New	Europe:	
debates	and	dilemmas	(Cambridge,	2012)	293.	
548	97	members	of	the	Gldani	Congregation	of	Jehovah	Witnesses	v	Georgia,	Application	no	71156/01	
(ECtHR,	3	May	2007).	
549	Ibid.,	at	130.	
550	Carolyn	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Freedom	 in	European	 Human	 Rights	Law:	 The	 Search	 For	 a	 Guiding	
Conception’	in	M	Janis	and	C	Evans	(eds),	Religion	and	International	Law	(The	Hague,	1999),	396.	
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bounds	of	an	accepted	form	of	religious	belief	since	this	ensures	that	it	will	cross	the	
threshold	of	“seriousness”.551	 	
Other	scholars	have	considered	the	wording	of	Article	9	itself.	Carolyn	Evans	
explains	that	despite	the	fact	that	Article	9	ECHR	calls	for	the	protection	of	religious	
freedom,	it	is	challenging	to	establish	what	exactly	this	freedom	covers.552	It	has	also	
been	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 underlying	 philosophical	 justification	 for	 the	 right	 to	
religious	freedom	and	religious	manifestation	remains	vague553	and	that	the	wording	
of	Article	9	 is	 limited,	ambiguous	and	non-comprehensive.554		Malcolm	Evans	states	
that	a	 lack	of	a	clear	and	narrow	definition	to	religion	in	the	legal	context	 is	one	of	
the	main	causes	of	the	incoherence	and	inconsistency	of	the	case	law	and	leads	to	a	
wide	variety	of	 conceptions.555	Consequently,	defining	 religion	or	belief	has	been	a	
constant	challenging	task	for	the	ECtHR	and	for	scholars	of	religious	studies.	However,	
identifying	 what	 practices	 and	 manifestations	 fall	 within	 the	 legal	 definition	 of	
religion	or	belief	is	fundamental	so	that	the	ECtHR	can	determine	whether	a	claim	is	
admissible	or	not	and	avoid	“acting	in	vacuum	and	without	principles	to	guide	them…	
with	minority	religions	particularly	left	unprotected.”556	
																																								 																					
551	Malcolm	 Evans,	Religious	 Liberty	 and	 International	 Law	 in	 Europe	(Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
2008)	at	p.	290-291.	
552	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	18.	
553 	Tom	 Lewis	 ‘What	 not	 to	 Wear:	 Religious	 Rights,	 the	 European	 Court	 and	 the	 Margin	 of	
Appreciation’	(2007)	I.C.L.Q.	56(2)	395-414	
554	See	Malcolm	Evans,	Religious	liberty	and	international	law	in	Europe,	(Cambridge	University	Press,	
1997).	 see	 also	 Carolyn	 Evans	 Freedom	of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	
(Oxford	University	press	2001).	See	also	Lucy	Vickers	Religious	Freedom,	Religious	Discrimination	and	
the	Workplace,	(Hart	Publishing	2008).	
555	Ibid.	This	idea	however	will	be	contested	in	the	following	chapters	to	show	that	what	is	lacking	is	a	
theory	on	religion	rather	than	a	definition.		
556	Lucy	Vickers	Religious	Freedom,	Religious	Discrimination	and	the	Workplace,	(Hart	Publishing	2008)	
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Identifying	 and	 interpreting	 what	 is	 belief	 or	 what	 is	 religion	 in	 the	
jurisprudence	of	the	ECtHR	is	far	from	straightforward.	Peter	Edge	and	Lucy	Vickers	
argue	 that	 although	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 definition	 as	 to	 what	 constitutes	 religion	 or	
belief,	there	is	a	certain	level	of	consistency	between	scholars	and	various	courts	in	
the	way	religion	 is	described	and	 interpreted.557	Vickers	also	states	 that	 there	 is	an	
on-going	 scholarly	 debate	 regarding	 a	 “proper	 definition	 of	 religion”558	and	 that	
these	 debates	 usually	 revolve	 around	 three	 approaches.	 The	 first	 identifies	 the	
contents	of	belief	that	makes	them	religious	in	nature;	i.e.	a	content-based	definition.	
The	second	approach	is	the	attempt	to	produce	a	list	of	“key	indicators”	of	religion,	
to	 be	 used	 as	 a	 testing	 method	 for	 religions	 that	 are	 “less	 well	 known”.559	This	
approach	 is	 called	 “reason	 by	 analogy” 560 	with	 religions	 that	 are	 regarded	 as	
“universal”	whereby	key	 indicators	of	 religion	are	 identified	and	tested	against	 less	
well-known	 religions.	 The	 third	 approach	 is	 the	 attempt	 to	 find	 a	 “purposive	
definition”,561	whereby	 the	 attempt	 is	 to	 look	 at	 the	 purpose	 to	 protect	 religions.	
Having	 set	 out	 these	 three	 approaches	 Vickers	 then	 shows	 how	 each	 is	 at	 risk	 of	
being	 biased	 towards	 the	majority	 or	 well-established	 religions,	 towards	 orthodox	
understanding	of	religion,	and	the	risk	of	them	being	over-	or	under-inclusive.	
Gunn	observes	 that	 legal	definitions	of	 religion	adopt	a	 similar	 approach	 to	
non-legal	 definitions,	 by	 “making	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 religion	 then	
																																								 																					
557	Peter	 Edge	 and	 Lucy	 Vickers,	 “Review	 of	 Equality	 and	 Human	 Rights	 Law	 relating	 to	 religion	 or	
belief”	Equality	and	Human	Rights	Commission,	Research	Report	97	(2015)	13.	
558	Lucy	Vickers,	Religious	Freedom,	Religious	Discrimination	and	the	Workplace	(Hart	Publishing	2008)	
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presented	 in	 either	 essentialist	 or	 polytheistic	 form.”562 	Gunn	 argues	 that	 legal	
definitions	establish	rules	for	regulating	social	and	legal	relations	among	people	and	
fail	 to	 merely	 describe	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 religion.	 This	 does	 not	 accommodate	
diverse	 views	 and	 attitudes	 as	 to	 what	 manifestation	 of	 religion	 is	 eligible	 for	
protection	and	more	 importantly	what	religion	 is	 in	the	first	place.	Gunn	concludes	
that	 as	 a	 result	 legal	 definitions	 “may	 contain	 serious	 deficiencies	 when	 they	
(perhaps	unintentionally)	incorporate	particular	social	and	cultural	attitudes	towards	
(preferred)	 religions,	 or	when	 they	 fail	 to	 account	 for	 social	 and	 cultural	 attitudes	
against	 (disfavored)	 religions.”563	According	 to	 Gunn	 in	 legal	 systems	 it	 is	 assumed	
that	 known	 religions	 are	 “real”	 religions	 while	 other	 faiths	 and	 beliefs	 are	 only	
“pseudo-religions.”	Gunn	further	notes	that	legal	systems	“may	explicitly	or	implicitly	
evaluate	 (or	 rank)	 religions.	 Depending	 on	 the	 attitudes	 of	 the	 evaluator,	 religions	
may	be	described	in	ways	such	as	“good	religion”	versus	“bad	religion,”	or,	“religion”	
versus	“non-religion.”	Thus	some	might	think	of	monotheistic	religions	in	terms	such	
as	 “traditional,”	 while	 polytheistic	 or	 non-theistic	 religions	 may	 be	 perceived	 as	
“primitive”	or	“superstitious.”564	
Lourdes	 Peroni	 notes	 that	 in	 its	 judgment	 in	 Eweida	 and	 Others	 v	 UK	 the	
ECtHR	has	done	“a	great	job	in	unpacking	what	counts	as	“manifestation”	of	religious	
belief,”565	when	 it	 held	 that	 there	 is	 to	 be	 “no	 requirement	 on	 the	 applicant	 to	
establish	 that	 he	 or	 she	 acted	 in	 fulfilment	 of	 a	 duty	mandated	 by	 the	 religion	 in																																									 																					
562	T.	Jeremy	Gunn,	‘The	Complexity	of	Religion	and	the	Definition	of	“Religion”	in	International	Law’	
(2003)	Harvard	Human	Rights	Journal	16	189-215,	194.	
563	Ibid	at	195.	
564	Ibid.,	at	196.	
565	Lourdes	 Peroni,	 ‘Eweida	 and	Others	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (Part	 I):	 Taking	 Freedom	 of	 Religion	
More	Seriously’,	 Strasbourg	 Observers,	 17	 January	 2013	 available	 at	
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/01/17/eweida-and-others-v-the-united-kingdom-part-i-taking-
freedom-of-religion-more-seriously/	[last	accessed	June	2017].	
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question.”566	Peroni	explains	that	one	of	the	advantages	of	this	approach	 is	that	“it	
leaves	more	room	for	recognising	minorities	within	religions,	whose	practices	might	
not	be	generally	recognised	or	considered	as	required	by	the	religion	in	question.”567	
Gwynth	Pitt	 contends	 that	protecting	 too	broad	a	 set	of	 religions	or	beliefs	
“leads	to	a	real	danger	of	trivialising	the	equality	principle”568,	or	watering	down	the	
concept	of	religion	or	belief	so	as	to	bring	it	into	disrepute.569	According	to	Malcolm	
Evans	and	Peter	Petkoff	while	a	definition	of	religion	was	never	offered	by	the	ECtHR,	
the	ECtHR	strays	 in	 this	direction	“while	determining	ancillary	 issues,	 such	as	what	
are	 and	 what	 are	 not	 religious	 symbols	 and	 appropriate	 forms	 of	 religious	
manifestation.”570	Furthermore,	 in	relation	to	the	ECHR,	Karl	Partsch	notes	that	the	
terms	 conscience,	 thought	 and	 religion	 that	 are	 utilised	 in	 Article	 9	 ECHR,	 are	
“diplomatic	 wording”	 intentionally	 used	 in	 the	 legal	 systems	 and	 mean	 different	
things	 for	 different	 people. 571 	There	 is	 a	 wide	 discretion	 as	 to	 what	 and	 how	
conscience,	religion	and	thought	are	 interpreted	and	the	 limits	set	regarding	 lawful	
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manifestation	of	 such	 religion	or	 belief.	However,	 in	 practice,	 the	 jurisprudence	of	
the	ECtHR	indicates	a	narrower	approach.572	
Aaron	 Petty	 correctly	 observes	 that	 “religion”	 as	 a	 legal	 term	 of	 art	 is	
generally	 understood	 by	 judges	 to	 refer	 primarily	 to	 propositional	 belief,	 that	 is,	
“belief	 in”	 something,	 and	 this	 understanding	 privileges	 Christianity	 (specifically	
Protestant	 Christianity,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 other	 confessional	 religions	 such	 as	
Islam)	 at	 the	expense	of	 others,	 such	 as	 Judaism	and	Hinduism,	 that	place	 greater	
emphasis	on	community,	practice,	ethics,	or	ritual.”573	
Moreover,	 such	 a	 conception	of	 religion,	 as	 belief	 or	 conscience	 is,	 as	 Talal	
Asad	says	in	his	commentary	on	Geertz’s	Interpretation	of	Cultures574	a,	
"[m]odern,	 privatised	 Christian	 one	 because	 and	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	
emphasises	 the	 priority	 of	 belief	 as	 a	 state	 of	 mind	 rather	 than	 as	 constituting	
activity	in	the	world…..	In	modern	society,	where	knowledge	is	rooted	either	in	an	a-
Christian	everyday	life	or	 in	an	a-religious	science,	the	Christian	apologist	tends	not	
to	regard	belief	as	the	conclusion	to	a	knowledge	process	but	as	its	precondition."575	
Asad	 adds	 that	 it	 was	 predominantly	 the	 Christian	 church	 that	 has	 occupied	 itself	
with	 “identifying,	 cultivating,	 and	 testing	belief	 as	a	 verbalizable	 inner	 condition	of	
true	religion.”576	
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573	Aaron	R.	Petty,	 ‘Religion,	Conscience,	and	Belief	 in	the	European	Court	Of	Human	Rights’,	 	(2016)	
The	Geo.	Wash.	Int’l.	L.	Rev.	48	807-851,	809-810.	
574	Geertz	states	that	"The	basic	axiom	underlying	what	we	may	perhaps	call	'the	religious	perspective'	
is	everywhere	the	same:	he	who	would	know	must	first	believe",	Clifford	Geertz,	The	Interpretation	of	
Cultures	(Basic	Books,	New	York,	1973)	110.	
575	Talal	Asad,	The	Construction	of	Religion	as	an	Anthropological	Category	in	Genealogies	of	Religion:	
Discipline	and	Reasons	of	Power	in	Christianity	and	Islam	(Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1993)	47-48.		
576	Ibid.	
	 182	
In	Chapter	3	it	was	established	that	there	cannot	be	a	universal	definition	of	
religion	 in	 regional	or	 international	human	 rights	 instruments,	not	only	because	 its	
constituent	 elements	 and	 relationships	 are	 historically	 specific,	 but	 because	 that	
definition	 is	 itself	 the	 “historical	 product	 of	 discursive	 processes.”577	Furthermore,	
religion	 in	 itself	 is	not	universal	 in	all	 cultures.	 This	 raises	 the	question	of	how	 the	
ECtHR	can	assess	whether	a	manifestation	of	some	act	is	actually	a	manifestation	of	
religion	 and	 therefore	 qualifies	 to	 be	 protected	 by	Article	 9	 given	 that	 there	 is	 no	
universal	definition	or	universal	concepts	of	religion	and	freedom	of	religion.		
	There	 is	 a	 wide	 discretion	 as	 to	 what	 and	 how	 conscience,	 religion	 and	
thought	 are	 interpreted	 and	 the	 limits	 set	 regarding	 lawful	 manifestation	 of	 such	
religion	or	 belief.	 But	 despite	 this,	 in	 practice,	 the	 ECtHR	 jurisprudence	 indicates	 a	
narrow	approach.	Often	non-Abrahamic	traditions	find	it	more	difficult	to	prove	that	
their	tradition	fulfils	the	requirements	to	be	considered	a	“religion”	protected	under	
Article	9.Even	though	the	ECtHR	has	not	yet	explicitly	provided	a	definition	of	religion,	
it	does	 in	practice	actually	do	 so	when	determining	 secondary	 issues	 such	as	what	
constitutes	 a	 religious	 symbol	 and	what	 does	 not	 qualify	 as	 an	 “eligible”	 religious	
symbol,	 as	 well	 as	 “proper”	 forms	 of	 religious	manifestation.578	As	Malcolm	 Evans	
and	Peter	Petkoff	correctly	observe,	“one	specific	problem	area	which	emerges	from	
the	jurisprudence	of	the	ECHR	is	the	way	in	which	the	Court	combines	neutrality	with	
certain	 sociological	 and	 empirical	 patterns	 when	 considering	 what	 is	 or	 is	 not	
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religious.”579	This	 approach	 enables	 the	 ECtHR	 to	 recognise	 particular	 empirical	
occurrences	as	evidence	of	a	manifestation	of	 “religious”	belief	 in	accordance	with	
Article	9(2).580	This	may	not	only	lead	to	an	inaccurate	assessment	of	facts	as	to	what	
is	a	 religious	manifestation	and	what	 is	not,	but	also	risks	 the	ECtHR	viewing	other	
traditional	 practices	 in	 light	 of	 the	 framework	 established	 of	what	 is	 religious	 and	
what	is	not.	It	is	irrational	to	assume	that	everything	that	emerges	in	the	public	realm	
and	appears	like	an	exercise	of	“religious	freedom”	in	the	forum	externum	is	actually	
a	manifestation	of	religion.581		
Although	there	are	detailed	analyses	and	explanations	on	what	the	wording	
of	 Article	 9	 means,	 these	 explanations	 are	 not	 satisfactory582	as	 these	 are	 ad	 hoc	
explanations	 of	 what	 religion,	 belief	 and	 conscience	 are.	 The	 “notion”	 of	 religion	
itself	 is	 not	 examined	 and	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 accept	 its	 universality	 without	
empirical	 evidence.	 Scholarly	work	 on	 religion	 also	 tends	 to	 only	 problematise	 the	
lack	of	definition	and	it	 is	caught	in	the	same	kind	of	a	terminological	game	of	how	
best	to	define	religion.		
Although	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 taken	 a	 “liberal”	 approach	 to	 the	 definition	 of	
religion	 by	 considering	 claims	 concerning	 scientology583,	 druidism584,	 pacifism585,	
communism586,	atheism587,	pro-life588,	Divine	Light	Zentrum589	and	the	Moon	Sect590,	
																																								 																					
579	Ibid.,	at	206.	
580	Ibid.	
581	Malcolm	Evans	and	Peter	Petkoff,	‘A	Separation	of	Convenience?	The	Concept	of	Neutrality	in	the	
Jurisprudence	of	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’	 (2008)	Religion	State	and	Society	36(3)	205-
223,	206.	
582	For	 a	detailed	 interpretation	on	 the	wording	of	Article	9	 see	Carolyn	Evans,	Freedom	of	Religion	
under	the	European	Convention	on	human	Rights	(Oxford	University	Press	2001).	
583	X	and	Church	of	Scientology	v.	Sweden	(1978)	16	DR	68.	
584	Chappell	v.	United	Kingdom	(1987)	53	DR	241.	
585	Arrowsmith	v.	United	Kingdom	(1978)	19	DR	5.	
586	Hazar,	Hazar	and	Acik	v.	Turkey	(1991)	72	DR	200.	
587	Angelini	v.	Sweden	(1986)	51	DR	41.	
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these	definitions	remain	within	the	theological	framework	 in	terms	of	the	language	
used	and	background	explanation	even	when	secularised	language	is	employed.	This	
leads	 to	 the	 implication	 that	 although	 the	 ECtHR	 recognises	 these	 movements	 as	
forms	of	 religion,	 it	 still	does	so	through	the	prism	of	Protestant	Christianity	and	 is	
therefore	 suggesting	 that	 there	 is	 one	 true	 religion	 which	 is	 the	 benchmark	 from	
which	other	religions,	movements	or	traditions	are	assessed.			
In	addition,	the	term	“belief”	as	used	by	the	ECtHR	is	“considered	to	require	a	
worldview	 rather	 than	 a	 mere	 opinion”591	and	 is	 defined	 as	 “views	 that	 attain	 a	
certain	 level	of	cogency,	seriousness,	cohesion	and	 importance.”592	The	assumption	
appears	 to	 be	 that	 by	 giving	 diverse	 definitions	 to	 the	 word	 “belief”	 and	 by	
secularising	the	concept	as	a	“worldview”	this	would	help	the	ECtHR	to	assess	Article	
9	claims	in	a	clearer,	more	inclusive	and	more	consistent	way.	However,	all	that	the	
ECtHR	 is	doing	 is	getting	caught	 in	a	terminological	game	and	trying	to	universalise	
religion	 while	 failing	 to	 see	 religion	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 world.	 It	 is	 only	 by	
looking	 at	 religion	 as	 a	phenomenon	 in	 the	world	 that	one	 can	 see	 the	distinction	
between	 various	 religions	 and	 traditions,	 and	 Article	 9	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 its	 wider	
context.			
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that	 not	 only	 has	 the	 ECtHR	 avoided	 defining	
religion	to	some	extent	it	has	also	“avoided	addressing	Article	9	entirely.	The	ECtHR	
has	developed	its	jurisprudence	of	the	permissible	limitations	on	rights	in	the	context	
of	Articles	8,	10,	and	11,	because	Article	9	claims,	until	1993,	were	nearly	all	deemed																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
588	Plattform	‘Ärtze	für	das	Leben’	v.	Austria	(1985)	44	DR	65.	
589	Omkarananda	and	the	Divine	Light	Zentrum	v.	Switzerland	(1981)	25	DR	105.	
590	X	v.	Austria	(1981)	26	DR	89.	
591	Mark	Hill,	Russell	Sandberg	and	Norman	Doe,	Religion	and	Law	in	the	United	Kingdom,	(Kluwer	Law	
International,	Netherlands,	2011)	49.	
592	Campbell	and	Cosans	v.	United	Kingdom	EHRR	4(1982)	293.	
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inadmissible	by	the	Commission….	and	has	found	[it]	easier	to	dispose	of	many	cases	
arising	in	a	religious	context	on	these	other	grounds	because	of	the	extant	case	law	
on	addressing	those	provisions.”593	This	 includes	applications	concerning	family	 life,	
privacy,	assembly,	association,	and	freedom	of	expression.	
5.3	Are	Non-Abrahamic	Traditions	Protected	under	Article	9?	
In	 Chapter	 3	 it	 was	 established	 that	 by	 contrast	 to	 religions,	 the	manifestation	 of	
traditions	does	not	require	doctrinal	justification.	Therefore,	it	is	difficult	to	separate	
between	a	belief	and	its	manifestation	or	to	determine	the	existence	of	the	belief	in	
the	 first	 place.	 The	 act	 could	 be	 a	 mere	 tradition	 practiced	 from	 tradition.	
Consequently,	 belief	 is	 not	 a	 core	 requirement	 for	 practice	 and	 engaging	 in	 a	
tradition	does	not	need	reasoning	or	theoretical	justification	to	practice	and	uphold	
ancestral	customs.594		
A	hypothetical	example	could	be	a	person	from	an	Indian	tradition	who	wants	
to	make	an	application	to	the	ECtHR	as	he/she	has	been	prohibited	from	attending	
the	temple,	not	because	this	person	wants	to	worship	God	or	pray	in	the	temple	but	
because	 he/she	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 a	 place	 of	 energy	 to	 recharge	 with	 positive	
vibrations.595	How	 would	 this	 person	 present	 himself	 to	 the	 court	 in	 order	 to	 fit	
within	or	qualify	 for	protection	under	Article	9?	How	would	he/she	emphasise	 the	
importance	of	practice	without	reference	to	belief?	Does	this	person	qualify	to	make	
a	claim	under	Article	9?	The	 importance	of	belief	and	faith	as	opposed	to	practice,																																									 																					
593	Aaron	R.	Petty,	 ‘Religion,	Conscience,	and	Belief	 in	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’,	 (2016)	
The	 Geo.	 Wash.	 Int’l.	 L.	 Rev.	 48	 807-851,	 844.	 See	 also	 Javier	 Martnez-Torron,	 ‘Limitations	 On	
Religious	 Freedom	 In	The	Case	 Law	Of	 The	European	Court	Of	Human	Rights’,	 (2005)	 Emory	 Int'l	 L.	
Rev.	19	587-636,	595.	
594	(For	 a	 further	 analysis	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 religion	 and	 a	 tradition,	 and	 a	 belief	 and	
practice	see	Chapter	3).	
595	Sadhguru	 Jaggi	 Vasudev	 ‘Idols	 in	 the	 Hindu	way	 of	 life’,	 Isha	 foundation	 Blog,	 28	 January,	 2014	
http://blog.ishafoundation.org/yoga-meditation/demystifying-yoga/hindu-idols-gods-worship/	
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which	 has	 become	 a	 secondary	 element	 to	 faith,	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 Protestant	
Christianity,	which	 is	reflected	in	Article	9	and	in	the	way	the	 legal	system	assesses	
religious	claims.	
The	 ECtHR	 has	 attempted	 to	 preserve	 the	 traditions	 of	 non-Abrahamic	
denominations	through	the	lens	of	Protestantism.	The	importance	the	ECtHR	gives	to	
the	 forum	 internum	 is	 evident	 in	 these	 cases.	 The	 ECtHR	 found	 that	 wearing	 a	
religious	symbol	was	always	seen	as	a	manifestation	rather	than	something	related	
to	 the	 forum	 internum. 596 	The	 reluctance	 therefore	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 to	 find	
manifestations	to	be	part	of	the	forum	internum	was	explicit	in	its	judgment	in	X	v	UK.	
In	 this	 case,	 a	 Sikh	 was	 convicted	 when	 he	 refused	 to	 replace	 his	 turban	 with	 a	
helmet	 while	 driving	 a	 motorcycle.	 Compelling	 the	 applicant	 who,	 based	 on	 his	
strong	beliefs,	wore	a	turban,	to	wear	a	helmet	was	considered	a	safety	measure.		
Although	the	ECtHR	found	that	there	was	an	interference	with	the	applicant’s	
right	under	Article	9,	the	 interference	was	justified	on	grounds	of	the	protection	of	
health.597	Similarly	 in	 Phull	 v	 France,598	a	 Sikh	 applicant	 was	 asked	 to	 remove	 his	
turban	 by	 the	 French	 security	 at	 the	 airport.	 The	 applicant	 argued	 that	 his	 rights	
under	Article	9	were	infringed	as	he	had	accepted	to	be	manually	scanned	by	a	hand	
detector	and	also	walk	through	the	scanner.	In	this	case	also,	and	similar	to	the	X	v	
UK	case,	the	French	airport	security	staff	asked	the	applicant	to	remove	his	turban	in	
the	interests	of	public	safety.	The	ECtHR	held	that	health	and	safety	concerns	proved	
“a	compelling	and	proportionate	reason”	to	interfere	with	the	applicant’s	freedom	of	
																																								 																					596	For	a	further	discussion	of	the	absolute	protection	of	the	conscience	or	forum	internum	please	see	section	7.2	in	this	thesis	
597	X	v	United	Kingdom	Application	No	7992/77	14	ECtHR	1978	Dec	and	Rep	234.	
598	Phull	v	France,	Application	no.	35753/03,	11	January	2005		
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religion,	 the	case	was	therefore	declared	 inadmissible.	 	 In	Salonen	v	Finland599,	 the	
application	of	a	man	who	wanted	to	name	his	daughter	“the	one	and	only	Marjaana”	
was	 found	 inadmissible.	 While	 the	 Commission	 did	 accept	 that	 “taking	 into	
consideration	 the	 comprehensiveness	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 thought,	 this	 wish	 can	 be	
deemed	 as	 a	 thought	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 Article	 9,”600	it	 did	 not	 find	 that	 it	 was	 “a	
manifestation	 of	 any	 belief	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 some	 coherent	 view	on	 fundamental	
problems	can	be	seen	as	being	expressed	thereby.”601	
	A	 similar	 approach	was	 taken	 in	X	 v	 Germany,602	where	 a	man	wanted	 his	
ashes	 to	be	scattered	over	his	 land	as	opposed	to	being	buried	 in	a	cemetery	with	
graves	bearing	Christian	symbols	and	writings.	The	Commission	concluded	 that	 the	
desired	 action	 had	 “strong	 personal	 motivation,”	 but	 decided	 that	 it	 was	 not	
protected	by	Article	9(1).	Hence	a	personal	motivation,	no	matter	how	strongly	held,	
does	 not	 fall	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 Article	 9	 because	 it	 does	 not	 constitute	 the	
expression	of	“a	coherent	view	on	fundamental	problems”.603		
The	ECtHR	has	developed	categories	such	as	“non-belief”	and	“non-religious”	
but	 these	 are	 also	 examined	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 religion	 just	 as	 belief	 and	
religion	are.	 	When	assessing	applications	 that	 relate	 to	 these	concepts,	 the	ECtHR	
raises	questions	that	emanate	from	religious	boundaries.	The	comparator	 is	always	
religion	or	God.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	atheism	becomes	theism	in	disguise	and	
the	sociology,	psychology,	anthropology,	morality	and	political	philosophy	of	atheists	
consist	of	accounts	that	can	make	sense	only	if	one	accepts	a	number	of	deeply	held																																									 																					
599	Salonen	v	Finland	Application	no.	27868/	95	(1997)	90	DR	60.	
600	Ibid.,	at	5.	
601	Ibid.,	at	6.	
602	X	v	Germany	Application	no	8741/79	(1981)	24	DR	137.	
603	Paul	M.	Taylor,	Freedom	of	Religion:	UN	and	European	Human	Rights	Law	and	Practice	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2005)	118.	
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Christian	 assumptions.	 Consequently,	 by	 postulating	 necessary	 and	 intelligible	
connections	of	parts	of	the	world	together,	and	asking	about	“meanings”	of	certain	
phenomena,	religion	provides	a	fertile	soil	for	the	growth	and	expansion	of	science.	
In	 Bernard	 v	 Luxembourg604	for	 example,	 the	 applicants	 argued	 that	 the	
refusal	 of	 the	 National	 Council	 for	 Moral	 and	 Social	 Education	 to	 exempt	 their	
children	 from	 attending	 compulsory	moral	 and	 social	 educational	 lessons,	 violated	
their	 rights	 under	Article	 9	 of	 the	 Convention	 and	Article	 2	 of	 Protocol	No.	 1.	 The	
Commission	 held	 that	 classes	 on	 society	 and	 morality	 were	 not	 a	 form	 of	
indoctrination	and	did	not	give	rise	to	an	interference	with	Article	9	and	the	case	was	
therefore	 held	 to	 be	 inadmissible.	 The	 Commission	 noted	 that	 by	 requiring	 the	
children	 to	 attend	 the	 social	 and	moral	 education	 classes,	 the	 legislators	were	not	
seen	to	have	“failed	to	respect	the	applicant’s	philosophical	convictions,”605	without	
attempting	 to	 describe	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 convictions.	 Here	 it	 is	 important	 to	
question	 the	 extent	 to	 which	morality	 is	 distinct	 from	 religion	 and	 if	 so,	 how	 the	
ECtHR	draws	this	distinction.	(See	Chapter	3	for	a	detailed	analysis	on	the	concepts	
of	morality	and	links	to	Christianity).		
In	C.	v.	United	Kingdom,	the	ECtHR	held	that	Article	9	primarily	protects	“[t]he	
sphere	 of	 personal	 beliefs	 and	 religious	 creeds,	 i.e.	 the	 area	 which	 is	 sometimes	
called	the	forum	internum.	In	addition,	it	protects	act	which	are	intimately	linked	to	
these	attitudes,	such	as	acts	of	worship	or	devotion	which	are	aspects	of	practice	of	a	
religion	or	belief	 in	a	generally	recognised	form.”606	The	different	protection	that	 is	
given	by	 the	ECtHR	 to	practice	and	belief	 (in	other	words	 the	 forum	externum	and	
																																								 																					
604	Bernard	and	Others	v	Luxembourg,	App	No.	17187/90,	75	Eur.	Comm’n.	H.R.	Dec	&Rep.	57	(1993).	
605	Ibid.,	p.75.	
606	C.	v	the	United	Kingdom	(Application	No.	10358/83)	1983.	
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the	forum	internum607)	suggests	that	the	kind	of	religion	that	is	legally	protected	by	
the	 ECtHR	 interpreting	 and	 applying	 the	 ECHR	 is	 the	 religion	 that	 is	 “private,	
voluntary,	 textual	 and	 believed”. 608 	However	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 that	 are	
classified	as	 religions	by	 the	ECtHR	are	often	grounded	 in	bodily	practices,	physical	
objects	and	 traditions	and	do	not	 require	any	 forms	of	doctrinal,	 textual	or	 simple	
“belief”	but	are	customary	practices	that	are	inherited	from	ancestors.	
The	 term	 “belief”	 in	 ECtHR	 case	 law	 is	 “considered	 to	 require	 a	worldview	
rather	than	a	mere	opinion”609	and	was	defined	as	“views	that	attain	a	certain	level	
of	cogency,	seriousness,	cohesion	and	 importance.”610	Here	 it	 is	obvious	that	forms	
of	“mainstream	religious	beliefs	have	a	considerable	advantage	in	being	able	to	place	
one’s	 belief	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 an	 accepted	 form	 of	 religious	 belief	 since	 this	
ensures	 that	 it	will	 cross	 the	 threshold	of	 seriousness.”611	This	will	also	apply	 if	 the	
applicant	relies	upon	a	belief	of	a	non-religious	nature	from	a	well-established	school	
of	thought.	Cantwell	Smith	argues	that	outside	the	scope	of	non-Abrahamic	religions,	
the	 idea	 of	 coherent	 beliefs	 or	 the	 primacy	 of	 belief	 is	 unintelligible	 or	 alien.	
Therefore	 the	 idea	 that	 religion	 is	 composed	 of	 a	 coherent	 set	 of	 beliefs,	 as	 the	
ECtHR	 case	 law	 suggests,	 cannot	 reflect	 how	 certain	 traditions	 perceive	 the	 issue.	
Moreover,	“belief”	 is	given	a	very	abstract	wide	scope.612	This	raises	concerns	as	to																																									 																					
607	Lourdes	Peroni,	 ‘Deconstructing	 “legal”	 religion	 in	 Strasbourg’,	 (2014)	Oxford	 Journal	 of	 Law	and	
Religion	 3	 235-257	 at	 236;	 see	 also	Meadhbh	McIvor,	 ‘Carnal	 exhibitions:	material	 religion	 and	 the	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights’	(2015)	Ecc.	L.J.	17(1),	3-14.	
608	Winnifred	Sullivan,	The	Impossibility	of	Religious	Freedom	(Princeton,	NJ,	2005),	p	5.	Sullivan	writes	
of	the	American	context,	but	her	analysis	equally	applies	to	the	ECHR.			
609	Mark	Hill,	Russell	Sandberg	and	Norman	Doe,	Religion	and	Law	in	the	United	Kingdom,	(Kluwer	Law	
International,	Netherlands,	2011)	49.	
610	Campbell	and	Cosans	v.	United	Kingdom	EHRR	4(1982),	para	36.	
611	Malcolm	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Liberty	 and	 International	 law	 in	 Europe’	 	 (Cambridge	University	 Press,	
1997)	291.	
612	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 Religion	 Under	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (Oxford	
University	press,	2001)	66.	
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whether	 the	 belief	 could	 cover	 or	 include	 political	 membership	 or	 broad	 ethical	
positions.	 Carolyn	 Evans	notes	 that	 if	 belief	were	 considered	not	 through	a	 simple	
definition	but	 through	a	 range	of	 factors	 (using	a	conceptual	approach)	 this	 “could	
help	to	ensure	that	the	term	does	not	become	unduly	restrictive	or	exclusionary	of	
new	 religious	 groups,	 but	 does	 not	 become	 so	 open-ended	 that	 it	 is	 rendered	
essentially	meaningless.”613	She	 further	 suggests	 that	 belief	 should	 be	 attributed	 a	
more	protective	 and	 restrictive	meaning,	 because	 for	many	 individuals	 it	 plays	 the	
same	essential	role	in	their	lives	as	religion.614		
However,	when	belief	is	set	beyond	the	conventional	doctrinal	context	and	is	
associated	with	orthopraxy	rather	than	orthodoxy,	it	often	fails	to	qualify	as	a	belief	
protected	 under	 Article	 9.	 	 The	 belief	 must	 relate	 to	 a	 “weighty	 and	 substantial	
aspect	of	human	 life	 and	behaviour”	and	also	be	 such	as	 to	be	deemed	worthy	of	
protection	in	European	democratic	society.615	
Personal	beliefs	and	convictions	must	amount	to	more	than	“mere	opinions	
or	 deeply	 held	 feelings,”616	therefore	 belief	 is	 not	 synonymous	 with	 the	 words	
“opinions”	 or	 “ideas”.	 Furthermore,	 these	 personal	 beliefs	 should	 have	 an	
identifiable	 formal	 content;617	hence	 Article	 9	 protects	 ideas	 relating	 to	 personal	
integrity.618	However	cultural	or	 language	preferences	are	not	protected,619	and	the																																									 																					
613	Ibid.		
614	Gay	Moon	 and	 Carolyn	 Evans,	 ‘Freedom	 of	 Religion	 under	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	
Rights’	(2002)	E.H.R.L.R.	1	126-127	
615	Campbell	and	Cosans	v.	United	Kingdom,	judgment	of	25	February	[1982],	Series	A	no.	48,	at	para.	
36	
616	McFeely	v	the	United	Kingdom	(1981),	3	EHRR	161.	
617	McFeeley	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 [1980],	 20	 DR	 44;	 In	 Campbell	 and	 Cosnas	 v.	United	 Kingdom	
[1982],	Series	A	no	48,	4	EHRR	293,	40	the	ECtHR	held	that	personal	beliefs	must	“attain	a	certain	level	
of	cogency,	seriousness,	cohesion	and	importance.	
618	Arrowsmith	v.	the	United	Kingdom.	
619	Belgian	‘language’	case,	Series	A,	No.	6;	V.	Berger,	Jurisprudence	de	la	Cour	européenne	des	Droits	
de	l’Homme,	Sirey,	9th	ed.,	2004,	p.	503	and	bibliography.	
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aim	of	seeking	to	protect	a	group’s	cultural	identity,620	does	not	give	rise	to	an	issue	
under	Article	9.	
5.4	True	Religion	versus	False	Religion/Idolatry		
From	 the	 early	 religious	 division	 between	 Protestants	 and	 Catholics	 emerged	 the	
idea	of	competing	truth	claims.	The	religious	debates,	 including	 Judaism	and	 Islam,	
were	defined	based	on	the	concept	of	“truth	and	falsity”	and	religions	were	classified	
as	 true	 and	 false.	 Whether	 the	 accusation	 amongst	 these	 religions	 is	 merely	 the	
deficiency	in	worshiping	God	(the	God	of	the	Bible)	or	being	false	religions	is	not	very	
significant;	 the	 important	 feature	 is	 that	 each	 of	 these	 religions	 claim	 that	 their	
beliefs	are	true.621	The	Roman	“religions”	were	called	false	religions	by	Judaism	and	
Christianity,	and	the	Hindu	traditions	were	called	the	same	by	Christianity	and	Islam	
many	years	 later.	When	these	concepts	of	truth	and	falsity	are	analysed	in	 law	and	
by	the	ECtHR	it	is	possible	that	the	legal	systems	of	liberal	States	and	the	ECtHR	could	
stay	neutral	with	regard	to	the	“competing	truth	claims	of	each	of	these	religions.”622	
In	 other	 words,	 the	 ECtHR	 could	 stay	 at	 an	 equal	 distance	 from	 all	 religions	 with	
respect	 to	competing	“truth	claims”.	However,	 this	position	would	not	prevent	 the	
ECtHR	from	viewing	religion	as	a	matter	of	truth	or	something	that	revolves	around	
doctrinal	truth.	As	Jakob	De	Roover	says,	
“[t]he	 claim	 that	 religion	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 truth	 is	not	 an	 epistemological	
thesis	about	the	beliefs	present	in	different	religions.	Instead,	it	is	a	theological	meta-
claim	advanced	 by	 each	 of	 the	 Semitic	 religions	 about	 itself……	The	 liberal	 state	 in	
the	West	has	accepted	a	Semitic	theological	meta-claim	as	its	factual	assumption.	It																																									 																					
620	Sidiropoulos	and	others	v.	Greece,	para	41.	
621	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conflict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	15(1)	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	67-92.	
622	Ibid.	
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is	able	to	play	the	agnostic	with	respect	to	the	truth-value	of	religious	claims	because	
it	shares	the	Semitic	beliefs	about	religions.”623		
In	 The	 Impossibility	 of	 Religious	 Freedom624	Winnifred	 Sullivan	 provides	 an	
interesting	 example.	 A	 Florida	 court	 was	 to	 decide	 if	 the	 municipal	 cemetery	
regulations,	 only	 permitting	 simple	 horizontal	 grave	 markers,	 constituted	 a	
significant	burden	on	the	applicant’s	freedom	to	exercise	religion.	The	court	had	to	
decide	 whether	 the	 applicant’s	 marking	 of	 the	 graves	 with	 statues	 and	 “vertical”	
symbols	was	 actually	 religious	or	 not.	 It	 found	 that	 the	practices	undertaken	were	
not	a	religious	requirement	and	that	the	decorations	were	 individual	and	voluntary	
acts,	and	that	the	cemetery	regulations	did	not	amount	to	a	significant	obstacle	on	
the	free	exercise	of	religion.625	
From	this	 it	 can	be	concluded	 that	 some	people	are	 told	 that	parts	of	 their	
practices	are	not	actually	religious,	although	they	consider	them	to	be	religious.	This	
implies	that	courts	view	these	practices	as	secular	practices	that	are	 just	“wrongly”	
regarded	as	religious,	and	can	be	regulated	by	placing	a	limit	on	their	manifestation.		
It	is	challenging	to	assess	what	or	who	is	truly	religious	outside	the	framework	
of	 a	 particular	 religion.	 If	 one	 takes	 the	 example	 of	 the	 breaking	 of	 bread,	 “the	
question	‘Is	this	a	religious	practice?’	hardly	makes	sense	when	it	concerns	crumbling	
bread	to	feed	ducks	in	a	pond.	It	is	only	against	the	background	of	liturgical	practices	
and	theological	disputes	about	transubstantiation,	sacraments	and	the	Eucharist	that	
it	becomes	a	 sensible	and	answerable	question.”626	To	provide	an	explanation,	one	
																																								 																					
623	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conflict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1)	67-92.	
624	Winnifred	Sullivan,	The	Impossibility	of	religious	Freedom	(Princeton	university	Press,	2005).	
625	Warner	v	City	of	Boca	Raton,	64	F.	Supp.	2d	1272	(S.D.	Fla.	1999).			
626	Jakob	De	Roover	“Secular	Law	and	the	Realm	of	False	Religion”	in	Winnifred	Fallers	Sullivan,	Robert	
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needs	 to	 interpret	 the	 Scripture	 in	 a	 certain	 way	 and	 get	 involved	 in	 theological	
disputes.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 other	 situations	 and	 examples.	 Such	 cases	 tend	 to	
transform	courts	 into	“arbiters	of	religious	truth	who	cannot	but	 invoke	theological	
criteria	 to	come	to	a	decision.”627		This	 is	also	 reflected	 in	 the	 jurisprudence	of	 the	
ECtHR.		
5.5	A	Protestant-Biased	Approach:	Favouring	Orthodoxy	over	Orthopraxy		
The	 bias	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Christian	 Protestant	 faith	 is	 shown	 by	 its	
favouring	orthodoxy	over	orthopraxy.	However	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	despite	
the	 fact	 that	 all	 Abrahamic	 religions	 engage	 in	 orthopraxy	 these	 practices	 are	 the	
embodiment	 or	 expressions	 of	 beliefs,	 unlike	 the	 practices	 that	 are	 carried	 out	 by	
non-Abrahamic	 denominations,	 which	 are	 practiced	 out	 of	 tradition	 and	 have	 no	
specific	 religious	obligation	or	moral	codes.	Christians	claimed	that	practices	alone,	
without	belief,	are	a	seduction	by	the	“Devil”,	which	will	inevitably	lead	to	these	false	
paths.	The	importance	of	the	antiquity	of	a	custom	or	tradition	was	diminished	in	so	
far	as	religion	was	concerned.	Consequently,	all	the	pagan	cults,	with	their	multitude	
of	practices,	ceremonies	and	rituals,	all	these	others,	became	mere	exemplifications	
of	another	religion,	namely	a	false	one.	
	Carolyn	 Evans	 correctly	 argues	 that	 while	 “some	 religions	 .	 .	 .	 give	 great	
emphasis	to	the	beliefs	or	orthodoxy	as	the	constituting	factor	of	the	religion.	Others	
do	not	do	so	or	place	equal	emphasis	on	acting	and	belief.”628	She	further	argues	that	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
A.	Yelle	&	Mateo	Tausig-Rubbo,	eds,	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2011)	43.	
627	Ibid	at	p.	45.	
628 	Carolyn	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 freedom	 in	European	 human	 rights	law:	 the	 search	 for	 a	 guiding	
conception’	in	M	Janis	and	C	Evans	(eds),	Religion	and	International	Law	(The	Hague,	1999),	385,	396.	
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the	ECtHR	favours	“the	cerebral,	the	internal	and	the	theological	over	the	active,	the	
symbolic	and	the	moral	dimensions	of	religion	and	belief.”629			
In	a	number	of	cases,	in	order	to	for	practices	to	count	as	“manifestations”	of	
religion,	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 demanded	 that	 the	 applicants	 explicitly	 (and	 implicitly)	
conform	with	textually	religious	prescriptions	and	mandates.630	This	approach	bears	
Protestant	hallmarks.	Lori	Beaman	suggests	that	
“[t]here	is	a	tendency	when	dealing	with	religious	groups	with	which	we	are	
not	 familiar	 to	 essentialize	 them,	 often	 in	 orthodox	 ways.	 Thus,	 not	 all	 Muslims	
require	 prayer	 space,	 not	 all	 Sikhs	 wear	 kirpan,	 and	 so	 on.	 Religious	 groups	 and	
individuals	themselves	complain	that	such	essentialization	is	pushing	them	toward	an	
orthodoxy	of	practice	that	is	inappropriate.”631	
In	Kuznetsov	 v.	 Russia,	 for	 example	where	 the	 applicants	 claimed	 that	 they	
were	 unable	 to	 conduct	 religious	 meetings	 without	 being	 disrupted	 by	 the	
government,	the	ECtHR	held	that	
“Article	9	of	the	Convention	protects	acts	of	worship	and	devotion	which	are	
aspects	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 a	 religion	 or	 belief	 in	 a	 generally	 recognised	 form…	 It	 is	
undeniable	that	the	collective	study	and	discussion	of	religious	texts	by	the	members	
of	the	religious	group	of	Jehovah’s	Witnesses	was	a	recognised	form	of	manifestation	
of	their	religion	in	worship	and	teaching”.632	
																																								 																					
629	Ibid.	
630	Lourdes	Peroni,	‘The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	and	Intragroup	Religious	Diversity:	A	Critical	
Review’,	(2014)	Chicago-Kent	Law	Review	2(89)	663,	672.	
631	Lori	 G.	 Beaman,	 ‘The	 Missing	 Link:	 Tolerance,	 Accommodation	 and…Equality’	 (2012)	 Canadian	
Diversity	9	16-19,	19.	
632	Kuznetsov	v.	Russia,	Application	no.	184/02	(ECtHR	11	January,	2007)	at	para	57	(emphasis	added).	
See	section	1.13.2	in	this	thesis.	
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The	 ECtHR	 concluded	 that	 the	 applicant’s	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion	 was	
violated	and	stressed	the	importance	of	religious	texts	as	being	a	“recognised	form”	
of	 a	 religion	 or	 belief	 thus	 favouring	 and	 illustrating	 the	 importance	 of	 doctrinal	
requirements	 over	 symbols.	 This	 shows	 that	 that	 non-textual	 and	 non-doctrinal	
practices	are	not	considered	worthy	of	forming	a	religious	subject	when	compared	to	
textual	practices.		
For	example,	 in	Kovaļkovs	v	Latvia,633	Mr.	Kovaļkovs,	a	Latvian	detainee	was	
an	 adherent	 to	 Vaishnavism,	 also	 called	 the	 International	 Krishna	 Consciousness	
Society.	He	 claimed	 that	 the	 Latvian	authority	had	violated	his	 right	 to	 freedom	of	
religion	(as	enshrined	 in	Article	9)	by	restricting	his	 freedom	to	practice	his	religion	
and	by	removing	incense	sticks	from	his	cell.	His	tradition	comprised	massaging	with	
oils,	meditation,	seeking	to	light	incense	and	chanting	in	shared	cells	in	prison.		
First,	 the	government	did	not	accept	 that	he	was	a	 follower	of	Vaishnavism	
stating	 that	 since	 the	applicant	had	“participated	 in	a	distance-learning	Bible	 study	
course,” 634 	he	 was	 simply	 not	 a	 follower	 of	 Vaishnavism.	 However,	 the	 ECtHR	
recognised	Mr.	Kovaļkov’s	 religious	practice	as	a	manifestation	of	belief	and	stated	
that	 it	 “in	 no	way	 can	 a	 person’s	 choice	 to	 educate	himself	 –	 be	 it	 on	 religious	or	
other	topics	–	be	objectively	held	to	affect	that	person’s	belief	system”.635	It	saw	“no	
reason	 to	 question	 the	 genuineness	 of	 the	 applicant’s	 faith.”636		 Furthermore,	 it	
considered	that	the	“applicant’s	wish	to	pray,	to	meditate,	to	read	religious	literature	
																																								 																					
633	Kovalkovs	v	Latvia	(35021/05)	(2012)	E.Ct.	H.R.	280	(ECHR).		
634	Gatis	Kovaļkovs	v	Latvia	at	para.	57.	
635	Ibid.	
636	Ibid.	
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and	to	worship	by	burning	incense	sticks	can	be	regarded	as	motivated	or	inspired	by	
a	religion	and	not	unreasonable.”637	
But	despite	this	finding,	the	ECtHR	was	reluctant	to	protect	practices	that	had	
a	material	impact	on	its	surrounding	rather	than	an	internal	belief.	It	concluded	that	
“restricting	the	list	of	 items	permitted	for	storage	in	prison	cells	by	excluding	items	
(such	as	incense	sticks)	which	are	not	essential	for	manifesting	a	prisoner’s	religion	is	
a	 proportionate	 response	 to	 the	 necessity	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 of	
others”. 638 It	 is	 clearly	 evident	 from	 the	 ECtHR’s	 decision	 that	 materialistic	
requirements	to	practice	a	religion	are	seen	as	secondary	to	the	manifestation	of	the	
religion.	It	did	not	consider	that	smell	and	music	to	be	a	central	part	of	Mr.	Kovaļkovs’	
religion,	 and	 his	 “religion”	 could	 be	manifested	without	 these	 requirements.	 Even	
though	 the	 ECtHR	 considered	 that	 the	wish	 to	 pray	 and	 meditate,	 coming	 within	
Article	 9(1)	was	 not	 unreasonable,	 it	 did	 consider	 other	materialistic	 requirements	
unessential	 to	 the	manifestation	of	 the	 applicant’s	 religion.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 on	what	
basis	or	benchmark	the	ECtHR	is	able	to	assess	the	reasonableness	of	the	claim.	If	it	
were	claiming	that	the	wish	to	pray,	to	meditate,	to	read,	etc.	was	not	unreasonable,	
why	 would	 it	 find	 that	 it	 was	 unessential	 or	 unnecessary?	 The	 ECtHR	 could	 have	
simply	noted	 that	“the	burning	of	 incense	sticks	 typically	creates	a	powerful	odour	
which	 is	 not	 pleasant	 to	 everyone	 and	 which	 might	 be	 disturbing	 to	 other	
prisoners.”639	
																																								 																					
637	Ibid.,	at	60	(emphasis	added).	
638	Gatis	Kovaļkovs	v	Latvia	at	68	(Emphasis	added).	
639	Ibid.,	at	68.	
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By	 contrast,	 in	Kuznetsov	 v.	 Russia,	where	 the	 applicants	 claimed	 that	 they	
were	 unable	 to	 conduct	 religious	 meetings	 without	 being	 disrupted	 by	 the	
government,	the	ECtHR	held	that	
“Article	9	of	the	Convention	protects	acts	of	worship	and	devotion	which	are	
aspects	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 a	 religion	 or	 belief	 in	 a	 generally	 recognised	 form…	 It	 is	
undeniable	that	the	collective	study	and	discussion	of	religious	texts	by	the	members	
of	the	religious	group	of	Jehovah’s	Witnesses	was	a	recognised	form	of	manifestation	
of	their	religion	in	worship	and	teaching”.640	
The	 ECtHR	 concluded	 that	 the	 applicant’s	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion	 was	
violated	and	stressed	the	importance	of	religious	texts	as	being	a	“recognised	form”	
of	 a	 religion	 or	 belief	 thus	 favouring	 and	 illustrating	 the	 importance	 of	 doctrinal	
requirements	 over	 symbols.	 This	 shows	 that	 that	 non-textual	 and	 non-doctrinal	
practices	are	not	considered	worthy	of	forming	a	religious	subject	when	compared	to	
textual	practices.		
This	 is	 also	 illustrated	 in	 the	 judgment	 in	 Jones	 v	 UK	 where	 the	 applicant	
requested	 that	a	photograph	be	engraved	on	a	memorial	 stone	and	placed	on	 the	
grave	 of	 his	 daughter.641	The	 ECtHR	 found	 that	 the	 restricting	 the	 applicant	 from	
placing	an	engraved	stone	on	his	daughter’s	grave	did	not	constitute	an	interference	
with	his	 rights	under	 the	Convention.	 It	 held	 that	 the	 application	was	 inadmissible	
holding	that	the	decision	to	refuse	granting	permission	to	place	a	photograph	on	the	
memorial,	 “cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	 preventing	 any	manifestation	 of	 the	 applicant’s	
religious	beliefs	 in	the	sense	protected	by	this	provision….	 it	cannot	be	argued	that	
																																								 																					
640	Kuznetsov	v.	Russia,	Application	no.	184/02	(ECtHR	11	January,	2007)	at	para	57	(emphasis	added).	
See	section	1.13.2	in	this	thesis.	
641	Victor	Jones	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	Application	no.	42639/04,	13	September	2005	(Inadmissible).	
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the	applicant’s	beliefs	required	a	photograph	on	the	memorial	or	that	he	could	not	
properly	pursue	his	religion	and	worship	without	permission	for	such	a	photograph	
being	given.”642			
In	X.	v.	 the	United	Kingdom,	 the	applicant,	a	Buddhist	prisoner,	was	refused	
permission	to	send	out	articles	to	be	published	in	a	Buddhist	magazine.	He	claimed	
that	 his	 rights	 under	 Article	 9	 were	 infringed.	 The	 Commission	 noted	 that	 the	
applicant,	 “has	 produced	 statements	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 communication	with	 other	
Buddhists	is	an	important	part	of	his	religious	practice.	But	he	has	failed	to	prove	that	
it	was	a	necessary	part	of	 this	practice	 that	he	should	publish	articles	 in	a	religious	
magazine.”643	The	 applicant’s	 complaint	 was	 therefore	 found	 to	 be	 manifestly	 ill	
founded.		
Similarly,	in	Austrianu	v.	Romania,	the	applicant	claimed	that	the	confiscation	
of	his	religious	audiotapes	and	cassette	player	by	the	prison	authorities	infringed	his	
right	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 Article	 9.	 The	 government	 argued	 that	 “the	
confiscation	by	 the	prison	authorities	of	 the	 cassette	player	 the	applicant	 received	
from	 the	national	 civil	 assistance	 centre	 for	 prisons	 could	not	be	 considered	 as	 an	
infringement	 of	 his	 freedom	 of	 religion	 as	 he	 could	 have	 continued	 his	 religious	
instruction	 by	 correspondence	 and	 by	 attending	 the	 activities	 organised	 by	 the	
prison.”644	
The	ECtHR	noted	that	his	freedom	of	religion	guaranteed	by	Article	9	was	not	
infringed	 since	 “the	 confiscation	 of	 the	 cassette	 was	 not	 such	 as	 to	 completely	
																																								 																					
642	Ibid.,	at	3	(Emphasis	added).	
643	X.	v.	United	Kingdom,	App.	No.	5442/72,		(1974)	1	Eur.	Comm’n	H.R.	Dec.	&	Rep.	41,	42	(emphasis	
added).	
644	Austrianu	v.	Romania,	Application	no.	16117/02	(2013)	para	101.	
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prevent	him	from	manifesting	his	religion.”645	Moreover,	it	found	that	restricting	the	
list	of	 items	prisoners	could	have	 in	their	cells	by	excluding	 items	(such	as	cassette	
players)	 “which	 are	 not	 essential	 for	 manifesting	 religion”	 was	 a	 proportionate	
response	 to	 the	 necessity	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 of	 others	 and	 to	
maintain	security	in	prison.646		
The	 ECtHR	 also	 stipulated	 that,	 “although	 the	 applicant	 contested	 the	
existence	of	a	cultural-educational	 facility	 in	prison	 it	appears	 that	he	did	not	 raise	
any	complaint	 in	 this	 respect	with	 the	prison’s	authorities.	Moreover,	he	had	been	
allowed	to	attend	religious	seminars,	and	the	fact	that	he	could	read	religious	books	
in	his	cell	was	never	contested.”647	
Since	 the	 applicant	 was	 not	 prevented	 from	 reading	 religious	 books,	
attending	 religious	 seminars	 and	 maintaining	 his	 religious	 instruction	 by	
correspondence,	 according	 to	 the	 ECtHR,	 his	 right	 to	 manifest	 his	 belief	 was	 not	
prevented	 and	 consequently	 not	 infringed	 even	 though	 the	 cassette	 player	 was	
confiscated.	His	“options”	to	write	and	read	were	found	to	meet	his	religious	needs.	
This	is	a	clear	illustration	of	the	doctrinal	approach	to	religion	that	the	ECtHR	applies	
which	is	similar	to	the	Protestant	ideology	on	icons	and	rituals	which	is	“suspicious	of	
the	kinds	of	sensual	worship	that	the	Protestant	reformers	might	have	dismissed	as	
indulgently	ritualistic,	and	is	wary	of	the	‘chanting	and	loud	clamour’	that	they	might	
have	 thought	 to	 be	 lacking	 in	 ‘true	 devotion’.”648	The	 engagement	 with	 textual	
doctrines	is	considered	more	significant	than	the	use	of	non-	textual	practices,	which	
																																								 																					
645	Ibid.,	at	104.	
646	Ibid.,	at	106	(emphasis	added).	
647	Ibid.,	at	105	(emphasis	added).	
648	Méadhbh	McIvor,	 ‘Carnal	exhibitions:	material	religion	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’	
(2015)	Ecc.	L.J.	17(1),	3-14,	6.	
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as	 in	 the	 judgment	 in	Austrianu,	were	not	considered	to	have	religious	significance	
since	the	ECtHR	allowed	the	confiscation	of	the	cassette	player	but	not	the	books.649	
For	 example	 in	 Förderkreis	 E.V.	 and	 Others	 v.	 Germany650	the	 applicants	
associations	were	“religious”,	or	meditation	associations	that	belonged	to	the	Osho	
Movement.	The	applicants	complained	that	the	government	 infringed	their	right	to	
manifest	 their	 “religion”	 under	 Article	 9,	 thereby	 identifying	 the	 movement	 as	
religion	 to	 be	 able	 to	 fit	 into	 Article	 9.	 The	 applicants	 were	 described	 as	 “sects”,	
“youth	 sects”,	 “youth	 religions”,	 “psycho-sects”,	 and	 “psycho-groups”	 or	 given	
similar	 labels	 and	 a	 campaign	 was	 launched	 by	 the	 German	 Government	 to	 draw	
attention	to	the	possible	dangers	of	such	groups	and	protect	the	“human	dignity”651	
of	 its	citizens.	The	applicants	requested	that	 the	Government	stop	describing	them	
using	 these	 terms.	 The	main	 concern	 “was	 the	potential	 danger	 that	 these	 groups	
could	 pose	 to	 adolescents’	 personal	 development	 and	 social	 relations...”652 	The	
applicants	 complained	 that	 the	 Government’s	 negative	 expressions	 breached	 their	
right	 to	 freedom	of	 religion,	mainly	manifestation.	 The	 applicants	 further	 objected	
that	the	government’s	campaign	had	an	undoubtedly	“negative	connotation	and	had	
been	 made	 in	 a	 climate	 of	 interference	 and	 oppression	 by	 the	 State	 and	 the	
mainstream	churches,	and	had	effectively	prevented	them	from	exercising	their	right	
to	freedom	of	religion.”653	
The	ECtHR	held	that	
																																								 																					
649	Ibid.,	at	6.	
650	Leela	Förderkreis	E.V.	and	others	v.	Germany,	Application	No.	58911/00	(2009)	at	para	7.	
651	Ibid.,	at	76.	
652	Ibid.,	at	7.	
653	Ibid.,	at	71.	
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“[t]he	 remaining	 terms,	 notably	 the	 naming	 of	 the	 applicant	 associations’	
groups	as	“sects”	,	“youth	sects”	or	“psycho-sects”,	even	if	they	had	a	pejorative	note,	
were	used	at	the	material	time	quite	indiscriminately	for	any	kind	of	non-mainstream	
religion.”654		
Although	 the	 ECtHR	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 “terms	 used	 to	 describe	 the	
applicant	 associations’	 movement	 may	 have	 had	 negative	 consequences	 for	
them,”655	it	 held	 that	 “the	 Government’s	 warnings	 were	 to	 provide	 information	
capable	 of	 contributing	 to	 a	 debate	 in	 a	 democratic	 society	 on	 matters	 of	 major	
public	concern	at	the	relevant	time	and	to	draw	attention	to	the	dangers	emanating	
from	 groups	which	were	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 sects.”656	The	 ECtHR	 noted	 that	
the	Government	failed	to	remain	neutral	when	it	started	the	information	campaign	
and	used	 the	negative	 expressions,	which	has	 resulted	 in	 an	 interference	with	 the	
applicant	 associations’	 rights	 under	 Article	 9(1).	 However,	 the	 ECtHR	 found	 the	
interference	 to	be	 “prescribed	by	 law”	and	pursued	a	 “legitimate	aim”	namely	 the	
protection	 of	 public	 safety	 and	 public	 order	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 and	
freedoms	 of	 others.	Moreover,	 the	 ECtHR	 stipulated	 that	 the	 protection	 of	 others	
and	public	safety	was	a	 legitimate	aim	although	no	proof	was	submitted	as	to	how	
these	 “sects”	 could	 be	 a	 threat	 or	 danger	 to	 society.	 	 It	 further	 observed	 that	 “a	
power	 of	 preventive	 intervention	 on	 the	 State’s	 part	 is	 also	 consistent	 with	 the	
Contracting	Parties’	positive	obligations	under	Article	1	of	the	Convention	to	secure	
the	rights	and	freedoms	of	persons	within	their	jurisdiction.”657		
																																								 																					
654	Leela	 Förderkreis	 E.V.	 and	 others	v.	 Germany,	 Application	 No.	 58911/00	 (2009)	 at	 para	 100	
(emphasis	added).	
655	Ibid.,	84.	
656	Ibid.,	94.	
657	Ibid.,	at	99.	
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The	 ECtHR	 stated	 that	 the	 terms,	 “sects”,	 “youth	 sects”	 or	 “psycho-sects”,	
were	used	at	the	material	time	quite	indiscriminately	for	any	kind	of	non-mainstream	
religion.658	In	her	partly	dissenting	opinion,	Judge	Kalaydjieva	held	that	although	the	
majority	 in	 this	 case	 indicated	 that	 “the	 States	 are	 entitled	 to	 verify	 whether	 a	
movement	or	association	carries	on,	ostensibly	in	pursuit	of	religious	aims,	activities	
which	are	harmful	to	the	population	or	to	public	safety”659	she	drew	attention	to	the	
fact	that	the	ECtHR	in	its	judgment	in	of	Manoussakis	v.	Greece	held	that	the	right	to	
freedom	of	 religion	“excludes	any	discretion	on	 the	part	of	 the	State	 to	determine	
whether	 religious	 beliefs	 or	 the	 means	 used	 to	 express	 such	 beliefs	 are	
legitimate.”660		
It	is	clear	that	in	its	judgment	in	Förderkreis	E.V.	and	Others	v.	Germany,	the	
ECtHR	looked	at	non-Abrahamic	traditions	as	some	kind	of	a	“form”	of	religion	but	a	
false	 one	 with	 idolatrous	 practices	 and	 it	 therefore	 found	 lawful	 the	 portrayal	 of	
negative	 stereotypes	 about	 them.	 It	 could	 easily	 be	 concluded	 from	 this	 judgment	
that	the	ECtHR	regarded	sects	to	be	a	“bad	thing”.661	It	is	not	clear	on	what	grounds	
the	ECtHR	determined	that	these	sects	were	not	true	religion.	Evidently	there	was	a	
comparator	and	this	comparator	was	the	mainstream	religions.		
Here	the	concept	of	truth	and	falsity	has	played	a	role	allowing	the	ECtHR	to	
indirectly	 consider	 these	 traditions	 or	 cultures	 as	 “false”	 religions	 leading	 to	 the	
conclusion	that	taking	preventive	measures	by	the	Government	to	protect	its	citizens	
from	 such	 sects	 is	 acceptable.	 Again	 the	 ECtHR	 is	 privileging	 and	 granting	 more	
																																								 																					
658	Ibid.,	at	100.	
659	Ibid,	Partly	dissenting	opinion	of	Judge	Kalaydjieva	at	p.	30.	
660	Manoussakis	v.	Greece,	at	para.	47.	
661	Bernadette	Rainey,	Elizabeth	Wicks,	Clare	Ovey,	Jacobs,	White	and	Ovey:	The	European	Convention	
on	Human	Rights,	7th	ed.	(Oxford	University	press,	2017)	474.	
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protection	 to	Abrahamic	 religions	over	cultures	or	 traditions.	The	ECtHR	concluded	
that	pejorative	words	are	appropriate	to	be	used	 in	relation	to	any	non-Abrahamic	
“religions”	because	these	traditions	are	false	as	there	can	only	be	one	true	God	one	
true	 doctrine	 and	 therefore	 one	 truth.	 The	 ECtHR	 is	 reproducing	 the	 Protestant	
theology	of	“false”	religion,	and	claiming	that	these	traditions	could	potentially	be	a	
danger	 to	 public	 order	 as	 they	 are	 “false”	 and	 therefore	 a	 “preventive	
intervention”662 	is	 needed.	 In	 today’s	 secularised	 language	 the	 ECtHR	 calls	 this	
prevention	 to	 secure	 public	 order	 and	 public	 safety,	 in	 the	 past	 this	 was	 called	
prevention	of	idolatry	and	false	religion.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 that	Calvin	did	not	 reject	Catholicism	by	saying	 that	
the	 Roman	 Catholic	 Church	was	 not	 “really”	 Catholic,	 but	 by	 calling	 it	 the	 “Devil’s	
church.”	It	was	in	the	name	of	Christianity	that	Calvin	rejected	Catholicism.	
When	“secular”	law	ends	up	verifying	the	religiosity	of	certain	practices,	this	
leads	 to	 the	 law	 losing	 its	 own	 secularity.	 When	 tracing	 the	 history	 of	 such	
assessments	 (whether	 an	act	 is	 truly	 religious	or	not)	 one	goes	back	 to	 the	 typical	
characterisation	 of	 the	 Protestant	 notions	 on	 idolatry,	where	 idolatry	was	 seen	 as	
imposing	some	sort	of	choice	and	human	inventions	that	are	not	necessarily	required	
by	 religion	 or	 not	 necessarily	 religious.	 As	 Gunn	 correctly	 notes,	 the	 concept	 and	
definition	of	 religion	under	 the	 legal	 systems	“may	not	 simply	be	neutral,	but	may	
contain	 an	 inappropriate	 societal	 value	 judgment	 regarding	 particular	 beliefs	 or	
actions	with	“good”	beliefs	being	characterised	as	“religions”	and	“bad”	beliefs	being	
characterised	as	“cults”	or	“heresies.”663		
																																								 																					
662	Ibid.,	at	99.	
663	T.	Jeremy	Gunn,	‘The	Complexity	of	Religion	and	the	Definition	of	“Religion”	in	International	Law’	
(2003)	Harvard	Human	Rights	Journal	16	189-215	at	197.	
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While	the	terminology	of	idolatry	or	false	religion	is	not	used	in	courts	today,	
the	 results	 are	 similar	 when	 secular	 courts	 have	 to	 decide	 on	 what	 constitutes	 a	
religion.	 It	 is	often	held	that	 legally	speaking,	 these	certain	beliefs	or	practices	that	
are	 considered	 religious	 by	 certain	 individuals	 are	 personal	 preferences	 or	 human	
inventions	 thus	 they	 are	 not	 truly	 religious.664	Moreover,	 even	 though	 nowadays	
pagan	traditions	and	practices	are	not	referred	to	as	 idolatrous	or	embodiments	of	
false	religions,	in	our	“modern”	era,	the	classification	of	certain	religions	and	cultures	
as	false	or	idolatrous	is	now	referred	to	as	not	only	practices	that	do	not	account	to	
be	religious	but	also	“violators	of	human	rights	law,	gender	equality	and	the	rule	of	
law.”665			
For	example,	the	principle	of	equality	in	Islamic	law	and	tradition	is	regarded	
as	discriminatory	against	women.	Sultanhussein	Tabandeh	argues	that	Islam	cannot	
accept	some	aspects	of	the	UDHR	particularly	Articles	2	and	18	since	“it	cannot	deny	
the	difference	between	a	Muslim	and	a	non-Muslim.”666	This	approach	towards	Islam	
is	 also	 evident	 from	 the	 ECtHR’s	 decision	 in	 Sahin	 v	 Turkey	 when	 the	 ECtHR	
concluded	that	the	headscarf	is	“imposed	on	women	by	a	religious	precept	that	was	
hard	 to	 reconcile	with	 the	principle	 of	 gender	 equality.”667	The	 same	was	noted	 in	
Dahlab	v	Switzerland.	It	is	thus	questionable	whether	the	ECtHR	regards	the	veil	ban	
to	 promote	 gender	 equality,	 and	 whether	 this	 approach	 amounts	 to	 negative	
stereotyping	of	non-Christian	faiths.																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
	
664	Jakob	De	Roover	“Secular	Law	and	the	Realm	of	False	Religion”	in	Winnifred	Fallers	Sullivan,	Robert	
A.	Yelle	&	Mateo	Tausig-Rubbo,	eds,	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2011)	43.	
665	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP	45(1)	58-75		
666	Sultanhussein	Tabandeh,	A	Muslim	Commentary	on	the	Universal	Declaration	on	Human	Rights,	(F.	
J.	Goulding	1970)	20.		
667Leyla	Sahin	v.	Turkey	[2005],	No.	44774/98	at	para	[111]	See	also	Dahlab	v	Switzerland	[2001]	No.	
42393/98.	
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 might	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 made	 a	 step	
forward	 in	 its	 judgment	 in	 S.A.S.	 v	 France	 and	 dismissed	 “gender	 equality”	 as	 a	
reason	noting	that	a	State	“cannot	invoke	gender	equality	in	order	to	ban	a	practice	
that	is	defended	by	women	–	such	as	the	applicant	–	in	the	context	of	the	exercise	of	
the	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 those	 provisions,	 unless	 it	 were	 to	 be	 understood	 that	
individuals	 could	 be	 protected	 on	 that	 basis	 from	 the	 exercise	 of	 their	 own	
fundamental	rights	and	freedoms.”668	However,	the	ECtHR	did	accept	that	the	veil	is	
a	barrier	to	the	notion	of	living	together.		
How	 these	 ideas	 have	 come	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 human	 rights	 violation	 and	
discrimination	is	clear.	The	Bible	states	that	“there	is	neither	Jew	nor	Greek,	there	is	
neither	 slave	 nor	 free,	 there	 is	 no	male	 and	 female,	 for	 you	 are	 all	 one	 in	 Christ	
Jesus.” 669 	As	 Zachary	 Calo	 convincingly	 notes,	 “[t]he	 idea	 of	 human	 rights,	
particularly	 the	 underlying	 idea	 of	 human	 dignity,	 is	 replete	 with	 echoes	 of	 the	
sacred.”670	And	 that	 it	 is	 “doubtful	 that	 the	universal	 claims	of	 human	 rights	 could	
have	emerged	without	religious	traditions	and	concepts.”671	
5.6	Distortions	under	the	ECtHR	
Early	 ideas	 of	 Christian	 freedom	 and	 freedom	 of	 the	 Church	 have,	 over	 time,	
transformed	political	theology	into	political	and	legal	theory.	As	Rudolph	Sohm	states,	
"Luther's	Reformation	was	a	renewal	not	only	of	faith	but	also	of	the	world:	both	the	
																																								 																					
668	SAS.	V	France	at	para	119.	
669	The	Bible,	Galatians	3:28.	
670	Zachary	R.	Calo,	‘Religion,	Human	Rights,	and	Post-Secular	Legal	Theory,’	(2011)	ST.	JOHN’S	L.	REV.		
85	495,	495.	For	further	explanation	on	the	origins	of	human	rights	see	section	4.2	in	this	thesis.	
671	Ibid.,	at	496.	For	a	detailed	analysis	on	the	link	between	Christianity	and	human	rights	see	sections	
4.3	and	4.5	in	this	thesis.	
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world	 of	 spiritual	 life	 and	 the	 world	 of	 law.”672	The	 conceptual	 structure	 of	 this	
political	thought	divided	the	world	into	two	separate	realms,	that	being	the	spiritual	
and	 the	 temporal.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 division,	 a	 complex	 political	 theory	 was	
generated,	which	“viewed	the	relations	between	governors	and	subjects	in	terms	of	
the	 rapport	 between	 the	 spiritual	 and	 temporal	 kingdoms.	 The	 result	 was	 the	
political	 theology	of	 the	two	kingdoms.”673	As	a	 result	of	 freeing	the	Christian	 from	
spiritual	 laws,	 the	notion	of	 the	 liberty	of	conscience	surfaced,	which	soon	became	
the	foundation	for	the	concept	of	toleration	in	early	modern	Europe.674	The	political	
theology	 of	 the	 two	 kingdoms	 turned	 the	 Protestant	 idea	 of	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	
human	 soul	 from	 the	 spiritual	 laws,	 into	 a	 strong	 foundation	 for	 the	 toleration	 of	
religious	 oppositions.675	As	 a	 result,	 Christian	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 became	 the	
ground	 from	which	 to	 challenge	 the	 authorities	 and	 thus	when	 the	 temporal	 laws	
infringed	on	the	conscience	and	faith	they	will	be	resisted	legitimately.676		
This	 is	 reflected	 in	 national677	as	 well	 as	 European	 legal	 and	 human	 rights	
instruments.	But	judgments	of	the	ECtHR	concerning	Article	9	reveal	a	confused	and	
narrow	approach	to	this	freedom	particularly	in	relation	to	manifestation.	This	makes	
it	 difficult	 for	 people	 outside	 the	 traditional	 European	 understanding	 of	 religious	
practice	 to	 make	 an	 application	 relying	 on	 Article	 9678	without	 distortion	 and	 the	
ability	 to	maintain	 that	 their	 practices	 are	 non-doctrinal	 but	 rather	 customary	 and																																									 																					
672	Rudolph	Sohm,	Weltliches	and	Geistliches	Recht,	(Munich	and	Leipzig	1914),	69.	Quoted	in	Harold	J.	
Berman,	 ‘The	Influence	of	Christianity	upon	the	Development	of	Law’,	(1959)	Oklahoma	Law	Review	
12(86)	86-101,	94.	
673	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	107.	
674	Ibid.,	at	108.	
675	Ibid.,	at	155.	
676	Ibid.,	at	109.	
677	US	first	Amendment.		
678	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	167.	
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based	on	tradition.	Hence	restrictions	on	the	manifestation	of	religion	of	adherents	
of	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions,	 that	 do	 not	 require	 any	 doctrinal	 justification	 for	 the	
manifestation	of	the	practice,	are	more	easily	imposed.		
For	example,	in	Jakóbski	v	Poland	679	the	ECtHR	held	that	the	refusal	to	offer	a	
Buddhist	 a	 meat-free	 diet	 in	 prison	 infringed	 his	 rights	 under	 Article	 9	 of	 the	
Convention.	The	ECtHR	held	that		
“Buddhism	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world's	 major	 religions	 officially	 recognised	 in	
numerous	countries.	In	addition,	it	has	already	held	that	observing	dietary	rules	can	
be	considered	a	direct	expression	of	beliefs	in	practice	in	the	sense	of	Article	9…..	In	
the	 present	 case	 the	 applicant	 requested	 to	 be	 provided	 with	 a	 meat-free	 diet	
because	as	a	practising	Buddhist	he	wished	to	avoid	eating	meat.	Without	deciding	
whether	such	decisions	are	taken	in	every	case	to	fulfil	a	religious	duty,	as	there	may	
be	 situations	 where	 they	 are	 taken	 for	 reasons	 other	 than	 religious	 ones,	 in	 the	
present	 case	 the	 Court	 considers	 that	 the	 applicant's	 decision	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	
vegetarian	diet	can	be	regarded	as	motivated	or	 inspired	by	a	religion	and	was	not	
unreasonable.	Consequently,	the	refusal	of	the	prison	authorities	to	provide	him	with	
a	vegetarian	diet	falls	within	the	scope	of	Article	9	of	the	Convention.”680		
The	 Polish	 government	 argued	 that	 “Buddhism	 generally	 did	 not	 prohibit	
eating	meat	and	vegetarianism	was	not	required	nor	did	it	constitute	an	element	of	
the	 Buddhist	 religion….	 They	 further	 submitted….that	 even	 the	 strict	 Mahayana	
school	to	which	the	applicant	declared	his	adherence	only	encouraged	vegetarianism																																									 																					
679	See	Jakóbski	v	Poland	[2010]	ECHR	1974,	(2012)	55	EHRR	8.	(App	no	18429/06,	7	December	2010.)	
at	para	[45].	
680 	Jakóbski	 v	 Poland	 Application	 no.	18429/06	 (2011)	 at	 para	 45	 See	 also	 Vartic	 v.	 Romania	
Application	no.	14150/08	(2014)	(emphasis	added).	
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and	 did	 not	 prescribe	 it.	 For	 these	 reasons	 only	 some	Mahayana	 Buddhists	 were	
vegetarians.”681	By	contrast	the	applicant	argued	that,		
“Buddhism	 was	 a	 path	 of	 life	 in	 which	 the	 individual	 was	 supposed	 to	
recognise	himself	and	develop	self-awareness.	A	Buddhist	was	supposed	to	improve	
his	spiritual	life,”682		
The	ECtHR	maintained	its	ad	hoc	understanding	of	what	a	religion	is	and	held:	
“Buddhism	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world's	 major	 religions	 officially	 recognised	 in	
numerous	countries.	In	addition,	it	has	already	held	that	observing	dietary	rules	can	
be	considered	a	direct	expression	of	beliefs	in	practice	in	the	sense	of	Article	9.”683		
Although	the	outcome	of	the	Jakóbski	case	is	to	be	welcomed,	as	despite	the	
Polish	government’s	claims,	that	offering	special	 food	for	detainees	would	 invoke	a	
lot	 of	 financial	 and	 technical	 difficulties,	 a	 violation	 of	 Article	 9	 was	 found,	 the	
problem	lies	in	how	the	ECtHR	justified	the	protection	and	the	language	it	used.	The	
ECtHR	ruled	that	
		 “[t]he	applicant’s	decision	to	adhere	to	a	vegetarian	diet	can	be	regarded	as	
motivated	 or	 inspired	 by	 a	 religion	 and	 was	 not	 unreasonable.	 Consequently,	 the	
refusal	of	the	prison	authorities	to	provide	him	with	a	vegetarian	diet	falls	within	the	
scope	of	Article	9	of	the	Convention.”684	
In	 the	 views	 of	 Saïla	Ouald-Chaib	 and	 Lourdes	 Peroni,	 the	 ECtHR	 “adopts	 a	
more	 accommodating	 approach	 towards	 religious	 minorities’	 specific	 needs.	 This	
																																								 																					
681	Jakóbski	v	Poland,	App.	No.	18429/06,	(2010)	Eur.	Ct.	H.R.,	at	para	38.	
682	Ibid	at	para.	35.	
683	Ibid.	(emphasis	added).	
684	Jakóbski	v	Poland,	App.	No.	18429/06,	(2010)	Eur.	Ct.	H.R.,	at	9,	10.[Emphasis	added].	
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stands	in	contrast	to	the	usual	hands-off	stance	adopted	in	most	of	its	prior	case	law,	
when	confronted	with	the	accommodation	of	religious	minorities’	concerns.”685		
In	Jakóbski	for	example,	the	ECtHR	did	not	grant	the	applicant	the	right	to	his	
meat-free	diet	because	 it	was	 simply	 the	applicant’s	decision	not	 to	eat	meat,	 but	
specifically	because	his	diet	preferences	were	inspired	and	motivated	by	religion,	and	
therefore	 supposed	 to	 follow	a	 religion.	He	won	his	application	because	 the	Polish	
authorities	failed	to	strike	a	fair	balance	between	his	interests	and	that	of	the	prison	
administration,	“namely	the	right	to	manifest	his	religion	through	observance	of	the	
rules	of	the	Buddhist	religion.”686	
The	ECtHR	often	directly	or	indirectly	compels	individuals	to	find	“meaningful”	
and	doctrinal	proofs	for	their	actions	and	“practical”	decisions	in	terms	of	“scientific”	
or	doctrinal	reasons.	Therefor	its	judgments	are	founded	on	“scientific”	or	doctrinal	
“truth”	(that	is,	the	hypotheses	which	are	dominant	at	that	particular	point	of	time).	
Thus,	the	search	for	the	meaning	or	doctrinal	evidence	of	the	practice	becomes	the	
ultimate	 adjudicator	 in	 decisions	 regarding	 traditions.	Accordingly,	 when	 an	
interference	with	a	certain	 tradition	or	 custom	 is	 challenged	before	 the	ECtHR,	 the	
applicant	has	to	give	good	doctrinal	and	meaningful	reasons	 in	order	to	defend	the	
importance	and	relevance	of	the	practice	using	religious	concepts	and	terminology.	
As	 Balagangadhara	 notes	 “by	 thematizing	 [tradition]	 as	 [a]	 belief-guided	 and	
theoretically	 founded	 set	 of	 practices,	 the	 very	 terms	 of	 description	 [are	
																																								 																					
685	Saïla	 Ouald-Chaib	 and	 Lourdes	 Peroni,	 ‘Jakόbski	 v.	 Poland:	 Is	 the	 Court	 Opening	 the	 Door	 to	
Reasonable	Accommodation?’	 Strasbourg	 Observers	 blog,	 8,	 December,	 2010,	 available	 at	
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/12/08/jak%CF%8Cbski-v-poland-is-the-court-opening-the-
door-to-reasonable-accommodation/[last	accessed	April	2018].	
686	Ibid	at	para.	54.	
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transformed].	 Practical	 certainties	 are	 provided	with	 something	 they	 never	 had	 or	
never	needed:	a	theoretical	foundation.”687		
	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 consideration	 of	 Jakobski	 above,	 further	 examples	 are	
provided	in	this	section	to	show	how	applicants	describe	and	distort	their	traditions	
so	as	to	be	recognised	in	the	legal	system.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	ECtHR	has	taken	
a	wide	approach	as	to	what	constitutes	a	religion	or	belief.688	However,	 in	practice,	
followers	 of	 non-Abrahamic	 beliefs	 and	 “religions”	 have	 to	 prove	 that	 religion	 or	
belief	 actually	 exists	when	presenting	 their	 case	 to	 the	 ECtHR.689	In	X	 v	 the	United	
Kingdom690	for	 example,	 the	 applicant	 was	 a	 prisoner	 who	 requested	 the	 prison	
Governor	 to	 be	 registered	 as	 a	 follower	 of	 the	 “Wicca”	 religion.	 His	 request	 was	
refused	and	the	applicant	had	to	prove	that	Wicca	was	a	religion	but	failed	to	do	so.	
According	 to	 the	Commission,	 the	 applicant	 failed	 to	mention	 “any	 facts	making	 it	
possible	to	establish	the	existence	of	the	Wicca	religion.”691	The	Commission	further	
noted	that	facilities	that	come	with	registering	a	prisoner	to	a	religion	could	only	be	
granted	“if	the	religion	to	which	the	prisoner	allegedly	adheres	is	identifiable.”692	As	
Jeremy	Gunn	notes,	the	European	Commission	has	always	denied	applications	from	
religions	 that	 could	 be	 called	 “new”,	 “minority”	 and	 “non-traditional.”” 693 	It	 is	
therefore	not	 clear	what	 type	of	 evidence	or	 facts	 the	Commission	was	 seeking	 in	
																																								 																					
687	S.N.	Balagangadhara,	The	Heathen	in	His	Blindness….	Asia,	the	West,	and	the	Dynamic	of	Religion	
(first	published	1994,	2nd	edn,	New	Delhi:	Manohar	2005)	330	
688	See	section	6.2	in	this	thesis.	
689	Paul	M.	Taylor,	Freedom	of	Religion:	UN	and	European	Human	Rights	Law	and	Practice	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2005)	118-119	
690	X.	v.	United	Kingdom,	Application	No.	7291/75	(1977)	11	DR	241.	
691	Ibid.,	at	56	(emphasis	added).	
692	Ibid.	
693	T.	 Jeremy	Gunn,	 ‘Adjudicating	 Rights	 on	 Conscience	Under	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	Human	
Rights,’	in	Johan	Van	der	Vyver	and	John	Witte,	Jr.,	Religious	Human	Rights	in	global	Perspective:	Legal	
Perspectives,	Volume	2,	(Kluwer	Law	International,	1996)	311.	
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order	 for	 the	Wicca	 “religion”	 to	 satisfy	 the	 existence	 of	 religion.	 The	 applicant’s	
belief	was	clearly	deemed	as	not	sincere	enough	to	qualify	deserve	legal	protection.	
It	 is	 clear	 that	no	adherent	 to	 the	Abrahamic	 religions	would	be	 required	 to	prove	
the	existence	of	their	faith.	
While	non-Abrahamic	traditions	and	minorities	have	been	held	to	“deserve”	
the	protection	of	religious	freedom	under	the	Convention,	“that	protection	has	only	
extended	 to	 manifestations	 that	 are	 highly	 analogous	 to	 Christian	
beliefs.”694 	Abrahamic	 religions	 fall	 easily	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 Article	 9	 without	
bearing	the	burden	of	proving	them	to	be	“religions”	or	whether	they	are	coherent.	
No	adherent	to	the	Abrahamic	religions	would	be	required	to	prove	that	Christianity,	
Islam,	 or	 Judaism	 were	 actually	 religions. 695 	This	 leaves	 little	 space	 for	 non-
Abrahamic	traditions	to	fall	within	the	scope	of	Article	9	unless	they	prove	that	they	
have	 “religious”	 elements	 and	 doctrinal	 evidence,	 while	 using	 terminology	 and	
elements	that	are	used	within	Abrahamic	religions.		
The	search	for	the	meaning	or	doctrinal	evidence	of	the	practice	becomes	the	
ultimate	 adjudicator	 where	 an	 application	 is	 made	 under	 Article	 9	 concerning	 a	
tradition.	Consequently,	 when	 a	 certain	 tradition	 or	 custom	 is	 raised	 in	court,	 the	
applicant	has	to	give	`good	doctrinal	and	meaningful	reasons’	in	order	to	defend	the	
importance	and	relevance	of	the	practice	using	religious	concepts	and	terminology.	
As	Gunn	correctly	observes,		
“[r]eligion”	may	be	seen	not	simply	as	a	neutral	description	of	such	things	as	
theological	 beliefs	 or	 ritual	 practices,	 but	 as	 judgment	 on	 whether	 the	 particular																																									 																					
694	Carloyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 Religion	 Under	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 (Oxford	
University	Press,	2001)	132.	
695	Ibid.,	at	57-58.	
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beliefs	or	actions	are	acceptable	to	the	society	or	the	legal	system.	Thus,	a	definition	
of	 “religion”	may	not	 simply	be	neutral,	 but	may	 contain	an	 inappropriate	 societal	
value	 judgment	 regarding	 particular	 beliefs	 or	 actions	 with	 “good”	 beliefs	 being	
characterised	 as	 “religions”	 and	 “bad”	 beliefs	 being	 characterised	 as	 “cults”	 or	
“heresies”.696		
The	ECtHR	does	not	actually	ask	whether	a	certain	manifestation	is	idolatrous	
or	not,	but	 it	does	ask	whether	 these	practices	are	“truly”	 (or	actually)	 religious.697	
Consequently,	 it	 takes	“an	agnostic	 stance	 towards	“falsity”	by	 transforming	claims	
about	falsity	 into	claims	about	beliefs	regarding	truth.”698		It	then	remains	up	to	the	
ECtHR	to	determine	whether	these	acts	may	qualify	as	“true”	religious	acts	and	can	
therefore	be	protected.	In	Pretty	v.	UK699	for	example	the	ECtHR	did	not	dispute	the	
“firmness	 of	 the	 applicant's	 views	 concerning	 assisted	 suicide”700	therefore	did	 not	
ask	 whether	 assisted	 suicide	 was	 an	 idolatrous	 practice	 or	 not	 but	 what	 they	 did	
assess	is	whether	these	practices	were	“truly”	religious.		
5.7	The	ECtHR	and	the	Concept	of	Choice		
It	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 ECtHR,	 when	 adopting	 the	 concept	 of	 choice	 in	 Article	 9,	
whether	 giving	 the	 applicant	 the	 choice	 to	wear	 the	headscarf	 or	 to	 retain	 certain	
religious	beliefs,	is	applying	a	Protestant	theological	framework,	because	freedom	of	
choice	is	crucial	and	one	of	the	important	foundations	to	the	Protestant	belief.	God	
																																								 																					
696	T.	 Jeremy	Gunn,	The	Complexity	of	Religion	and	the	Definition	of	"Religion"	 in	 International	Law,	
(2003)	Harv.	Hum.	RTs.	J.	16		191-193	
697	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘On	 the	 Dark	 Side	 of	 the	 “Secular”:	 Is	 the	 Religious-Secular	 Distinction	 a	
Binary?’	 available	 at	
https://www.academia.edu/6379024/On_the_Dark_Side_of_the_Secular_Is_the_Religious-
Secular_Distinction_a_Binary	 See	 also	Winnifred	 F.	 Sullivan,	 The	 Impossibility	 of	 Religious	 Freedom	
(Princeton	University	Press	2007)	
698	Ibid.			
699	Pretty	v	the	United	Kingdom	Application	no.	2346/02,	Reports	2002-III.	
700	Ibid.,	at	80.	
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has	given	man	 the	 freedom	 to	 choose.	Christian	beliefs	 are	not	based	on	 coercion	
but	on	 the	 theological	 ideas	 that	every	 individual	has	 the	 right	 to	 choose	between	
God	and	the	“Devil”	and	 in	secularised	terms	“good	and	evil.”701	In	ethical	 theories	
for	example,	a	moral	action	is	an	action	of	choice,	made	freely	without	coercion	and	
in	the	absence	of	freedom	or	choice	morality	is	impossible.	However,	it	only	does	so	
when	 the	 requirements	 to	 consider	 the	 concept	 of	 choice	 are	 compliant	 with	
Christian	 concepts.702	When	 the	 ECtHR	 refers	 to	 the	 applicant’s	 freedom	of	 choice	
when	manifesting	religious	beliefs,	it	is	imposing	the	Protestant	notion	of	choice	and	
considering	that	the	applicants	have	freely	taken	a	particular	decision,	in	other	words,	
freely	agreed	to	choose	evil.	Freedom	of	conscience	remains	a	fundamental	element	
in	both	the	Christian	theology	and	in	the	ECtHR,	for	in	the	Protestant	belief	the	“true”	
God	does	not	 accept	 unwilling	 followers	who	had	been	 forced	 into	His	worship	 as	
that	would	be	a	violation	to	this	freedom	that	God	has	given	to	man.	
	 Truth	 and	 falsity	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 Christian	 beliefs	 in	 general	 and	
Protestant	faith	specifically	and	is	reflected	in	the	language	of	the	ECtHR,	while	the	
question	 of	 truth	 is	 insignificant	 in	 other	 cultures	 and	 traditions.	 The	 ECtHR	
frequently	states:	
	 “As	enshrined	in	Article	9,	freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion	is	one	
of	the	foundations	of	a	“democratic	society”	within	the	meaning	of	the	Convention…	
In	its	religious	dimension	it	is	one	of	the	most	vital	elements	that	go	to	make	up	the	
identity	 of	 believers	 and	 their	 conception	of	 life.	 But	 it	 is	 also	 a	precious	 asset	 for	
																																								 																					
701	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Negative	 Portrayals	 of	 non-Western	 Cultures	 like	 Indian:	 Secularization	 of	
Christianity’	 February	 28,	 2011,	 available	 at	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/02/28/negative-
portrayals-of-non-western-cultures-like-indian-secularization-of-christianity-s-n-balagangadhara/		
702	In	X	v.	Germany	the	Commission	did	not	accept	that	the	scatter	of	one’s	ashes	is	a	“coherent	view	
on	fundamental	problems”.	
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atheists,	agnostics,	sceptics	and	the	unconcerned.	The	pluralism	indissociable	from	a	
democratic	society,	which	has	been	dearly	won	over	the	centuries,	depends	on	it….	
Religious	 freedom	 is	primarily	a	matter	of	 individual	 thought	and	conscience...	This	
aspect	 of	 the	 right	 set	 out	 in	 the	 first	 paragraph	of	Article	 9,	 to	hold	 any	 religious	
belief	 and	 to	 change	 religion	 or	 belief,	 is	 absolute	 and	 unqualified.	 However,	 as	
further	set	out	in	Article	9(1),	freedom	of	religion	also	encompasses	the	freedom	to	
manifest	one's	belief,	 alone	and	 in	private,	but	also	 to	practice	 in	 community	with	
others	 and	 in	 public….	 The	manifestation	 of	 religious	 belief	may	 take	 the	 form	 of	
worship,	 teaching,	practice	and	observance.	Bearing	witness	 in	words	and	deeds	 is	
bound	up	with	the	existence	of	religious	conviction...”703		 	
	 As	 seen	 above	 the	 ECtHR	 uses	 a	 secularised	 Christian	 theological	 language	
and	 Christian	 ethics	 that	 do	 not	 make	 sense	 within	 non-Abrahamic	 cultures	 and	
traditions.	 “Bearing	 false	Witness”	 is	 a	 religious	 prohibition	 in	 Abrahamic	 religions	
and	 is	 considered	a	heinous	 religious	 transgression.	 The	notion	of	 truth	and	 falsity	
are	not	theoretical	terms	in	the	sense	that	they	do	not	carry	a	technical	meaning	as	
defined	 in	 some	 specific	 branch	 of	 law	 or	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 are	 specifically	
jurisprudential	terms.	Legal	language	works	with	normal	meanings	of	these	words	as	
they	 are	 connoted	 by	 these	 natural	 language	 terms.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 their	
semantic	scope	one	needs	to	 look	at	 their	meanings	 in	natural	 languages	and	their	
common	history.704	The	ECtHR	is	neither	neutral	nor	agnostic	because	to	be	a	neutral	
entity	 with	 respect	 to	 religious	 matters,	 the	 ECtHR	 must	 not	 take	 any	
position	regarding	 the	 truth	 or	 falsity	 of	 religions	 and	 must	 treat	 religion	 as	 a																																									 																					
703	Kokkinakis	v.	Greece	(1993)	17	EHHR	397	(App	no	14307/88,	25	May	1993.)	para	31	
704 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Rethinking	Religion	in	India	IV:		Religion,	Secularism	and	Law’	
The	Platform	Paper	electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
http://www.rethinkingreligion.org/files/downloads/RRI_IV_platform_paper.pdf		
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phenomenon	 in	 the	 world	 rather	 than	 something	 universal.	 The	 ECtHR	 must	
remain	agnostic	with	 respect	 to	 God	 and	 His	 revelation.	 It	 is	 not	 enough	 for	 the	
ECtHR	to	say	that	it	is	agnostic	but	it	must	be	seen	to	be	agnostic	as	well.	Applicants	
must	recognise	agnosticism	as	a	“possibility	they	can	countenance	in	their	strife.”705		
This	 means	 that,	 “for	 both	 believers	 and	 atheists,	agnosticism	must	 appear	 as	 a	
reasonable	 option	within	 their	 discourse.	That	 is,	 in	 more	 general	
terms,	agnosticism	is	 a	 choice	 both	 within	 a	 theistic	 discourse	 and	 an	 atheistic	
discourse	 and,	 as	 such,	is	 a	 part	 of	 such	 discourses.	 And,	 as	 such,	 is	 not	 an	
independent	third	choice	that	is	above	and	beyond	theism	and	atheism.”706	
Further,	 when	 assessing	 Article	 9	 claims,	 even	 when	 broadened	 to	 include	
Catholicism	 and	 Judaism,	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 been	 following	 a	 “dogmatic	 (favouring	
derivative	 theological	 articulation	 over	 religious	 activity),	 a	 theistic	 (God,	 supreme	
being),	 belief-centred	 (discriminating	 against	 ritual-centred	 religions)	 and	 content-
centred	(favouring	so-called	“high”	or	“civilised	religions”	over	“low”	or	“barbarian”	
ones)”707	approach.		
5.8	Conclusion		
In	this	chapter	the	attempts	of	the	ECtHR	to	define	religion	have	been	examined.	The	
theological	 roots	 of	 Article	 9	 have	 been	 found	 to	 cause	 problems	 and	 distortions	
when	Article	 9	 is	 being	 relied	on	by	non-	Abrahamic	 litigants.	 It	 is	 also	 argued	 the	
traditions	 and	 customs	 of	 non-Abrahamic	 applicants	 are	 distorted	 so	 as	 to	 fit	 the	
Christian	Protestant	backdrop	of	Article	9ECHR.	The	case	law	has	revealed	that	some																																									 																					
705	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘The	 Religion	 of	 Secular	 State:	 De-Christianized	 Christianity	March	 3,	 2011	
available	 at	 http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/03/the-religion-of-secular-state-dechristianized-
christianity-s-n-balagangadhara/		
706	Ibid	
707	Veit	Bader,	‘Religion	and	the	Myths	of	Secularization	and	Separation’	RELIGARE	Working	Paper	No.	
8/March	2011,	p.	3.	
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applicants’	practices	are	not	 actually	 religious,	 although	 the	applicants’	 themselves	
consider	 them	 to	 be	 religious.	 This	 implies	 that	 ECtHR	 views	 these	 practices	 as	
secular	practices	that	are	just	“wrongly”	regarded	as	religious,	and	can	be	regulated	
by	placing	a	limit	on	their	manifestation.	The	ECtHR	does	not	actually	ask	whether	a	
certain	manifestation	is	idolatrous	or	not,	but	it	does	ask	whether	these	practices	are	
“truly”	(or	actually)	religious.	It	was	also	shown	that	the	ECtHR	privileges	Abrahamic	
religions	over	non-	Abrahamic	traditions	as	not	only	does	it	favours	orthodoxy	over	
orthopraxy	but	 also	 views	 religion	 as	 a	matter	of	 truth	or	 something	 that	 revolves	
around	doctrinal	truth.	
The	 ECtHR	 asks	 questions	 of	 faith	 and	 worship	 that	 are	 only	 intelligible	 to	
people	from	Abrahamic	religions	because	they	are	fundamentally	based	on	Christian	
anthropological	 framework,	 which	 assumes	 that	 humans	 are	 intentional	 beings.708	
When	doing	so,	they	presuppose	Christianity	to	be	the	benchmark	from	which	other	
“faiths”	are	understood	and	engage	in	Christian	ethics	and	discussions	of	what	ought	
or	 ought	 not	 be	 done.709	Therefore	 in	 order	 for	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 to	 claim	
religious	freedom	under	Article	9,	they	have	to	distort	themselves	in	such	a	way	to	fit	
into	 the	 framework	and	wording	of	Article	9	which	has	a	 theological	backdrop	and	
defend	 their	 traditions	as	 religion.	Moreover,	with	any	 judgment	of	 the	ECtHR,	 the	
significant	part	 lies	 in	the	articulation	by	the	majority	of	the	emergent	principles	 in	
accreted	Strasbourg	case	law	when	interpreting	and	applying	the	relevant	articles	of	
																																								 																					
708	Eweida	and	Others	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	no.	48420/10,	ECHR	2013.	
709	Prakash	Shah,	 ‘In	pursuit	of	 the	Pagans:	Muslim	 law	 in	 the	Legal	Context’	 (2013)	 JLP	45(1)	58-75	
available	 at	 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07329113.2013.773197#.UwvMWvR_s00	
see	also	Prakash	Shah,	‘Asking	about	reasonable	accommodation	in	England’	(2013)	IJDL	13(2-3)	83–
112,	88.	
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the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.710	What	one	 finds	 is	 the	adoption	of	a	
language	 that,	 when	 sufficiently	 repeated	 over	 time,	 develops	 into	 a	 secularised	
Christian	 theological	 mantra.	 The	 specific	 religious	 language	 becomes	 the	 meta-
language	to	discuss	and	decide	on	matters	of	religion	in	courts	of	law	and	serves	as	
the	standard	to	accept	or	reject	certain	practices	as	not	“truly”	religious.711		
									
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																									 																					
710	Mark	 Hill,	 ‘Religious	 Symbolism	 and	 Conscientious	Objection	 in	 the	Workplace:	 an	 Evaluation	 of	
Strasbourg's	Judgment	in	Eweida	and	others	v	United	Kingdom’	(2013)	Ecc.	L.J.	15(2)	191-203.	
711	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘Secular	Law	and	the	Realm	of	False	Religion’	in	Winnifred	Fallers	Sullivan,	Robert	
A.	Yelle,	and	Mateo	Taussig-Rubbo	(eds)	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford	University	Press	2011).	
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Chapter	6	
Article	9,	the	ECtHR,	Other	Abrahamic		Religions	and	“Other”	Christians”		
6.1	Overview	
In	 this	 chapter,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 even	 amongst	 other	 Christians	 and	 Abrahamic	
religions,	 there	 is	 a	 bias	 in	 the	 ECtHR	 towards	 the	 Protestant	 thought.	 It	 is	
demonstrated	 that	 this	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 ECHR	 as	 well	 as	 the	
interpretation	and	application	of	the	case	law	by	the	judges	of	the	ECtHR.	Similar	to	
the	argument	in	the	previous	chapter,	other	religions	are	seen	through	the	prism	of	
Protestantism	and	religious	symbols	(like	the	headscarf)	are	seen	by	the	ECtHR	as	a	
symbol	 of	 iconoclasm.	 Case	 examples	 are	 provided	 throughout	 to	 prove	 the	
hypothesis.		
The	“two	kingdoms”	of	Luther,	 the	private	 realm	of	 the	conscience	and	 the	
public	 realm	 of	 the	 (sinful)	 body,	 are	 clearly	 reflected	 in	 the	 interpretation	 and	
application	 of	 Article	 9.	 The	 concept	 of	 neutrality	 and	 the	 approach	 of	 the	 ECtHR	
with	 regards	 to	 proselytism	 and	 conversion	 are	 analysed	 with	 links	 made	 to	 the	
Protestant	thought.	Furthermore,	it	is	shown	that	the	ECtHR	favours	orthodoxy	over	
orthopraxy	 and	 a	 new	 analysis	 concerning	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 face	 in	 cases	
relating	 to	 the	 full-face	 veil	 is	 set	 out.	Moreover,	 the	 discrepancy	 in	 analysing	 the	
meaning	of	symbols	by	the	ECtHR	provides	evidence	that	“courts	and	legislators	tend	
to	secularise	the	meaning	of	religious	symbols	and	 interpret	them	according	to	the	
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sensitivities,	 prejudices,	 and	 claims	 of	 the	 majority”, 712 	which	 happens	 to	 be	
Christianity	 in	 Europe.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 here	 that	 although	 the	 ECtHR	 does	
interpret	at	times	religious	symbols	incoherently,	the	hypothesis	in	this	thesis	is	that	
it	 regards	 symbols	 as	 “deaf	 and	 dumb”	 in	 other	 words	 a	 secularised	 version	 of	
idolatry	that	can	easily	be	removed.	
6.2	The	Absolute	Protection	of	the	Freedom	of	Conscience	or	the	Forum	Internum	
Free	choice	and	choice	without	interference	or	imposition	is	crucial	to	the	Protestant	
theology,	because	God	has	given	man	 the	“freedom”	 to	choose	between	 the	Devil	
and	God	and	therefore	choosing	one’s	religion	cannot	be	derived	from	humankind.	
The	ECtHR	has	consistently	held	that	“[t]he	internal	dimension	of	religious	freedom	is	
absolute,	while	the	external	dimension	is	by	 its	very	nature	relative.	 Indeed,	Article	
9(2)	 clearly	 states	 that	 the	 limitations	 specified	 therein	may	be	applied	only	 to	 the	
freedom	 to	 manifest	 one’s	 religion	 or	 beliefs.”713		 Furthermore,	 Article	 9	 grants	
protection	 to	 individuals	 to	 choose	 a	 particular	 religion,	 maintain	 adherence	 to	 a	
religion,	or	to	change	their	religion	altogether	as	well	as	having	the	right	to	be	free	
from	 restrictions	 or	 coercive	 forces	 that	 impair	 that	 choice.	 Personal	 choice	 is	
unrestricted.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Special	 Rapporteur	 of	 the	 Sub-Commission	 on	
Prevention	of	Discrimination	and	Protection	of	Minorities,	Arcot	Krishnaswami,	has	
noted	 that	 “[f]reedom	 to	 maintain	 or	 to	 change	 religion	 or	 belief	 falls	 primarily	
within	 the	domain	of	 the	 inner	 faith	and	conscience	of	 an	 individual.	Viewed	 from																																									 																					
712	Paolo	 Ronchi,	 ‘Crucifixes,	 Margin	 of	 Appreciation	 and	 Consensus:	 The	 Grand	 Chamber	 Ruling	 in	
Lautsi	v	Italy’,	(2011)	Ecclesiastical	Law	Journal	13	287-297	p.294	and	Susanna	Mancini,	The	Power	of	
Symbols	 and	 Symbols	 of	 Power:	 Secularism	 and	 Religion	 as	 Guarantors	 of	 Cultural	 Convergence,	
(2008)	Cardozo	Law	Review	30	at	629-631.	The	quotation	 is	 from	Carolyn	Evans	and	Timnah	Rachel	
Baker,	 ‘Religion	 and	 Human	 Rights:	 Principles	 and	 Practice’,	 in	 Frank	 Cranmer,	Mark	 Hill	 QC,	 Celia	
Kenny	and	Russell	Sandberg	(eds),	The	Confluence	of	Law	and	Religion:	Interdisciplinary	Reflections	on	
the	Work	of	Norman	Doe.	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2016)	at	p.	196	
713	Javier	Martınez-Torron,	Limitations	on	Religious	Freedom	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	European	Court	of	
Human	Rights,	(2005)	Emory	International	Law	Review	19	587,	590	
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this	 angle,	 one	 would	 assume	 that	 any	 intervention	 from	 outside	 is	 not	 only	
illegitimate	but	impossible.”714		
Malcolm	Evans	 suggests	 that	 the	ECtHR	 is	more	 concerned	with	 the	 role	of	
the	 State	 in	 religious	 affairs	 than	with	 the	 rights	of	 individuals,	 and	 that	when	 the	
ECtHR	addresses	 individual	 rights	and	the	protection	of	 their	beliefs	and	religion,	 it	
“has	 taken	 such	a	 cautious	approach	 to	protecting	 the	manifestation	of	 religion	or	
belief	that	the	law	has	come	to	protect	only	a	very	restrictive	and	conservative	form	
of	private	religious	 life”.715	For	example,	 in	Kosteski	v.	the	former	Yugoslav	Republic	
of	Macedonia	the	applicant	absented	himself	from	work	while	celebrating	a	Muslim	
religious	holiday	and	was	subsequently	fined.	The	ECtHR	held	that	
“while	 it	 may	 be	 that	 this	 absence	 from	 work	 was	 motivated	 by	 the	
applicant’s	intention	of	celebrating	a	Muslim	festival	it	is	not	persuaded	that	this	was	
a	manifestation	of	his	beliefs	in	the	sense	protected	by	Article	9	of	the	Convention	or	
that	the	penalty	imposed	on	him	for	breach	of	contract	in	absenting	himself	without	
permission	was	an	interference	with	those	rights”716		
Moreover,	the	ECtHR	recalled	that		
“the	 courts’	 decisions	 on	 the	 applicant’s	 appeal	 against	 the	 disciplinary	
punishment	 imposed	 on	 him	made	 findings	 effectively	 that	 the	 applicant	 had	 not	
substantiated	the	genuineness	of	his	claim	to	be	a	Muslim	and	that	his	conduct	on	
the	 contrary	 cast	 doubt	 on	 that	 claim	 in	 that	 there	 were	 no	 outward	 signs	 of	 his	
																																								 																					
714 	Arcot	 Krishnaswami,	 Special	 Rapporteur	 of	 the	 Sub	 -Commission	 on	 the	 Prevention	 of	
Discrimination	and	Protection	of	Minorities,	Study	of	Discrimination	in	the	Matter	of	Religious	Rights	
and	Practices,	E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1	(1960)	at	16.	
715	Alice	Donald,	‘Advancing	Debate	about	Religion	or	Belief,	Equality	and	Human	Rights:	Grounds	for	
Optimism?’,	(2013)	OJLR	2	50,	51.		
716	Kosteski	v.	the	former	Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia	Application	no.	55170/00	(judgment	of	13	
April	2006)	at	para.	38	(emphasis	added).	
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practising	the	Muslim	faith	or	joining	collective.	Muslim	worship….	the	notion	of	the	
State	 sitting	 in	 judgment	 on	 the	 state	 of	 a	 citizen’s	 inner	 and	 personal	 beliefs	 is	
abhorrent	and	may	smack	unhappily	of	past	infamous	persecutions….”717		
A	striking	link	can	be	seen	between	the	ECtHR’s	language	which	stresses	that	
it	 is	 abhorrent	 for	 the	 State	 to	 judge	 a	 “citizen’s	 inner	 personal	 beliefs”	 and	 the	
Protestant	 theology	which	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 private	 realm	 of	 the	
conscience	 where	 no	 man	 can	 interfere	 and	 is	 therefore	 inviolable.	 The	 ECtHR	
required	evidence	to	substantiate	the	applicant’s	claims	that	he	was	an	adherent	to	
the	Muslim	 faith,718	thus	 testing	 whether	 the	 applicant’s	 beliefs	 were	 sincere	 and	
genuine	enough	to	be	protected.	This	could	also	imply	that	the	ECtHR	was	accusing	
the	applicant	of	having	a	fraudulent	belief	since	his	actions	were	not	deemed	sincere	
enough	to	be	granted	protection	under	Article	9.	Here	the	interference	was	justified	
as	being	prescribed	by	law	and	necessary	in	a	democratic	society	for	the	protection	
of	the	rights	of	others.		
Malcolm	Evans	also	notes	that	since	the	ECtHR	repeatedly	stipulates	that	the	
protection	of	the	forum	internum	is	the	main	purpose	of	Article	9,	it	ought	to	identify	
what	it	considers	to	fall	under	the	forum	internum,	but	it	fails	to	do	so.719	The	ECtHR	
may	well	protect	the	forum	internum,	but	has	difficulties	giving	this	a	wide	scope	and	
sees	 things	 as	 non-absolute	 manifestations.	 For	 example,	 in	 Francesco	 Sessa	 v.	
Italy, 720 	the	 applicant	 was	 unable	 to	 attend	 court	 hearings	 as	 his	 religious	
responsibilities	 prevented	 this	 given	 the	 hearing	 date	 fell	 on	 the	 same	 day	 as	 a	
																																								 																					
717	Ibid	at	39	(emphasis	added).		
718	Ibid	at	39.	
719	Malcolm	 Evans,	 Manual	 on	 Wearing	 of	 Religious	 Symbols	 in	 Public	 Areas,	 (Martinus	 Nijhoff	
Publishers,	2009)	8.	
720	Francesco	Sessa	v.	Italy,	Application	no.	28790/08	(2012).	
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Jewish	 religious	 holiday.	 The	 applicant	 argued	 that	 the	 refusal	 of	 the	 judicial	
authority	 to	 adjourn	 the	 hearing	 infringed	 his	 rights	 under	 Article	 9	 of	 the	
Convention.	The	ECtHR	held	that	it	was	
“not	 convinced	 that	 setting	 the	 case	 down	 for	 hearing	 on	 a	 date	 which	
coincided	with	a	Jewish	holiday	and	refusing	to	adjourn	it	to	a	later	date	amounted	
to	a	restriction	on	the	applicant’s	right	to	practise	his	religion	freely.	It	is	not	disputed	
between	the	parties	that	the	applicant	was	able	to	perform	his	religious	duties.”721		
The	ECtHR	 found	that	 the	applicant’s	 freedom	of	conscience	and	belief	was	
not	 restricted,	 which	 again	 illustrates	 the	 importance	 of	 absolute	 freedom	 of	
conscience	thought	and	belief	enshrined	in	Article	9(1),	while	Article	9(2)	 justifiably	
limits	the	manifestation	of	this	belief.	Moreover,	it	reveals	the	ECtHR’s	reluctance	to	
find	“manifestations”	to	be	part	of	the	forum	internum.	
By	contrast,	 in	Darby	v	Sweden,722	the	Commission	held	that	being	forced	to	
pay	 taxes	 to	 a	Church,	 to	which	one	does	not	belong,	 for	 secular	 functions,	was	 a	
serious	interference	on	the	forum	internum	since	the	applicant	was	being	forced	to	
participate	 in	a	 religion	 in	which	he	did	not	believe.	Consequently,	not	adhering	 to	
that	particular	religion	would	force	the	person	unwillingly	to	reveal	his	own	beliefs,	
violating	his	 right	under	Article	9(1).	The	Commission	attempted	to	set	a	definition	
for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 forum	 internum	 by	 stating	 that	 “Article	 9(1)	 protects	
everyone	from	being	compelled	to	be	involved	in	religious	activity	against	his	will.”723	
On	the	private	and	“silent”	level,	freedom	of	conscience	is	protected	and	coercion	is	
not	allowed.	This	 is	 reminiscent	of	 the	words	of	Luther	 in	his	1521	 Imperial	Diet	of	
																																								 																					
721	Ibid.,	at	37.	
722	Darby	v	Sweden	[1990]	187	Eur	Ct.	H.R.	(Ser	A)	
723	Ibid,	Annex	at	51.	
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Worms	when	he	said	“my	conscience	 is	captive	to	the	Word	of	God.	 I	cannot	and	I	
will	not	recant	anything,	for	to	go	against	conscience	is	neither	right	nor	safe.”724		
The	 Commission	 did	 not	 provide	 clear	 guidance	 on	 how	 direct	 the	
participation	has	to	be,	and	how	the	person	can	be	said	to	be	involved	“against	his	
will”725	and	 at	 what	 level	 the	 participation	 was	 considered	 to	 be	moved	 from	 the	
silent	level	to	the	level	of	manifestation.		However,	it	is	clear	that	what	is	absolutely	
protected	is	going	against	one’s	will,	for	all	human	laws	imposed	on	the	Christian	in	
the	spiritual	realm	go	against	true	religion.726	
The	 judgment	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 in	 Buscarini	 v	 San	 Marino	 also	 concerned	 the	
forum	internum.	Members	of	the	parliament	of	San	Marino	were	required	to	take	an	
oath	on	the	Gospel,	“without	referring	to	any	religious	text”727,	or	not	assume	their	
parliamentary	 seats.	 The	 oath,	 as	 the	 Government	 explains,	 has	 lost	 its	 religious	
significance	and	 is	 replaced	by	 “	 the	need	 to	preserve	public	order,	 in	 the	 form	of	
social	cohesion	and	the	citizens’	trust	in	their	traditional	institutions.”728	Despite	the	
wide	margin	 of	 appreciation	 and	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 on	which	 San	Marino	was	
founded,	the	judges	unanimously	ruled	that	there	had	been	a	violation	of	Article	9.	
The	 ECtHR	 also	 held	 that	 requiring	 “members	 to	 swear	 allegiance	 to	 a	 particular	
religion”	 was	 contrary	 to	 Article	 9(1),	 unless	 swearing	 allegiance	 to	 a	 particular	
																																								 																					
724 	Words	 of	 Martin	 Luther	 at	 the	 Imperial	 diet	 of	 Worms	 on	 April	 18,	 1521,	 available	 at	
http://www.luther.de/en/worms.html	(Last	accessed	November	2017).	
725	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	73.	
726	John	Calvin,	Institutes,	McNeill,	Ed.,	vol.	2:	1180	
727	Buscarini	v	San	Marino	at	para.	8.	728	Ibid.,	at	36.	
	 224	
religion	 is	prescribed	by	 law	and	 is	necessary	 in	a	democratic	 society	under	Article	
9(2).729		
The	 ECtHR	 concluded	 that	 it	 was	 dealing	 with	 a	 case	 of	 manifestation	 of	
religion	 or	 belief	 rather	 than	 with	 the	 basic	 freedom	 of	 religion	 itself,	 which	 was	
already	protected.730	It	 further	accepted	the	applicants’	claim	that	 the	requirement	
to	 take	an	oath	on	 the	Gospel	was	a	 ““premeditated	act	of	 coercion”.731	Similar	 to	
the	Protestant	line	of	thought,	the	ECtHR	was	not	tolerant	of	any	act	that	it	viewed	
as	a	coercion	of	religion	holding	that	“it	would	be	contradictory	to	make	the	exercise	
of	 a	 mandate	 intended	 to	 represent	 different	 views	 of	 society	 within	 Parliament	
subject	 to	 a	 prior	 declaration	 of	 commitment	 to	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 beliefs.”732	
However,	 the	 oath	 in	 itself	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 secondary	 act,	 in	 terms	 of	 Protestant	
thought,	 not	 essential	 to	 the	 religion,	 but	 rather	 a	 manifestation	 of	 religion.	 Paul	
Taylor	 has	 correctly	 noted	 that	 treating	 the	 obligation	 to	 swear	 on	 the	 Gospel	
contrary	 to	 one’s	 belief	 “cannot	 sensibly	 be	 characterised	 as	 a	 restriction	 on	 the	
manifestation	of	one’s	own	beliefs.”733	
In	El	Morsli	 v	 France,734	the	 applicant,	 a	Muslim	woman	who	wore	 the	 veil,	
was	denied	entry	to	the	French	consulate	in	Marrakech	after	refusing	to	remove	her	
veil	for	a	security	check.	The	woman	was	therefore	refused	a	visa	to	join	her	husband	
in	France	and	the	husband	 lodged	an	appeal	on	behalf	of	his	wife.	The	ECtHR	held	
																																								 																					729	Ibid.,	34.	
730	Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 religion	 under	 the	 European	 convention	 of	 Human	 rights	 (Oxford	
University	press	2001)	74.	
731	Buscarini	and	others	v	San	Marino	at	para	37.	
732	Ibid.,	at	39.	
733	Paul.	M.	Taylor,	Freedom	of	Religion:	UN	and	European	Human	Rights	Law	and	Practice	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2005)	130.	
734	El	Morsli	v	France,	Application	no.	15585/06,	4	March	2008.	
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that	 the	 limitation	 “concerned	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 legitimate	 aims	 provided	 for	 in	
Article	 9	 §	 2,	 namely	 public	 safety	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 public	 order.” 735		
Furthermore,	 in	Serif	v.	Greece736,	although	the	ECtHR	accepted	that	convicting	the	
applicant	for	usurping	the	functions	of	a	minister	of	a	“known	religion”	(Mufti)	and	
publicly	wearing	 the	dress	of	 such	a	minister	 amounted	 to	 a	 violation	of	his	 rights	
under	Articles	9,	 it	recognised	the	interference	to	have	a	legitimate	aim	namely	“to	
protect	 public	 order”.737	The	 ECtHR	 maintained	 its	 reasoning	 from	 Phull	 v	 France	
concerning	 security	 checks	 stating	 that	 the	 interference	 was	 necessary	 in	 a	
democratic	society	finding	that	the	“obligation	to	remove	her	veil	for	the	purposes	of	
a	security	check	was	necessarily	very	limited	in	terms	of	time.”738		In	Işik	v.	Turkey739,	
the	right	not	to	have	to	manifest	a	religion	or	belief	was	considered.	The	ECtHR	held	
that	 requiring	a	citizen	 to	specify	his	 religion	on	an	application	 for	an	 identity	card	
amounted	 to	 an	 interference	with	 Article	 9	 but	 it	 did	 not	 consider	 the	 applicant’s	
request	 to	change	his	 religion	 from	 Islam	to	Alevi,	 a	 tradition	 influenced	by	Sufism	
and	 certain	 pre-Islamic	 beliefs.	 Instead,	 the	 ECtHR	preferred	 to	 assess	 the	 case	 on	
the	 basis	 of	 the	 right	 not	 to	 manifest	 a	 religion.	 By	 doing	 this,	 the	 ECtHR	 had	
considered	the	Alevi	tradition	a	religion	and	granted	the	applicant	the	negative	right	
that	 is	 protected	 under	 Article	 9.	 However,	 the	 applicant	 was	 placed	 within	 the	
boundaries	 of	 religion	 and	 the	 Alevi	 tradition	 was	 not	 seen	 outside	 the	 realm	 of	
conventional	religion.	In	Refah	Partisi	v	Turkey740	,	although	the	case	was	determined	
																																								 																					
735	Ibid.	
736	Serif	v	Greece	Application	no.		38178/97	(2000).	
737	Ibid.,	at	45.	
738	Ibid.	
739	Sinan	Işik	v	Turkey	Application	no.	21924/05	(02	May,	2010).	
740	Refah	Partisi	(The	Welfare	Party)	and	Others	v.	Turkey	[GC]	Application	nos.		41340/98,	41342/98,	
41343/98	and	41344/98	(2003).	
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under	Article	11	and	the	ECtHR	maintained	that	 it	was	not	necessary	to	examine	 it	
under	other	 ECHR	provisions741	separately,	 the	 judgment	 reveals	 the	distortion	 the	
ECtHR	inflicts	when	assessing	non-Christian	beliefs.	The	case	concerned	members	of	
a	political	party	 (Refah	Partisi),	where	the	applicants	argued	that	 the	dissolution	of	
the	Party,	by	the	Turkish	Constitutional	Court	and	the	suspension	of	certain	political	
rights	of	the	other	applicants	violated	their	rights	under	articles	9,	10,	11,	14,	17	and	
18.742	The	Constitutional	court	in	Turkey	argued	that	the	“Refah	had	become	a	centre	
of	activities	contrary	to	the	principle	of	secularism”743	as	whenever	they	spoke	they	
“advocated	 the	 wearing	 of	 Islamic	 headscarves	 in	 State	 schools	 and	 buildings	
occupied	by	public	administrative	authorities.”744	Furthermore	they	claimed	that	the	
applicant	has	stated	that	he	“would	fight	to	the	end	for	the	 introduction	of	 Islamic	
law	 (sharia).” 745 	The	 applicant	 maintained	 that	 “his	 speeches	 which	 they	 had	
distorted	and	taken	out	of	context”.746	The	ECtHR	held	that		
“the	 plan	 to	 introduce	 a	 plurality	 of	 legal	 systems,	 which	 had	 never	 been	
abandoned	 by	Refah,	 was	 clearly	 incompatible	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 non-
discrimination,	 which	 was	 enshrined	 in	 the	 Convention	 and	 was	 one	 of	 the	
fundamental	principles	of	democracy.”	747	The	ECtHR	ruled	that	the	dissolution	of	the	
party	 was	 within	 the	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 of	 Turkey	 and	 the	 interference	 was	
prescribed	 by	 law	 and	 necessary	 in	 a	 democratic	 society.	 Furthermore	 the	 ECtHR	
																																								 																					
741	Articles	being	9,	10,	14,	17	and	18	of	the	Convention	and	Articles	1	and	3	of	Protocol	No.	1.		
742	Refah	Partisi	(The	Welfare	Party)	and	Others	v.	Turkey	at	para.	2.	
743	Ibid.,	at	26.	
744	Ibid.,	at	12.	
745	Ibid.	
746	Ibid.,	at	17.	
747	Ibid.,	at	80.	
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noted	 that	 “the	 dissolution	 of	 a	 political	 party	 on	 account	 of	 a	 risk	 of	 democratic	
principles	being	undermined	met	a	pressing	social	need”.748	
The	 party’s	 attempt	 to	 introduce	 a	 system	whereby	 it	 set	 its	 own	 religious	
beliefs	 to	 abide	 by,	 clashed	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 secularism.	 In	 the	 name	 of	
secularism,	 non-Christian	 principles	 (in	 this	 case	 Islamic),	 were	 carefully	 being	
reformed	by	the	ECtHR.	There	was	an	attempt	“to	transfer	the	language	of	Muslims	
from	 language	of	 law	and	 religion	 to	a	 language	 that	 is	more	 related	 to	ethics	and	
virtue	so	that	they	could	fit	into	a	secular	national	public	sphere.”749	This	secularised	
language	forces	non-Christians	somehow	to	condemn	and	criticise	practices	that	are	
“considered	 offensive	 in	 a	Western	 culture	 as	 practices	 being	 “non-Islamic”	 in	 an	
attempt	to	reform	them.”750		
It	is	evident	that	in	the	absence	of	doctrinal	justification	of	the	manifestation,	
it	is	difficult	to	establish	the	existence	of	the	belief	that	is	being	manifested.	Whilst	it	
could	 be	 argued	 in	 relation	 to	 all	 of	 these	 judgments	 that	 “victories	 for	 common	
sense”751	prevailed,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 concluded	 that	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 ECtHR	
regard	symbols	as	deaf	and	dumb	(a	secularised	version	of	idolatry)	that	can	easily	be	
removed.		This	is	also	evident	in	the	way	the	ECtHR	views	the	veil	as	an	object,	with	
																																								 																					
748	Ibid.,	at	104.	
749	Prakash	Shah,	Shaira	in	the	West:	Colonial	Consciousness	in	a	Context	of	Normative	Competition,	in	
Elisa	Giunchi	(ed),	Muslim	Family	Law	in	Western	Courts	(Routledge	2014)	19.	Within	Christianity	for	
example,	 the	 concept	 of	 consent	 in	 marriages	 was	 a	 fundamental	 Christian	 obligation,	 which	 was	
further	 developed	 by	 theologians	 in	 a	 later	 stages.	 This	 idea	 of	 consent	 was	 endorsed	 in	 many	
Western	 legal	 systems	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 its	Christian	 roots	have	 faded.	See	also	Harold	Berman,	
Law	and	Revolution:	The	Formation	of	the	Western	Legal	Tradition	(Harvard	University	Press,	1983)	p.	
75,	168	
750	Ibid.,	at	25.	
751	Andrew	 Copson,	 BHA:	 'Persecution	 of	 Christians'	 and	 'aggressive	 secularism'	 claims	 exposed	 as	
false	 by	 European	 court	 judgment’	 15	 January	 2013	 	electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
http://www.politics.co.uk/opinion-formers/bha-british-humanist-association/article/persecution-of-
christians-and-aggressive-secularism-claims-e	(last	accessed	in	September	2015).	
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no	 further	 meaning,	 that	 can	 easily	 be	 removed	 for	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time	 or	
whenever	 necessary.	 The	 language	 used	 (whether	 consciously	 or	 unconsciously)	
implies	 that	 the	veil	 is	 also	an	“icon”	 that	 can	be	put	aside	 for	a	 specific	period	of	
time.	Furthermore,	 these	religious	symbols	are	seen	as	manifestations	and	 it	 is	not	
countenanced	by	the	ECtHR	that	any	could	come	within	9(1).	
	This	 jurisprudence	 clearly	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 forum	 internum	 is	
absolutely	protected	and	that	“the	ECtHR	has	construed	freedom	of	religion	in	terms	
of	a	binary	opposition	between	belief	and	practice.”752	Recalling	the	two	kingdoms	of	
Luther	 and	 then	 Locke,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 similar,	 if	 not	 identical	 lines	 of	
thought.	The	private	realm	of	the	conscience,	which	the	State	could	not	and	should	
not	 interfere	with,	 is	held	 silently,	 and	 the	public	 realm	of	 the	 (sinful)	body	or	 the	
manifestations	may	be	punished	by	the	magistrate	(State).		
These	 are	 reflected	 today	 in	 the	 split	 between	 the	 assertion	 of	 religious	
freedom	in	Article	9(1)	of	the	ECHR	and	the	limitations	thereto	as	expressed	in	Article	
9(2)	 and	 presuppose	 a	 Protestant	 theology.	 Moreover,	 this	 separation	 in	 itself	
ascertains	that	there	actually	are	two	parts	to	religion	or	belief:	one	is	the	thought,	
the	ideas,	and	the	doctrines	which	constitute	the	first	part	to	have	a	“true”	religion;	
the	 other	 is	 the	 manifestation	 which	 is	 very	 much	 linked	 to	 the	 doctrinal	 or	
theoretical	part.		
The	ECtHR	 tries	 to	utilise	 a	wide	approach	 to	 the	protection	 granted	under	
Article	 9,	 yet	 these	 definitions	 and	 interpretations	 remain	 within	 a	 Protestant	
theological	 framework	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 language	 used	 and	 the	 background	 of	 the	
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explanation	of	the	ECtHR	albeit	with	a	secularised	language.	The	ECtHR	also	tends	to	
focus	on	the	definition	of	belief,	religion,	and	conscience.	However,	all	that	it	is	doing	
is	 getting	 caught	 in	 a	 terminological	 game	 of	 how	 best	 to	 describe	 these	 terms	
instead	of	 looking	at	religion	as	a	phenomenon	in	the	world	rather	than	something	
universal	 in	 all	 cultures.	 The	 ECtHR’s	 assertion	 that	 all	 cultures	 in	 the	 world	 have	
religion,	 an	 idea	 which	 has	 also	 been	 adopted	 and	 elaborated	 within	 the	 human	
sciences,753	is	itself	a	claim	of	Protestant	theology,	albeit	since	secularised.		
It	 was	 reported	 in	 Le	 Monde	 on	 11	 May	 2010754	that	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	
politicise	 “alien”	 religions	 and	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 complying	 with	 the	
beliefs	of	the	majority,	the	French	minister	of	 immigration,	Eric	Besson,	announced	
that	Imams	who	intend	to	work	in	France	should	undergo	courses	in	two	provincial	
universities	to	learn	how	to	“articulate	their	Islamic	beliefs	in	a	way	compatible	with	
the	French	political	values	and	republican	culture.”755	This	is	a	clear	example	of	how	
State	authorities	distort	non-Christian	cultures	and	moulding	them	in	order	to	fit	into	
the	 secularised	Protestant	 framework.	 They	 are	 seeking	 to	 influence	how	 “beliefs”	
ought	to	be	held	and	manifested	in	a	way	that	is	compatible	with	Christian	beliefs.	
6.3	The	Protestant	Thought	and	Compulsory	Religious	Education		
The	ECtHR	has	attempted,	when	deciding	on	Article	9	cases,	to	distinguish	between	a	
“practice”	that	is	merely	motivated	or	inspired	by	belief	or	religion	as	opposed	to	a	
practice	which	is	a	manifestation	of	belief	or	religion.	However,	people	often	shape	
																																								 																					
753	Tomoko	Masuzawa,	The	Invention	of	World	Religions	or,	how	European	Universalism	was	Preserved	
in	the	Language	of	Pluralism,	(University	of	Chicago	Press	2005).	
754	Eric	Besson	Annonce	de	Futures	Formations	D'imam	à	L'université,	Le	Monde	11-05-2010	available	
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755	Cited	in	Raymond	Plant,	‘Religion,	Identity	and	freedom	of	expression’	(2011)	Res	Publica	17(1)	7-
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their	 religious	 beliefs	 by	 following	 a	 thought	 or	 their	 conscience,	 and	 therefore	 in	
reality,	it	is	hard	to	differentiate	between	the	two.756	Nicholas	Gibson	observes	that	
to	assess	if	there	is	a	violation	when	manifesting	a	“belief”,	one	should	first	question	
if	 “the	matter	 relates	 to	 a	 protected	 ‘belief’	 under	 Article	 9.”757	This	 question	may	
seem	simple,	but	 it	 is	actually	challenging	 to	address	because	 in	assessing	whether	
an	 act	 is	 a	 protected	 belief,	 one	 is	 assuming	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 belief	 is	 indeed	
universal	in	all	cultures	and	has	similar	meaning	amongst	all	cultures.		As	a	result	of	
this	approach,	the	ECtHR	fails	to	address	the	needs	of	non-Abrahamic	applicants	 in	
general	 and	 non-Protestant	 applicants	 in	 particular.	 The	 ECtHR	 sets	 a	 very	 high	
threshold	for	applicants	to	prove	that	a	certain	practice	is	a	manifestation	of	religion.	
This	 threshold	 is	 easily	 met	 by	 applicants	 from	 religious	 groups	 whose	 practices	
emanate	from	belief	and	which	are	in	turn	mandated	by	religious	doctrines.	On	the	
contrary,	 applicants,	 from	 a	 non-Protestant	 background,	 find	 it	 more	 difficult	 to	
prove	 that	 their	 tradition	and	practices	 fulfils	 the	 requirements	 to	be	considered	a	
manifestation	under	Article	 9.	 This	 is	 illustrated	by	 the	example	of	 how	 the	ECtHR	
deals	with	claims	against	compulsory	religious	education.	
In	 Karnell	 and	 Hardt	 v.	 Sweden758	for	 example,	 the	 applicants	 challenged	 a	
Swedish	 law	 that	 required	 compulsory	 religious	 education	 to	 be	 taught	 in	 public	
schools.	 The	 applicants,	 all	 of	 whom	 were	 adherents	 to	 the	 Evangelical	 Lutheran	
faith,	 argued	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 First	 Protocol	 that	 "the	 State	 shall	
respect	 the	 right	 of	 parents	 to	 ensure	 such	 education	 and	 teaching	 in	 conformity	
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with	 their	 own	 religious	 and	 philosophical	 convictions.”759	The	 Swedish	 law	 states	
that	the	exemption	should	be	granted	only	to	pupils	where	the	parents	“adhere	to	a	
faith	and	concept	of	life	which	essentially	belongs	to	a	different	civilisation	than	our	
own."760	Eventually,	 both	 parties	 came	 to	 a	 compromise	 and	 agreed	 that	 pupils	
belonging	to	the	Evangelical	Lutheran	sect	could	be	exempted	from	the	compulsory	
religious	studies.			
Contrary	 to	 this	 decision,	 in	Angeleni	 v	 Sweden	 the	 Commission	 found	 the	
application	 to	 be	 manifestly	 ill-founded.	 The	 case	 concerned	 a	 mother	 and	 a	
daughter,	 both	 of	 whom	 were	 atheists	 and	 did	 not	 belong	 to	 any	 religious	
congregation.	The	mother	requested	that	her	daughter	be	exempt	from	the	religious	
knowledge	 course	 and	 complained	 that	 her	 daughter’s	 “freedom	 of	 thought	 is	
violated	 when	 the	 child	 is	 obliged	 to	 be	 brought	 into	 the	 Christian	 way	 of	
thinking.”761	Moreover,	 the	applicant	argued	that	the	religious	teaching	undertaken	
by	 the	 school	 was	 not	 neutral	 and	 it	 was	 only	 concerned	 with	 Christianity.762	The	
Commission	 found	 “the	 fact	 that	 the	 instruction	 in	 religious	 knowledge	 focuses	on	
Christianity	 at	 junior	 level	 at	 school	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 second	 applicant	 has	
been	 under	 religious	 indoctrination	 in	 breach	 of	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 Convention.”763	It	
also	 accepted	 the	 school’s	 arrangement	 to	 exempt	 the	 second	 applicant	 from	
“morning	gatherings	of	a	religious	character	with	singing	of	hymns”.764	The	National	
School	 Board	 rejected	 the	 mother’s	 request.	 The	 Commission	 held	 that	 the	
obligation	for	the	applicant	to	follow	a	course	in	religious	knowledge,	did	not	subject																																									 																					
759	The	Convention,	First	Protocol,	art.	2	
760	Karnell	and	Hardt	v.	Sweden,	at	670.	
761	Angeleni	v	Sweden	at	p.	46.	
762	Ibid.,	at	49.		
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her	 to	 any	 religious	 indoctrination,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 did	 not	 infringe	 her	 right	 to	
freedom	of	religion.	
This	case	fits	the	Protestant	line	of	thought	whereby	chanting	and	singing	of	
religious	 hymns	 is	 considered	 a	 ritualistic,	 unessential	 character	 of	 a	 religion,	 and	
therefore	 could	 easily	 be	 removed	 from	 one’s	 religious	 or	 customary	 practices.	 It	
should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 Commission	 did	 not	 find	 the	 Christian	 religious	
education	to	cause	any	kind	of	indoctrination	on	the	applicant,	while	other	religious	
symbols	such	as	the	headscarf	are	considered	by	the	ECtHR	to	be	powerful	symbols	
of	 indoctrination.	 This	 preferential	 status	 for	 the	 Protestant	 line	 of	 thinking	
portrayed	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 reasoning	 is	 indeed	 problematic	 since	 it	 could,	 as	
Carolyn	 Evans	 suggests,	 lead	 to	 marginalisation	 of	 people	 who	 think	 or	 act	
differently.765		
By	 contrast,	 in	 Folergo	 v	 Norway,	 the	 applicants,	 a	 group	 adhering	 to	 the	
humanist	 thought,	 requested	 an	 exemption	 from	 religious	 knowledge	 classes.	 The	
ECtHR	ruled	in	favour	of	the	applicants	and	held	that	failing	to	grant	the	applicant’s	
full	exemption	from	religious	classes	infringed	their	rights	under	Protocol	1	Article	2	
of	the	Convention.	Although	the	outcome	of	the	case	was	indeed	more	favourable	to	
the	applicants	than	that	 in	Angeleni	and	Others	v	Sweden,	 the	ECtHR’s	approach	of	
interpretation	 did	 not	 differ	 much.	 The	 ECtHR	 did	 not	 question	 the	 privilege	 of	
Christianity	 in	the	education	syllabus	and	clearly	accepted	that	the	“presence	of	an	
established	religion	does	not	 in	 itself	violate	the	right	to	belief	and	religion	of	non-
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members.”766	Moreover,	 the	 ECtHR	 found	 that	 it	 was	within	 the	 State’s	margin	 of	
appreciation	 whether	 to	 adopt	 a	 syllabus	 that	 gave	 greater	 weight	 to	 Christianity	
than	to	other	religions.767		The	ECtHR	stated	that	
“[t]he	 fact	 that	 Christianity	 was	 given	 priority	 is	 true	 only	 as	 far	 as	 the	
quantity	of	the	different	religions	and	other	elements	of	the	KRL	subject	is	concerned.	
Furthermore,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Christianity	is	not	only	the	state	religion	of	
Norway,	but	also	forms	an	important	part	of	Norwegian	history.	In	our	opinion,	the	
KRL	subject	clearly	fell	within	the	limits	of	the	competence	of	the	Contracting	States	
under	Article	2	of	Protocol	No.	1.”768	
The	implication	of	this	judgment	is	that	equality	with	regard	to	religions	and	
philosophies	is	not	deemed	essential	by	the	ECtHR.	It	can	also	been	concluded	that	
the	 ECtHR	 does	 indeed	 accept	 that	 Norway	 can	 favour	 Evangelism,	 but	 not	 force	
anyone	into	coercive	ways	to	be	taught	it.	This	is	reminiscent	of	the	Protestant	line	of	
thought	that	prevents	subjecting	individuals	to	coercive	ways	to	accept	Christianity,	
which	 in	 turn,	 and	 according	 to	 the	 Protestants,	 infringes	 one’s	 freedom	 of	
conscience.	
6.4	The	Concept	of	Neutrality	
It	is	questionable	whether	the	ECtHR	is	able	to	be	neutral	when	dealing	with	Article	9	
cases.769	It	is	often	argued	that	in	order	to	prevent	the	State	from	interfering	in	the	
																																								 																					
766	Ian	Leigh,	Objective	Critical	and	pluralistic:	Religious	Education	and	Human	Rights	in	the	European	
Public	 Sphere,	 in	 Law,	 State	 and	 Religion	 in	 the	 New	 Europe:	 Debates	 and	 Dilemmas,	 192,	 209,	
Lorenzo	Zucca	&	Camil	Ungureanu	eds	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2012).	
767	Folgero	and	others	v	Norway	at	para	89	
768	Folgero	and	others	v	Norway.	
769	Case	 law	 examples	 will	 be	 given	 later	 in	 section	 7.3	 to	 illustrate	 the	 present	 hypothesis	 in	 this	
section.	
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internal	 affairs	 of	 religious	 communities,	 neutrality	 may	 be	 invoked.	 However,	
neutrality	can	result	in	such	interferences.	“Neutrality	may	be	the	product	of	a	desire	
to	 create	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 all	 are	 able	 to	 make	 ultimate	 choices	 in	 an	
unfettered	 fashion,	but	 it	may	also	prevent	 the	making	of	 choices	and	 reduce	 that	
freedom	 of	 choice	 to	mere	 relativism.”770	As	 defined	 in	 the	 ECtHR’s	 case	 law,	 the	
State’s	 duty	 of	 impartiality	 and	 neutrality	 “is	 incompatible	with	 any	 power	 on	 the	
State’s	part	to	assess	the	legitimacy	of	religious	beliefs	or	the	way	those	beliefs	are	
expressed.”771	
In	order	 for	 the	ECtHR	to	be	neutral	when	assessing	Article	9	cases,	 it	must	
have	the	same	attitude	towards	religious	conversions	and	proselytism	and	not	favour	
one	 type	of	 conversion	 over	 the	 other.	 That	 is,	 it	must	 treat	 conversions	 between	
Abrahamic	 religions	 and	 other	 traditions	 in	 a	 similar	 manner772 	as	 conversions	
between	different	“religions”.	It	should	also	refrain	from	qualifying	what	constitutes	
proper	means	of	proselytism	and	conversion,	which	it	draws	from	within	Abrahamic	
theological	 ideas.	 A	 “neutral”	 ECtHR	 should	 also	 assume	 that	 Abrahamic	
religions	and	other	traditions	are	the	same	kind	of	phenomena.	The	problem	lies	 in	
the	fact	that	this	assumption	cannot	be	made	because	what	makes	Semitic	religions	
into	a	religion	is	not	the	same	as	what	makes	other	traditions	into	traditions.773		
																																								 																					
770	Malcolm	Evans	and	Peter	Petkoff,	‘A	Separation	of	Convenience?	The	Concept	of	Neutrality	in	the	
Jurisprudence	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights.’	(2008)	Religion,	State	&	Society	36(3)		205-223,	
206.	
771	Metropolitan	Church	of	Bessarabia	and	Others	v.	Moldova	at	para	118	and	123;	Hasan	and	Chaush	
v	Bulgaria,	para.	62.	
772	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conﬂict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	e	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1),	67-92.	
773	See	 section	 3.7	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Books,	 beliefs,	 God,	 Prophet	 and	 most	 importantly	 doctrines	 are	
essential	requirements	to	make	Christianity,	Islam	and	Judaism	into	religions,	and	without	them	they	
cannot	be	recognized	as	religions.	These	same	essential	 requirements	are	not	crucial	 to	make	other	
traditions	such	as	‘Hinduism’,	‘Buddhism’	and	‘Jainism’	into	a	religion,	yet	they	are	still	considered	to	
be	a	kind	of	‘religion.’	
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Ramchandra	N.	Dandekar,	for	example,	argues	that	Hinduism	“can	hardly	be	
called	a	religion	at	all	in	the	popularly	understood	sense	of	the	term.”774	The	problem	
is	 not	 conﬁned	 only	 to	 Hinduism,	 but	 applies	 to	 all	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 and	
cultures.	 Decisions	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 reveal	 that	 Semitic	 religions	 and	 non-Semitic	
traditions	 are	 being	 treated	 as	 instances	 of	 the	 same	 kind	 rather	 than	 different	
phenomena.			
If	 the	 ECtHR	 keeps	 its	 current	 approach	 of	 treating	 both	 as	 similar	
phenomena,	it	will	continue	to	favour	Semitic	values	over	traditional	ones	and	refer	
to,	for	example,	proselytism	and	conversion	 in	terms	of	proper	and	improper.775	By	
referring	to	proper	means	of	proselytism	and	conversion,	it	is	essentially	prohibiting	
all	 forms	of	 improper	means	 including	 coercion	 in	 conversion.	 It	 is	 suggesting	 that	
proper	means	of	conversion	can	take	place	by	means	of	persuasion	alone.	But	if	“one	
takes	 conversion	 from	 one	 religion	 to	 another	 to	 be	 a	 matter	 of	 persuasion,	 one	
must	presuppose	 that	 religion	 involves	 the	question	of	doctrinal	 truth.	One	can	be	
persuaded	 to	 convert	 only	 in	 so	 far	 as	 one	 accepts	 the	 truth	 of	 one	 religion	 as	
opposed	to	the	falsity	of	another.”776	Conversion	and	proselytising	are	intrinsic	drives	
within	 Abrahamic	 religions	 and	 freedom	 to	 convert	 assumes	 rival	 movements	
competing	with	each	other	to	win	converts	into	the	“true”	religion.		
																																								 																					
774	Ramchandra	 Narayan	 Dandekar,	 ‘Hinduism’	 (Brill	 1971)	 237.	 Quoted	 also	 in	 Will	 Sweetman,	
“Hinduism”	And	The	History	Of	“Religion”:	Protestant	Presuppositions	In	The	Critique	Of	The	Concept	
Of	 Hinduism”	 Method	 &	 Theory	 in	 the	 Study	 of	 Religion,	 (2003)	 Journal	 of	 the	 North	 American	
Association	for	the	Study	of	Religion	15	329-353	at	331.	See	also	section	3.6	of	this	thesis.	
775	Kokkinakis	v.	Greece	(1993)	17	EHHR	397	(App	no	14307/88,	25	May	1993.)	para	48.	
776	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conﬂict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	e	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1),	67-92.	
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The	 ECtHR’s	 restriction	 on	 religious	 conversion	 shows	 that	 it	 is	 indirectly	
questioning	whether	or	not	religion	is	a	matter	of	truth.777	It	 is	reforming	traditions	
and	their	manifestations	according	to	Christian	theological	concepts	and	normative	
morals.778 	Although	 the	 ECtHR	 may	 not	 merely	 accept	 the	 “truth”	 claims	 of	 a	
particular	 religion,	 it	does,	however,	seem	to	accept	and	assume	that	religion	does	
revolve	around	truth	claims.779	Failing	to	be	neutral	towards	the	issue	of	conversion	
is,	as	Balagangadhara	says,	a	“general	malfunction	of	the	neutrality	of	the	model	of	
liberal	 secularism.	 Even	 when	 its	 theorists	 take	 a	 critical	 attitude	 towards	
proselytisation,	 they	 reproduce	 the	 theological	 assumption	 that	 religion	 revolves	
around	truth	and	therefore	support	a	principle	of	religious	freedom	that	entails	the	
freedom	 to	 convert.” 780 	The	 ECtHR	 could	 only	 be	 neutral	 with	 respect	 to	
the	competing	 truth	 claims	 of	 Semitic	 religions.	 Moreover,	 despite	 the	 alleged	
neutrality	and	secularity	of	the	law	and	the	ECtHR	protestant	Christianity	“continues	
to	shape	significant	aspects	of	both	the	state	and	state	law.	This	is	an	embarrassment	
for	liberal	theories	of	rights	and	their	assumption	of	state	neutrality.”781		
6.5	Proselytism	and	Conversion		
The	reasons	why	the	ECtHR,	in	its	current	approach,	is	 incapable	of	acting	neutrally	
vis-à-vis	 all	 religions	 and	 traditions	 and	 ends	 up	 favouring	 adherents	 to	 the	
Protestant	 faith	 in	 particular,	 has	 been	 analysed	 earlier	 in	 this	 thesis.782	In	 this	
																																								 																					
777	The	analysis	of	the	case	law	regarding	proselytism	and	conversion	is	looked	at	later	in	section	7.3	in	
this	thesis.	
778	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘Christian	Attitudes	and	the	Rule	of	Law	as	the	Mechanism	of	Secularization’	April	
1	2011,	available	at	http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/01/law-secularization-and-religious-attitudes/		
779	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conﬂict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	e	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1),	67-92.	
780	Ibid.	
781	Peter	 Dunchin,	 ‘Islam	 in	 the	 Secular	 Nomos	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights’	 (2011)	
Michigan	Journal	Of	International	Law	32(4)	663,	744.		
782	See	sections,	2.9,	4.4,	5.3	and	7.4	in	this	thesis.	
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section,	it	will	be	demonstrated	that	the	approach	of	the	ECtHR	on	proselytism	and	
conversion	is	not	neutral	and	bears	significant	Protestant	hallmarks.	
			 Ostensibly,	Article	9	protects	acts	intimately	linked	to	the	forum	internum	of	
personal	belief.783	It	has	held	that	“bearing	witness	in	words	and	deeds	is	bound	up	
with	the	existence	of	religious	convictions”.784	However,	in	Kokkinakis	v	Greece785	the	
ECtHR	 opened	 up	 a	 distinction	 between	 proper	 as	 opposed	 to	 “improper	
proselytism”786	and	religious	conversion.	The	ECtHR	held:	
“[F]irst	of	all,	a	distinction	has	to	be	made	between	bearing	Christian	witness	
and	 improper	 proselytism.	 The	 former	 corresponds	 to	 true	 evangelism,	which	 in	 a	
report	 drawn	 up	 in	 1956	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	World	 Council	 of	 Churches	 is	
described	 as	 an	 essential	mission	 and	a	 responsibility	 of	 every	 Christian	 and	 every	
Church.	The	latter	represents	a	corruption	or	deformation	of	it.”787		
		 It	 suggested	 that	 “improper	 proselytism”	 as	 opposed	 to	 “bearing	 Christian	
witness”	might	
“[t]ake	 the	 form	 of	 activities	 offering	 material	 or	 social	 advantages	 with	 a	
view	to	gaining	new	members	for	a	Church	or	exerting	improper	pressure	on	people	
in	 distress	 or	 in	 need;	 it	 may	 entail	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 or	 brainwashing;	 more	
generally,	 it	 is	 not	 compatible	with	 respect	 for	 the	 freedom	of	 thought,	 conscience	
and	religion	of	others.”788			
In	its	view,	improper	proselytism	was	coercive	and	incompatible	with	respect	
for	freedom	of	religion,	thus	being	a	corruption	or	deformation	of	true	proselytism.																																										 																					
783	CJ,	JJ	and	EJ	v.	Poland,	Appl.	no.	23380/94,	(1996)	DR84,	p.	46.	
784	Kokkinakis	v.	Greece,	judgment	of	25	May	1993,	Series	A	no.	260-A,	at	para.	31.	
785	Kokkinakis	v.	Greece	(1993)	17	EHHR	397	(App	no	14307/88,	25	May	1993).	
786	Ibid.,	at	48.	
787	Ibid.,	(emphasis	added).	
788	Ibid.,	(emphasis	added).	
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It	 is	 not	 clear	 how	 the	 ECtHR	 assesses	 proper	 or	 “true”	 as	 opposed	 to	
“improper”	 proselytism.	 In	 Chapter	 3,	 spreading	 religion	 through	 conversion	 and	
proselytism	 was	 analysed. 789 	Christians	 maintain	 that	 conversion	 is	 part	 of	 the	
universal	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 and	 is	 therefore	 a	 fundamental	 human	 right.790	
However,	the	concept	of	conversion	claims	that	the	religious	have	a	religious	duty	to	
spread	the	“true”	religion,	the	universal	truth	that	God	has	given	to	mankind,	and	to	
include	more	people	into	the	“true”	religion,	for	Christ	ordered	Christians	to	“go	and	
make	disciples	of	all	nations.”791		Freedom	to	convert	assumes	that	religions	are	rival	
movements	competing	with	each	other	 to	win	converts	 into	 the	“true”	 religion.	As	
also	explained	in	Chapter	3,	non-Abrahamic	cultures	consider	every	“religion”	to	be	
equally	 true,	 so	 there	 is	 no	 existence	 of	 “false	 religion”.	 Therefore,	 religious	
conversion	from	falsity	to	truth	is	deemed	meaningless.792	It	 is	clear	that	the	ECtHR	
has	also	set	a	benchmark	 from	which	 it	decides	upon	true	or	proper	and	 improper	
proselytism	in	just	the	same	language	as	Christianity	divides	between	spreading	the	
“true”	religion.	
In	 its	 judgment	 in	 Kokkinakis,	 the	 ECtHR	 promoted	 the	 “comprehensive	
doctrine	 or	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 good”793	of	 Christianity	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 other	
traditions.	The	ECtHR	held	that	the	Greek	courts	did	not	“sufficiently	specify	in	what	
way	 the	accused	had	attempted	to	convince	his	neighbour	by	 improper	means”,794	
thereby	 suggesting	 a	 different	 outcome	 had	 there	 been	 proof	 to	 “improper”																																									 																					
789	See	sections	3.8	and	3.9	in	this	thesis.	
790	See	for	example	Kokkinakis	v	Greece	at	para	48;	where	the	ECtHR	speaks	of	“improper	proselytism	
and	true	evangelism.”	
791	The	Gospel	of	Mathew	28:19.	
792	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conflict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1)	67-92.	
793	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	354-356.	
794	Kokkinakis	v.	Greece	at	para.	49.	
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proselytism	or	 in	other	words	“untrue”	evangelism.	In	his	dissenting	opinion,	 Judge	
Valticos	 differentiated	 between	 a	 “militant”	 Jehovah’s	 Witness	 faith	 and	 a	 “true”	
Christian	faith:	
“[O]n	the	one	hand,	we	have	a	militant	Jehovah's	Witness,	a	hardbitten	adept	
of	proselytism…..	on	the	other	hand,	the	ideal	victim,	a	naive	woman,	the	wife	of	a	
cantor	 in	 the	Orthodox	Church”.795	He	 further	notes	 that	 “it	 is	 regrettable	 that	 the	
above	 judgment	 should	 allow	 proselytising	 activities	 on	 condition	 only	 that	 they	
should	not	be	"improper".”796	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 Larissis	 and	 Others	 v	 Greece797	case,	 the	 applicants	 were	
officers	 in	 the	Greek	 air	 force	 and	 followers	 of	 the	 Pentecostal	 church.	 They	were	
convicted	of	improper	proselytisation	on	Orthodox	Christian	airmen	of	lower	ranking,	
as	 well	 as	 civilians.	 The	 applicants	 claimed	 that	 their	 rights	 under	 Article	 9	 were	
breached	when	they	were	prosecuted	and	punished	because	they	were	proselytising	
others.	The	ECtHR	did	not	dispute	that	there	was	an	interference	with	the	applicants’	
rights	 to	 “freedom	…	 to	manifest	 [their]	 religion	 or	 belief”.798	However,	 the	 ECtHR	
notes	 that	 the	measures	 taken	were	prescribed	by	 law799	and	pursued	a	 legitimate	
aim.800		 On	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 measures	 were	 necessary	 in	 a	
democratic	society,	the	ECtHR	held	that	
“the	 hierarchical	 structures	which	 are	 a	 feature	 of	 life	 in	 the	 armed	 forces	
may	 colour	 every	 aspect	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 military	 personnel,	 making	 it	
																																								 																					
795	Kokkinakis	v.	Greece,	(Valticos,	J.,	dissenting	opinion).	
796	Ibid.	
797	Larissis	and	others	v	Greece,	65	ECtHR	363	(1998).	
798	Ibid.,	at	38.	
799	Ibid.,	at	42.	
800	Ibid.,	at	44.	
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difficult	for	a	subordinate	to	rebuff	the	approaches	of	an	individual	of	superior	rank	
or	to	withdraw	from	a	conversation	initiated	by	him.	Thus,	what	would	in	the	civilian	
world	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 innocuous	 exchange	 of	 ideas	 which	 the	 recipient	 is	 free	 to	
accept	 or	 reject,	may,	 within	 the	 confines	 of	military	 life,	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 form	 of	
harassment	 or	 the	 application	 of	 undue	 pressure	 in	 abuse	 of	 power.	 It	 must	 be	
emphasised	 that	 not	 every	 discussion	 about	 religion	 or	 other	 sensitive	 matters	
between	 individuals	 of	 unequal	 rank	 will	 fall	 within	 this	 category.	 Nonetheless,	
where	 the	 circumstances	 so	 require,	 States	 may	 be	 justified	 in	 taking	 special	
measures	to	protect	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	subordinate	members	of	the	armed	
forces.”801	
The	ECtHR	accepted	that	the	Greek	courts’	decisions	were	 justified	 in	protecting	
airmen	 from	 improper	 proselytisation	 and	 any	 forms	 of	 coercion.	 The	 ECtHR	 held	
that	
“...	the	Court	considers	that	the	Greek	authorities	were	in	principle	justified	in	
taking	some	measures	to	protect	the	lower	ranking	airmen	from	improper	pressure	
applied	to	them	by	the	applicants	in	their	desire	to	promulgate	their	religious	beliefs.	
It	 notes	 that	 the	 measures	 taken	 were	 not	 particularly	 severe	 and	 were	 more	
preventative	 than	 punitive	 in	 nature,	 since	 the	 penalties	 imposed	 were	 not	
enforceable	if	the	applicants	did	not	reoffend	within	the	following	three	years.	...	In	
all	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case,	 it	 does	 not	 find	 that	 these	 measures	 were	
disproportionate.”802	
The	 ECtHR,	 however,	 rejected	 the	 respondent	 government’s	 arguments	 as	
regards	 proselytising	 the	 civilians	 and	 held	 that	 “the	 Court	 finds	 it	 of	 decisive																																									 																					
801	Larissis	and	Others	v.	Greece,	Application	Nos.	40/1996/759/958–960	(1998)	at	paras.	50-51.	
802	Ibid.,	at	54.	
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significance	 that	 the	 civilians	whom	 the	 applicants	 attempted	 to	 convert	were	 not	
subject	to	pressures	and	constraints	of	the	same	kind	as	the	airmen.”803	
What	 the	 above	 cases	 reveal	 is	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 does	 not	 only	 show	
appreciation	 for	“true”	proselytism	over	what	 it	 identifies	as	 improper	proselytism,	
but	 also	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 and	 necessity	 of	 proselytism	 to	 the	 Christian	
faith.	 The	 ECtHR	 thus	 accepts	 the	 right	 to	 proselytise	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	 the	
teaching	of	one’s	belief	or	religion.	However,	true	conversion	–	or	as	the	ECtHR	calls	
it:	proper	proselytisation	–	which	the	ECtHR	accepts,	derives	(as	Chapter	3	illustrates)	
from	the	Christian	belief	that	every	individual	should	be	free	to	turn	towards	the	true	
God	 at	 all	 times	 and	 that	 this	 can	 be	 done	 only	 by	 converting	 from	 false	 to	 true	
religion.	 This	 conversion	 should	 be	 done	without	 coercion,	 as	 the	 Protestant	 faith	
recommends.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 how	 the	 ECtHR	 accepted	 the	 air	 force	 officers	
proselytising	 of	 the	 civilians,	 where	 it	 considered	 that	 there	 would	 not	 be	 any	
coercion,	 but	 found	 compatible	 with	 Article	 9	 the	 measures	 taken	 against	 the	
applicants	when	proselytising	airmen	as	these	were	“justified	by	the	need	to	protect	
the	 prestige	 and	 effective	 operation	 of	 the	 armed	 forces	 and	 to	 protect	 individual	
soldiers	from	ideological	coercion.”804		
Though	the	ECtHR	does	not	use	the	language	“true”	versus	“false”	religion,	it	
does	 interpret	 it	 in	 this	 line	of	 thought,	 this	 is	 an	 indication	of	 the	underlying	bias	
that	is	present	in	the	ECHR	system.	According	to	Balagangadhara,805	non-Abrahamic	
cultures	do	not	have	“religion”	to	compete	in	this	religious	rivalry.	They	are	traditions	
																																								 																					
803	Ibid.,	at	59.	
804	Ibid.,	at	47.	
805 	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘To	 Follow	 our	 Forefathers:	 The	 nature	 of	 Tradition’	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/04/02/to-follow-our-forefathers-the-nature-of-tradition-s-n-
balagangadhara/	
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with	 specific	 sets	 of	 ancestral	 practices	 that	 characterise	 a	 human	 community.	
Traditions	are	 inherited	practices	and,	unlike	 religious	practices	 traditions,	have	no	
authority	 to	determine	who	belongs	 to	 them	or	whether	a	certain	culture	 requires	
them	 or	 not.	 Stories	 that	 are	 told	 within	 a	 tradition	 do	 not	 claim	 the	 truth	 like	
religious	stories	and	there	is	no	obligation	to	practice	a	tradition806	or	proselytise	and	
convert	 people	 into	 a	 tradition.	 The	 traditions	 are	maintained	 because	 they	make	
some	community	 into	a	 community	and	not	because	 they	contain	 some	“exclusive	
truth”	binding	the	believer	to	God.	The	attempt	to	 interfere	with	the	tradition	of	a	
community	from	the	outside	will	be	seen	as	illegitimate,	since	all	traditions	are	part	
of	 the	human	quest	 for	 truth.807	Freedom	 to	 convert	 or	 proselytise	does	not	make	
sense	 to	cultures	 that	do	not	view	others	 in	 terms	of	“religious”	 rivals.	Proselytism	
and	 conversion	 are	 an	 intrinsic	 drive	 within	 Abrahamic	 religions,	 hence	 when	 the	
ECtHR	accepts	that	conversion	and	proselytism	have	proper	and	improper	aspects,	it	
is	 confirming	 that	 there	 are	 true	 and	 false	 ways	 to	 proselytise	 and	 convert.	 This	
competing	attitude	of	truth	and	falsity	(or	of	conversion)	is	entrenched	in	Abrahamic	
religions.	When	there	were	divisions	between	the	Catholics	and	the	Protestants	(i.e.	
when	Western	Christianity	was	divided	during	 the	Age	of	Reformation),	both	 sects	
spoke	of	competing	truth	claims.	The	discussions	were	initiated	as	debates	on	false	
versus	true	religions.	Interestingly,	Judaism	and	Islam	did	the	same.	Each	suggested	
that	 their	 beliefs	 were	 the	 true	 beliefs	 regardless	 of	 whether	 they	 accused	 each	
other	of	being	deficient	in	worshipping	God	or	whether	they	were	false	religions.	
																																								 																					
806Ibid.		
807		S.N.	Balagangadhara,	Jakob	De	Roover,	The	Secular	State	and	Religious	Conflict:	Liberal	Neutrality	
and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1)	67–92.		
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		 Consequently,	 and	 by	 adopting	 a	 similar	 theological	 approach,	 the	 ECtHR	
cannot	 play	 the	 role	 of	 the	 agnostic,	 because	 it	 presumes	 that	 religious	 truth	 is	
cognitive	 in	 nature,	 and	 for	 example,	 coercion	 is	 not	 the	 way	 for	 a	 religion	 to	
persuade	 people	 of	 its	 truth.808	It	 therefore	 cannot	 remain	 neutral	with	 respect	 to	
the	competing	truth	claims	of	each	and	every	religion.	That	 is,	“the	notion	of	state	
neutrality	 can	 be	made	 sense	 of	 by	 saying	 that	where	 there	 are	 competing	 ‘truth	
claims’,	 one	 does	 not	 assume	 a	 pro-stance	 with	 respect	 to	 any	 one	 of	 them.”809	
However,	as	the	case	law	shows,	the	ECtHR	does	not	debate	whether	religion	itself	is	
a	question	of	truth	and	therefore	accepts	 it	to	be	a	matter	of	truth.	This	also	 leads	
the	ECtHR	to	endorse	the	religious	toleration,	which	is	in	itself	a	Protestant	concept	
that	is	not	in	turn	agnostic.810		
6.6	 Secularism	and	 Indoctrination	 in	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	 Is	 the	
Veil	a	Symbol	of	Iconoclasm?	
Limitations	on	the	manifestation	of	religion,	especially	religious	symbols	and	clothing,	
are	often	justified	by	the	principle	of	secularism.	For	example,	in	Sahin	v	Turkey,	the	
ECtHR	 notes	 that	 “it	 is	 the	 principle	 of	 secularism….which	 is	 the	 paramount	
consideration	underlying	the	ban	on	the	wearing	of	religious	symbols	in	universities.	
In	such	a	context,	where	the	values	of	pluralism,	respect	for	the	rights	of	others	and,	
in	 particular,	 equality	 before	 the	 law	 of	 men	 and	 women	 are	 being	 taught	 and	
applied	in	practice,	it	is	understandable	that	the	relevant	authorities	should	wish	to	
preserve	the	secular	nature	of	the	institution	concerned	and	so	consider	it	contrary	
																																								 																					
808	S.N.	 Balagangadhara	 and	 Jakob	 De	 Roover,	 ‘The	 Secular	 State	 and	 Religious	 Conflict:	 Liberal	
Neutrality	and	the	Indian	Case	of	Pluralism’	(2007)	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	15(1)	67–92,	85-
86.	
809	Ibid.,	at	86.	
810	For	more	details	on	the	concept	of	truth	and	falsity	see	section	3.6	in	this	thesis.	
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to	such	values	to	allow	religious	attire,	including,	as	in	the	present	case,	the	Islamic	
headscarf,	 to	 be	 worn.”811	Furthermore,	 the	 ECtHR	 noted	 in	 Dogru	 v	 France	 that	
“having	 regard	 to	 the	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 which	 must	 be	 left	 to	 the	 member	
States	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 delicate	 relations	 between	 the	
Churches	 and	 the	 State,	 religious	 freedom	 thus	 recognised	 and	 restricted	 by	 the	
requirements	of	secularism	appears	legitimate	in	the	light	of	the	values	underpinning	
the	Convention.”812	However,	it	is	questionable	if	the	ECtHR	can	then	be	neutral	in	its	
decisions	 and	whether	 it	 could	play	 the	 role	 of	 an	 agnostic.	 It	 is	 also	questionable	
whether	a	“neutral”	State,	as	opposed	to	a	“secular”	State,	can	better	accommodate	
the	cultural	traditions	of	say	adherents	of	non-Abrahamic	traditions.		
In	Lautsi	v	Italy	for	example,	the	applicants	complained	that	the	presence	of	a	
cross	on	the	school	walls	infringed	the	principle	of	secularism	and	requested	that	the	
crucifix	be	removed.	The	applicants	argued	that	the	crucifix	is	a	religious	symbol	with	
no	 cultural	 attribute.813	However,	 even	 though	 Italy	 is	 a	 “secular”	 State,	 the	ECtHR	
accepted	the	cross	to	be	a	religious	symbol,	but	allowed	schools	to	display	it	on	the	
walls	 under	 the	 name	 of	 secularism	 or	 neutrality.	 The	 ECtHR	 did	 not	 deny	 the	
religious	nature	of	the	cross,	but	did	not	see	it	as	a	sufficient	element	to	constitute	
indoctrination,	 thereby	 confirming	 the	 Protestant	 line	 of	 thought	 that	 symbols,	
although	they	are	religious	in	nature,	are	indeed	“deaf”	and	“dumb”.	
The	 Grand	 Chamber	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 overruled	 the	 lower	 Chamber’s	 decision	
and	 held	 that	 the	 question	 of	 religious	 symbols	 in	 classrooms	 was,	 in	 principle,	 a	
																																								 																					
811	Sahin	v	Turkey	at	116.	
812	Dogru	v	France,	Applciation	No.	27058/05	at	para	72.	
813	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	42.	
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matter	 falling	within	 the	margin	 of	 appreciation	 of	 the	 State,	 particularly	 as	 there	
was	no	European	consensus	as	regards	the	presence	of	religious	symbols.	The	ECtHR	
reverted	to	the	principle	of	the	margin	of	appreciation	to	recommend	that	the	Italian	
public	opinion	or	local	consensus	should	be	taken	into	consideration.	This	shows	that	
“judges	come	to	judgments	relying	upon	a	local	consensus	about	religion.”814		
In	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 ECtHR,	 the	 fact	 that	 crucifixes	 in	 State-school	
classrooms	in	Italy	conferred	on	the	country’s	majority	religion	predominant	visibility	
in	 the	 school	 environment	 was	 not	 in	 itself	 sufficient	 to	 denote	 a	 process	 of	
indoctrination.	Moreover,	in	its	view,	“the	presence	of	crucifixes	was	not	associated	
with	 compulsory	 teaching	 about	 Christianity”,815	and	 there	was	 nothing	 to	 suggest	
that	 the	authorities	were	 intolerant	of	pupils	who	believed	 in	other	 religions,	were	
non-believers	 or	who	held	 non-religious	 philosophical	 convictions.	 It	 accepted	 that	
the	cross	was	a	religious	symbol,	yet	 it	allowed	schools	to	display	 it	on	the	walls	of	
the	school.	
	 The	 ECtHR	 considered	 the	 crucifix	 to	 be	 “essentially	 a	 passive	 symbol	 .	 .	 .	
particularly	having	regard	to	the	principle	of	neutrality.”	It	was	not	“deemed	to	have	
an	 influence	 on	 pupils	 comparable	 to	 that	 of	 didactic	 speech	 or	 participation	 in	
religious	 activities.”816	The	 Grand	 Chamber	 rejected	 the	 Chamber’s	 view	 that	 the	
cross	was	a	“powerful	external	 symbol,”817	since	 the	display	of	 the	crucifix	was	not	
accompanied	by	obligatory	Christian	teachings	and	proselytising.818	It	held	that	there	
was	 no	 evidence	 to	 show	 that	 the	 display	 of	 the	 cross	 on	 the	wall	may	 have	 any	
																																								 																					
814	Jakob	De	Roover,	Europe,	India,	and	the	Limits	of	Secularism,	(Oxford	University	Press,	2016)	32.	
815	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	74.	
816	Ibid.,	at	72.	
817	Ibid.,	at	73.	
818	Ibid.,	at	74.	
	 246	
influence	 on	 the	 students.	 There	 was	 no	 consideration	 of	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	
crucifix	on	the	wall	would	lead	students	to	question	the	significance	and	meaning	of	
it	or	that	this	in	itself	could	be	a	kind	of	proselytism	and	influence.		
By	contrast,	in	a	different	judgment	regarding	religious	symbols,	i.e.	in	Sahin	v	
Turkey,819	the	ECtHR	concluded	that	the	headscarf	represented	a	“powerful	external	
symbol”,	which	“appeared	to	be	imposed	on	women	by	a	religious	precept	that	was	
hard	to	reconcile	with	the	principle	of	gender	equality.”820		
As	 Lorenzo	 Zucca	 points	 out,	 it	 is	 curious	 that	 the	 Grand	 Chamber	 did	 not	
believe	 that	 the	 crucifix,	 as	 a	 symbol,	 does	 have	 a	 sizeable	 impact	 on	 pupils.821		
Furthermore,	 it	held	 that	whether	 the	crucifix	has	 “any	other	meanings	beyond	 its	
religious	 symbolism	 is	not	decisive	at	 this	 stage.”822	However,	why	would	a	 symbol	
need	any	interpretation?	A	symbol	as	defined	by	Oxford	English	dictionary	is	“a	thing	
that	 represents	 or	 stands	 for	 something	 else,	 especially	 a	 material	 object	
representing	something	abstract.”823		The	cross	is	a	clear	visual	reflection	and	visual	
influence	 of	 what	 it	 stands	 for.824	If	 the	 cross	 has	 no	 visual	 influence	 or	 if	 it	 is	 a	
passive	symbol	as	the	ECtHR	claims,	could	it	then	be	seen	as	a	symbol	that	is	neither	
false	 nor	 true	 with	 “no	 “moral	 rule”	 attached	 to	 it	 (the	 way,	 say,	 the	 fables	 of	
Aesop)”825	and	with	no	reflective	 influence?	Could	the	concept	 it	resembles	also	be	
seen	as	neither	 true	nor	 false?	The	ECtHR	required	the	applicant	 to	bring	evidence																																									 																					
819	Leyla	Sahin	v.	Turkey	(2005),	Application	no.	44774/98.	
820	Ibid.,	at	111.	See	also	Dahlab	v	Switzerland	(2001)	No.	42393/98.	
821 	Lorenzo	 Zucca,	 ‘Lautsi:	 a	 Commentary	 of	 the	 Grand	 Chamber	 Decision’	 April	 14,	 2011	 IJCL,	
electronic	copy	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809577		
822	Lautsi	v.	Italy	at	66.	
823 	Definition	 of	 the	 word	 symbol	 in	 Oxford	 dictionary	 electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/symbol		
824	Lorenzo	 Zucca,	 ‘Lautsi,	 ‘A	 Commentary	 of	 the	 Grand	 Chamber	 decision’	 April	 14,	 2011	 IJCL,	
electronic	copy	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809577	
825 	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘Are	 Stories	 Symbols?”	 March	 23,	 2011	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/23/are-stories-symbols/		
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that	the	crucifix	had	a	negative	influence	on	her	children,	stating	that	“[t]here	is	no	
evidence	before	the	Court	that	the	display	of	a	religious	symbol	on	classroom	walls	
may	have	an	influence	on	pupils	and	so	it	cannot	reasonably	be	asserted	that	it	does	
or	 does	 not	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 young	 persons	 whose	 convictions	 are	 still	 in	 the	
process	of	being	formed.”826		
When	 comparing	 the	 Lautsi	 case	with	 the	Dahlab	 case,	 Jeroen	 Temperman	
observes	that	the	ECtHR	considers	that:	
“in	 the	 absence	 of	 proof	 to	 the	 contrary	 in	 cases	 involving	 state	 display	 of	
symbols	 (notably,	 crucifixes)	 in	 public	 schools,	 it	may	be	 assumed	 that	 the	 symbol	
has	no	adverse	effects	on	the	rights	of	others;	whereas	in	the	absence	of	proof	to	the	
contrary	 in	 cases	 involving	 the	 individual	 display	 of	 symbols	 (notably,	 Islamic	
headscarves)	 it	 may	 be	 assumed	 that	 the	 symbol	 does	 have	 adverse	 effects	 on	
pupils”.827			
Jeroen	 Temperman	 observes	 that	 when	 the	 ECtHR	 refers	 to	 symbols	 as	
“passive”828	or	“powerful”,	 it	does	so	without	any	authoritative	citation	or	evidence	
but	by	merely	relying	on	“common	sense”.829	Moreover	Nicholas	Gibson	reveals	the	
inconsistent	approach	taken	by	the	ECtHR	in	the	Sahin	and	Dahlab	case	on	the	one	
hand	and	the	Kokkinakis	case	on	the	other	hand.	He	states	that	the	“mere	wearing	of	
religious	attire	is	scarcely	“improper””.		He	explains	that,	even	if	worn	with	the	intent	
of	proselytising,	the	wearing	of	the	headscarf	remains	a	passive	act	when	compared	
to	the	“active	coercion	inherent	in	the	examples	of	impropriety	listed	in	Kokkinakis.”																																									 																					
826	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	66.	
827	Jeroen	 Temperman	 (ed.),	 Religious	 Symbols	 in	 the	 Public	 School	 Classroom,	 The	 Lautsi	 Papers:	
Multidisciplinary	Reflections	on	Religious	Symbols	in	the	Public	School	Classroom	(BRILL/	Nijhoff,	2012).	
828	Lautsi	and	Others	v.	Italy,	para.	72.	
829	Ibid.	
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Nicholas	Gibson	argues	that	even	if	a	teacher	wears	the	headscarf	 in	the	classroom	
this	 on	 its	 own	 is	 insufficient	 to	 cause	 "impropriety,	 as	 that	 would	 require	 “more	
active	attempts	by	her	to	coerce	or	corrupt.”830		
	 When	 assessing	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 crucifix	 on	 children	 in	 the	 Lautsi	 case,	
one	should	not	only	question	the	potential	influence	of	the	symbol	itself	(as	a	passive	
symbol),	but	rather	the	message	the	State	is	sending	by	prescribing	its	display	(as	an	
active	 symbol).	 The	 ECtHR	 indirectly	 accepted	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 Italian	
Administrative	court	which	had	decided	as	follows:	
	 “The	 symbol	 of	 the	 crucifix,	 thus	 understood,	 now	 possesses,	 through	 its	
references	to	the	values	of	tolerance,	a	particular	scope	in	consideration	of	the	fact	
that	at	present	 Italian	State	schools	are	attended	by	numerous	pupils	 from	outside	
the	European	Union,	to	whom	it	is	relatively	important	to	transmit	the	principles	of	
openness	 to	 diversity	 and	 the	 refusal	 of	 any	 form	 of	 fundamentalism	 –	 whether	
religious	or	secular	–	which	permeate	our	system.”831		
	 The	 judgment	 is	 also	 an	 example	 of	 the	 ECtHR’s	 understanding	 of	 what	
“proper	proselytism”	is	as	opposed	to	improper	proselytism.832		
	 By	accepting	that	there	was	no	violation	of	Article	9,	the	ECtHR	also	accepted	
that	 “[t]he	 cross,	 as	 the	 symbol	 of	 Christianity,	 can	 therefore	 not	 exclude	 anyone	
without	 denying	 itself;	 it	 even	 constitutes	 in	 a	 sense	 the	 universal	 sign	 of	 the	
																																								 																					
830	Nicholas	Gibson,	‘Faith	in	the	Courts:	Religious	Dress	and	Human	Rights’	(2007)	C.L.J.	66(3)	657-697,	
693.	
831	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	12.6.	
832	Kokkinakis	v	Greece	(1993)	260	A	ECtHR		(ser.	A)	at	para	48.	
	 249	
acceptance	of	and	respect	for	every	human	being	as	such,	irrespective	of	any	belief,	
religious	or	other,	which	he	or	she	may	hold.”833				
	 Recalling	 Balagangadhara’s	 framework,	 religion	 spreads	 either	 through	
proselytisation	 or	 by	 secularising	 itself.	 Consequently	 in	 order	 for	 religion	 to	
universalise	 and	 spread,	 it	 requires	 secularism	 that	 makes	 it	 lose	 its	 specific	
reference	 to	 a	 religion	 and	 eventually	 lose	 its	 specific	 character,	 which	 in	 this	
argument	is	Protestant	Christianity.	Accordingly,	“secularisation	would	not	mean	the	
absence	of	religion,	but	occlusion	of	the	specific	religion	that	Christianity	is,	as	part	of	
its	universalizing	dynamic,	and	its	spread	in	a	non-religious	guise.”834	The	Lautsi	case,	
therefore	 exemplifies	 an	 excellent	 model	 of	 such	 a	 process	 for	 “the	 ostensibly	
atheistic	demand	for	the	removal	of	the	crucifix	is	really	the	iconoclasm	at	the	heart	
of	Christianity	presented	in	secular	form.”835	
The	ECtHR’s	decision	that	the	cross	did	not	infringe	the	principle	of	neutrality,	
secularism	and	 freedom	of	 thought	and	conscience	 is	an	acceptance	that	 the	cross	
“constitutes	in	a	sense	the	universal	sign	of	the	acceptance	of	and	respect	for	every	
human	being	as	such,	 irrespective	of	any	belief,	 religious	or	other,	which	he	or	she	
may	 hold.”836	Moreover,	 it	 is	 an	 indirect	 acceptance	 that	 its	 presence	 is	 a	 sign	 of	
tolerance,	 equality	 and	 respect	 for	 all	 human	 beings	 irrespective	 of	 their	 beliefs,	
since	the	ECtHR	clearly	accepts	that	the	presence	of	crucifixes	in	classrooms	“made	a	
legitimate	contribution	to	enabling	children	to	understand	the	national	community	in	
																																								 																					
833	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	13.3.	
834	Prakash	 Shah,	 “‘Does	Durkheim	 Enhances	Our	Understanding	 of	 Law	 and	 Religion’	 Legal	 Studies	
Research	 Paper	 No.	 212/2015	 at	 p.4.	 Available	 at	
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694566	(last	accessed	in	March	2018).	
835	Ibid.	
836	Ibid.,	at	13.4	
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which	they	were	expected	to	integrate”837	as	there	was	no	sign	to	suggest	that	“the	
authorities	 were	 intolerant	 of	 pupils	 who	 believed	 in	 other	 religions,	 were	 non-
believers	or	who	held	non-religious	philosophical	convictions.”838 	
The	 ECtHR	 also	 clearly	 accepted	 the	 analogy	 that	 the	 cross	 does	 not	 reject	
other	 faiths,	 since	 doing	 so	 would	 be	 a	 contradiction	 to	 the	 Protestant	 faith.	
However,	nothing	similar	is	said	about	other	faiths,	which	also	means	that	the	ECtHR	
considers	 this	 similarity	 inapplicable	 to	 other	 religions.	 The	 ECtHR	 has	 clearly	
accepted	the	Italian	court’s	analysis	that	the	presence	of	the	cross	in	the	classroom	
“when	 correctly	 understood,	 is	 not	 concerned	 with	 the	 freely	 held	 convictions	 of	
anyone,	excludes	no	one	and	of	course	does	not	impose	or	prescribe	anything.”839	
	 Moreover,	 this	 acceptance	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	message	 from	 the	 ECtHR	 that	
Christianity	 is	universal,	since	no	one	can	exclude	herself	or	himself,	and	all	human	
beings	 are	 included	 in	 the	message	 that	 the	 cross	 displays.	 The	 ECtHR	 also	 agrees	
that	symbols	relating	to	Christianity	are	universal	symbols	of	 respect	and	tolerance	
that	do	not	convey	any	coercive	or	proselytising	messages,	even	on	children	who	are	
still	developing	their	own	non-religious	or	non-Christian	views.840		
By	contrast,	 in	Dahlab	v	Switzerland	a	Muslim	schoolteacher	was	prohibited	
from	wearing	the	headscarf	whilst	teaching.	The	ECtHR	held	that	wearing	a	headscarf	
was	 contrary	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 tolerance	 which	 was	 employed	 as	 an	 additional	
argument	 for	 accepting	 the	 ban.	 This	 approach	 is	 highly	 problematic	 because	 by	
																																								 																					
837	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	39.	
838	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	74.	
839	Lautsi	v	Italy	(2011)	at	para	14.1.	
840 	Stijin	 Smet,	 ‘Lautsi	 v	 Italy:	 The	 Argument	 from	 Neutrality’	 March	 22,	 2011	 available	 at	
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2011/03/22/lautsi-v-italy-the-argument-from-neutrality/	 (Last	
accessed	in	April	2018).	
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accepting	that	the	headscarf	is	a	sign	of	intolerance,	the	ECtHR	is	not	only	in	danger	
of	stigmatising	the	applicant	herself	as	 intolerant,	but	also	numerous	other	women	
wearing	 the	 scarf.841	Furthermore,	 as	 Judge	 Tulkens	 noted	 in	 Sahin	 v	 Turkey,	 “by	
accepting	 the	 applicant’s	 exclusion	 from	 university	 in	 the	 name	 of	 secularism	 and	
equality,	 the	 majority	 have	 accepted	 her	 exclusion	 from	 precisely	 the	 type	 of	
liberated	environment	in	which	the	true	meaning	of	those	values	can	take	shape	and	
develop.”842			
Tolerance	is	not	some	secular	or	philosophical	doctrine,	but	a	concept	that	is	
embedded	 in	 the	 Protestant	 theology.	 The	 discussions	 about	 tolerance	 emanated	
from	 the	 religious	 conflicts	 in	 Europe	 between	 the	 Protestants	 and	 the	 Catholics.	
According	to	the	Protestant	theology,	there	should	be	no	human	mediation	between	
God	and	man.	The	Catholics,	by	contrast,	claimed	that	the	Church	mediated	between	
man	and	God	because	 the	Church	was	 the	body	and	bride	of	Christ.	 The	Catholics	
held	 that	 the	Church	decided	what	proper	 faith	 is,	whilst	 the	Protestants	held	 that	
the	Holy	Spirit	inspired	Christians	in	interpreting	the	message	of	God	(that	being	the	
Bible,	 without	 the	 mediation	 of	 the	 Church).843	Religious	 symbols	 were	 viewed	 as	
idolatrous	 or	 the	 Devil’s	 worship.	 Accordingly,	 when	 the	 ECtHR	 refers	 to	 the	
headscarf	as	a	sign	of	 intolerance,	 it	 is	getting	 involved	 in	 the	same	debate	as	 that	
between	 the	 Protestants	 and	 the	 Catholics,	 and	 is	 viewing	 the	 headscarf	 as	 some	
kind	of	idolatry	or	iconoclasm.		
																																								 																					
841	Ingvill	Thorson	Plesner	‘The	European	Court	on	Human	Rights	between	fundamentalist	and	liberal	
secularism’	 	 (Strasbourg	 Conference),	 available	 at	
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=3849	[Accessed	May	2014]	
842	Leyla	Sahin	v.	Turkey	[2005],	Appl.	no.	44774/98	at	para	19.	
843 	S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 ‘The	 Theology	 of	 Tolerance’	 March	 25,	 2014	 available	 at	
http://www.hipkapi.com/2014/03/25/theology-of-tolerance/		
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Idolatry	 identifies	 the	 practices	 that	 are	 forbidden	 from	 the	 practices	 that	
worship	 constitutes	 as	 obligatory,	 thus	 opening	 up	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 religiously	
permissible.	“By	filtering	out	such	neutral	or	indifferent	practices,	the	mechanism	of	
idolatry	 creates	 a	 secular	 world	 that	 is	 now	 defined	 by	 Christian	 religion.”844	The	
ECtHR	does	not	use	terms	such	as	“false	religion”	or	“idolatrous	practices”,	but	the	
conclusion	 is	 similar	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 to	 decide	 what	 counts	 as	
religion.845	It	 argues	 that	 certain	 practices	 or	 beliefs	 considered	 religious	 by	 some	
people	are	not	 truly	 religious,	but	actually	concern	personal	preferences	or	secular	
issues	that	is,	human	inventions.	Regarding	the	headscarf,	what	the	ECtHR	is	actually	
saying	is	that	the	headscarf	is	not	“truly”	religious	even	though	it	looks	that	it	is	so.	It	
is	 false	 faith.	 The	 suggestion	 also	 is	 that	 these	 practices	 are	 secular	 and	 wrongly	
viewed	as	religious	so	can	therefore	be	regulated	by	State.		
The	problem	therefore	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	disputes	about	whom	or	what	 is	
truly	 religious	are	 viable	only	within	 the	 framework	of	 a	 specific	 religion.	846		When	
the	 ECtHR	 describes	 the	 headscarf	 as	 a	 powerful	 symbol	 that	 “appeared	 to	 be	
imposed	 on	 women	 by	 a	 religious	 precept	 that	 was	 hard	 to	 reconcile	 with	 the	
principle	of	gender	equality,”847	it	 is	again	trying	to	identify	what	qualifies	as	“true”	
practices	of	religion	and	what	are	thought	to	be	“false”	spiritual	rules	and	coercive	
methods,	which	according	to	the	Protestants	infringe	one’s	freedom	of	conscience.		
The	notion	of	Christian	liberty	and	freedom	from	spiritual	laws	is	at	the	core	
of	 how	 the	ECtHR	 interprets	what	 constitutes	 the	 freedom	of	 conscience.	Humans	
																																								 																					
844	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘Secular	Law	and	the	Realm	of	False	Religion’	in	Winnifred	Fallers	Sullivan,	Robert	
A.	Yelle,	and	Mateo	Taussig-Rubbo	(eds)	After	Secular	Law	(Stanford	University	Press	2011).		
845	Ibid.	
846	Ibid.	
847Leyla	Sahin	v.	Turkey	[2005],	No.	44774/98	See	also	Dahlab	v	Switzerland	[2001]	No.	42393/98.	
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could	 therefore	 legitimately	 resist	 any	 human	 laws	 which	 infringed	 upon	 their	
conscience	 and	 faith	 (in	 this	 case	 the	 false	 religious	 law	 or	 belief	 in	 wearing	 the	
headscarf).	 The	 spiritual	 kingdom	 should	 only	 be	 the	 place	where	 God	 only	 rules.	
When	 human	 laws	 infringed	 upon	 faith	 and	 conscience,	 they	 could	 be	 resisted	
legitimately.848		
While	using	“secular”	 language	 in	 its	 judgment	 in	Dahlab	v	Switzerland,	 the	
ECtHR	 prohibited	 the	 headscarf	 and	 “legally”	 replicated	 the	 Protestant	 ideas	 that	
symbols	(in	this	case	the	Hijab)	are	interfering	between	man	and	God	and	cannot	be	
tolerated	 in	a	 “secular”	 society.	When	 the	ECtHR	 identifies	 the	 cross	 in	Lautsi	 as	 a	
“truly”	religious	symbol,	although	a	passive	one,	it	is	introducing	an	implicit	model	of	
false	 religion	 that	 restructures	 traditions	 in	 society.	 The	 ECtHR	 in	 Lautsi	 explicitly	
rejected	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 crucifix	 is	 a	powerful	 religious	 symbol	while	accepting	 in	
Dahlab	that	the	headscarf	is	an	immediate	visible	religious	symbol	that	has	a	direct	
influence	on	pupils.	It	held	that	
“it	is	very	diﬃcult	to	assess	the	impact	that	a	powerful	external	symbol	such	
as	the	wearing	of	a	headscarf	may	have	on	the	freedom	of	conscience	and	religion	of	
very	young	children	.	.	.	In	those	circumstances,	it	cannot	be	denied	outright	that	the	
wearing	of	 a	 headscarf	might	 have	some	 kind	of	 proselytising	eﬀect,	 seeing,	 that	 it	
appears	to	be	imposed	on	women	by	a	precept	which	is	laid	down	in	the	Koran	and	
which,	 as	 the	 Federal	 Court	 noted,	 is	 hard	 to	 square	with	 the	 principle	 of	 gender	
equality.	 It	 therefore	 appears	 difficult	 to	 reconcile	 the	 wearing	 of	 an	 Islamic	
headscarf	with	the	message	of	tolerance,	respect	for	others	and,	above	all,	equality	
																																								 																					
848	Jakob	De	Roover	,	PhD	thesis	at	p.	111.	
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and	non-discrimination	that	all	teachers	in	a	democratic	society	must	convey	to	their	
pupils.”849			
The	ECtHR	did	not	give	a	clear	explanation	as	to	why	students	in	Dahlab	may	
be	more	 influenced	and	 indoctrinated	by	 religious	symbols	 than	students	 in	Lautsi.	
The	 ECtHR	 could	 be	 seen,	 when	 also	 comparing	 Dahlab	 and	 Sahin	 to	 Lautsi	 and	
Eweida,	as	favouring	particular	symbols	over	others.	With	a	slight	ironic	implication,	
the	 principle	 of	 neutrality	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 prohibit	 non-Christian	 symbols,	 but	
does	 not	 apply	 to	 ban	majority	 symbols,	 or	 it	 may	 even	 be	 concluded	 that	 some	
symbols	 are	 more	 “neutral”	 than	 others.850	The	 ECtHR	 considers	 the	 cross	 and	
Christian	religious	symbols	to	be	passive	and	therefore	“deaf	and	mute”,	much	 like	
the	 Protestant	 ideology	 on	 symbols.	 However,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 symbols	 of	 other	
faiths,	 the	 ECtHR	 is	 more	 critical	 and	 views	 them	 as	 symbols	 that	 can	 easily	
indoctrinate	 and	 spread	 “false”	 images.851	This	 is	 a	 similar	 interpretation	 of	 the	
Protestant	ideology	on	iconoclasm.		
Lourdes	 Peroni	 makes	 a	 very	 incisive	 observation	 on	 the	Dahlab	 judgment	
noting	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 “backgrounds	 the	 applicant	 through	 nominalisation.”852	She	
notices	that	the	ECtHR	suppresses	the	applicant	by	using	the	noun	“the	wearing	of”	
the	headscarf,	 instead	of	using	 the	active	 verb	 clause	 “to	wear”.	 This,	 Peroni	 says,	
objectifies	 the	 applicant’s	 action	 (wearing	 of	 the	 veil)	 and	 backgrounds	 her	 (the	
applicant).	 It	therefore	transforms	the	applicant	(the	agent)	 into	a	static	entity.	She	
																																								 																					
849	Dahlab	v	Switzerland	Application	No.	42393/98,	15	February	2001	at	p.13.	
850	Lorenzo	 Zucca,	 ‘Lautsi,	 ‘A	 Commentary	 of	 the	 Grand	 Chamber	 decision’	 April	 14,	 2011	 IJCL,	
electronic	copy	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809577	
851	See	for	example	Dahlab	v	Switerzland	and	Leyla	Sahin	v	Turkey.	
852	Lourdes	Peroni,	‘Religion	and	Culture	in	the	Discourse	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	the	
Risks	of	Stereotyping	and	Naturalising’,	(2014)	International	Journal	of	Law	in	Context	10(2)	195-221,	
202.	
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further	 notes	 that	 this	 language	 is	 not	 used	 when	 talking	 about	 the	 applicant’s	
“victims”,	 as	 they	 are	 not	 excluded	 from	 the	 text	 like	 the	 applicant. 853 	Peroni	
continues	to	explain	that	“by	turning	verbs	into	nouns,	the	Court	linguistically	creates	
a	‘thing’.	It	suggests	that	‘the	headscarf’	has	a	real	or	tangible	existence,	external	to	
that	of	 the	applicants.	 It	 gives	 ‘the	headscarf’	 a	 life	of	 its	 own,	while	 “denying	 the	
lives	 of	 the	 applicants.”854	Thus	 the	 veil	 becomes	 a	 symbol	 and	 an	 entity,	 and	 it	 is	
evident	that	this	entity	(the	veil)	is	not	seen	as	similar	to	the	cross	(which	was	seen	as	
a	passive	symbol	 in	Lautsi)	but	has	some	active	element	 in	 it	that	could	 improperly	
proselytise.		
The	ECtHR’s	decisions	on	the	veil	and	other	religious	garments	and	symbols	
reflect	Calvin’s	words	that	it	was	when	the	world	began	to	delight	in	vests,	garments	
and	 other	material	 things,	 rather	 than	 seeking	 Christ	 in	 his	Word,	 sacraments	 and	
spiritual	 graces	 asserts,	 that	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 corruption	 into	 idolatry	
happened.855	Consequently,	 to	put	this	 in	the	context	of	 the	Protestant	theology,	 it	
could	 be	 seen	 as	 illustrating	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 post-Reformation	 struggle	 for	
iconoclasm,	but	one	that	is	fought	over	through	the	secularised	language	of	modern	
law,	 such	 as	 equality,	 gender	 inequality,	 discrimination,	 and	 respect	 for	 others.	
Similarly,	in	Sahin	v.	Turkey,	it	could	also	be	said	that	the	ECtHR	viewed	the	veil	as	a	
powerful	 symbol	 capable	 of	 exerting	 pressure	 on	 students	 and	 that	 “wearing	 the	
Islamic	 headscarf	 could	 not	 easily	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	 message	 of	 tolerance,	
respect	for	others	and,	above	all,	equality	and	non-discrimination	that	all	teachers	in	
																																								 																					
853	Ibid.		
854	Ibid.,	at	203.	
855	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	138.	
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a	democratic	 society	 should	convey	 to	 their	pupils.”856	Maleiha	Malik	 suggests	 that	
when	the	ECtHR	invokes	the	gender	equality,	living	together	and	other	arguments,	it	
is	 implicitly	 portraying	 religions	 other	 than	 Christianity,	 for	 example	 Islam,	 as	
“backward”	and	“barbaric”	when	compared	with	the	Western	culture.857		
In	D.	 v	 France,858	the	 applicant,	 a	 devout	 Jewish	man,	 had	 refused	 to	 hand	
over	the	Guett	 (a	divorce	document)	to	his	ex-wife	 in	order	to	preserve	his	right	to	
remarry	his	wife.	The	Commission	noted	that	“that	the	applicant	does	not	allege	that	
in	 handing	 over	 the	 letter	 of	 repudiation	 he	 would	 be	 obliged	 to	 act	 against	 his	
conscience.”859	Furthermore,	 it	 argued	 that	 the	 “applicant	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 at	
variance	on	this	point	with	the	religious	leaders	under	whose	authority	he	claims	to	
be	acting.”860	Then	the	Commission	found	that	“under	Hebrew	law,	it	is	customary	to	
hand	over	the	letter	of	repudiation	after	the	civil	divorce	has	been	pronounced,	and	
that	 no	 man	 with	 genuine	 religious	 convictions	 would	 contemplate	 delaying	 the	
remittance	 of	 this	 letter	 to	 his	 ex-wife.”861	Accordingly,	 the	 Commission	 concluded	
that	 this	 refusal	 did	 not	 constitute	 the	 manifestation	 of	 religious	 observance	 or	
practice	and	declared	the	complaint	manifestly	ill-founded.	
The	ECtHR	 in	this	 judgment	required	the	applicant	to	be	 in	compliance	with	
religious	 leaders	 in	order	to	be	entitled	to	the	protection	granted	by	Article	9.	This	
approach	clearly	places	at	a	disadvantage	those	who	do	not	adhere	to	all	doctrinal	
																																								 																					
856	Sahin	v	Turkey	at	para	111.	
857	Maleiha	Malik,	The	“Other”	Citizens:	Religion	in	a	Multicultural	Europe,	in	Law,	State	and	Religion	
In	the	New	Europe:	Debates	And	Dilemmas	93,	112	(Lorenzo	Zucca	&	Camil	Ungureanu	eds.	2012).	
858	D.	v.	France,	App.	No.	10180/82,	35	(1983)	Eur.	Comm’n	H.R.	Dec.	&	Rep.	199.	
859	Ibid.,	at	p.	202.	
860	Ibid.	
861	Ibid.	(emphasis	added).	
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prescriptions	of	a	particular	religion.862	The	ECtHR	also	questions	the	authenticity	of	
the	 applicant’s	 religious	 convictions	 as	 it	 considers	 that	 a	 man	 with	 genuine	
convictions	would	not	“behave”	in	the	way	the	applicant	did.	Furthermore,	it	shows	
that	the	ECtHR’s	narrow	construction	of	the	“manifestation”	of	religion	fits	with	an	
understanding	 of	 religion	 as	 “a	 set	 of	 theological	 propositions”	 as	 opposed	 to	 “a	
particular	way	of	living.”863		
Furthermore	 in	 Cha’are	 Shalom	 Ve	 Tsedek	 v.	 France 864 ,	 the	 applicants’	
organisation	wanted	to	follow	its	own	ritual	in	slaughtering	while	using	the	strictest	
method.	 The	 ECtHR	 claimed	 that	 authorisation	 for	 ritual	 slaughter	 was	 already	
granted	to	an	organisation	which	was	supposed	to	be	broadly	representative	of	the	
Jewish	community	in	France.	Applicants	could	still	eat	Kosher	meat	and	the	meat	did	
not	differ	much	 from	that	of	“glatt”	meat	 (which	could	be	obtained	 from	Belgium)	
and	the	applicants	could	not	establish	 that	 they	were	unable	 to	obtain	 this	kind	of	
meat	from	Belgium	or	elsewhere.	
The	ECtHR	held	that	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion	guaranteed	by	Article	9	
of	 the	 Convention	 could	 not	 “extend	 to	 the	 right	 to	 take	 part	 in	 person	 in	 the	
performance	 of	 ritual	 slaughter	 and	 the	 subsequent	 certification	 process.”865 	It	
considered	 this	 ultra-orthodox	 category	 of	 Jews	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 the	 dominant	
Jewish	 religion.	 Furthermore	 it	 stated	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 only	 consuming	 Kosher	
meat	was	required	by	Judaism	as	enshrined	in	the	Doctrines	and	the	Torah.		
																																								 																					
862	See	 also	 Carolyn	 Evans,	 Freedom	 of	 Religion	 Under	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights	
(Oxford	University	press,	2001)	122	
863	Carolyn	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Freedom	 in	European	 Human	 Rights	Law:	 The	 Search	 For	 a	 Guiding	
Conception’	in	M	Janis	and	C	Evans	(eds),	Religion	and	International	Law	(The	Hague,	1999),	385,	395		
864	Cha’are	Shalom	Ve	Tsedek	v.	France	ECtHR,	Application	no.	27417/95		(2000).	
865	Ibid	at	82	(emphasis	added).	
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The	 ECtHR	 did	 not	 contest	 that	 that	 ritual	 slaughter	 “constitutes	 a	 rite	 …	
whose	purpose	is	to	provide	Jews	with	meat	from	animals	slaughtered	in	accordance	
with	 religious	 prescriptions,	 which	 is	 an	 essential	 aspect	 of	 practice	 of	 the	 Jewish	
religion.”866	It	 held	 that	 there	would	 have	 been	 an	 infringement	 of	 the	 applicant’s	
freedom	 of	 religion	 “only	 if	 the	 illegality	 of	 performing	 ritual	 slaughter	 made	 it	
impossible	 for	 ultra-orthodox	 Jews	 to	 eat	 meat	 from	 animals	 slaughtered	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 religious	 prescriptions	 they	 considered	 applicable,”867	which	
was	decided	not	to	be	the	case.	The	interference	was	seen	as	prescribed	by	law	and	
perused	a	legitimate	aim	namely	the	“protection	of	public	health	and	public	order,	in	
so	far	as	organisation	by	the	State	of	the	exercise	of	worship	is	conducive	to	religious	
harmony	and	tolerance.”868	Accordingly,	the	ECtHR	ruled	that	there	was		no	violation	
of	Article	9.		
The	 ECtHR	 has	 considered	 the	 applicant’s	 method	 of	 slaughter	 a	 “ritual	
performance”,	 where	 the	 “only	 difference	 lies	 in	 the	 thoroughness	 of	 the	
examination	 of	 the	 slaughtered	 animal's	 lungs	 after	 death”;869	a	 difference	 which	
evidently	the	ECtHR	regards	as	not	of	any	importance	or	is	of	minimal	significance.	It	
is	thus	clear	that	the	ECtHR	favoured	a	highly	textualised	and	doctrinal	approach	to	
rituals	performed	by	the	applicants.	
Silvio	Ferrari	 suggests	 that	 the	ECtHR	“has	some	problems	 in	understanding	
the	conceptions	of	 religion	which	 stress	 the	elements	of	 identity	and	practice	over	
																																								 																					
866	Ibid.,	73.	
867	Ibid.	
868	Ibid.,	84.	
869	Ibid.,	79.	
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those	of	 freely	 chosen	belief.”870		 Furthermore,	Nomi	Maya	 Stolzenberg	notes	 that	
“[t]here	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 be	 concerned	 that	 the	model	 of	 religion	 as	 conscience,	
which	 relies	 on	 the	 basic	 distinction	 between	 practice	 and	 belief,	 privileging	 the	
latter	 over	 the	 former,	 threatens	 to	 give	 short	 shrift	 to	 religious	 practices	 and	
institutions.”871	The	ECtHR	refers	to	the	“non-essential”	element	of	a	certain	practice	
when	considering	the	“manifestation	of	religion”	and	is	in	favour	of	the	conventional	
or	Protestant	logic	that	material	requirements	to	manifest	a	religion	can	be	restricted	
without	causing	any	interference	with	the	applicant’s	real	beliefs.	By	focusing	on	the	
forum	 internum	 at	 the	 expense	 of	material	manifestation	 of	 a	 tradition	 the	 ECtHR	
fails	to	take	into	account	that	a	particular	religion	or	more	specifically	a	tradition	can	
be	 something	 grounded	 in	 experience	 and	 matter	 and	 not	 merely	 something	
immaterial.	It	seems	that	to	qualify	for	the	protection	accorded	under	Article	9,	the	
applicant	 ought	 to	 have	 demonstrated	 immaterial	 concepts	 to	 accessing	 the	
divine.872	
6.6.1	The	Protestant	Understanding	of	Symbols	
The	 above	 examples	 show	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 remains	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	
theological	explanations	as	to	what	freedom	of	religion	entails	and	there	seems	to	be	
no	accommodation	of	traditions	that	fall	outside	a	doctrinal	or	theological	scope.	It	
appears	 that	 manifestations	 of	 belief	 that	 are	 doctrinally	 mandated	 attract	
protection	under	Article	9	of	 the	ECHR	as	opposed	 to	 religious	manifestations	 that																																									 																					
870	Silvio	Ferrari,	The	Strasbourg	Court	and	Article	9	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights:	A	
Quantitative	 Analysis	 of	 the	 Case	 Law,	 in	 THE	 LAUTSI	 PAPERS:	 Multidisciplinary	 Reflections	 On	
Religious	Symbols	In	The	Public	School	Classroom	13	and	n.2	(Jeroen	Temperman,	ed.,	2012)	33.	
871	Nomi	Maya	Stolzenberg,	‘Theses	on	Secularism’	(2010)	SDLV	47	1041,	1065.	
872	Saïla	Ouald	 Chaib,	Gatis	 Kovalkovs	 v.	 Latvia:	 The	 Strasbourg	 Court	 keeps	 the	 door	 to	 reasonable	
accommodation	open	 March	 15	 2012	 avaliavb;e	 at	
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/15/gatis-kovalkovs-v-latvia-the-strasbroug-court-keeps-the-
door-to-reasonable-accommodation-open/	)	
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are	 not	 based	 on	 doctrinal	 mandates.873	Protestantism	 attempted	 to	 transform	 a	
community	into	a	“pure	Christian	church”	by	eliminating	iconoclasm.	For	it	believed	
that	 the	 use	 of	 symbols,	 relics	 images,	 and	 items	 of	worship	were	material	 of	 the	
temporal	world.874	In	 just	 the	 same	way	 as	 Christians	 rejected	 the	practices	 of	 the	
pagans	as	idolatrous,	Reformists	did	the	same	with	the	Roman	Catholics	and	labelled	
their	practices	as	 idolatrous.	They	viewed	them	as	 the	pagans	of	 the	sixteenth	and	
seventeenth	centuries.	The	established	doctrinal	boundary	(through	ecclesiastic	law)	
set	by	 the	Reformists	allowed	them	to	determine	which	practices	and	beliefs	were	
idolatrous	and	harmful	to	religion;	other	practices	were	acknowledged	as	indifferent	
to	religion.	Church	laws	therefore	had	to	distinguish	between	truly	religious	acts	and	
idolatrous	ones.		
Going	 back	 to	 the	 arguments	 in	 Lautsi	 above	 for	 example,	 these	 reveal	 a	
similar	approach	to	that	of	the	Protestants	and	Catholics	in	the	sixteenth	century	and	
disclose	the	on-going	clash	of	iconoclasm.	Although	the	ECtHR	does	not	use	the	term	
idolatry,	 in	 its	 view	 there	was	 “no	evidence	before	 the	Court	 that	 the	display	of	 a	
religious	symbol	on	classroom	walls	may	have	an	influence	on	pupils,”875	and	that	“a	
crucifix	 on	 a	 wall	 is	 an	 essentially	 passive	 symbol”.876	According	 to	 the	 Protestant	
theology,	 symbols	 are	 not	 considered	 to	 interfere	 with	 the	 conscience	 of	 the	
believers.	Symbols	are	mere	passive	objects	that	have	no	actual	influence	on	“true”	
Christians.	 The	 ECtHR’s	 opinion	 of	 the	 cross	 as	 a	 mute	 symbol	 bears	 a	 striking	
similarity	 to	 the	 description	 by	 the	 iconoclast	 and	 German	 Protestant	 Reformer	
																																								 																					
873	Mark	 Hill,	 Religious	 Symbolism	 and	 Conscientious	 Objection	 in	 the	Workplace:	 An	 Evaluation	 of	
Strasbourg's	Judgment	in	Eweida	and	others	v	United	Kingdom,	(2013)	ELJ	15(2).	
874	Jakob	De	Roover	PhD	Thesis	p.135		
875	Lautsi	and	Others	v	Italy	at	para.	66.	
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Andreas	Karlstadt	of	religious	art	as	“deaf	and	dumb”.	Karlstadt	argued	in	1522	that,	
“since	images	are	deaf	and	dumb,	can	neither	see	nor	hear,	neither	learn	nor	teach	
and	 point	 to	 nothing	 other	 than	 the	 pure	 and	 simple	 flesh	 which	 is	 of	 no	 use,	 it	
follows	conclusively	that	they	are	of	no	use.”877	
	 	 Although	one	may	suspect	that	the	Catholic	faith	did	indeed	benefit	from	the	
decision	 of	 keeping	 the	 cross	 on	 the	wall	 in	 the	 classroom,	 this	 could	 be	 debated	
otherwise.	 According	 to	 Catholics,	 religious	 symbols	 and	 statues	 are	 not	 dead	 and	
mute	 (passive);	 on	 the	 contrary,	 they	 are	 “power	 and	 presence”.878	Symbols	 and	
statues	 could,	heal,	bleed,	 and	even	cry.	Consequently	 the	view	of	 the	 cross	 could	
potentially	break	“just	as	many	sensory	boundaries	as	the	sound	of	Mr.	Austrianu’s	
audio	tapes	or	the	aroma	of	Mr	Kovalkovs’	incense.”879	
Although	 the	 ECtHR	 protected	 the	 Catholic	 symbol	 in	 the	 Italian	 school,	 it	
only	 did	 so	by	 interpreting	 the	 concept	of	 the	 cross	 in	 such	 a	way	 as	 to	declare	 it	
passive	 and	 mute	 therefore	 unable	 to	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 students,	 thus	
applying	 the	 Protestant	 theology	 which	 does	 not	 object	 to	 the	 use	 of	 symbols	 as	
such,	but	rather	objects	to	the	ideology	and	faith	associated	with	it.		
In	Eweida	v	UK	a	broader	understanding	of	“manifestation”	was	adopted	by	
the	 ECtHR.	 The	 applicant,	 a	 Coptic	 Christian	 and	 a	 British	 Airways	 employee,	
complained	that	her	rights	under	Article	9	were	 infringed	as	she	was	prohibited	by	
her	 employers	 to	 wear	 a	 necklace	 displaying	 a	 visible	 cross.	 The	 UK	 government																																									 																					
877	Andreas	Karlstadt,	 ‘On	 the	 removal	of	 images’	 in	Bryan	Mangrum	and	Giuseppe	Scavizzi	 (eds),	A	
Reformation	 Debate:	 Karlstadt,	 Emser	 	and	 Eck	 on	 sacred	 images,	 trans	 B	Mangrum	 and	G	 Scavizzi	
(Toronto,	 1991;	 first	 published	 1522),	 pp	 19-39	 at	 p	 25.	 Electronic	 copy	 available	 at	
http://warburg.sas.ac.uk/mnemosyne/fq/karlstadt.pdf	(Last	accessed	September	2015)	
878	Jon	Mitchell,	 ‘Performing	 Statues:	 the	 Presence	 and	 Power	 of	 Catholic	 Saints’	 in	D	Morgan	 (ed),	
Religion		and	Material	Culture:	the	Matter	of	Belief	(London,	2010),	262–276,	266.	
879	Meadhbh	McIvor	 ‘Carnal	exhibitions:	material	 religion	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’,	
(2015)	Ecc.	L.J.	17(1),	3-14,	9	
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found	that	since	the	applicant	wore	the	cross	as	“a	personal	expression	of	 faith”880	
and	 not	 because	 it	 was	 a	 “generally	 recognised	 form	 of	 practising	 the	 Christian	
faith,”881	this	did	not	fall	under	Article	9.	The	ECtHR	rejected	the	argument	and	noted	
that	“in	order	to	count	as	a	manifestation	within	the	meaning	of	Article	9,	the	act	in	
question	must	be	intimately	linked	to	the	religion	or	belief.”882	Although	the	ECtHR’s	
understanding	of	 the	 type	of	 acts	 that	 fall	 under	Article	9	 is	 broader	 than	 the	one	
taken	by	 the	UK	government,	 the	ECtHR	added	that	a	“sufficiently	close	and	direct	
nexus	between	the	act	and	the	underlying	belief”883	is	 required.	This	 implies	that	 if	
they	are	not	viewed	as	external	proof	as	 to	what	 is	considered	the	core	of	 religion	
(i.e.	belief),	 then	the	use	of	 religious	objects	will	not	be	protected.	 It	could	also	be	
argued	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 found	 the	 cross	 to	 be	 a	 discrete,884	and	 therefore	 a	
passive	 symbol	of	 faith	 that	 causes	no	harm,	 indoctrination	or	proselytising	 effect.	
Lourdes	Peroni	observes	that	this	line	of	thought	and	approach	by	the	ECtHR	shows	
that	the	ECtHR	privileges	belief	over	practice	and	that	the	manifestation	of	a	belief	
cannot	exist	prior	to	the	internal	belief.885	
The	Eweida	 judgment	also	shows	that	 it	was	quite	easy	 for	 the	applicant	 to	
prove	the	connection	between	her	underlying	belief	and	the	religious	object.	This	is	
illustrated	 in	 the	ECtHR’s	 finding	 that	 “there	 is	no	 requirement	on	 the	applicant	 to	
establish	 that	 he	 or	 she	 acted	 in	 fulfilment	 of	 a	 duty	mandated	 by	 the	 religion	 in	
																																								 																					
880	Eweida	and	Others	v	UK,	at	para	58.	
881	Ibid.	
882	Ibid.,	at	82.	
883	Ibid.	
884	Ibid.,	at	94.	
885	Lourdes	Peroni,	 ‘Deconstructing	 “legal”	 religion	 in	 Strasbourg’,	 (2014)	Oxford	 Journal	of	 Law	and	
Religion	3	235-257,	255.	
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question.”886	For	 many	 religious	 people	 outside	 the	 Protestant	 faith,	 religion	 or	 a	
tradition	 is	more	about	doing	 certain	 rituals	 and	acts	 that	do	not	 require	doctrinal	
statements	 and	 creeds,	 and	 which	 do	 not	 in	 turn	 necessarily	 have	 an	 easy	
explanation	of	the	meaning	of	the	act	or	the	religious	symbol.	As	Meadhbh	McIvor	
notes,	“as	such,	a	restriction	of	protection	to	objects	which	have	a	definite	basis	 in	
belief	may	end	up	benefiting	some	religious	forms	over	others.”887	
6.7	Beyond	the	Living	Together	Argument:	Why	is	the	Face	so	Important?		
There	is	an	on-going	debate	in	Europe	about	the	covering	of	the	face	with	the	Niqab	
or	 Burqa,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 headscarf	 (although	 not	 as	 controversial	 as	 the	 Niqab	 or	
Burqa).	 In	 the	 previous	 section	 it	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 favours	
orthodoxy	over	orthopraxy	and	thus	has	a	Protestant-biased	approach.	Furthermore,	
the	 Protestant	 line	 of	 thought	 was	 further	 adopted	 so	 as	 to	 consider	 the	 veil	 a	
continuation	of	 the	post-Reformation	 struggle	 for	 iconoclasm,	 fought	over	 through	
the	secularised	language	of	modern	law.	In	this	part,	the	Protestant	backdrop	to	the	
importance	of	the	face	is	considered.	
In	S.A.S	v	France,888	the	applicant,	a	Muslim	French	national	of	Pakistani	origin,	
challenged	the	French	law	which	imposed	a	blanket	ban	on	concealing	one’s	face	in	
public.	She	complained	that	this	ban	on	the	face	veil	prevented	her	from	manifesting	
her	 faith	 and	 interfered	 with	 and	 infringed	 her	 rights	 under	 Article	 9.889 		 The	
applicant	mentioned	that	she	was	“content	not	to	wear	the	niqab	in	public	places	at	
all	 times	but	wished	 to	be	 able	 to	wear	 it	when	 she	 chose	 to	do	 so,	 depending	 in																																									 																					
886	Eweida	and	Others	v.	The	United	Kingdom	at	para	30.	
887	Meadhbh	McIvor,	 ‘Carnal	exhibitions:	material	 religion	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’	
(2015)	Ecc.	L.J.	17(1),	3-14.	11.	
888	S.A.S.	v	France	Application	No.	43845/11	(ECtHR	Judgment	of	1	July	2014)	
889	The	applicant	also	complained	that	the	ban	infringed	her	rights	under	Articles	3,	8,	10,	11	and	14.	
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particular	on	her	spiritual	feelings.”890	The	applicant	further	added	that	she	agreed	to	
remove	 the	 veil	 while	 going	 through	 security	 or	 identity	 checks,	 airports	 and	
banks.891		
The	 French	 government	 argued	 that	 the	 ban	 protected	 public	 safety	 and	
ensured	“respect	for	the	minimum	set	of	values	of	an	open	and	democratic	society”.	
The	latter	underpins	the	principle	of	respect	of	human	dignity	and	gender	equality,	
and	“respect	of	the	minimum	requirements	of	 life	 in	society”892	which	 is	also	called	
the	 living	 together	 concept	 of	 “le	 vivre	 ensemble”.	 The	 ECtHR	held	 that	 there	had	
been	 no	 violation	 of	 Article	 9.	 With	 respect	 to	 legitimate	 aim	 it	 found	 that	 that	
“under	 certain	 conditions	 the	 “respect	 for	 the	 minimum	 requirements	 of	 life	 in	
society”	referred	to	by	the	Government	–	or	of	“living	together”…	can	be	 linked	to	
the	legitimate	aim	of	the	“protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others”.893		
The	French	government	doubted	 “the	 seriousness	of	 the	 consequences	of	 the	ban	
for	the	applicant,	given	that	she	had	admitted	to	refraining	from	wearing	such	a	veil	
in	public	when	 it	would	 raise	practical	obstacles,	 in	 the	context	of	her	professional	
life	 or	 when	 she	 wished	 to	 socialise,	 and	 had	 said	 that	 she	 wore	 it	 only	 when	
compelled	to	do	so	by	her	introspective	mood,	her	spiritual	feelings	or	her	desire	to	
focus	on	religious	matters.”894		
The	French	government	also	submitted	that	the	restriction	of	the	applicant’s	
right	 and	 the	 ban	 was	 justified	 on	 grounds	 of	 public	 safety	 and	 “respect	 for	 the	
																																								 																					
890	S.A.S.	v	France	Application	No.	43845/11	(ECtHR	Judgment	of	1	July	2014)	at	para	12.	
891	Ibid.,		at	13.	
892	Ibid.,	at	121.	
893	S.A.S.	v	France	Application	No.	43845/11	(ECtHR	Judgment	of	1	July	2014)	at	para	121.	
894	Ibid.,	at	53.		
	 265	
minimum	set	of	values	of	an	open	and	democratic	society,”895	and	that	the	grounds	
for	a	democratic	society	entail:	gender	equality,	human	dignity	and	“respect	for	the	
minimum	requirements	of	life	in	society”	or	in	other	words	“living	together”.896		
The	ECtHR	dismissed	the	arguments	based	on	gender	equality,	human	dignity	
and	 safety	 and	 acknowledged	 the	 harm	 the	 ban	 could	 have	 on	Muslim	women.897	
However,	it	upheld	the	ban	as	a	proportionate	measure	within	the	State’s	margin	of	
appreciation	 to	 achieve	 the	 objective	 of	 living	 together	 in	 society.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	
most	 debates	 in	 Europe	 concerning	 the	 face	 veil,	Muslim	women	who	wear	 a	 full	
face	 veil	 have	 been	 negatively	 stereotyped	 as	 being	 oppressed	 and	 in	 need	 of	
protection.898Furthermore,	the	gender	equality	debate	usually	succeeds	by	revealing	
the	 veil	 to	 be	 a	 “symbol	 of	 patriarchal	 authority	 and	 of	 female	 subservience	 to	
men,”899	and	an	assault	on	women’s	dignity.”900	Although	the	ECtHR	did	not	accept	
the	French	government’s	argument	in	S.A.S.	v	France	that	the	veil	amounts	to	gender	
equality,	 it	 did	 however	 accept	 that	 the	 veil	 is	 a	 barrier	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 living	
together.	It	ruled	that	the	“Court	is	able	to	accept	that	a	State	may	find	it	essential	to	
give	particular	weight	 in	this	connection	to	the	 interaction	between	individuals	and	
may	consider	this	to	be	adversely	affected	by	the	fact	that	some	conceal	their	faces	
in	public	places.”901	
																																								 																					
895	Ibid.,	at	82.	
896	Ibid.,	at	77,	116,	121.	
897	Ibid.,	at	139,	146,	152.	
898	Lourdes	Peroni,	 ‘Religion	And	Culture	 In	The	Discourse	Of	The	European	Court	Of	Human	Rights:	
The	Risks	Of	Stereotyping	and	Naturalising’,	(2014)	International	Journal	of	Law	in	Context,	10(2),	195-
221,	217.	
899	Ralph	 Grillo	 and	 Prakash	 Shah,	 Reasons	 to	 Ban?	 The	 Anti-Burqa	Movement	 in	Western	 Europe.	
MMG	 Working	 Paper	 12-05,	 Max	 Planck	 Institute	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Religious	 and	 Ethnic	 Diversity	
(2012),	Available	at:	www.mmg.mpg.de/workingpapers	(Last	accessed	September	2017)	p.27.	
900	Ibid.	
901	Ibid.,	at	122	and	141	
	 266	
In	the	debates	concerning	the	ban	that	occurred	in	France,	the	concept	of	the	
“vivre	 ensemble”	 is	 strongly	 linked	 to	 the	 Republican	 principle	 of	 “fraternité”	
(brotherhood).	The	concept	of	seeing	the	face	of	others	was	put	forward	as	a	moral	
right, 902 	and	 the	 face	 veil	 “represented	 a	 denial	 of	 fraternity,	 constituting	 the	
negation	of	contact	with	others	and	a	flagrant	infringement	of	the	French	principle	of	
living	together	(le	“vivre	ensemble”).”903	
The	French	government	argued	before	 the	ECtHR	that	more	than	any	other	
part	of	the	body,	the	face	plays	a	significant	role	in	human	and	social	interaction.	It	
reflects	 one’s	 shared	 humanity	 with	 the	 interlocutor	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 one’s	
otherness	 and	 expresses	 the	 existence	 of	 the	individual	 as	 a	 unique	 person.	 The	
effect	 of	 concealing	 ones	 face	 in	 public	 places	 is	 to	 break	 the	 social	 tie	 and	 to	
manifest	a	refusal	of	the	principle	of	living	together.904	This,	as	Eva	Brems	notes,	is	a	
“curious	 combination	 of	 concrete	 behavioural	 concerns	 (the	 role	 of	 the	 face	 in	
human	 interaction)	 and	 a	 highly	 theoretical	 perspective”905	which	 she	 says	 is	 not	
supported	by	empirical	evidence.			
Stephanie	 Berry	 observes	 that	 the	 "living	 together”	 concept	 in	 the	 S.A.S	 v	
France,	 case	 pursues	 a	 “distinctly	 assimilationist	 agenda",	 which	 risks	 that	 the	
majority	will	be	permitted	to	dictate	that	minorities	assimilate	"instead	of	pursuing	
the	 more	 integrationist	 aims	 of	 "pluralism,	 tolerance	 and	 broadmindedness."906	
Vickers	 further	 maintains	 that	 "living	 together"	 is	 "one	 of	 the	 weakest	 legitimate																																									 																					
902 	Eva	 Brems,	 ‘S.A.S.	 v	 France:	 A	 Reality	 Check’,	 (2016)	 NLJ	 25	 1-16,	 11	 available	 at	
SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810221		
903	S.A.S	v	France	at	17.	
904	S.A.S	v	France	at	82.	
905 	Eva	 Brems,	 ‘S.A.S.	 v	 France:	 A	 Reality	 Check’,	 (2016)	 NLJ	 25	 1-16,	 11	 available	 at	
SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810221		
906	Stephanie	Berry,	 ‘S.A.S.	v	France:	Does	Anything	Remain	of	 the	Right	 to	Manifest	Religion?’,	EJIL:	
Talk,	2	July	2014.	
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aims"	 identified	 under	 the	 ECtHR	 given	 that	 the	 majority	 in	 S.A.S	 v	 France	 were	
involved	 in	 “a	 careful	and	well	evidenced	demolition	of	 the	 standard	arguments	 in	
favour	 of	 banning	 the	 veil”.907	Eva	 Brems	 argues	 that	 “living	 together	 reflects	 the	
fundamental	unease	of	a	large	majority	of	people	with	the	idea	of	an	Islamic	face	veil,	
and	 the	widespread	 feeling	 that	 this	 garment	 is	 undesirable	 in	 our	 society”.908	She	
also	contends	that	the	“right	of	others	to	live	in	a	space	of	socialisation	which	makes	
living	together	easier”	could	pave	the	way	to	the	coercive	imposition	of	majoritarian	
preferences	about	how	others	should	live.909		
	
Further	 insight	 can	 be	 gained	 by	 examining	 the	 link	 between	 the	 ECtHR’s	
ideas	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 face	 in	 Christian	 and	 consequently	 Protestant	
theology.910	In	the	Bible,	the	importance	of	the	face	is	mentioned	several	times	and	
in	various	verses.	It	 is	stated	that	God	created	man	in	the	best	image	(in	his	image)	
and	 that	 “My	 heart	 says	 of	 you,	 Seek	 his	 face,	 Your	 face,	 Lord,	 I	 will	 seek.”911	
Furthermore,	the	Bible	notes	“we	all,	who	with	unveiled	faces	contemplate	the	Lord’s	
glory,	are	being	transformed	into	his	image	with	ever-increasing	glory,	which	comes	
from	 the	 Lord,	who	 is	 the	 Spirit.”912	Another	 verse	 from	Corinthians	 illustrates	 the	
importance	of	the	face:	“For	God,	who	said,	Let	light	shine	out	of	darkness,	made	his	
																																								 																					
907	Lucy	Vickers,	"Conform	or	Be	Confined:	S.A.S.	v	France",	Oxford	Human	Rights	Hub,	8	July	2014.	
908	Eva	Brems,	"S.A.S.	v	France	as	a	Problematic	Precedent",	Strasbourg	Observers,	9	July	2014.	
909	Ibid.	
910	Bernard	Ramm,	Protestant	Biblical	Interpretation:	A	Textbook	of	Hermeneutics	(Baker	Book	House,	
1970)	48.	
911	The	Bible:	Psalm	27:8.	
912	The	Bible:	2	Corinthians	3:18	(emphasis	added).	
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light	shine	in	our	hearts	to	give	us	the	light	of	the	knowledge	of	God’s	glory	displayed	
in	the	face	of	Christ.”913		
On	the	concept	of	living	together,	equality,	brotherhood	and	agape,	the	Bible	
is	also	very	clear.	 In	the	book	of	Romans,	 it	states	“May	the	God	of	endurance	and	
encouragement	grant	you	to	 live	 in	such	harmony	with	one	another,	 in	accord	with	
Christ	Jesus,	that	together	you	may	with	one	voice	glorify	the	God	and	Father	of	our	
Lord	Jesus	Christ.	Therefore,	welcome	one	another	as	Christ	has	welcomed	you,	 for	
the	glory	of	God.914	Further	the	Bible	requests	people	to	love	one	another,915	live	in	
harmony	 with	one	 another,	916 	show	 hospitality	to	 one	 another,917 	be	 likeminded	
towards	one	 another, 918 	submit	to	 one	 another, 919 	serve	one	 another, 920 	and	 be	
devoted	to	one	another.921	Relating	this	language	and	concepts	to	the	S.A.S.	v	France	
case,	one	could	easily	see	similar,	if	not	identical,	line	of	thought	and	language	used	
by	the	ECtHR	whereby	 it	considers	the	veil	as	a	barrier	to	the	“living	together”	and	
notes	 that	 “the	 face	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 social	 interaction” 922 	without	
substantial	evidence.	
6.8	Conclusion		
In	this	chapter,	it	was	demonstrated	that	Abrahamic	religions	easily	fall	within	
the	 concepts,	 terms	 and	definitions	of	 religion	 set	 by	 the	 ECtHR.	 	However,	 it	was	
argued	 that	 even	 amongst	 applicants	 before	 the	 ECtHR	 considered	 to	 be	 religious	
																																								 																					
913	The	Bible:	2	Corinthians	4:6.	
914	The	Bible-	Romans	15:5-7	(emphasis	added).	
915	The	Bible-	John	13:35.	
916	The	Bible-	Romans	12:16	(emphasis	added).	
917	The	Bible	1	Peter	4:9	(emphasis	added).	
918	The	Bible-	Romans	15-5	(emphasis	added).	
919	The	Bible-	Ephesians	5:21,	1	Peter	5:5	(emphasis	added).	
920	The	Bible-	Galatians	5:13	(emphasis	added).	
921	The	Bible-Romans	12:10	(emphasis	added).	
922	S.A.S.	v	France	at	para	122.	
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such	 as	Muslims,	 Jews	 and	 other	 Christians	 there	 is	 a	 bias	 towards	 the	 Protestant	
faith.	By	dividing	the	case	law	in	three	groups	(other	Christians,	other	Abrahamic	and	
Non-Abrahamic)	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 examine	 the	 influence	 of	 Protestantism	 on	 the	
three	denominations	separately.	It	was	proven	that	distortions	occur	in	all	claims	to	
religious	 freedom	 before	 the	 ECtHR	 but	 occur	 more	 strongly	 the	 further	 away	 a	
culture	 is	 from	 the	 idea	 of	 religion	 presupposed	 within	 Article	 9	 ECHR.	 A	 fresh	
analysis	 of	 the	 case	 law	 including	 religious	 symbols	 was	 offered	 and	 judgments	
concerning	 Muslims,	 mainly	 concerning	 the	 wearing	 of	 the	 headscarf	 (hijab),	 was	
included	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 judgments	 in	 these	 cases	 are	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	
post-Reformation	 struggle	 for	 iconoclasm,	 fought	 over	 through	 the	 secularised	
language	 of	modern	 law.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	Western	 legal	 systems	 have	
backdrops	of	Christian	theological	concepts	that	have	spread	through	the	process	of	
secularisation.	 As	 a	 result,	 non-Christian	 religions	 are	 being	 “freed”	 from	 their	
character	as	false	or	idolatrous	(pagan)	religions	prior	to	entering	the	sphere	of	the	
secular	Western	law.	The	case	law	has	shown	that	there	is	a	considerable	amount	of	
pressure	placed	on	Muslims	to	abstain	from	undertaking	“idolatrous”	practices.	As	a	
result,	Muslims	are	obliged	to	justify	their	practices	by	doctrinal	evidence	and	where	
this	 proves	 difficult,	 they	 in	 turn	 have	 to	 “expunge	 their	 cultures	 of	 idolatrous	
elements,	 exacerbating	 a	 tendency	 that	 is	 already	 latent	 within	 the	 Islamic	
tradition”.923	
It	 has	 also	 been	 proved	 that	 Article	 9	 in	 its	 present	 format	 and	 the	 ECtHR	
judgments	 are	 biased	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Protestant	 theology.	 The	 two	 kingdoms	 of	
Luther,	the	private	realm	of	the	conscience	and	the	public	realm	of	the	(sinful)	body,																																									 																					
923	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP	45(1)	58-75,	63.	
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are	reflected	today	in	the	split	between	the	assertion	of	religious	freedom	in	Article	
9(1)	ECHR	and	the	 limitations	expressed	 in	Article	9(2)	ECHR	and	are	 therefore	 the	
benchmark	 from	which	 the	 judicial	 interpretations	 and	decisions	 by	 the	 ECtHR	 are	
taken.	No	matter	how	wide	or	narrow	the	scope	of	practice	or	manifestation	is,	it	is	
still	interpreted	by	the	ECtHR	using	the	assumption	that	all	cultures	have	religion	and	
that	 this	 includes	 the	 teaching	 and	 dictates	 of	 one’s	 religion	 and	 not	 of	 one’s	
tradition.	 The	 ECtHR	does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 that	 some	 cultures	may	 not	 have	
religion	or	that	some	traditional	practices	do	not	fall	within	the	scope	of	protection	
without	 distortions	 taking	 place	 so	 that	 those	 cultures	 and	 traditions	 fit	 into	 the	
religious	 Protestant	 framework	 of	 Article	 9.	 The	 belief-based,	 doctrinal	 Protestant	
approach	 to	 religion	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 follows	 is	 challenging	 for	 applicants	 who	 are	
unable	 to	demonstrate	an	adequate	 link	between	the	use	of	a	 religious	object	and	
their	underlying	religious	beliefs	or	traditions.	Whilst	the	connection	was	easily	made	
in	Eweida	v	UK,	it	was	dismissed	in	Jones	v	UK,	where	the	ECtHR	held	that	placing	a	
photograph	 on	 the	 applicant’s	 daughter’s	 grave	 was	 not	 a	 practice	 of	 religion.	
Furthermore,	 if	 one	 goes	 back	 to	 the	 Lautsi	 case	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 “ostensibly	
atheistic	demand	for	the	removal	of	the	crucifix	is	really	the	iconoclasm	at	the	heart	
of	Christianity	presented	in	secular	form.”924	
				
																																								 																					
924	Prakash	 Shah,	 ‘Does	 Durkheim	 Enhances	 Our	 Understanding	 of	 Law	 and	 Religion’	 Legal	 Studies	
Research	 Paper	 No.	 212/2015	 at	 p.9.	 Available	 at	
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694566	[last	accessed	in	January	2016].	
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Chapter	7	
Conclusion	
In	 this	 thesis	 it	 was	 argued	 that	 the	 current	 framework	 as	 well	 as	 the	 judicial	
interpretations	 and	 applications	 of	 Article	 9	 ECHR,	 are	 biased	 in	 favour	 of	 the	
Christian	Protestant	view.	 	Taking	 into	account	Balagangadhara’s	 theory	on	religion	
as	 an	 explanatory	 intelligible	 account	 of	 the	 cosmos	 and	 itself,	 it	 has	 been	 shown	
that	 religion	 cannot	 be	 a	 universal	 in	 all	 cultures	 and	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 a	
phenomenon	 in	 the	 world.	 Consequently	 Balagangadhara’s	 theory	 allows	 one	 to	
consider	a	type	of	cultural	diversity	according	to	which	some	cultures	have	religion	
while	 others	 do	 not.	 This	 further	 raises	 the	 question	 as	 to	 what	 happens	 when	
different	 cultures	 come	 under	 a	 legal	 system	 that	 is	 heavily	 influenced	 by	
Protestantism.		
The	 framework	 for	 studying	 religion	 in	 the	Western	 culture	 derives	 from	 a	
Protestant	background,	even	in	the	realm	of	comparative	religion.	Religion	does	not	
exist	in	all	cultures	and	the	assertion	that	all	cultures	have	a	religion,	an	idea	which	
has	also	been	adopted	and	elaborated	within	the	human	sciences,	is	itself	a	claim	of	
Protestant	 theology,	 albeit	 since	 secularised. 925 	This	 had	 a	 great	 influence	 on	
Western	 legal	 systems	 in	 general	 and	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	
Human	 Rights	 in	 particular.	 It	 was	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 the	 format	 in	
which	 Article	 9	 ECHR	 was	 drafted,	 interpreted,	 and	 applied,	 is	 influenced	 by	
Protestant	 theology.	 The	 two	 kingdoms	 of	 Luther,	 the	 private	 realm	 of	 the	
conscience	and	the	public	realm	of	the	(sinful)	body,	are	reflected	today	in	the	split	
																																								 																					925	See	section	2.5	in	this	thesis.	
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between	the	assertion	of	religious	freedom	in	Article	9(1)	ECHR	and	the	 limitations	
expressed	 in	 Article	 9(2)	 ECHR	 and	 are	 the	 benchmark	 from	 which	 the	 judicial	
interpretations	and	decisions	by	the	ECtHR	are	made.	
Judgments	 in	 the	 ECtHR	 disfavour	 non-Christians	 in	 general	 and	 non-
Protestants	in	particular.	The	interpretation	and	application	of	Article	9	by	the	ECtHR	
requires	applicants	to	distort	their	traditions	and	customs	while	using	a	secularised	
language,	 and	 to	 present	 their	 practices	 as	 “false”	 religions.	 The	 belief-centred	
approach	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 takes	 explains	 how	 manifestations,	 such	 as	 wearing	
particular	clothes,	are	seen	as	“symbols”	exemplifying	beliefs,	 leaving	open	various	
interpretations	 as	 to	 what	 these	 “symbols”	 represent.	 This	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	
people	 outside	 the	 conventional	 European	 understanding	 of	 religion	 and	 religious	
practice	 to	make	sense	of	Article	9	without	having	 to	distort	 themselves	 to	 fit	 into	
the	 current	 system,	 which	 has	 a	 Protestant	 theological	 backdrop.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	
situation	where	customs	and	traditions	are	recognised	in	the	ECtHR	if	and	only	if	the	
majority,	which	in	the	West	happens	to	be	heavily	influenced	by	the	Protestant	line	
of	 thought,	 approves	 of	 such	 recognition.	 Consequently	 this	 also	 dictates	 the	way	
through	which	recognition	is	applied.	 
If	 it	 is	accepted	that	some	cultures	do	not	have	religion,	 it	 follows	that	they	
do	not	have	a	claim	to	religious	freedom	under	the	framework	of	Article	9.	While	this	
might	prevent	some	cultures	 from	obtaining	the	protection	of	Article	9,	 it	could	be	
defended	on	 the	ground	that	 treating	 them	as	having	 religion	merely	distorts	 their	
character	and	presents	a	false	picture	of	reality.		
The	ECtHR	recognises	freedom	of	religion	to	be	a	vital	aspect	of	human	lives	
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and	 one	 of	 the	 foundations	 of	 a	 “democratic	 society”.	 However,	 this	 right	 is	 not	
absolute	 and	 manifestations	 can	 be	 limited	 or	 restricted	 by	 States	 provided	 that	
good	 reasons	 are	 provided.	 Furthermore,	 it	 tends	 to	 protect	 more	 firmly	 “the	
cerebral,	the	internal	and	the	theological	…	dimensions	of	religion	and	belief”,	while	
paying	 less	 attention	 to	 “the	 active,	 the	 symbolic	 and	 the	 moral	 dimensions”.926	
Furthermore,	it	is	noted	that	“underlying	the	Court's	case	law	is	the	idea	that	religion	
is	 primarily	 an	 inward	 feeling;	 a	 “matter	 of	 individual	 conscience”.927		Many	of	 the	
judgments	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 show	 that	 Christian	 Protestant	 applicants,	 and	 those	
individuals	from	religions	who	can	rely	on	doctrinal	proofs	for	their	beliefs,	are	more	
difficult	to	restrict	and	easier	to	interpret	than	those	who	base	their	beliefs,	thoughts	
or	 traditions	 on	 practices	 rather	 than	 doctrines.	 Such	 examples	 range	 from	
confiscating	 religious	 audio	 tapes	 and	 a	 cassette	 tape	 player,	 which	 the	 ECtHR	
considered	 as	 being	 not	 essential	 to	manifesting	 a	 religion,928	to	 removing	 incense	
sticks	and	massage	oils	from	an	applicant’s	prison	cell	where	again	the	ECtHR	again	
deemed	 these	 as	 not	 essential	 for	 the	manifestation	 of	 belief.929	Other	 applicants	
have	 had	 to	 prove	 that	 a	 certain	 tradition	 is	 a	 religion	 in	 order	 to	 qualify	 for	 the	
protection	of	Article	9.930	In	this	thesis	it	has	been	proved	that	there	is	only	a	limited	
place	for	non-Abrahamic	tradition(s)	and	non-Protestant	beliefs	under	Article	9.	
The	 ECtHR	 faces	 an	 immense	 challenge	 if	 it	 were	 to	 cultivate	 a	 pluralistic																																									 																					
926	Carolyn	 Evans,	 ‘Religious	 Freedom	 in	European	 Human	 Rights	Law:	 The	 Search	 For	 a	 Guiding	
Conception’	in	M	Janis	and	C	Evans	(eds),	Religion	and	International	Law	(The	Hague,	1999),	396	
927	Ibid.,	at	396.	See	also	Julie	Ringelheim,	‘Rights,	Religion,	and	the	Public	Sphere:	the	European	Court	
of	Human	Rights	in	Search	of	a	Theory?’,	in	L	Zucca	and	C	Ungureanu	(eds),	Law,	State	and	Religion	in	
the	 New	 Europe:	 debates	 and	 dilemmas	 (Cambridge,	 2012),	 293	 (the	 quotation	 is	 taken	 from	97	
members	of	the	Gldani	Congregation	of	Jehovah	Witnesses	v	Georgia,	Application	no	71156/01	(ECtHR,	
3	May	2007)	(2007)	46	EHRR	613	at	Para	130).	
928	Austrianu	v.	Romania,	Application	no.	16117/02	(2013).	
929	Kovalkovs	v	Latvia	Application	no.	35021/05	(2012)	ECtHR	280	(ECHR).		
930	X.	v.	United	Kingdom,	Application	No.	7291/75	(1977).	
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ethos	 as	 this	 seems	 impossible	 to	 attain	 under	 the	 present	 wording	 and	
interpretations	of	Article	9	given	 it	 is	only	 through	 the	prism	of	 “religion’	 that	non	
Abrahamic	traditions	are	viewed.	One	possible	solution	may	be	to	redraft	Article	9	in	
light	of	 the	current	pluralist	and	diverse	society	 that	Europe	has	become	so	 that	 it	
includes	 traditions	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 separate	 from	 religion	 and	 drop	 the	
“universalistic”	 reference	 to	 religion.	 But	 this	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 given	 the	 political,	
historical,	social	and	economic	contexts	that	religion	is	associated	with.		
Article	 9	 in	 its	 present	 format	 is	 unable	 to	 offer	 strong	 protection	 to	 the	
“traditions”	 of	 the	 non-Abrahamic	 applicants.	 The	 assessment	 of	 the	 claims	 from	
non-Abrahamic	 applicants	 should	 not	 be	 defined	 by	 presupposed	 Christian	
parameters	 such	 as	 doctrines,	 beliefs	 and	 books,	 but	 rather	 by	 the	 tradition	 itself	
that	does	not	necessarily	refer	to	beliefs,	doctrines	and	texts.	As	Maleiha	Malik	says,	
“[r]eligion	 .	 .	 .	 needs	 to	 be	 categorised	 within	 a	 wider	 frame	 than	 religion	 and	
belief.”931		
It	 has	 also	 been	 proved	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 Article	 9	 and	 accompanying	
jurisprudence	results	in	discrimination	against	non-Abrahamic,	other	Abrahamic	and	
other	Christian	religions.	Even	though	human	rights	law	can	accommodate	in	various	
ways	diverse	religions	and	tradition	it	only	does	so	through	the	predetermined	ideas	
and	concepts	that	were	developed	by	the	secularisation	of	Christian	liberty	through	
its	 Protestant	 lineage.932	Hence	 despite	 secularisation,	 Protestantism	 becomes	 the	
																																								 																					
931	Maleiha	Malik,	‘The	“Other”	Citizens:	Religion	in	a	Multicultural	Europe’,	in	Law,	State	and	Religion	
In	the	New	Europe:	Debates	And	Dilemmas	93,	95-96	(Lorenzo	Zucca	&	Camil	Ungureanu	eds.,	2012).	
932	Jakob	De	Rover	 and	 S.N.	 Balagangadhara,	 Liberty,	 Tyranny	 and	 the	Will	 of	God:	 The	 Principle	 of	
Toleration	in	Early	Modern	Europe	and	Colonial	India’		30	History	of	Political	Thought	(2009),	111-139.	
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benchmark	 from	which	other	 faiths	 and	denominations	 are	understood,	 as	well	 as	
the	criterion	by	which	judicial	interpretations	and	decisions	by	the	ECtHR	are	made.	
This	Protestant	background,	whether	directly	or	indirectly,	sets	the	terms	for	
what	 is	 required	 to	 protect	 non-Christian	 and	 other	 Christians	 religions	 as	 well	 as	
non-Abrahamic	 traditions.	 Non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 are	 viewed	 as	 a	 variant	 of	
religion	or	some	“kind”	of	religion,	which	is	also	set	by	Protestant	thought.	As	shown	
in	 this	 thesis,	 the	 ECtHR	 constantly	 refers	 to	 beliefs,	 doctrines	 and	 texts	 when	
assessing	Article	9	 claims.	 Protestantism	 therefore	becomes	 the	prototype	 form	of	
assessment	 while	 other	 non-Abrahamic	 traditions	 become	 its	 variant.	 Moreover,	
there	has	emerged	a	new	dynamic	between	 the	 secular	and	 the	 religious	whereby	
non-Abrahamic	 traditions	are	not	 referred	 to	as	 idolatrous	or	embodiment	of	 false	
religions	but	what	was	false	or	idolatrous	is	now	referred	to	in	the	secular	world	as	
“violators	of	human	rights	law,	gender	equality	and	the	rule	of	law.”933		
The	ECtHR’s	decisions	on	the	veil	and	other	religious	garments	and	symbols	
reflect	Calvin’s	words	that	it	was	when	the	world	began	to	delight	in	vests,	garments	
and	 other	material	 things,	 rather	 than	 seeking	 Christ	 in	 his	Word,	 sacraments	 and	
spiritual	 graces	 asserts,	 that	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 corruption	 into	 idolatry	
happened.934 	The	 ECtHR	 continues	 to	 marginalise	 orthopraxy,	 symbols	 and	 the	
sensory	 (sight)	 requirements	 for	 religious	 beliefs	 and	 practices935	and	 still	 requires	
the	“believer”	to	abolish	objects,	which	is	a	clear	expression	of	Protestant	theology.	
																																								 																					
933	Prakash	Shah,	‘In	pursuit	of	the	Pagans:	Muslim	law	in	the	Legal	Context’	(2013)	JLP	45(1)	58-75,	58.	
934	Jakob	De	Roover,	‘A	Kingdom	of	Another	World:	Christianity,	Toleration	and	the	History	of	Western	
Political	Thought’	(DPhil	Thesis,	University	of	Ghent	2005)	138.	
935 	See	 S.A.S.	 v	 France	 Application	 No.	 43845/11	 (ECtHR	 Judgment	 of	 1	 July	 2014),	 Dahlab	v.	
Switzerland	Application	no.42393/98,	(Dec)	ECHR	2001-V,	(inadmissible),	Lautsi	v	Italy	(language	used	
to	interpret	the	presence	of	the	crucifix),	Leyla	Sahin	v.	Turkey	[2005],	Appl.	no.	44774/98,	Austrianu	v.	
Romania,	Application	no.	16117/02	(2013)	(confiscation	of	religious	tapes-	Inadmissible)	
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The	description	of	the	cross	for	example	as	a	mute	and	passive	symbol	in	the	Lautsi	
case	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 sixteenth	 century	 iconoclastic	 language.	 Orthodoxy	 or	 a	
dogmatic/belief-centred	approach	(doctrines	and	beliefs)	remains	crucial	in	assessing	
claims	 in	 the	 ECtHR	 as	 opposed	 to	 orthopraxy	 or	 a	 practice-centred	 approach	
(objects	and	practices	based	on	tradition	rather	than	doctrines).	By	focusing	merely	
on	belief,	texts	and	doctrines	in	considering	issues	of	religion	the	ECtHR	is	“culturally	
dependent	on	1700	years	of	Christian	history,	so	ingrained	as	to	be	invisible.”936This 
does not require the deconstruction of human rights given Protestant origins. 
What is necessary is a concept of religion which abandons the pretentious claim 
of universality. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																									 																					
936	Aaron	R.	Petty,	‘Religion,	Conscience,	and	Belief	in	the	European	Court	Of	Human	Rights’,	The	Geo.	
Wash.	Int’l.	L.	Rev.	2016	(48),	807,	850.	
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Declarations	and	Treaties		
• Article	17	of	the	Religious	Peace	of	Augsburg	(1555).	
• Article	I,	Section	2	of	the	final	Act	of	the	Congress	of	Vienna,	signed	on	June	9,	
1815	
• Declaration	of	the	Right	of	Man	and	the	Citizen,	26	August	1789	
• Declaration	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Intolerance	 and	 of	
Discrimination	 Based	 on	 Religion	 or	 Belief,	 G.A.	 Res.	 36/55,	 U.N.	 Doc.	
A/RES/36/55	(Nov.	25,	1981).	
• Doc.	CM/WP	4	(50)	16,	appendix;	A	1445	collection	of	travaux	préparatoires,	
vol.	3.	
• First	 Session	 of	 the	 Consultative	 Assembly	 from	 the	 collected	 Edition	 of	
Travaux	Préparatories,	vol.	1	
• First	 Session	of	 the	Consultative	Assembly,	The	collected	Edition	of	Travaux	
Préparatories,	vol.	1,	
• General	Assembly	resolution	217	(III).	International	Bill	of	Human	Rights]	217	
C	(III).		
• Human	Rights	Committee	General	Comment	No.	22	Article	18	 (Forty-eighth	
session,	1993).	
• International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	G.A.	Res.	2200A	(XXI),	21	
U.N.	 GAOR	 Supp.	 (No.	 16)	 U.N.	 Doc.	 A/6316	 (1966),	 Mar.	 23,	 1976,	 999	
U.N.T.S.	171.	
• International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	adopted	Dec.	
16,	1966,	993	U.N.T.S.	3,4,	UDHR,		
• International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	adopted	Dec.	
16,	 1966,	 993	 U.N.T.S.	Meeting	 of	 the	 Committee	 of	 Experts,	 6	 Feb.	 1950,	
Doc.	A798	collection	of	Travaux	préparatoires,	vol.	3.	
• Meeting	 of	 the	 Committee	 of	 Experts,	 6	 Mar.	 1950,	 Doc.	 CM/WP1	 (50)	 2,	
A915,	collection	of	Travaux	préparatoires,	vol.	3.	
• Peace	Treaty	of	Westphalia	of	October	24,	1648	
• The	Cairo	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	in	Islam	(CDHRI)	and	the	organisation	
of	the	Islamic	Conference	established	on	September	25,	1969.	
• The	 Vienna	 convention	 on	 the	 law	 of	 treaties,	 23	May	 69	 UN	 Doc	 A/Conf.	
39/27,	8	ILM	679.	
• Thomas	Jefferson’s	Letter	to	the	Danbury	Baptist,	January	1,	1802.	
• Travaux	Préparatoires,	vol.	1,	at	xxx–xxxii	
• UN	Doc	A/C.3/SR.161	p.726		
• UN	Doc.	A/36/51	(1981).	The	Declaration	was	adopted	by	General	Assembly	
Res.	36/55,	36	UN	GAOR,	Supp.	(No.	51).	
• UN	Doc.	A/C.3/SR.127	(1948)		
• UN	Doc.	A/C.3/SR.179	(1948)		
• Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 UN	 GA	 Res.	 217	 A	 III	 adopted	 and	
proclaimed	on	December	10	1948.	
• Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 G.A.	 Res.	 217A	 (III),	 U.N.	 GAOR,	 3d	
Sess.,	at	71,	U.N.	Doc.	A/810	(Dec.	10,	1948).	
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